Catch-all policies have many critics who accuse them of populism; they adopt whatever policies necessary to win an election without any ideological conviction or clear policy goal. This has led to many of the electorate losing confidence in politicians as well as politics in general, as people lose trust when it becomes clear a politician has lied about a particular policy or when they are unable to see any consistent idea of what each party stands for. Consequently, voter turnout is likely to fall as voters either cannot decide who to vote for or they see all parties as standing for the same thing. In 2010 in the UK, Nick Clegg of the Liberal Democrats based much of his electoral campaign upon his desire to remove tuition fees from universities completely. A huge proportion of his supporters voted for his party based on this promise alone, so when later in the same year it was announced that fees would increase threefold, many people were disillusioned by this as it became clear that the promises made in the run up to the election did not mean a great deal once power had been secured. On the other hand, some argue that if parties maintain a rigid ideology they will isolate voters who do not fit in with any of these ideologies, thus encouraging them not to vote. For example, in the USA where there is essentially a two-party system the Republicans are on the right and the Democrats are on the left, meaning that people in the centre are in between the two and thus may not know which to vote for, which would also lead to a reduced voter turnout.
A number of problems can be identified with catch-all parties, as explained by scholars such as Grofman, Merrill, Brunell and Koetzle. They point out that in two-party competition, “the more ideologically concentrated party may be advantaged in that its party median may be closer to the overall median voter than that of the more dispersed party” (Grofman et. al. 1999). They argue that often at party primaries, candidates are selected that are close to the party median and that in a general election voters often choose between two candidates with widely divergent ideologies. It follows, therefore, that a smaller, more ideologically concerted party may find its candidate closer to the overall median voter than with a candidate in a catch-all party. This would lead to smaller parties being able to win elections despite having a numerically smaller party. Further problems can be identified when examining Kirchheimer’s four functions of political parties: integrating individuals and groups into the political order; determining policies; nominating office holders and expressing opinions. With regard to catch-all parties, the expressive function has become increasingly problematical as they attempt to secure access to a wide range of sometimes opposed interest groups while also being restricted by tactical considerations. Furthermore, the absence of a single cohesive ideology makes it difficult to form policy as there will be internal disputes and a lack of direction which voters may pick up on. This de-ideologisation of the party and reduction of politically controversial policies mean that the personalities of the leadership become more important in the quest for votes, thus the choice of a charismatic leader is crucial for the party. This could be seen in the UK General Election of 2010 where the first ever leadership debates were held between the leaders of the main three parties. With the ideological differences between the parties smaller than ever, opinion polls proved that personalities are becoming increasingly important in UK politics.
Despite criticism, it is easy to see why parties may move towards the centre if we look at the Downsian spatial model of political party competition. Downs assumes that each voter will vote for the candidate or the party that is closest to their position on the political spectrum. Therefore, in a two party system if one party takes up a position to the right of the other party, they will obtain all of the votes to the right of that position. Consequently, both parties will aim for a political position virtually the same as their opponents, with both parties driven to select the political position of the median voter. Black (1948) pointed out that the quest for the median voter is a Nash equilibrium and theoretically would result in voters being indifferent between the parties and casting their vote with equal probability, hence each party would obtain 50% of the votes. If either party deviates from the median voter this will result in them losing votes and consequently losing the election. Although this scenario would never occur in reality, it does go some way to explain why parties may take up the middle ground when campaigning for elections. Downs’ model outlines one of the key problems with the first-past-the-post (FPTP) system used in the UK and many other modern democratic states. As well as inherently encouraging parties to abandon their ideologies and seek the median voter, Duverger’s Law (Duverger 1972) shows that it will also lead to a two-party system in the long run, whereas proportional representation promotes multi-party politics and ideological value.
In looking at European politics today with focus on the UK, this essay concludes that Kirchheimer’s catch-all thesis was correct. It is clear that political parties are gradually merging towards the middle ground of the political spectrum as they aim to seek the median voter. In the 2010 UK General Election it was evident that the Labour Party and the Conservative Party no longer have harshly contrasting policies and that voters have thus become more interested in personality of the leadership. However, it is clear that there are many issues with catch-all parties and the problems outlined above can be seen in UK politics today; parties have various ideological branches which may compete with each other, making it difficult to see a clear overall view without looking at the view of the leadership. However, it is clear that to a certain extent political parties are only ‘catch-all’ parties come election time and when in opposition. When the Conservative-Liberal coalition in the UK secured fixed term parliament for five years they didn’t hesitate in breaking some of their pre-election promises as they no longer needed the support of the majority of the country. Although this may harm them in the next general elections, it is entirely possible that by then they will have a new leader with a new personality, thus making them a brand new party in the eyes of the electorate.
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