'Reintegrative shaming is the key to controlling crime'. Discuss

Stacey Broome T8253516 D315 / TMA05

‘Reintegrative shaming is the key to controlling crime’. Discuss.

Following almost three centuries of differing rationales, such as retribution, punity, reformation and rehabilitation, competing to be the dominant influence on the criminal justice systems of modern Western societies, there has emerged a ‘new’ approach to crime control, that of restorative justice. The aim of this approach is to offer a ‘tougher reworking’ of the concerns of welfare and the rehabilitation of the offender, coupled with punishment of the criminal behaviour, and a more central role with regards the rights of, and justice for the victim (Hughes, 2002). Restorative justice aims to bring the process of conflict resolution back into the ‘community’, thus enabling all parties affected by criminal behaviour to be involved in working towards a reconciliatory outcome (Hughes, 2001, p.248, cited in McLaughlin and Muncie, 2001).

Reintegrative shaming is a strategy based upon the logic of restorative justice (Hughes, 2002) and it is this method of crime control that is the subject of this essay. In order to fully explore the issue as to whether reintegrative shaming is the key to controlling crime, it will be necessary to first explain the features of reintegrative shaming, with reference to its main advocate, John Braithwaite. Secondly, it would be advantageous to the purposes of this essay to examine how such techniques work in practice. Having looked at the theoretical basis and working practices of reintegrative shaming, I will then discuss both the merits and limitations of this approach, to enable an informed assessment as to whether reintegrative shaming is an effective form of crime control.

A fundamental question at the heart of Braithwaite’s (1989, cited in McLaughlin et al, 2003, pp. 393-99) theory of reintegrative shaming is ‘why do people not commit crime?’ He argues that for most well-socialized people, it is our consciences that will not allow us to perpetrate acts of wrong-doing, since if we were to even contemplate executing a harmful act, we would experience an immediate anxiety response, a pang of conscience. Conscience, in turn, is built through the process of shaming during our formative childhood years; when we commit an act that contradicts the mores and values of our culture, we are faced with the disapproval of significant others, and since we value the acceptance and approval of those we love, we feel shame in disappointing them. Eventually, the disapproval is internalised and direct external reprimands are needed less and less, as our conscience increasingly guides our behaviour.

However, sometimes even the most developed consciences may let us down, and it is in these situations that shaming is a very powerful tool of informal social control (McLaughlin et al, 2003). In their critique of delinquent subcultures, Sykes and Matza (1957, cited in McLaughlin et al., 2003. pp. 232-38) demonstrate how consciences may ‘slip’, via the delinquents’ use of ‘techniques of neutralization’, in which they attempt to rationalize their deviant behaviour. However, Sykes and Matza argue that although the delinquent may seem committed to the deviant system of his or her subculture, it is evident that he or she accepts the moral validity of the dominant social values, since despite their frequent rationalizations, research has shown that many delinquents do experience a sense of shame, particularly if ‘significant others’ are informed of their wrong-doing. Thus, although techniques of neutralization can, to some degree, lessen the effectiveness of both internal and external control, it is still possible to appeal to the delinquent’s conscience through the use of shaming.

This is a preview of the whole essay

Braithwaite (1989, cited in McLaughlin et al, 2003, pp. 393-99) argues that shaming can be put to good use in the control of crime, however, as he points out, there are two types of shaming – reintegrative and disintegrative, and it is the latter which has been the dominant form of shaming within the criminal justice processes of Western societies. This type of shaming tends to stigmatize and degrade the offender, leading to exclusionary practices, from ostracization to imprisonment, which then increases the likelihood of reoffending (McLaughlin et al., 2003). Hughes (2002, p.283-4) alerts us to the disintegrative qualities of shaming by example of ‘naming and shaming’ campaigns. Such cases remind us that if shaming is to occur, it must be in the community, and not of the community, since without the protection of the criminal justice system, offenders are vulnerable to what can often be vicious and vindictive behaviour.

Reintegrative shaming attempts to reverse this outcome, by reducing the stigma involved through focusing on the ‘evil of the deed rather than on the offender as an irredeemably evil person’ (ibid.) and thus offering the offender a gesture of ‘reacceptance’ (McLaughlin and Muncie, 2001, p.262). In so doing, the offender is encouraged to acknowledge the harmful consequences of his actions, which may then lead onto an attempt by the offender to rectify the wrong that has been committed, and so reaffirm his or her membership of the community (McLaughlin et al, 2003).

According to Braithwaite, reintegrative shaming is a strategy based on mutual respect, involving all those affected by the wrongdoing, that is, the offender, the victim and close associates of both. The inclusion of these associates structures both shame, via the victim’s supporters, and reintegration, via the offender’s supporters, into the process (Braithwaite, 2003). It aims to ‘heal the wounds’ rather than be merely punitive (Hughes, 2002).

This account accords with Durkheim’s (1893, cited in McLaughlin et al., 2003, pp. 3-4) views with regards to the expressive function of punishment. Durkheim claimed that the role of punishment is to maintain a general moral consensus, achieved through the ritual coming-together of ‘law-abiding’ members of a community, in which a commitment to shared values can be reinforced, thus preserving social cohesion.

Braithwaite argues that the preventive success of this approach lies in its impact on the offender’s conscience. Rose (1999, cited in Hughes, 2002, p.290) explains that such strategies seek to ‘inscribe awareness’ of the damaging consequences for others ‘directly into the ethical make-up of the offender’. Braithwaite thus concedes that reintegrative shaming is more likely to work in close-knit communities, with a high degree of ‘interconnectedness’ (Braithwaite, 1989, cited in McLaughlin et al., 2003, p. 6). However, he contends that reintegrative shaming is relevant in contemporary, individualistic societies, and this viewpoint is somewhat validated when we consider the influence such an approach has had on recent criminal justice policies and practices. Indeed, reintegrative shaming practices, such as Family Group Conferences, established in New Zealand in 1989, and which involve the victims, the offenders and their families, mediated by professionals, is based on the ‘communitarian systems of conflict resolution within Maori culture’ (Hughes, 2002, p. 286). Such conferences have been lauded as being particularly successful in reducing rates of re-offending (Maxwell and Morris, 1996, cited in Hughes, 2002), with some proponents claiming an 80% reduction of young people in care for welfare or criminal reasons (Hughes, 2002).

In England and Wales the logic of restorative justice has become increasingly prominent, particularly in respect to young offenders. The White Paper, No More Excuses (Home Office, 1997b, cited in Hughes, 2002, p.289), proposed reformation of the criminal justice system, particularly in the area of youth crime, placing great emphasis on responsibility, restoration and reintegration, principles which formed a large part of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998. The Youth Justice Board, together with local authority Youth Offending Teams were given a greater hand in dealing with crime and delinquency, thus bringing youth justice measures into the ‘community’.

Initiatives introduced included reparation orders, conferencing, and the opportunity for the victim to be more involved in the decisions regarding the content of certain orders (Goldson, 2000, cited in Hughes, 2002, p.289). Parents of offenders were to recognise their responsibility for the criminal actions of their children, and to understand their role in helping to prevent the recurrence the offending behaviour (Home Office, 1997b, cited in Hughes, 2002, p.289). These measures reflected the growing recognition within the criminal justice system that community interventions could go some way to reducing recidivism (Hughes, 2002).

There are a number of positive aspects to techniques of reintegrative shaming, particularly when compared with the dominant forms of Western crime control. The latter tends to be exclusionary and stigmatising, with the labelling of the offender as ‘criminal’ impeding his or her attempts to ‘go straight’. Reintegrative shaming, on the other hand, seeks to reduce the stigma and thus enable the offender to rejoin society. As already discussed, by encouraging the offender to recognize the harmful consequences of his or her actions, through appeals to the conscience, there is a greater chance of success in achieving this aim.

Furthermore, state-based adversarial justice tends to marginalize the voices of both the victim and the offender, who become detached from the process, in the words of Hughes (2001, in McLaughlin and Muncie, 2001, p.248) ‘passive spectators’. By including all parties affected by the offence in decisions of disposal, a more satisfactory outcome can be reached. Indeed, Maxwell and Morris (1996, cited in Hughes, 2002, p.287) argue that in the majority of cases referred to Family Group Conferencing in New Zealand, with the centrality given to all participants’ views, all parties record a high level of satisfaction with the outcomes. Indeed, in relation to the UK, Ashworth (2003, p.175) cites the claim by the Youth Justice Board that victims benefit greatly from mediation with the offender, since the process gives them a ‘sense of control and peace’ and helps to alleviate their fears of revictimization.

Finally, within the context of the managerialist discourse, increasingly prevalent in the area of all public service institutions, which stresses economy and efficiency, community-based restorative justice programmes avoid the high costs associated with formal court processing (Audit Commission, 1996, cited in Hughes, 2002, p.287).

Despite his fervent belief in reintegrative shaming, Braithwaite concedes that such programmes cannot work for some; thus for these cases custodial sentences may be necessary in order to protect the community. Katz (1988) highlights such offenders, who he claims are ‘seduced’ by the lived experience of criminality. They are beyond shame because they ‘take pride in a defiant reputation as “bad”’, using such a reputation to gain higher status among their peers. According to Katz, even the most cold-blooded murderers may be shameless, since far from feeling remorse, such killers may actually revel in the power he or she feels, both during and after the act. In a similar vein, he refers to Bernie Goetz, a New York citizen, acquitted of the murder of four black men, who was not alone in feeling justification for his actions, which he saw as a kind of pre-emptive attack – indeed, many fellow citizens lauded Goetz as a hero, despite the fact that the level of violence he used towards his victims was seemingly gratuitous, since none of them were armed.

Taking a different slant, Becker (1963), in his research into deviance, argues that since deviancy is a relative concept, a product of power differentials between the dominant group and the ‘outsider’, that is the person labelled as ‘deviant’, it is possible that the ‘outsider’ will not accept the rules by which he or she is being judged, and/or will view those who judge them as either incompetent or not entitled to do so. Reintegrative shaming is rooted in a belief of a moral consensus, whereas Becker alerts us to the fact that morality operates on many different levels.

His assertion that dominant groups in society have the power to make the rules and apply them to others also alerts us to the possibility of discrimination within any system of justice, and there have indeed been doubts expressed regarding discrimination within reintegrative shaming programmes. Blagg (1998, cited in Hughes, 2002, p.288) claimed that such programmes in Australia tended to be targeted at the Aboriginal people, an ‘already victimized population’. However, such discrimination occurs in conventional practices of criminal justice, and as Brownlee (1998, cited in Hughes, 2002, p.293) states, societies already fragmented on the lines of age, gender and ‘race’ are ‘likely to reproduce inequalities of power and disadvantage in even the best-intended institutions unless positive steps are taken to combat this trend.’

Cohen (1979, 1985, cited in Hughes, 2002, p.291) claims that decarceration in general, and community-based restorative justice practices in particular, have served to extend the reach and intensity of social control, by bringing about additions, rather than alternatives to, existing sentencing measures.

The tendency has been to siphon off the less serious cases, to be dealt with in the community (Daly and Immarigeon, 1998, cited in Hughes, 2002, p.288).

Concerns have also been expressed with regards to the lack of accountability within reintegrative shaming programmes. Furthermore, Hughes (2002) argues that appropriate protection for the offender is not being met, with recourse to due process greatly reduced in such cases. However, these latter criticisms are simply procedural problems, and as such should be relatively easy to overcome in the long term.

So, is reintegrative shaming the key to controlling crime? Since the majority of people are socialized to varying degrees in accordance with the dominant values of their culture, and since these values tend to be internalised at an early age, then shaming would seem to be a logical method of social control, both as a preventive and deterrent measure. In terms of the parties involved, the inclusionary principle allows offenders a second chance, through recognition of the consequences of their wrongdoing; victims, meanwhile have an opportunity to voice their opinions, feelings and fears. All parties thus are active in deliberating about the action and the eventual outcome.

Reparation is an important element of the process, and can range from a simple apology to some kind of monetary payment. In any instance, it both salves offenders’ consciences, whilst addressing the needs of both the victim and the community. Reintegrative shaming, as an expression of disapproval, can help to maintain and strengthen social solidarity – an idea that harks back to the Durkheimian view discussed earlier (1893, cited in McLaughlin et al., 2003, pp. 3-4). Evidence of the success of shaming can be seen in the success of drink-driving campaigns (Braithwaite, 1989) and also in the zero tolerance campaign against domestic violence.

Braithwaite’s acceptance that shaming may not work in all instances, is perhaps the most telling aspect with regards to whether shaming is the key to crime control. He advocates the use of custodial and punitive sentencing in the few cases where reintegrative shaming would be futile. Thus it would seem that whilst reintegrative shaming is indeed worthy of a significant place within criminal justice processes, it would need to run in concurrence with other forms of crime control – sentencing need to fit the nature of the offence and the offender.

References

Ashworth, A. (2003) ‘Is Restorative Justice the Way Forward for Criminal Justice?’ in McLaughlin, E., Fergusson, R., Hughes, G. and Westmarland (eds) (2003) Restorative Justice: Critical Issues, London, Sage / The Open University

Braithwaite, J. (2003) ‘Restorative Justice and a Better Future’ in McLaughlin, E., Fergusson, R., Hughes, G. and Westmarland (eds) (2003) Restorative Justice: Critical Issues, London, Sage / The Open University

Braithwaite, J. (1989)’Reintegrative Shaming’ in McLaughlin, E., Muncie, J. and Hughes, G. (eds) (2003) Criminological Perspectives: A Reader, London, Sage / The Open University.

Hughes, G. (2002) ‘The Competing Logics of Community Sanctions: Welfare, Rehabilitation and Restorative Justice’ in Mclaughlin, E. and Muncie, J. (eds) (2002) Controlling Crime, London, Sage

Katz, J. (1988) ‘Seductions and repulsions of crime’ in McLaughlin, E., Muncie, J. and Hughes, G. (eds) (2003) Criminological Perspectives: A Reader, London, Sage / The Open University.

McLaughlin, E. and Muncie, J. (2001) The Sage Dictionary of Criminology, London, Sage.

McLaughlin, E., Muncie, J. Hughes, G. and Westmarland, L. (2003) ‘Is crime control desirable?’ in Theory Guide 2: Crime Control, Milton Keynes, The Open University.

Sykes, G.M. and Matza, D. (1957) ‘Techniques of Neutralization’ in McLaughlin, E., Muncie, J. and Hughes, G. (eds) (2003) Criminological Perspectives: A Reader, London, Sage / The Open University.