The state preceded the nation. How valid is this view of Italian and German unification?
Ruth Yeo 1A13A
Term Essay Two: Nationalism
European History
20 May 2004
1. ‘The state preceded the nation.’ How valid is this view of Italian and German unification?
To define what constitutes a state is simple, for the state is simply a political unit united under one government. To define a nation, however, is a little bit trickier. Matthews describes nationalism as ‘the belief that we have something in common which binds us all together in a particular national community.. a sense of belonging and mutual responsibility, of fraternity, and, of course, difference from others.’ Dahbour considered the nation to be something which arouses a ‘modern emotional effusion.’ The concept of the nation is something imagined and intangible, and by its inherent nature it is tricky to gauge how far a particular community can be considered a nation. Nevertheless, it can be argued that in the cases of both Italy and Germany, the statement in the question is true to a great extent. Political unification was achieved in 1871 and the states of Germany and Italy were formed, but both, to differing degrees, lacked much actual unity. There was a long, hard way to go with regards to cultivating a national consciousness and identity, as there remained many serious, fundamental barriers to national unity that had yet to be overcome. Although it cannot be denied that the support for nationalism in both states had grown considerably since the beginning of the century, the key point to note here is that nationalism was not the main force in the drive towards political unification – that title belonged to the expansionist ambitions of Piedmont and Prussia, the dominant powers in the two states respectively. Since nationalism was not the main impetus which led to the formation of both countries, what Italy and Germany got after unification were not nation states, but simply states. They were only to become nation states much later, in the twentieth century, but their routes to nationhood were fraught with difficulty.
In the early 1800’s, most ‘Italians’ would have pledged loyalty to their local, regional identities – the other Italian states were regarded as foreigners. What mattered to them were the ‘ties of blood and community derived from long settlement in a particular area.’ [Matthews] This was coupled with what had always been a traditionally strong north-south divide – the North had never wanted unification with the South, as the latter were economically backward and seemed like a totally different country altogether – D’Azeglio considered unification with the south as terrible as ‘going to bed with someone with smallpox.’ In 1848, during the wave of revolutions which spread across Europe, the ‘springtime of time peoples,’ the apparent nationalism as the Italian states rose up against their ancient regime rulers was merely a façade. In fact, each and every state was really fighting for differing, localist causes. Charles Albert was fighting for Piedmontese glory, the Romans wanted their republic and the Sicilians wanted foreign occupants off the island. In John Gooch’s immortal words, ‘in 1848, no one fought for Italy.’ This problem of preeminent regional loyalties persisted even after political unification in 1861. ‘A large slice of the new kingdom showed the utmost reluctance to knuckle under and accept Piedmontese rule,’ [Gooch] and this reluctance was illustrated very graphically with the outbreak of a civil war in the South – a civil war, no less, barely under a year after Italy was unified. Piedmont could lead the other Italian states to water, but it certainly could not make this horse drink. The Italy that had been formed was no more than an enlarged Piedmont, and the strength of the regional loyalties which had existed for decades were by no means diluted by a sense of newfound loyalty towards the larger cause and for the greater good of mother Italy; on the contrary, they were strengthened considerably as the inhabitants were inflamed by their new rulers. Chambers observes that ‘to many Italians, especially in the South, unification felt like a foreign occupation.’ The north-south divide was no less evident than it had traditionally been – the Piedmontese government made no attempt to understand the south, as it believed the south to have great wealth in terms of natural resources and land, just waiting for exploitation by the industrialized north. The attitude held by Piedmont seems more like the one a state would hold towards a conquered colony, rather than the part of the ‘nation state’ that southern Italy ostensibly was. The language divide was another fundamental issue that had remained a problem since the 1800s. Thanks to the prolific and esteemed writer Dante’s influence, Italian was accepted as the national language of Italy, but few actually spoke it. A mere 2.5% of the population, mostly the educated elite, was conversant in Italian – the majority of Italians communicated in regional dialects. A telling sign that unity was far from being achieved was the moment when Victor Emmanuel, King of Prussia, muttered the words ‘at last we’re here’ as he stepped into Rome, the last piece of the Italian puzzle which had finally come under Piedmontese control. Gooch remarks wryly that ‘appropriately, the words were uttered not in Italian but in Piedmontese.’ Language is one of the most fundamental channels of culture. If even the leader of the Italian state could not take the effort to be conscious of using Italian instead of his native tongue, it not only shows us where his true loyalties lie, but offers a bleak picture with regards to his people’s linguistic and cultural unity. Furthermore, there was a clear religious divide that split the country into two, and many Italian peasants had deeply rooted religious loyalties – the heavy influence of the Catholic pope in the proceedings of 1848 are testament to the fact. This religious divide had always been a potential source of political friction, especially in the light of the Piedmontese government’s unpopularity, and tensions were exacerbated when after the unification, Pius IX forbade Catholics to take part in national elections and rejected the indemnity and guarantees of protection the government offered. Many heeded his words, and this is clear evidence of how a large proportion of Italians viewed themselves firstly in religious terms, followed by nationalistic ones. Italy was a state in which two different religions were forced to coexist unhappily, not a nation in which citizens embraced their nationality as their primary identity and were willing to put aside all their differences because they viewed themselves as one people. In essence, Italy the state in 1867 lacked a fundamental common link between all its citizens strong enough to bind them together in spite of their many differences, and the fact that its leader was more concerned about Piedmont than Italy, in particular the southern states, certainly did not contribute to the cultivation of Italy the nation.
