licensees or those entering “as of right”. But they must be visiting the occupier
For the purposes of the Act Charles is a licensee and has therefore a licence to enter the property under
the protection of the Act. However, this licence is only in act if there is no signs excluding salesmen of
any type. As this is not the case Charles is permitted to be on the property until he is told to go away by
Adam only at this point will his licence be revoked and he must leave the property. So at all times
Charles is viewed as a lawful visitor under the act. The only other possible scenario in which Adam
could discharge the common duty of care to a visitor is where damage is caused to a visitor by a danger
of which he had been warned by the occupier. The warning is not to treated as absolving the occupier
from liability unless in all circumstances it was enough to enable the visitor to be reasonably safe e.g. if
he placed a sign stating that the property is in a dilapidated state and that you are to enter at your own
risk which upon entering would negate any claim as the visitor decided to run the risk.
When assessing whether Adam is liable in torts for an action against Diana it first must be established
that there is a duty owed by him to Brenda, and that in turn Diana may claim under that same right,
otherwise Adam can take leave of any claim by Diana and that she will have to seek remedies for her
damages through Brenda instead.
A landlord’s liability is assessed according to the defective premises Act 1972. In which s.4(1) imposes
a duty to take such care as is reasonable in all the circumstances to see that (claimants) are reasonably
safe from personal injury or from damage caused by a relevant defect. However, this definition
provokes the response that Adam took such care that is reasonable to ensure that any claimants were
safe, it was not his fault that the work, which was engaged, was of an inadequate standard. However,
the case of Sykes v Harry negates that notion as it enforces s.4(2) in stating that landlords are liable for
defects they didn’t know about. Therefore a landlord under an obligation to the tenant for the
maintenance or repair of the premises is liable and owed that common duty of care. However, what
must be noted is the fact that not all landlords are capable of being sued under s.4 as it is only those
whom are under an obligation to maintain the premises. This obligation must be proved, not just
assumed. This obligation can occur either by statute in particular the Defective Premises Act 1972
s.4(4) as it turns an implied right to repair into an implied duty. Yet this must coincide with the
Landlord and Tenant Act 1985, in particular ss11-14, as this must apply to a lease of less than 7yrs as
beyond that a Landlord can exclude an obligation to maintain the premises and insist that it is now the
person leasing the properties responsibility, in this case being Brenda. However there is no reason to
suspect that this is the case as why would’ve Adam otherwise gone to the expense of fixing a roof that
is no longer his responsibility therefore it is an unlikely pursuit that the lease between Adam and
Brenda exceeds the 7yr period thus making Adam liable. Yet he is only liable for “relevant defects” in
maintenance or repair and not “design” defects.
The significant turning point when assessing Adam’s liability to Brenda and Diane is; to whom is the
duty owed? The duty is owed to all persons who might reasonably be expected to be affected by
defects in the state of the premises, s.4(1) adopts the Atkinian neighbours principle, this therefore
includes the tenants. But the case of Sykes v Harry considers the tenant’s family, visitors, and a passer-
by or even a trespasser, therefore widening the scope of section 4; as it also borrows from Donoghue v
Stevenson the duty owed to all persons who might reasonably be expected to be affected. Therefore it
doesn’t matter who you are, but were you in the danger area. As a result it provides a wide umbrella
protecting claimants who could sue the landlord. It must be noted though that this is not strictly liable,
it only applies in the case of a breach of duty. This applies to any premises, which are let whether
dwelling or not, but that where the tenancy is broad enough to embrace contractual and statutory
licences, s.4(6) Landlord and Tenant Act 1985. Section 6(3) secures that any avoidance of the act is
void but it only applies if the landlord was negligent, as the Unfair Contract Terms Act doesn’t apply to
leases.
Edward cannot use the aids of the Defective Premises Act 1972, as non-entrants cannot sue, they have
to enter the premises to use the act. Therefore it is necessary to consult common law negligence when
assessing a claim in regards to Edward as he was walking past number three when the incident
occurred and ended up being injured on the public highway as a result. Negligence occurs when a
person fails to take reasonable care not to cause damage or injury to another’s person or property and
thereby causes loss to that person. The neighbour principle provides that you must take reasonable care
to avoid acts or omissions, which you can reasonably foresee, would likely to injure your neighbour.
Who then, in law is my neighbour? Persons who are so closely and directly affected by my act that I
ought reasonably to have them in contemplation as being so affected when I am directing my mind to
the acts or omission which are called in question. Therefore it is a prima facie duty of care, to take
such care as is reasonable not to cause harm to those whom are likely to be affected in regards to
personal injury. Therefore as the neighbour principle is satisfied Adam is liable for the damages
caused to Edward.
It is conclusively coherent that Adam shall be liable for damages in regards to Charles under the
Defective Premises Act 1972, provided that there was no warning to Charles explaining the dilapidated
state of the premises. However it is unlikely to exist as he had just work completed on the roof, and
therefore there should be no reason for Adam to doubt the quality of the work and as a result Adam
shall be liable for damages. Adam shall also be liable for the damages in regard of Brenda and Diana
under the Landlords and Tenant Act 1985 provided that the defect which caused the damage was not a
design defect or that the lease was not exceeding 7 years and that Adam excluded the liability of the
right to repair. It is without doubt that Adam is liable under negligence for damages to Edward and
damages consequence of the personal injury. The only possible remedy Adam may be able to seek is to
claim back any damages which he liable for from the company whom contracted to do the work
Word count 1548
Bibliography:
Blackstone’s Statutes on Contract Tort and Restitution, 2002-2003, 13th Ed, Francis Rose
A Casebook on Tort, Tony Weir, 9th Ed, Sweet & Maxwell
Textbook on Torts, 8th Ed, Michael A. Jones, Oxford University Press
Holden v White [1982] QB 679, [1982] 2 All ER
[2001] EWCA Civ 167; [2001] 3 WLR 62, CA
Per Stevenson LJ in Rimmer, supra p10. D
Lee v Leeds City Council, Trustees of Dame Margaret Hungerford Charity v Beazley
Lee v Leeds City Council, Trustees of Dame Margaret Hungerford Charity v Beazeley
Donoghue v Stevenson [1932] Ac 562 HL
Home Office v Dorset Yacht Co [1970] AC 1004