In March 2001 under the provisions of the Criminal Justice and Court Services Act 2000, the Home Office was given greater powers to tackle the problems that I have just highlighted. Its aim was to eliminate inconsistency, uncertainty and to increase the quality of work surrounding public protection. In March 2001 it introduced a statutory duty on Probation and the police to make joint arrangements for the management and assessment of sexual offenders who may cause serious harm to the public. This placed a duty on Probation and police to set up Multi agency public protection arrangements (MAPPA) and to involve key organisations. These dangerous offenders were also placed into three different categories:
- Category 1 offenders: Registered sex offenders
- Category 2 offenders: Violent or other sex offenders. This includes violent offenders sentenced to imprisonment for 12 months or more. Sex offenders not required to register and those subject to hospital orders with restrictions.
- Category 3 offenders: Other offenders. These include offenders who do not fall under category 1 or 2 but still pose a risk of harm to the public due to the nature of their offences.
MAPPA is then organised into three levels of management:
- Level 1: involves a single agency
- Level 2: requires the involvement of other agencies such as housing, social services etc.
- Level 3: Meetings under this level are known as Multi – Agency Public Protection Panels (MAPPPs). They should only be dealing with the ‘critical few’ (Young et al, 2005) whose management is so problematic that management of a senior level is required.
The Criminal Justice Act 2003 strengthened MAPPA legislation by introducing a ‘duty to co-operate’ with the responsible authority (i.e Prison, Probation and Police). (Young et al 2005). This required relevant agencies to co-operate with the assessment and management of risk so they could work together effectively.
Since the introduction of MAPPA there have been various pieces of research investigating the different processes that MAPPA adopt to identify and manage risk. I will be examining a couple and comparing their findings.
The first piece of research I will be looking at is the experience of mental health representatives on the MAPPP held within the borough of the South London and Maudsley (SLAM) NHS Trust.
This research was conducted over a 21 month period between October 2001 and 2003.The purpose of the study was to look at the nature and significance of the forensic community health service to MAPPP and the ethical and professional issues that arose. The results highlighted important issues including the importance of mental health teams in the contribution to the management of dangerous offenders. For example the report showed how necessary and important it was that mental health teams provided reports with regards to an offender’s mental state and provide risk assessments to MAPPP. A problem they encountered however was with regards to disclosure. The mental health teams often had problems managing the balance between patient confidentiality and public safety. This often caused conflict amongst other agency members who were not always subject to similar requirements of confidentiality. Other areas highlighted were the absence of increased resources to meet the demands of increased workloads. In addition there was a constant lack of protocols and guidelines. There were many inconsistencies between MAPPPS which were being managed on an individual basis and found that it needed to be more co-ordinated and standardised (Young et al 2001).
The aim of the next study was to explore typologies of risk amongst high risk offenders and to identify resources to improve risk management strategies adopted by MAPPA. The study investigated all offenders registered as level 3 MAPPP cases, between January 2004 and December 2005. These cases were reviewed and the risks posed were identified. Three distinct groups emerged distinguishing one cluster of offenders from another:
Cluster 1: Sexual offenders with few other risks.
Cluster 2: Domestic violence offenders without emotional instability and substance misuse.
Cluster 3: Violent offenders with additional risks of emotional instability and substance misuse.
One of the factors that distinguished cluster 3 from the others was the higher probability of mental health disorders, personality disorder, self harm and/or substance misuse. It was apparent from this study that the profile of level 3 offenders was a complex one with multiple risks. Wood (2007) states that this indicates that a vast amount of violent offenders were most likely to present with emotional instability.
These findings highlight the importance of psychiatric and psychologists input at MAPPA meetings. However many meetings are still not receiving the full benefit of these agencies. This could be due to the fact that mental health services are reluctant about sharing information and the issues of patient confidentiality.
The findings also demonstrated the need for offence specific assessment tools to ensure a more thorough assessment of offenders who commit sexual, generic violence or domestic violence offences. Although The Offender Assessment System (OASys, 2001) used by the Probation and Prison service has been hailed as ‘probably the most advanced tool for this purpose in the world’ (Her Majesty’s Inspection Report, 2006:69). It does not however enable a detailed assessment of specific offence types. It also does not correspond well with other agencies’ assessments.
Next I will discuss the two high profile murders by released prisoners and examine the parole board’s decision to release them, and the quality of supervision upon their release. Starting with the murder of Naomi Bryant in Winchester, by Anthony Rice. At the time of Ms Bryant’s murder Rice was on a life licence after having served 16 years in prison, he had a history of sexual attacks including rape, attempted rape and other assaults. He was being supervised in the community by Hampshire Probation Area alongside a number of other agencies through MAPPA. Following the murder of Ms Bryant it was actually Hampshire MAPPA who requested an independent report. The report identified a number of substantial deficiencies in the way Rice had been managed before and after his release from prison.
It became apparent from early on that Rice had been too dangerous to be released in the first place. Importantly, the report also revealed the failure to manage Rice’s risk of harm was not down to a single person or agency, it was a cumulative failure of processes and actions both in prison and in the community. With regards to his release the panel were given incomplete information about his assaults on children. Secondly, the over optimistic assessments on Rice ignored his risk factors and the risk of harm he posed to the public. Upon his release it was not entirely clear who took lead responsibility of this case and there were often transfers of key responsibilities. Licence conditions were neither clear nor concise as it stated on Rice’s licence that he should not misuse substances. Hostel staff therefore thought it was ok for Rice to drink some alcohol. Throughout the case there were numerous mistakes, lack of communication and a number of misjudgements. The MAPPA panel handling the case also allowed their attention to be distracted by Human Rights issues as opposed to Public Protection. What Rice’s case did was re-enforce the importance of multi- agency work, having clear and consistent practice especially between the three core MAPPA agencies, Probation, Police and Prisons.
The next case is regarding the murder of John Monckton and the attempted murder of his wife by two men who were under the supervision of London Probation.
Damien Hanson was aged 23 at the time he committed the murder. He had criminal convictions for indecent assault, theft, violence and burglary. When Hanson was 17 he received a sentence of 12 years for attempted murder and conspiracy to rob. It was whilst on licence for this offence that he murdered John Monckton.
Elliot white was aged 23 at the time of the offence and he was on a drug testing and treatment order. His previous convictions consisted of drug offences only. The inspectorate report (2006) that was conducted on this case used the term “collective failure” to describe the flawed practice of all those involved in the Hanson and White’s management, and acknowledges “considerable organisational constraints”.
Although neither offender was referred to MAPPA, Hanson should have been. He was assessed as a high risk of harm but was not dealt with as such. The parole board underestimated the relevance of Hanson’s propensity to use instrumental violence. Hanson had a record of using calculating violence for financial gain. The ‘CALM’ programme that he was placed on does not address that type of violence. Another problem arose on his release. Hanson was told to report to an office which was in the borough of his exclusion zone. He was also to reside in a hostel that had not been agreed by the Parole board, the previous hostel in Essex had declined the application and Hanson had been placed elsewhere without the parole board’s approval.
In the case of Elliot White his order at the time was lacking in good management and there was a failure to enforce the order properly. There was poor record keeping and lack of communication between White and his offender manager. Not only were there missed appointments but he did not complete all his drug tests that was required. He breached his order after nine months and the case was left for months without any action being taken. The report expresses the opinion that this mis-management would have led to White having a “weak understanding” of supervision, and a “low regard for the importance of complying” (HM inspectorate of Probation 2006).
Having looked at these two cases, there are similarities in the way they were managed badly. In both cases there were problems with the interpretation of the licence conditions. The risk of harm the offenders posed were not assessed or managed properly and the partnership arrangements did not work together.
So far this essay has addressed quite negative aspects of multi–agency work. Now I will look at some of the positive aspects of their work.
The Joint Thematic inspection report which took place in 2005 highlighted that although there were still improvements to be made alot of good work had been done. Firstly the report found that in a high proportion of cases, the risk of harm assessments had been appropriate. In just under three quarters of the sample that had been investigated, within the risk of harm assessments there were references to other assessments and victim issues. Once an offender had been identified as a MAPPA case, Probation and Prisons worked closely together to find appropriate programmes for the offender to complete. The interventions put in place were also appropriate to decrease or maintain the risk of harm the offender posed.
The next piece of research conducted in 2005 presented the differences to a 2001 review of public protection arrangements (Maguire et al, 2001). This is a piece of research that I have also discussed earlier which highlighted that the systems that were in place had been different and varied in quality from area to area. Apart from Probation and the Police, attendances from other agencies were often very few.
This review however highlights a lot of improvements that have been made since then. This was due to the introduction of the Criminal Justice Court Services Act 2000 and since then involvement in managing high risk cases had significantly improved. Many agencies were now attending meetings and decisions made were recorded and supported by evidence. There were regular case reviews and formal protocols were in place regarding exchanging of information. All areas had procedures in place to manage risk at each level and offender risk classification tools for assessing risk and gate keeping through the system.
Overall what the report showed is that there were some problems which still did exist such as resources, case management and recording systems. However between 2001 and 2005 a more coherent and structured approach for the assessment and management of high risk offenders had developed across England and Wales (Madoc-Jones 2006).
A National Overview of MAPPA was completed which was a review of the progress that had been made between 2001 to 2006. This report indicated that level 3 MAPPP was refined to ensure that resources were focussed where they could be most effective in enhancing public protection. The frequency of level 2 risk management meetings had also increased. The report showed that in 2004 and 2005 compared to 2005 – 2006 there had been a reduction in the number of serious further offences. In addition many areas were meeting MAPPA guidance specification to a large extent. This report demonstrated that MAPPA had also benefited from work done by different agencies, such as the OASys Quality Assurance programme, implementation of the offender management model and the expansion of Visor (the violent and sex offenders register). This system is already used by the police and will soon be introduced to Probation and Prisons. This will allow efficient data sharing between the Responsible Authorities to reduce re-offending.
What also must be commended on with regards to MAPPA just like all areas of Probation is their commitment to Anti Discriminatory Practice. Throughout its work MAPPA will be sensitive and responsive to people’s differences and needs. It will integrate this understanding into the delivery of its functions to ensure that nobody is disadvantaged as a result of their belonging to a specific social group (MAPPA Guidance 2007).
With regards to my experiences, as a Trainee Probation Officer I have not had any experience of dealing with MAPPA cases; however I spoke to an experienced Probation Officer who has had experience with MAPPA cases. He works in the Public Protection Unit and said he generally found MAPPA meetings harmonious and when it came to decision making everyone was generally in agreement. He did state that on a couple of occasions there were incidents when the Police did not want to disclose certain information about an offender as they did not feel it was necessary. This obviously caused problems within the meetings, however he generally felt that MAPPA was informative, helpful and felt that they were a success.
For the benefit of this assignment I have also looked up three offenders who I was informed were being managed under MAPPA. I looked at the Delius entries (Probation IT System) and was very impressed. There was thorough and up to date information on there from Offender Managers, Hostel workers and other key people. All key information was logged on to the system such as correspondence with other external agencies, it clearly demonstrated how these offenders were being managed; the co-operation between key agencies and any problems were identified and dealt with quickly and efficiently such as recalls and breaches.
Since the introduction of MAPPA they have undergone a lot of change and revision over time. There are still some inconsistencies between different areas and some lack of participation from key agencies such as psychology and mental health teams. However MAPPA does continue to learn from their experiences and evolve.
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