One’s knowledge may be structured through one’s belief, which is in turn affected by one’s previous experiences and needs. Therefore, what one perceives through the faculty of sight (here, meaning their eyes) may seem different than what it really is, based on the observer’s own wants, needs, and emotions among other subjective factors. An example of this can be seen in the children’s Hans Christian Anderson’s story, The Little Mermaid. When the title character recovered a fork from a sunken ship, she was puzzled by the unfamiliar form. Not knowing what this pronged metallic object was—which was indeed much different than the trident her father held—and having no need for forks where she came from, along with the unfamiliar object’s similarity to what she thought a comb would be, she instead believed the object to be a comb. She also did not know that the ship where she recovered the fork did not carry women, and therefore she did not have any other combs to compare the unknown object to. She believed that the fork was a comb even more profoundly when a more knowledgeable source told her that it was so. She was clearly not blind, and even if she were, she had the sense of touch to tell her that what she held was not a comb; then why did she believe it to be so? Her lack of knowledge of what the fork was led her to believe that she knew the fork was a comb. Therefore, although she used ‘the organ of sight,’ her eyes, to try and analyse the object, without true knowledge of its use, she was unable to see the fork for what it really was: a fork.
As also evident in the foregoing example, what the eyes and the brain see can be completely different. The Little Mermaid’s eyes saw a fork, but her brain, unable to parallel the fork with any other archival data, translated the metal utensil into a comb. Same argument may be true for language: While one may see with their eyes, letters arranged in a particular order, without knowledge to make sense of the intent of the letters the letters would be meaningless. For example, a foreigner who comes to the United States from a country where they use the same type of alphabet but speak a different language may see important signs and, without knowledge of what they are saying, act in a manner that jeopardizes his health and the health of those around him. Even more likely is that the foreigner will automatically not notice many of the signs that he does not understand. Why? Because although the eyes received information that the signs are there, the brain is baffled and therefore chooses to ignore many of the unfamiliarities in order to comfort itself. As Reuben Abel stated, “What enters the eye is not really seen until it is organized by the brain.” Hence, the brain’s inability to organize unfamiliar data prevents the observation of the coded information that has entered the eyes.
Sight is affected by knowledge, which is, as mentioned earlier, in turn affected by emotion. John Marks Templeton, in his article “The Way Emotions Are Assigned,” explained “what humans observe or encounter in life is tagged with an emotion in the brain even before we have a chance to think about something or decide what we feel about it.” This would mean that each person must first sense an emotion in the brain about what they are observing in order to be able to think about analyzing it. Therefore, one needs emotions in order to tap knowledge, and knowledge in order to see.
Art and history are two other areas of knowledge that are dependent on the observations of the eyes. In art, one may see an abstract work of art, such as The Skull of Zurbaran, by Salvador Dal (see Appendix A); the burnt colours may capture the observer’s attention, but at first glance it is likely that he will miss the fact that what he is looking at is a skull as well as a village, especially if he does not know what a skull is. The picture causes an emotional reaction in the brain, which will condition what type of knowledge should be applied to the analysis of the painting. Perhaps the opposite remark may be true for an observer who works with skulls as a part of his line of work (such as, lets say, a physical anthropologist); this observer may miss the village (though it is hard for most people) and instead see only the skull because his knowledge has decided to condition the object of his attention to what he already knows.
Taking the study of history to also include archaeology, one can argue that for the archaeologist his knowledge is his organ of sight rather than his eyes. Just as the Little Mermaid had uncovered a tool from a time and place unknown to her, the archaeologist digs into the past to find answers about who we are and where we came from, to maybe even where we are headed. The archaeologist may uncover tools unparalleled in our society; since he has no knowledge of what the unknown object is, he analyses it carefully and justifies his conclusions based on his knowledge of his own society and emotions (knowledge by acquaintance) and what he has learned through his studies as an archaeologist (knowledge through study). Therefore, though it is essential that the object be observed carefully through the eyes, it is also very important that the observer has some sort of knowledge in order to be able to see what there is to see.
While it is important to realize that our anatomical manifestation has designed the eyes as the organs of sight and has wired our brains to associate light activity with colours, dimensions, and emotions, knowledge is essential in the correct analysis of what is being observed. Therefore, although knowledge cannot literally be defined as an organ, to take the quote as literally referring to knowledge as a tangible entity would be inherently flawed. Knowledge, affected by belief, justification, and emotion, is the indispensable ‘organ of sight,’ as without it what one sees is no more than raw data. After all, one only sees what he wants it to be.
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Bibliography
Books:
Abel, Reuben. “ 2: Basis of Knowledge.” Man is the Measure. New York; Free Press, 1976.
Andersen, Hans Christian. The Little Mermaid. Ed. Claire Booss. New York: Jelly Bean Press, 1993.
Templeton, John Marks. “The Way Emotions Are Assigned.” How Large is God? —The Voices of Scientists and Theologicians. London; Templeton Foundation Press, 1997.
Appendix A. The Skull of Zurbaran. Salvador Dal. 1956.
