This applies to Eve and Fred’s contract as the agreement was for Fred to renovate a six-bedroom property by the 1st October in return for a £20,000 payment from Eve. This means that Eve is not obliged to pay Fred the extra £2,000 she promised because Fred was already bound by his original contractual duty to complete the work by 1st October.
If Fred had performed more than he had originally promised, then there could be consideration as illustrated in Hartley v Ponsonby (1857) where nearly half the crew deserted, discharging the contracts of the remaining sailors as it was dangerous to sail the ship home with only half the crew. The sailors were therefore free to make a new contract, so the captain’s promise to pay them extra wages was enforceable.
In relation to Gina and the other tenants, past consideration applies where something is already completed before the promise is made; it cannot generally amount to consideration. Roscorla v Thomas (1842) illustrates this; the defendant promised the plaintiff that a horse, which had been bought by him, was sound and free from vice. However, because the promise was made after the sale had been completed it could not be enforced as it was held that there was no consideration.
Eve and Gina entered a contract whereby Gina looked after any minor problems with the other tenants in the house and to give Eve £5 per week in the return of a room. Eve is bound by the contract to accept £5 per week from Gina and has no authority to change this without Gina’s agreement. The same principle applies to the other tenants; because Eve had promised to charge them half rent until the work on the roof was finished as compensation for the inconvenience, she again, has no authority to change this as she is already bound by the existing contract whereby she will only charge half rent. However, in London Property Trust Ltd v High Trees House Ltd (1947) Lord Denning introduced ‘promissory estoppel’ whereby ‘if a promise, intended to be binding, and intended to be acted upon, is acted upon, then the court will not allow the promisor to go back on his promise.’ In London PropertyTrust Ltd v High Trees House Ltd (1947), owners of a block of flats had promised to accept reduced rates in 1939. There was no consideration for their promise, but Lord Denning stated that he would nevertheless estop them from recovering any arrears. However, this contradicts the House of Lord’s decision in Jorden v Money (1854) where it was concluded that estoppel applied only to statements of fact and not to promises.
So from the cases explored and previous jurisdiction it appears that Gina can continue to pay £5 per week and the other tenants do not have to pay Eve any arrears.
‘Law of Contract Fourth Edition’ Ewan McKendrick, Palgrave, New York, 2000