The Anglo-Irish Treaty of December 6, 1921 was the foundation stone of an independent Ireland

        Thus when the Inter-Party Government of 1948-51 decided to quit the Commonwealth this was effected simply by repealing the 1936 Act. With equal logic all symbols of Commonwealth membership were purged from the new Constitution. In place of the Governor General a President was to be head of State for internal purposes. His/ her powers and functions were meticulously spelt out , and there was not trace left of no sense is the Government today even formally “His/ Her Excellency's Government.” It was also of symbolic significance, and in keeping with the democratic character of the new Constitution, that provision was made for the election of the President; the Governor General was the choice of the politicians not the people. This must not be overstressed, however. The new Constitution also provided that if there was only one candidate, no election should be necessary (Article 12.4.5 )

        The new Constitution differed from its predecessor in many other respects. Its layout was much to be preferred; for example the fundamental rights provisions were so headed and were stated with more emphasis. It contained some entirely new material; thus the 1922 Constitution featured nothing comparable to Article 29 (International Relations ), Article 41 (the family), Article 42(education) and Article 43 (property rights). Nor had it any counterpart to Articles 2 and 3. the 1937 Constitution was in several places markedly declamatory in its tone, whereas that of 1922 contended itself with a prosaic, not to say pedestrian, statement of legal principles. Bunreacht na hEireann, while of course stating, such principles, also contains aspirations and objectives- witness Article 29.1.2 on International Relations and Article 45's directive principles of social policy. Its tone is also more definitely religious. God is mentioned in the preamble to the Constitution Act of 1922, but the much longer preamble to Bunreacht na hEireann goes much further with its references to “the Most Holy Trinity” and “our Divine Lord, Jesus Christ”. This is echoed in Article 44.1 (religion) which had no counterpart in the 1922 Constitution.

        The framers of the new Constitution had in several respects learned from experience. It was decided that amendment of the Constitution should require a referendum- but also that the Oireachtais should have a period of grace during which it could amend the Constitution by ordinary  statute. Article 51 also specifically provided that ;

1.  Article 46, the referendum requirement could not be touched.
2.  Article 51 itself could not be amended.

        Thus there was no question of extending the three year time period. Nor, after June 25, 1941 , could there be any room for an argument that this Constitution was implicity amended by legislation conflicting with its provisions. The arrangements for coping with emergency situations were quite different in form from those under the earlier Constitution. Its original ban on the creation of “extraordinary courts” (article 70) was not repeated; Article 38.3 of Bunreacht na hÈireann specifically authorised the establishment by law of special criminal courts. Thus the expedient adopted in 1931 with the insertion of Article 2A, under which a whole emergency code became part of the Constitution, was not repeated. But the new Constitution gave the Oireachtais large powers to cope with emergencies ( Article 28.3.3.) by virtue of which it could set aside practically all restrictions.

        Notwithstanding this, the degree of continuity between the two documents is still very high. Many of Bunreacht na hEireann's provisions are broadly similar in terms tot hose of the 1922 Constitution. In many instances the language is identical, and in others there occur only slight verbal changes which do not alter the substance. This holds true, for example, for the provisions of the courts ( Articles 34 – 36) and on the Dail (Article 16). and some of Bunreacht na hEireann's new material came from pre-existing statutes. Thus it decrees that Dail deputies shall be elected “on a system of proportional representation by means of the single transferable vote” (Article 16.2.5) whereas Article 26 of the 1922 Constitution had referred simply to “principles of proportional representation”. But the Electoral Act 1923, which implemented Article 26, provided for the single transferable vote and its provisions inter alia on counting the votes are still in force. Again the 1922 Constitution did not specify the declaration in Article 34.5.1. But that declaration, with minor variations in wording, is that specified under the Courts of Justice Act 1924, section 99. Similarly there was no article in the 1922 Constitution devoted to the office of Attorney General but that office certainly existed before 1937 and section 6 of the Ministers and Secretaries Act 1924 still applies to it.

        The Oireachtais established under the 1937 Constitution is a bicameral legislature, but the balance of power is tipped much more firmly in favour of the Dail. The new Seanad, however, exhibits certain features of its predecessor for example it has 60 members, it contains a nominated element and the electorate is clearly modeled on the amended provisions of the 1922 Constitution.

THE REACTION TO THE CONSTITUTION

                At home, reaction to the Constitution took numerous forms. Many of the adverse attitudes were influenced by hostility to, or suspicion of, Eamon De Valera, so powerfully did the Fianna Fail leader polarise feelings in the bitterly divided political scene. On the “national” aspects of the Constitution, the small remnant of republican diehards like Mary MacSwiney were not seduced by the new document: as guardians of the holy flame of the “unsurped” Second Dail, they continued to maintain that the State had no legitimacy. Sinn Fein flew black flags to mark the passing of the “bogus” Constitution. Northern nationalists like Eamon Donnelly who wanted representation in the Dail regretted that the Constitution had been enacted before an anti-partition drive could be established. 

        The Constitution of 1937 for the first time gave full effect to the conduct of our foreign policy as a sovereign, independent, democratic State. It was with considerable wisdom and foresight that we committed ourselves then in Article 29 to the pacific settlement of international disputes and international law as the rule for our conduct with other states. This was a statement of fundamental policy that was courageous and determined on the part of a people, who had so recently endured desperate loss of life in a World War, a War of Independence and a Civil War. Our commitment was for the peaceful settlement of conflict and the rule of international law, something quite different to neutrality as a political or even military concept.

         It is clearly evidenced from Articles 41.2.1 and 41.2.2 that in the early decades of the new Irish State, Catholic ideology and statutory developments combined, to create a range of formal and informal barriers to the participation of women in the workplace. The role of motherhood was socially and legally sanctioned as the 'natural' role for Irish women. Even the interchange of the words 'woman' and 'mother' in the aforementioned articles indicates the strength of the ideology of motherhood in Irish society. The Constitution alone however did not buttress this way of thinking in regards to women as this was firmly in place before the Constitution was even drafted. Legislative measures employed by the new State copper fastened women's status of guardians of the home. The 1925 Civil Service Act restricted certain jobs for men and legislation enacted in 1933 required female teachers to resign on marriage. The lowering of the retirement age for women teachers was lowered form 65 to 60 for women teachers. A marriage bar was introduced in the Civil Service and similarly in many semi-state and private organisations like Aer Lingus and the Banks, until 1974. Furthermore the tax and welfare system was based on a male breadwinner model and was intrinsically biased towards female and in particular, married female workers. It is very hard to believe in modern Ireland today that the status of women in our society was ever such, but what is even harder to believe is that while all this arbitrary legislation has been resigned to history, Articles 41.2.1 and 41.2.2, which embody this mindset, are still within our Constitution today. 

THE STATUS OF THE COUNTRY IN 1937

        The economic war had begun in 1932. Eamon De Valera had become Taoiseach on the 9th of March 1922 and from the outset he was determined to pursue a republican policy. He vowed to remove the Oath of Allegiance from the Irish Constitution and introduced the relevant legislation to the Dail on the 20th of April. Although the Dail passed the Bill, the Senate delayed it from coming into operation until May 1933. De Valera was also determined to retain the land annuities for the Irish treasury. Dating from the Land Acts, these annuities were repayments on loans given to the Irish farmers to buy out landlords;and annual installments were sent to the British exchequer. The Free State Government announced on the 1st of July 1932 that it was withholding theses annuities. The British Government reacted by instituting a customs duty on Irish cattle imported into Britain. In response the Free State imposed duties on British goods sold in Ireland. This was the beginning of the six year economic war between the two countries. the new governments withholding of land annuities to the UK resulted in the imposition of 40% duty on cattle and 30% on other Irish agricultural imports to the UK. This was a devastating blow to the State as it was so dependent on agricultural exports. Subsidies, payable by the Department of Agriculture, were introduced for exported livestock, on foot of certified Customs' documents. An 'Emergency Imposition of Duties Order', hurried through the Oireachtas, imposed duties on most UK, NI and Commonwealth goods. Smuggling, confined to mainly sugar in the earlier years, became an attractive each way bet. There was particular concern about livestock declared for export, availing of State subsidies, later smuggled into Northern Ireland and later again smuggled back into the State.

        The ethical and moral values on which the constitution is based, enacted and amended as it is by the People, will naturally reflect the broad values of Irish society. These values naturally change from time to time and prompted changes in the Constitution. The Preamble acknowledges the Christian God and seeks to promote the common good with due observation of prudence, justice and charity. Kenny J in Ryan v. Attorney General  spoke of the ' Christian and democratic nature of the State'.

        In 1937 the influence of the Church was very strong in Irish society and this is reflected throughout the Constitution. An examination of the status, role and treatment of women in Irish society since we took over control of our own affairs, would tell us a lot about our maturity as a people. We didn’t start out too badly. The 1922 Free State Constitution extended the franchise to women. Article 14 said all citizens, “without distinctions of sex”, shall have the right to vote. Indeed, back in 1919, when the first Dáil met in the Mansion House in Dublin, a piece of feminist history was made when Countess Constance Markievicz became the first woman to hold a Cabinet post as Minister for Labour.  By the time of the 1937 Constitution, however, there was considerable frustration among women over their treatment and their perception of themselves as second-class citizens. This manifested itself in the hostility displayed by many women’s groups to Eamon De Valera’s Constitution, with - as they saw it - its demeaning and limiting role of domesticity and home-making for women. It is clearly evidenced from Articles 41.2.1 and 41.2.2 that in the early decades of the new Irish State, Catholic ideology and statutory developments combined, to create a range of formal and informal barriers to the participation of women in the workplace. The role of motherhood was socially and legally sanctioned as the 'natural' role for Irish women. Even the interchange of the words 'woman' and 'mother' in the aforementioned articles indicates the strength of the ideology of motherhood in Irish society. The Constitution alone however did not buttress this way of thinking in regards to women as this was firmly in place before the Constitution was even drafted. Legislative measures employed by the new State copper fastened women's status of guardians of the home.

        Article 41.2.1 states that with regards to the family the State recognises in particular "...that by her life within the home, woman gives to the States a support without which the common good cannot be achieved." Article 41.2.2 goes on the say that: "The State shall, therefore, endeavour to ensure that mothers shall not be obliged by economic necessity to engage in labour to the neglect of their duties in the home."

        Article 41.2.2 assigns to women, a domestic role as wives and mothers, but has failed to be of any particular assistance to women working exclusively in the home. In the case of L v. L the Supreme Court rejected a claim by a married woman, who was a mother and had worked exclusively in her home to be entitled to a 50% interest in the family home. At Common Law however it has been held that a married woman who makes a financial contribution, directly or indirectly, to the acquisition of a family home is entitled to a proportional interest in it. It is clear that this principle is no help to the significant number of women who have no separate income from which they can make financial contributions to a family home. The Supreme Court felt however that Article 41.2.2 did not confer jurisdiction on the courts to transfer any property rights within a family.   

        It is obvious that Ireland is no longer the State that De Valera envisaged when the Constitution came into being in 1937. Articles 42.2.1 and 42.2.2  made a mockery of the role once played by women in Irish society and the role in which they now play. The Constitution Review Group in 1996 recommended deleting the Articles in favour of a revised provision in gender neutral form which might provide: "The State recognises that home and family life give society a support without which the common good cannot be achieved. The State shall endeavour to support persons caring for others within the home". This revised article should be implemented as it ensures the Constitution reflects Irish society as it is today and no longer relegates women to the status it did over half a century ago.

        The views of Irish women were reflected in the outcome of the referendum in relation to the acceptance of the 1937 Constitution as it was passed by a small majority. Women would have felt rejected by the wording of the above articles and would have felt like second class citizens. Eamon De Valera stated that the Constitution was “enacted by the people”. This statement seems to indicate that the  whole population of  the 26 counties were to be represented in the new constitution but in reality it was not so, well not fairly anyway. The women of Ireland although represented in the constitution were not presented with an equitable standing in society. This has changed during the years and changes have occurred with many women entering the predominantly male run associations of society such as the government, the legal profession, medicine etc. De Valera portrayed the woman as the mother, house-keeper and person in the background. As Ireland evolved through the ages so did its women, the original articles of the constitution had no reference to these changes being administered and adopted into Irish society. In this instance it highlights that the constitution was not perfect and did not respond to the changing needs of Irish society in relation to the female population.

        One way the constitution did respond to the changing needs of Irish society is in relation to the topic of sovereignty. In the first place, as De Valera would argue, the whole purpose of the independence movement, the central issue of the civil war and the unilateral, piecemeal undoing of the Treaty's shackles in the 1920s and 1930s all related to the fundamental question : was Ireland (or the movement that part of it under Irish control) to be autonomous, sovereign, mistress of her own destinies, independent of foreign, that is to say British, interference? Bunreacht na hEireann, De Valera would maintain, unequivocally affirmed that sovereignty, a sovereignty which would soon successfully pass its greatest test, neutrality in a world war. After all, foreign affairs is sovereignty, in Pandit Nehru's phrase. The dimension of sovereignty in the constitution meant the supreme authority of the people (Article 6.1), not the dominance of the State over its citizens. The point has been made that in a unicameral parliament a powerful De Valera could have enacted his constitution legislatiely, without recourse to popular endorsement. Given the fancistic and dictatorial climate of so much of contemporary Europe, he could have carved out an authoritarian power base for himself, had he been so inclined. And those opponents who had long distrusted and demonised him were vociferously suspicious of his sinister intentions, alleging that the constitution (particularly the new and strange office of the Presidency) would be in the last analysis, simply a front for personal aggrandisement. Yet the truth is that this new basic document, however much it might reflect the values of contemporary Catholic sociology, bore witness to Eamon De Valera's commitment to liberal democratic principles and to the British parliamentary heritage. These principles are exemplified both in the Articles (15-28) dealing with the organs of government and parliament, and in that proclaiming “personal rights” (Article 40).

        De Valera ringingly affirmed that the constitution clearly upheld the sovereignty of the people. “ If there is one thing more than another that is clear and shining through this whole constitution,it is the fact that the people are the masters.

        In other respects, especially where the 1937 Constitution reflected the particular political preoccupations of the day and the values of a then dominant ethos, it could be argued that the document has not served us that well in the vastly changing circumstances of the last thirty years. In 1996 the Whitaker report on the constitution suggested some possible changes to the constitution such as “the evolution of socio- political thinking, the desire for greater inclusiveness, the implications of membership of the European Union”. The constitution has been or needs to be altered to reflect popular thinking on Church- State relations, the changing position of marriage and the family ; denominational ethos and public morality ; the debate over abortion; and womens rights. In the latter connection, the Constitution Review Group recommended that the gender inclusiveness principle should be observed in the wording of the constitution a recommendation itself reflecting a profound change in attitudes to women since 1937

        Some of these change shave occurred through various referenda but changes are still required. Some  decisions which are highlighted where the constitution has been amended as society has changed since its introduction in 1937 are in relation to bail, adoptions, abortion and divorce to name but a few. These decisions demonstrated the capacity of the political system, through the referendum process, to react adequately to a significant shift in public attitudes concerning the balance of personal rights between different groups.

THE DOCTRINE OF PRECEDENT

        When examining the Constitution for an article or sub-article that was either included or excluded that was surprising given the history of Irish Constitutional emergence, the doctrine of precedent emerged as an important ingredient in our legal system that was omitted from the 1937 Constitution. The vast body of common law was not created by legislation but was developed through the centuries by the judges applying the customary law to new situations. In this way consistency feature of the common law. In simple terms the application of a principle of law as laid down by a higher court on a previous occasion in a case similar to that before the court. This is known as the doctrine of stare decisis. The term stare decisis is shorthand for the cumbersome Latin phrase stare decisis et non quieta movere, which may be translated as stand by the thing decided and do not disturb the calm. The virtues of the doctrine encompass efficiency, stability, reliability and predictability, legitimacy and the appearance of impartiality, non-capriciousness, and consistency. Stare decisis is also recognized as supplying some guarantee of substantive equality.

         Basically, under the doctrine of stare decisis, the decision of a higher court within the same provincial jurisdiction acts as binding authority on a lower court within that same jurisdiction.         The decision of a court of another jurisdiction only acts as persuasive authority. The degree of persuasiveness is dependent upon various factors, including, first, the nature of the other jurisdiction. Second, the degree of persuasiveness is dependent upon the level of court which decided the precedent case in the other jurisdiction. Other factors include the date of the precedent case, on the assumption that the more recent the case, the more reliable it will be as authority for a given proposition, although this is not necessarily so. And on some occasions, the judge's reputation may affect the degree of persuasiveness of the authority.

        Though not recognised in the Constitution, the doctrine of precedent is strongly adhered to in our courts. ' The laws which we have taken over', said Kingsmill Moore J in the Supreme Court, in the  Attorney General v. Ryans Car Hire Ltd. , 'is based on the following of precedent and there can be no question of abandoning the principle of following precedent as the normal, indeed most universal procedure.' While judicial precedent is a very valuable source of law it can be, and often is, overruled by legislation though not in constitutional cases.  In the late 18th century precedent tended to be viewed as a structure of principle,which particular decisionsillustrated: eg - Lord Mansfield in Jones v Randall (1774):“Precedents may serve to fix principles, which [precedents] for certainty’s sake are not suffered to be shaken, whatever might be the weight of the principle independent of precedent. But precedent, thought it be evidence of the law, is not the law itself: much less the whole of the law.”Stare decisis was a principle, not a set of rules. A clear hierarchy of courts was established from 1833. From then, rules of precedent began to develop. Single decisions at a higher level were treated as strictly binding. By 1861, it was established that the House of Lords was strictly bound by its own decisions. A similar rule for the Court of Appeal was virtually established by the end of the century.

        In America Chief Justice Marshall's opinion in Marbury v. Madison  laid down that the Supreme Court cannot and should not be bound to follow a precedent that it has itself concluded is not a sound interpretation of the Constitution. Stated differently, the justices are in a sense duty bound to overrule their own precedent if they conclude upon further reflection that a decision was wrong. "In cases involving the Federal Constitution, where correction through legislative action is practically impossible, this Court has often overruled its earlier decisions. The Court bows to the lessons of experience and the force of better reasoning, recognizing that the process of trial and error, so fruitful in the physical sciences, is appropriate also in the judicial function"  Similarly, the Court has written that "In constitutional questions, where correction depends upon amendment and not upon legislative action, this Court throughout its history has freely exercised its power to reexamine the basis of its constitutional decisions" and that stare decisis is a cornerstone of our legal system, but it has less power in constitutional cases, where, save for constitutional amendments, this Court is the only body able to make needed changes. 

        The power to say what the Constitution means or requires recognized since Marbury v. Madison implies a power to determine the sources of authority on which constitutional rulings properly rest.  To recognize a congressional power to determine the weight to be accorded to precedent no less than to recognize congressional authority to prescribe the significance that should attach to the original understanding, would infringe that core judicial function.

         Arguments have been put forward that the American Constitution recognises the doctrine of precedent an example of this is put forward by Richard H. Fallon Jr. by saying that Article III’s grant of “the judicial Power” authorizes the Supreme Court to elaborate and rely on a principle of stare decisis and, more generally, to treat precedent as a constituent element of constitutional adjudication. That constitutional authorization is itself part of “the supreme Law of the Land” and adequately justifies the Justices in sometimes failing to enforce what otherwise would be the best interpretation of particular constitutional provisions. Crucially, two kinds of arguments converge to support this conclusion. One set of arguments appeals to the text, original understanding, and structure of the

 written Constitution. By contrast, another set of arguments treats the entrenched status of stare decisis and the policy arguments that support it as additional, constitutionally relevant  considerations tending to establish the doctrine’s constitutional validity.

        It is a proposition too plain to be contested that either the Constitution controls any Supreme Court act repugnant to it, or the Court may alter the Constitution by an ordinary judicial opinion. Between these alternatives there is no middle ground. But certainly those who framed the Constitution contemplated that as the fundamental law of the nation, an opinion of the Court repugnant to the Constitution is void.

        Historians record that the doctrine of precedent either was established or becoming established in state courts by the time of the Constitutional Convention. 

        Although stare decisis was initially a common law doctrine, its extension into constitutional law finds support in early constitutional history. As Paulsen recognizes, “the idea that ‘the judicial Power’ establishes precedents as binding law, obligatory in future cases,” traces at least to the early nineteenth century, “perhaps presaged by certain Marshall Court opinions.” 

        With the doctrine of precedent being as many learned judges have commented as being a cornerstone of our legal system why was this infamous doctrine not given constitutional recognition, especially when the basic translation of our constitution, Bunreacht na hEireann is basic law of Ireland. Also,one of the most important Articles of the Constitution is Article 15.4, which states that the Oireachtas must not enact any law that is repugnant to the Constitution and that any such law is invalid. This means, that the law set down in the Constitution is superior to all other law, including legislation. If the judges plan to change laws in our society as with changing times this often happens how does the doctrine come into play then. These are questions which the original drafters of the 1937 constitution seemed to overlook. These questions have not caused great concern for our courts at present but they may do in the future.

 CONCLUSION

        In conclusion, it should be remarked that the Irish constitution offers very powerful protection for human rights vis-à-vis the Executive and the Legislature , probably stronger than any other parliamentary democracy. For decades the courts have been vigilant in upholding individual rights against inadvertent and unintended legislative breaches. This series of decisions mainly involved constitutional challenges by individuals or corporations, although there have also been a small number of Presidential references of Bills to the Supreme Court. The roots of this system of protection of rights lie in the 1922 Constitution, where articles 6 to 10 set out fundamental rights to liberty of the person, inviolability of citizens' dwellings, freedom of conscience and of profession and practice of religion, and the right to free elementary education as well as a guarantee against religious discrimination. These constitutional provisions for the protection of personal rights represented a revolutionary change from the situation that had existed under British rule when, in common with the rest of the people of the United Kingdom, Irish people had been subjects of the Crown rather than citizens with rights. As subjects they had lacked any protection for their rights. After independence, as citizens, they could appeal to the courts against decisions of the Executive and the Legislature that infringed their rights which were entrenched in the 1937 constitution. 

        The 1937 constitution provided the Irish people with responsibility for their own country, something they had been fighting with Britain for over past decades in their history. Although the constitution has been amended many times the original drafters must have foreseen this requirement as laid down in article 26 was the power for the constitution to be amended. Within this article the people were still held to be the decision makers as any changes would have to be put before the people and ratified by the people before any change could be made.

        Even though as pointed out earlier the doctrine of precedent is not recognised in the constitution, the constitution has not infringed the doctrine. Also in relation to the doctrine the constitutional rights of the people are held to be of the paramount importance. Constitutional amendments will continue to occur piecemeal, but at some stage a new basic document may well replace the 1937 version. If that happens, there will be continuity as well as change. The best constitutional values and the insights and enlightenments of the last several decades must be further preserved, just as all that was worthwhile in the Irish Free State Constitution of 1922 received renewed expression in Bunreacht na hEireann 1937.

        For O. Hanlon J “..the Irish Constitution remains unique among the constitutions of the world.[because].there is a law superior to all positive law, which is not capable of being altered by legislation, or even by a simple amendment of the Constitution itself..”  

It appears adequate to end this discussion based on the above words of the learned judge.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

1.   Brian Doolan, Principles of Irish Law, 5th Edition (Gill & Macmillan, Dublin, 1999).

2.  Dermot Keogh, Ireland and Europe 1919-1948, (Gill & Macmillan, Dublin, 1998)

3.   Gerard Hogan & Gerry Whyte, Kelly's Irish Constitution, 4th Edition (Butterworths, Dublin,

2001)

4.  Glanville Williams, Learning the Law, 11 th ed. (London: Stevens and Sons, 1982), p. 75.

5.  James P. Casey, Constitutional Law in Ireland , 3rd Edition (Round Hall, Dublin, 2000)

 

6.   J. Foley and S. Lalor (eds.), Annotated Constitution of Ireland (Gill & Macmillan, Dublin, 1995)

7.  John Bowman,  De Valera and the Ulster Question,(Oxford University Press, London, 1982)

8. Michael Farry, Education and the Constitution (Round Hall Sweet and Maxwell, Dublin, 1996)

9.  Tim Murphy and Patrick Twomey (eds.), Ireland's Evolving Constitution 1937-97: Collected Essays. (Hart Publishing, Oxford, 1998)

10.   www.irelandsmillenia\history.ie

11.  www.oasis\constitution.ie

12.  

13.  www.politics.tcd.ie/courses/undergrad/bcc/thunderer/ ( TCD The Thunderer email)

14.  Ian Walsh, “Between  Scylla  and  Charybdis.   The  Supreme  Court  and  the  Regulation  of Information Bill (1995).” colr.ucc.ie/ SC%20and%20Regulation%20of%20Information%20-%20Ian%20Walsh.pdf

15.  Paul Perell of Weir & Foulds  “Stare Decisis and Techniques of Legal Reasoning and Legal Argument”  legalresearch.org/docs/perell.html

16.  Richard H. Fallon Jr. www.nyu.edu/pages/lawreview

                                

                                

DECLARATION

        I declare that this above assignment is all of my own work for the purposes of the constitutional law assignment.

                                

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