4.2 The Problems.
Whether human tissue is classified as property or not, problems exist with both approaches because property law, and the Lockean concept of oneself is defined from a dominant, individualistic and masculine perspective, reinforcing the complete myth that men are somehow superior to everything else. Only people falling within the
definition of ‘citizen’ (almost always white men), were afforded rights under the special ‘human’ laws, whilst others either held no legal status or were classified as non-people without any real rights; the very real experience for indigenous peoples and women.
In times before slavery was abolished , many people were classified as property, and treated by the legal system without ethical or moral considerations. The Zong case, among others, provides a clear illustration of humans being legally quantified in property terms - a case involving the murder of hundreds of African slaves who were thrown overboard by the ship’s captain and crew – and during which it was stated:.
‘What is this claim that human people have been thrown overboard? This is a case of chattels or goods. Blacks are goods and property.’
Whilst the Zong case is an extreme example, potential commodification of human tissue in a property context may be dangerous because property law vests rights which are detached from moral and ethical considerations – they are founded firmly in the economic perspective.
In the event a donor is vested with proprietary rights in their own genetic material, and/or information, they may gain considerable control over that material, but consistently, the right of execution would also apply. This could lead to the outcome of a debtor gaining exclusive ownership rights over donor material or information, in order to remedy debts incurred by the owner. This has already occurred for processed genetic material falling within property law, as was illustrated in 2001 Japanese case, that witnessed the first auction of human cell strains to realize the debts of the corporate owner.
It raises the fundamental question, whilst human tissue could be classified as property, should such reform take place, and risk the potential economic quantification of humans that led to injustice and crimes like the Zong case?
4.3 The Potential Benefits of Human Tissue as Property?
Vesting proprietary rights with the donor would provide enforceable rights and remedies to be asserted against others who might deal with the tissue samples in a manner contrary to the owner’s rights – as long as they retained those rights.
Currently, donors of tissue samples may consent to the use of tissue samples with a person or company, but they have little control if that sample is subsequently passed onto people or companies outside the original legal agreement.
Research suggests this is in line with popular community expectations, and that whilst people are quite accepting of non-altruistic organ and body donation, they are concerned about the commercial use and abuse of human tissue and genetic information.
To this end, it is argued property rights not only offer the potential to grant tissue donors protection and control over their own bodies and the tissue derived from it, but to further medical research because of financial market incentives. Recent indications suggest the common law may be attempting discreet change to address these community expectations.
4.4 Case Study – Possible Extension of the Lockean Perspective?
In 2009 the UK Court of Appeal determined a matter regarding the inadvertent destruction of sperm samples being held in trust by the Southmead Hospital in Bristol. The samples were being stored solely for the purpose of preservation for use by the donors at a later time, who were undergoing chemotherapy treatment. The samples were accidentally destroyed and the donors lodged claims asserting the loss constituted damage to a bailed chattel, giving rise to remedies under property law. The court held:
‘A decision whether something is capable of being owned cannot be reached in a vacuum. It must be reached in context…the concept of ownership is no more than a convenient global description of different collections of rights held by persons over physical and other things.’
The court reinforced ‘[t]he common law for 150 years at least that neither a corpse nor parts of a corpse are in themselves and without more capable of being property protected by rights.’ However, the court then identified that:
‘[d]evelopments in medical science now require a re-analysis of the common law’s treatment of an approach to the issue of ownership of parts or products of a living human body.’
It then proceeded to examine the issue of human tissue derived from a living person by resting ‘[t]heir conclusions on a broader basis.’ The court held the men had ‘[o]wnership of the sperm which they ejaculated,’ and property rights arose in the samples because the samples were dispensed and stored solely for the donor’s benefit, and were held on trust by the hospital which imposed duties and responsibilities consistent with bailment. In reaching its decision, the court reflected on similar findings in US Courts, and rejected the assertion that statutory limitations on the use of sperm samples excluded the application of property rights to such samples. In practical terms, the court did not overturn 150 years of common law, but simply broadened the interpretation of skill and labour, set down in earlier cases.
Australia has demonstrated a similar approach involving blood products including the theft of a blood sample, and recognition that blood products are goods under the Trade Practices Act.
These cases illustrate the common law is still reluctant to extend the definition of property to human tissue in its natural, unaltered state, but is willing to extend the concept of labour and skill to give rise to property rights.
V THE GREAT DILEMMA – COMMODIFICATION & CORPORATIONS CURRENT LAWS.
The most effective way to restrict democracy is to transfer decision-making from the public arena to unaccountable institutions: kings and princes, priestly castes, military juntas, party dictatorships, or modern corporations.
5.1 Commodification
Vesting property rights in human tissue would effectively ‘commodify’ the human body and potentially diminish respect for human life, to the complete exclusion of ethical, moral and cultural considerations in pursuit of economically driven individualism. It would also be inconsistent with other areas such as labour law, that asserts human labour is not a commodity to be traded, a perspective that has evolved from the dark ages of villeiny and serfdom, in which powerful ‘masters’ controlled society with little if any accountability.
A consistent legal approach would reinforce this philosophy ensure human tissue is also not a commodity to be traded; a view currently reflected in existing human tissue legislation.
The commodification of human tissue would also draw it squarely within contract law, founded on the mythical presumption that property transactions involve ‘equal’ bargaining parties. This ignores the reality that many transactions involve strong power imbalances between the parties, giving rise to the very real danger that disadvantaged and vulnerable people would trade off property rights in their own biological material to their detriment. Donors could even be potentially held accountable by purchasers for losses arising from ‘damaged’ or faulty biological samples.
5.2 Corporations and Human Tissue
Commodification of human tissue would not occur in a societal vacuum, and it is likely the greatest beneficiaries would be corporations. History has shown that wealth dominates, and the strongest wealth is retained by multi national corporations. Corporations primarily operate in a manner completely devoid of ethical, cultural and moral considerations through the wielding of enormous commercial power to maximize financial returns for shareholders. Corporations are also largely unaccountable to society, with many of their activities being conducted in secret and beyond scrutiny; quantification of human tissue as property would only expand their vast wealth and power further.
Society has already witnessed substantial harm caused by abuse of corporate power
abuse in other areas, and arguably, corporations represent the new ‘master’ in society – but one without conscience.
5.3 Existing Laws.
Existing laws prevent the commodification of human tissue at the donor source and present adequate scope to protect donors of human tissue. Whilst donors are permitted to altruistically donote human tissue, they are prohibited from trading in their own tissue unless granted Ministerial permission, which is supplemented by criminal and tort law protecting individuals from unlawful interference of their body for the purpose of removing human tissue.
It is recognized existing laws are in need of improvement, but maintaining the human/property dichotomy at least enables society, through its democratically elected representatives to reflect their needs through legislation; legislation that can
accommodate and reflect moral, ethical and cultural considerations.
Some areas recognized as being in need of reform include privacy and non-discrimination laws to protect against the inappropriate use of genetic information, human rights and cultural rights.
VI CONCLUSION
As long as our civilization is essentially one of property, of fences, of exclusiveness, it will be mocked by delusions.
Whilst the traditional human/property dichotomy is struggling to meet the challenges presented by issues raised by matters surrounding the use of human tissue, it does not justify overturning two centuries of common law, by commodifying human tissue in economic terms. The argument for recognizing property rights in the person forces us to question how we perceive the future of our society?
Quantification of human tissue in property terms would define our relationships with each other in terms removed from ethical, moral and cultural considerations. When combined with the rapid growth in wealth and power dominance of corporations in human biological fields, who already operate in a moral and ethical vacuum, the potential for significant injustice is not only a very real risk; but inevitable.
Existing laws represented by the imperfect human/property dichotomous child, whilst birthed in an era of injustice, have grown to offer the strongest potential for positive reform, and should be improved to more adequately meet the challenges presented by technological advances in the area of human tissue use.
Finis
Locke quoted, in Matthew Kramer, John Locke and the Origins of Private Property: Philosophical Explorations of Individualism, Community, and Equality (2004) 146.
Margaret Davies & Ngaire Naffine, in Shelley Bielefeld, MySCU Property Law Blackboard Assignment Task (2010).
Janice Gray, Brendan Edgeworth, Neil Foster & Scott Graham, Property Law in New South Wales (2nd ed, 2007) 6-7,
Meir Dan-Cohen, Harmful Thoughts: Essays On Law, Self & Morality (2002) 296,
Gopal Sreenivasan, The Limits of Lockean Rights in Property (1995) 66,
Margaret Davies, Property: Meanings, Histories, Theories (2007) 96.
Australian Law Reform Commission (ALRC), Protection of Human Genetic Information, Discussion Paper 66 (2001) [17.11],
M De Voltaire, A Philosophical Dictionary In Two Volumes: Volume II (1875) 166-169.
Sir William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England: Book the first (1890) 290,
M.D. Vattel, The Law of Nations; or Principles of the Law of Nature, Applied to the Conduct and Affairs of Nations and Sovereigns (1820) 174-175,
Voltaire, above n 4, 166-169,
Gray, above n 3, 6-7,
Davies, above n 3, 96.
Merete Borch, Conciliation, Compulsion, Conversion: British Attitudes Toward Indigenous Peoples (2004) 202,
P Drahos, A Philosophy of Intellectual Property (1996) 43,
Voltaire, above n 4, 166-169,
Davies, above n 3, 89,
Kramer, above n 1,
Sreenivasan, above n 3.
Hayne’s Case (1614) 12 Co. Rep. 113; 77 ER 1389,
R v Sharpe (1856-57) Dears & Bell 160; 169 ER 959,
Handyside (1749) 2 East. PC 652,
Williams v Williams (1882) 20 Ch. 659,
Doodeward v Spence (1908) 6 CLR 406,
Jonathan Yearworth & Ors v North Bristol NHS Trust [2009] EWCA Civ 37.
For example, criminal, tort and human rights laws,
Loane Skene, ‘Arguments Against People Legally ‘Owning’ Their Own Bodies, Body Parts & Tissue (2002) 2 Macquarie Law Journal 165, 167-170.
Human Tissue Act 1983 (NSW) s 32,
Roger Magnusson, ‘The Recognition of Proprietary Rights in Human Tissue in Common Law Jurisdictions’ (1992) 18 Melbourne University Law Review 601, 601-603.
Magnusson, above n 9, 601-603,
C. G. Weeramantry, Justice Without Frontiers: Protecting Human Rights in the Age of Technology (1998) 357-379,
Gray, above n 3, 26-7.
Imogen Goold, ‘Sounds Suspiciously Like Property Treatment: Does Human Tissue Fit Within the Common Law Concept of Property? (2005) 7 UTS Law Review 62, 1,
Gray, above n 3, 26-7,
Skene, above n 8, 175.
Peter Nygh & Peter Butt (eds), Butterworths Australian Legal Dictionary (2007) 1170, [Tissue],
Human Tissue Act 1983 (NSW) s 4(1), [tissue],
Gray, above n 3, 26-7,
Skene, above n 8, 175.
Gray, above n 3, 6-7,
Richard Taylor, ‘Human Property: Threat or Saviour? (2002) 9 Murdoch University Electronic Journal of Law 4, [42-[43],
Magnusson, above n 9, 601-603,
Skene, above n 8,
ALRC, above n 4, [17.12]-[17.16].
Martin Luther King (Jnr), The Trumpet of Conscience (1989) 56.
W Byrne, Dictionary of English Law (1923) 709-710, [Property],
Nygh, above n 12, 940, [Property],
Goold, above n 11, 3-13,
Taylor, above n 13, [42]-[48].
ALRC, above n 4, [17.9],
Byrne, above n 15, 709-710,
Nygh, above n 12, 940, [Property],
Goold, above n 11, 3-13,
Voltaire, above n 4, 166-169, 362,
Taylor, above n 13, [42]-[48].
Byrne, above n 15, 709-710,
Nygh, above n 12, 940, [Property],
Goold, above n 11, 3-13,
Voltaire, above n 4, 166-169, 362,
Taylor, above n 13, [42]-[48].
Byrne, above n 15, 709-710,
Nygh, above n 12, 940, [Property],
Goold, above n 11, 3-13,
Taylor, above n 13, [42]-[48].
Examples including but not limited to:
Australian Constitution, s 51(xviii),
Copyright Act 1968 (Cth),
Designs Act 2003 (Cth),
Patents Act 1990 (Cth),
Trade Marks Act 1995 (Cth),
Plant Breeder’s Rights Act 1994 (Cth),
Circuit Layouts Act 1989 (Cth).
Byrne, above n 15, 709-710,
Nygh, above n 12, 940, [Property],
Goold, above n 11, 3-13,
Voltaire, above n 4, 166-169, 362,
Taylor, above n 13, [42]-[48].
Bertrand Russell, Principals of Social Reconstruction (1997) 162.
Davies, above n 3, 92,
Voltaire, above n 4, 166-169,
Kramer, above n 1, 134-5.
Davies, above n 3, 92,
Voltaire, above n 4, 166-169,
Kramer, above n 1, 134-5.
Davies, above n 3, 92,
Sreenivasan, above n 3, 51.
Davies, above n 3, 92,
Sreenivasan, above n 3, 51.
Goold, above n 11, 15,
Davies, above n 3, 92,
Sreenivasan, above n 3, 51.
Hayne’s Case (1614) 12 Co. Rep. 113; 77 ER 1389,
R v Sharpe (1856-57) Dears & Bell 160; 169 ER 959,
Handyside (1749) 2 East. PC 652,
Williams v Williams (1882) 20 Ch. 659,
Doodeward v Spence (1908) 6 CLR 406,
Jonathan Yearworth & Ors v North Bristol NHS Trust [2009] EWCA Civ 37.
Byrne, above n 15, 247, [Corpse],
R v Kelly [1999] 2 WLR 384, (Rose LJ),
Hayne’s Case (1614) 12 Co. Rep. 113; 77 ER 1389,
R v Sharpe (1856-57) Dears & Bell 160; 169 ER 959,
Handyside (1749) 2 East. PC 652,
Williams v Williams (1882) 20 Ch. 659,
Doodeward v Spence (1908) 6 CLR 406,
Jonathan Yearworth & Ors v North Bristol NHS Trust [2009] EWCA Civ 37,
Michael Molan, Cases and Materials on Criminal Law (2008) 490-1.
R v Kelly [1999] 2 WLR 384, (Rose LJ),
Molan, above n 31, 490-1.
Byrne, above n 15, 247, [Corpse],
R v Kelly [1999] 2 WLR 384, (Rose LJ),
Molan, above n 31, 490-1.
Goold, above n 11, 3-13,
Gray, above n 3, 3,
Sreenivasan, above n 3, 171-3.
Goold, above n 11, 3-13,
Gray, above n 3, 3-5,
Sreenivasan, above n 3, 171-3.
Goold, above n 11, 3-13,
Gray, above n 3, 3-5,
Sreenivasan, above n 3, 171-3.
Goold, above n 11, 3-13,
ALRC, above n 4, [17.10],
Gray, above n 3, 3-5,
Sreenivasan, above n 3, 171-3.
Goold, above n 11, 3-13,
Gray, above n 3, 3-5,
Sreenivasan, above n 3, 171-3.
ALRC, above n 4, [17.10],
Goold, above n 11, 15,
Magnusson, above n 9, 603,
Yearworth and Others v North Bristol NHS Trust [2009] EWCA Civ 37, 36 (Lord Judge CJ).
ALRC, above n 4, [17.10],
Goold, above n 11, 15,
Magnusson, above n 9, 603.
ALRC, above n 4, [17.10],
Goold, above n 11, 15,
Magnusson, above n 9, 603,
Yearworth and Others v North Bristol NHS Trust [2009] EWCA Civ 37, 36 (Lord Judge CJ).
James Ely, Main Themes in the Debate Over Property Rights (1997) 428.
ALRC, above n 4, [17.1]-[17.21],
Skene, above n 8, 165-176,
Taylor, above n 13, 1-2,
Magnusson, above n 9, 601-3.
Davies, above n 3, 92,
Sreenivasan, above n 3, 51.
ALRC, above n 4, [17.1]-[17.21],
Skene, above n 8, 165-176,
Taylor, above n 13, 1-2,
Magnusson, above n 9, 601-3.
ALRC, above n 4, [17.1]-[17.21],
Skene, above n 8, 165-176,
Taylor, above n 13, 1-2,
Magnusson, above n 9, 601-3.
Goold, above n 11, 15,
Taylor, above n 13, [47]-[48].
Goold, above n 11, 15,
Taylor, above n 13, [47]-[48].
Goold, above n 11, 15,
Taylor, above n 13, [47]-[51].
Goold, above n 11, 15,
Taylor, above n 13, [47]-[51].
Davies, above n 3, 96,
Gray, above n 3, 18-20,
Sreenivasan, above n 3, 76-7.
Davies, above n 3, 96,
Gray, above n 3, 18-20,
Sreenivasan, above n 3, 76-7.
Davies, above n 3, 96,
Gray, above n 3, 18-20,
Sreenivasan, above n 3, 76-7.
Blackstone, above n 5, 291, 366-375,
Byrne, above n 15, 825, [Slave], 917, [Villein],
Harrison Moore, The Constitution of the Commonwealth of Australia (1902) 144,
Nygh, above n 12, 195, [Citizen],
Davies, above n 3, 96,
Sreenivasan, above n 3, 76-7.
Davies, above n 3, 46 &96,
Sreenivasan, above n 3, 76-7.
Anna Cole, Victoria Katharine Haskins, Fiona Paisley, Uncommon Ground: White Women in Aboriginal History (2005) 135-142,
Gwyn Campbell, Suzanne Miers, Joseph Miller (eds), Women and Slavery (2007),
David Barry Gaspar, Darlene Clark Hine, More Than Chattel: Black Women and Slavery in the America’s (1996),
Davies, above n 3, 46,
Gregson v. Gilbert (1783) 3 Dougl 232; 99 629,
R v Knowles, ex parte Somersett (1772) 20 State Tr 1,
Moore, above n 55, 144.
Slavery Abolition Act 1833 (UK).
John Solomos, Les Back, Racism and Society (1996) 40-41, Palgrave MacMillan, London,
Gregson v. Gilbert (1783) 3 Dougl 232; 99 629.
Solomos, above n 58, 39-41,
Gregson v. Gilbert (1783) 3 Dougl 232; 99 629.
R v Knowles, ex parte Somersett (1772) 20 State Tr 1.
Solomos, above n 58, 39-41,
Gregson v. Gilbert (1783) 3 Dougl 232; 99 629, (SG Lee)
Gray, above n 3, 14-16,
Davies, above n 3, 8, 46, 104,
Jeannie Paterson, Andrew Robertson & Peter Heffey, Principles of Contract Law (2005) 15-19.
Skene, above n 8, 169,
Goold, above n 11, 6-13,
Taylor, above n 13, [49]-[62].
Skene, above n 8, 169,
Goold, above n 11, 6-13,
Taylor, above n 13, [49]-[62].
Skene, above n 8, 169,
Goold, above n 11, 6-13,
Taylor, above n 13, [49]-[62].
‘Human cell strains up for grabs: Research matter used as loan collateral to be auctioned’
The Japan Times, 27 October 2001, <> at 30 June 2010.
Skene, above n 8, 169-170,
Goold, above n 11, 6-13,
Taylor, above n 13, [49]-[62].
Skene, above n 8, 169,
Goold, above n 11, 6-13,
Taylor, above n 13, [49]-[62].
ALRC, above n 4, [17.22]-[17.43],
Goold, above n 11, 6-13,
Taylor, above n 13, [49]-[62].
Magnusson, above n 9, 615-628.
Magnusson, above n 9, 615-628.
ALRC, above n 4, [17.12]-[17.43],
ALRC, above n 4, [17.12]-[17.43],
ALRC, above n 4, [17.12]-[17.43],
ALRC, above n 4, [17.22]-[17.43],
Goold, above n 11, 6-13,
Taylor, above n 13, [49]-[62].
ALRC, above n 4, [17.31]-[17.42],
Goold, above n 11, 13-15,
Skene, above n 8, 171-3.
Yearworth and Others v North Bristol NHS Trust [2009] EWCA Civ 37.
Yearworth and Others v North Bristol NHS Trust [2009] EWCA Civ 37, 1-12 (Lord Judge CJ).
Yearworth and Others v North Bristol NHS Trust [2009] EWCA Civ 37, 1-12 (Lord Judge CJ).
Yearworth and Others v North Bristol NHS Trust [2009] EWCA Civ 37, 9-17 (Lord Judge CJ)
Yearworth and Others v North Bristol NHS Trust [2009] EWCA Civ 37, 28 (Lord Judge CJ).
Yearworth and Others v North Bristol NHS Trust [2009] EWCA Civ 37, 36 (Lord Judge CJ).
Yearworth and Others v North Bristol NHS Trust [2009] EWCA Civ 37, 45(a) (Lord Judge CJ).
Yearworth and Others v North Bristol NHS Trust [2009] EWCA Civ 37, 45(e) (Lord Judge CJ)
Yearworth and Others v North Bristol NHS Trust [2009] EWCA Civ 37, 45(f) (Lord Judge CJ).
Yearworth and Others v North Bristol NHS Trust [2009] EWCA Civ 37, 50 & 60 (Lord Judge CJ).
Yearworth and Others v North Bristol NHS Trust [2009] EWCA Civ 37, 39 (Lord Judge CJ),
Moore v Regents of the University of California (1990) 793 P2d 479,
Hecht v Superior Court of Los Angeles County (1993) 20 Cal Rptr 2d 275.
Yearworth and Others v North Bristol NHS Trust [2009] EWCA Civ 37, 37-45 (Lord Judge CJ).
Yearworth and Others v North Bristol NHS Trust [2009] EWCA Civ 37, 37-45 (Lord Judge CJ).
ALRC, above n 4, [17.15],
Magnusson, above n 9, 615-617.
R v Rothery [1976] Crim LR 691,
R v Welsh [1974] RTR 478.
Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth),
Magnusson, above n 9, 619,
E v Australian Red Cross Society (1991) 27 FCR 310.
ALRC, above n 4, [17.12]-[17.21],
Magnusson, above n 9, 615-617.
ALRC, above n 4, [17.12]-[17.21],
Magnusson, above n 9, 615-617.
Noam Chomsky, Profit Over People: Neoliberalism and Global Order (1999) 132.
ALRC, above n 4, [17.33],
Skene, above n 8, 165, [footnote 2],
Davies, above n 3, 8, 65, 102-14.
ALRC, above n 4, [17.33],
Skene, above n 8, 165, [footnote 2],
Davies, above n 3, 8, 65, 102-14.
Rosemary Owens & Joellen Riley, The Law of Work (2009) 3,
International Labour Organisation (ILO), International Labour Law (2009) at 28 July 2010.
Owens, above n 97,
ILO, above n 97.
Owens, above n 97,
ILO, above n 97.
Skene, above n 8, 165, 175-6,
ALRC, above n 4, [17.43],
Taylor, above n 13, [62].
Skene, above n 8, 165, 175-6,
ALRC, above n 4, [17.43],
Taylor, above n 13, [62].
ALRC, above n 4, [17.33],
Skene, above n 8, 165, [footnote 2],
Davies, above n 3, 8, 65, 102-14.
Paterson, above n 62, 17-19, 24-26,
Owens, above n 97, 185-195.
Paterson, above n 62, 17-19, 24-26,
Owens, above n 97, 185-195, 490.
Skene, above n 8, 169-170,
Davies, above n 3, 8, 104-105,
Taylor, above n 13, [62].
Skene, above n 8, 169-170.
Weeramantry, above n 10, 371-3,
David Corten, When Corporations Rule the World (2001) 221-229,
Thomas Donaldson, Corporations and Morality (1982) 121, 164,
Owens, above n 97, 490,
Marshall Clinard, Corporate Corruption: the Abuse of Power (1990) 1-20,
Mary Crock & Leah Friedman, ‘Immigration Control and the Shaping of Australias’ Labour Market, in Christopher Arup, Peter Gahan, John Howe, Richard Johnstone, Richard Mitchell & Anthony O’Donnell (eds), Labour Law and Labour Market Regulation (2007) 342-343.
Weeramantry, above n 10, 371-3,
Corten, above n 107, 221-229,
Donaldson, above n 107, 121, 164,
Owens, above n 97, 490,
Clinard, above n 107, 1-20,
Crock, above n 107, 342-343.
Weeramantry, above n 10, 371-3,
Corten, above n 107, 221-229,
Donaldson, above n 107, 121, 164,
Owens, above n 97, 490,
Clinard, above n 107, 1-20,
Crock, above n 107, 342-343.
Weeramantry, above n 10, 371-3,
Corten, above n 107, 221-229,
Donaldson, above n 107, 121, 164,
Owens, above n 97, 490,
Clinard, above n 107, 1-20,
Crock, above n 107, 342-343.
Skene, above n 8, 165, [footnote 2],
Weeramantry, above n 10, 371-3.
Weeramantry, above n 10, 371-3,
Corten, above n 107, 221-229,
Donaldson, above n 107, 121, 164,
Owens, above n 97, 490,
Clinard, above n 107, 1-20,
Crock, above n 107, 342-343.
Weeramantry, above n 10, 371-3,
Corten, above n 107, 221-229,
Donaldson, above n 107, 121, 164,
Owens, above n 97, 490,
Clinard, above n 107, 1-20,
Crock, above n 107, 342-343.
Skene, above n 8, 165, 175-6,
ALRC, above n 4, [17.43],
Taylor, above n 13, [62].
Skene, above n 8, 165, 175-6,
ALRC, above n 4, [17.43],
Taylor, above n 13, [62].
Skene, above n 8, 165, 175-6,
ALRC, above n 4, [17.43],
Taylor, above n 13, [62].
Skene, above n 8, 165, 175-6,
ALRC, above n 4, [17.43],
Taylor, above n 13, [62].
Skene, above n 8, 165, 175-6,
ALRC, above n 4, [17.44]-[17.53],
Taylor, above n 13, [62].
Skene, above n 8, 165, 175-6,
ALRC, above n 4, [17.44]-[17.53],
Taylor, above n 13, [62].
Taylor, above n 13, [62].
Skene, above n 8, 165, 175-6,
ALRC, above n 4, [17.44]-[17.53],
Taylor, above n 13, [62].
Ralph Waldo Emerson, Representative Men: Seven Lectures (1900) 200.
Yearworth and Others v North Bristol NHS Trust [2009] EWCA Civ 37, 45(a) (Lord Judge CJ),
Skene, above n 8, 165, 175-6,
ALRC, above n 4, [17.44]-[17.53],
Taylor, above n 13, [62].
Yearworth and Others v North Bristol NHS Trust [2009] EWCA Civ 37, 45(a) (Lord Judge CJ),
Skene, above n 8, 165, 175-6,
ALRC, above n 4, [17.44]-[17.53],
Taylor, above n 13, [62].
Magnusson, above n 6, 601-603,
Yearworth & Ors v North Bristol NHS Trust [2009] EWCA Civ 37, 45(a) (Lord Judge CJ),
ALRC, above n 4, [17.33],
Skene, above n 8, 165, [footnote 2],
Taylor, above n 13, [62].
Weeramantry, above n 10, 371-3,
Corten, above n 107, 221-229,
Donaldson, above n 107, 121, 164,
Owens, above n 97, 490,
Clinard, above n 107, 1-20,
Crock, above n 107, 342-343.
Weeramantry, above n 10, 371-3,
Corten, above n 107, 221-229,
Donaldson, above n 107, 121, 164,
Owens, above n 97, 490,
Clinard, above n 107, 1-20,
Crock, above n 107, 342-343.
Weeramantry, above n 10, 371-3,
Corten, above n 107, 221-229,
Donaldson, above n 107, 121, 164,
Owens, above n 97, 490,
Clinard, above n 107, 1-20,
Crock, above n 107, 342-343.
Davies, above n 3, 92, 104-5.
Davies, above n 3, 92, 104-5.
Skene, above n 8, 165, 175-6,
ALRC, above n 4, [17.44]-[17.53],
Taylor, above n 13, [62].
Skene, above n 8, 165, 175-6,
ALRC, above n 4, [17.44]-[17.53],
Taylor, above n 13, [62].