This response strategy was questioned in its success and relevance as the correct solution to the crisis. A government inquiry following the outbreak signified a loss of media and public support as they argued that culling, particularly of healthy animals, was unnecessary and more suitable solutions were available. Moreover, academics such as Blake et al (2003) and Sharpley & Craven (2001) have suggested that despite the greater economic significance of tourism for the countryside, the measures introduced were implemented to maintain export markets for livestock. Numerous studies (See Dyer & Shaw 2005; Blake et al 2003; Frisby 2002 and Sharpley & Craven 2001) all emphasise the detrimental effect the FMD had not only upon the agricultural sector (loss of £3.1 billion, Thompson et al, 2002) but on the tourism
sector, both rural and urban which are estimated to have lost between £2.7 - £3.2 billion (Anderson, 2002b). The following section will seek to examine the effect FMD and government control policies had on tourism.
Tourism is one of the largest businesses in the UK worth around £73.7 billion in 2001 and employing 2.1 million people (Frisby, 2002:89). In the context of the countryside, tourism generates around £12 billion annually and employs 380,000 people in 25,000 small businesses (Sharpley and Craven, 2001). In some rural regions, the community are heavily dependent on population earnings which often generate “twice as much revenue as livestock farming” (Sharpley & Craven, 2001:534) in Britain.
Source: Thompson et al, 2002
Figure 1.0 highlights the integral role of tourism and its significant contribution to the economy of rural areas. In support, Sharpley and Craven (2001) discuss that tourism generates four times as much revenue (£64 billion) than agriculture making it more economically significant to the economy in addition to employing a higher proportion of the workforce (7% compared to 1.7% in agriculture). Despite this relative importance, it is evident form the policies that little was introduced to protect the tourism sector.
Following the FMD outbreak, the response of the government to place the British countryside under ‘quarantine’ and adopt policies such as ‘contiguous’ culling (Sharpley & Craven 2001) had inevitable consequences for the rural tourism industry. Primarily, the controversial policy of culling and incinerating the carcasses to control the spread of the disease were images explicitly transmitted by the media to domestic and overseas audiences. This acted as a deterrent to potential visitors not only overseas but locally who were discouraged by the “huge piles of slaughtered animals and …pyres emitting sickening odours” (Sharpley and Craven 2001). Frisby (2002) highlighted that these images of a “totally ravished landscape” dominated by piles of slaughtered animals and ‘odorous’ pyres perceived as toxic coupled with often inaccurate reporting resulted in a rapid decline in international visitors. Visitor numbers for 2001 recorded that the number of overseas visitors fell by 9% to 22.8 billion creating a loss of £1.5 billion in revenue generated (Frisby, 2002). Additionally, a general survey by the English Tourism Council (2001), found that 46% did not want to visit because of the slaughtered animals and a further 38% were dissuaded by health fears of the smoke. Therefore, a further factor influencing tourism was the appearance of the countryside. Government policies had affected the ‘quintessentially English landscape’ and “living working countryside” (CMSC, 2001: vii) that so many international tourists in particular envisage. In Cumbria for example, the fields were almost barren with little livestock remaining disturbing the visual character of the region and consequently tourists incentives to visit. Thus the FMD outbreak had to an extent created a ‘media frenzy’ obsessed with the presenting the negative images of the outbreak aggravating the prospects for tourism growth. As Frisby (2002) argues, the media needed to instead focus on supporting and helping preserve the prospects of these affected regions.
A further factor affecting tourism in the countryside during the outbreak was the closure of footpaths and other rights of way. This combined with widespread media coverage of the impacts of the disease on farming communities suggested that it was maybe in the best interest of the countryside for the public to avoid visiting all rural areas. A statement made by the Prime Minister (27/02/2001) supported this commenting that staying away would “…show support for farmers…and help contain and then eradicate the disease”. Many visitor attractions were closed and agricultural and sporting events cancelled. For example, the Cheltenham festival, a 3 day horse racing event generating around £12 million for the area, was cancelled completely resulting in an economic loss for the area. Similarly, most tourism businesses such as accommodation and transport sectors experienced financial losses. In the South West, there was a 30% decrease in bookings for March and further cancellations for preceding months (Coles, 2003). This created further detrimental impacts on employment as many businesses made employees redundant to save on expenditure. A survey in Exmoor National Park revealed that of 8 accommodation businesses questioned, 17% had made redundancies as a result of FMD. This generated additional social problems such as loss of income and possible deterioration in their quality of life. Moreover, uncertainty over access additionally contributed to the fall in visitor numbers. Although access restrictions were removed, the information on this was not widely publicised and so many remained unaware that much of the countryside was now open. The British Tourist Authority (BTA) identified this problem in their recovery plan for the countryside commenting that communication with visitors to allow “access to accurate information” (Frisby, 2002) was vital to improve tourism outlook for Britain. Thus, the FMD outbreak and the policies introduced to rectify its impact had extensive and prolonged problems for tourism in Britain. Visitor numbers declined quickly in many parts through the combined impact of “sensationalist and frequently inaccurate media reporting” (Frisby, 2002) and restricted access to attractions and businesses.
The nationwide effects of FMD on tourism were studied by Blake et al (2003) who concluded that the total tourism revenue in 2001 fell by £7.7 billion, 21% of which was attributable to a decline in domestic tourism, 49% to falls in day visits and 30% to reductions in overseas tourism. The following table (Figure 1.1) illustrates the tourism expenditure reduction for the UK economy in 2001.
Source: Blake et al, 2003
Figure 1.0 concludes that a total of £179 million reduction in revenues was recorded per week representing 13% of normal weekly tourism expenditure. This is a staggering reduction and the distribution of these effects varied regionally. Figure 1.2 presents the tourism expenditure reductions by UK region in 2001.
Source: Blake et al, 2003
It is evident from figure 1.2 that Cumbria, one area that suffered considerable losses from the FMD outbreak, had a fall in tourism expenditures of approximately £265 million in 2001, a result of the fall in domestic overnight tourism. Domestic tourism is the primary source of tourists for rural tourism who identify that the majority of customers stay in ‘Bed and Breakfast’ accommodation for short breaks (Dyer & Shaw, 2005). These are relatively easy to book holidays so when FMD emerged, it had an immediate impact on this market as visitors could easily cancel and book elsewhere which many did. As figure 1.2 highlights, a further areas suffering reductions in expenditures were Scotland and London. Scotland had the highest reduction at £1.92 billion constituting 25% of the UK total reduction whilst London experienced a £1.4 billion (18% of the total UK loss) decline in expenditure. The majority of cases in Scotland occurred in areas popular with tourists. This created a considerable loss to the profitable domestic and day trip tourism expenditures as access restrictions forbid many visitors from travelling to such areas.
Although FMD was widely publicised as affecting rural areas, urban areas suffered considerably too. Loss of profits in urban areas was lower (£0.8 - £1 billion) and as exemplified by figure 1.2, the main reason for a decrease was the reduction in foreign visitors dissuaded by media images and perceived health risk of FMD. Thus the FMD outbreak had not only a direct impact on rural areas but an indirect influence on unaffected regions through policies such as the restriction of movement.
In balance, the evidence presented throughout this essay supports the idea that the “tourism sector is one of the most susceptible and vulnerable industries to crises” (Santana, 2003). Santana (2003) and Ritchie et al (2003) both discuss the effects of crises on tourism with the latter concluding that despite this awareness of the effect crises such as FMD can have on the tourism industry, there is little evidence of adequate crisis management. This was particularly apparent in the FMD outbreak where much of the UK was unprepared for the scale and effect it would have. The BTA were the first to implement a notable solution to the tourism crisis, identifying that a lack of accurate information and communication to the public regarding the FMD had led to confusion locally and internationally. Thus they introduced an Immediate Action Group (IAG) to coordinate events and promote the countryside. Eventually, tourism began to improve following a wide scale campaigns and programmes to improve “the perception of Britain as a destination” (Frisby, 2002). Gradually, this encouraged more tourists to return to the countryside and enjoy its unique qualities.
Therefore, in conclusion it is important to emphasise that the FMD had a devastating effect for tourism which was worsened by the government’s policies to try and rectify the situation. With regards to a similar crisis occurring again, the government will have learnt some important lessons from the FMD outbreak. Primarily, that appropriate responses are required to ensure that one sector does not benefit at the expense of another. This was seen during the FMD outbreak where the agricultural sector despite being smaller in size and value received primary consideration in the governments control strategy. Such proposals have also suggested that vaccinations should be considered over compulsory culling should a further outbreak occur. Although vaccinations are illegal in the European Union, they can be implemented as an emergency where necessary. This would improve the outlook for tourism as there would not be the widespread negative media reporting of burning carcasses for example. Moreover, communication of information was a factor absent from the FMD outbreak of 2001. It is apparent that if the government had done more to ensure the public were aware of the FMD and what was being done in addition to providing detailed information on areas where access was permitted, the countryside may not have suffered to the extent it did. Thus, despite the perceived progress made in managing crises, many still remain unprepared for such events as the FMD outbreak. however, the government are now more aware of the rapid and devastating effect such events can have and have ensured additional measures are in place for future events.
References
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