As the war in Iraq seems to be coming to a close, many news channel pundits and scholars alike have been theorizing on how this war will be viewed by history.

Just as the debate over war in Iraq raged in the streets of London, it did in the House of Commons and the House of Lords. Some conservatives felt that Blair and those who agreed with him did not fully make a legitimate case for the war, and Liberal Democrats felt that military action would be illegal. While those who are against the war in Parliament express similar sentiments to those amongst the general populace, even those who support Blair acknowledge that in mid March, the issue at hand in that stage of the game was not necessarily ideological support of the war, but a “backing down from confrontation.”  One MP, Douglas Hogg, points to the fact that there is not a majority in support of the war in the country or in the House because “the case for the war is not overwhelming.” It is evident, as is made obvious by editorials, public opinion polls, and even resignations from members of parliament, that Tony Blair faced an enormous amount of opposition in is decision to support a war on Iraq.

The implications and possible consequences of this lack of popular support are numerous. To begin, as John Denham, one of the ministers to resign from Parliament, said, a war against Iraq would be characterized as pre-emptive, and therefore “demands an even higher level of international support and consensus.” In an international situation that requires a united front, massive demonstrations and parliament resignations is the last thing Tony Blair needs. Pursuing a course that the vast majority of the country disagrees with could result in great instability, especially the longer it goes on and the more British causalities that result. The way that the anti-war movement has grown internationally is also a threat to Blair, as the British against the war receive support from all over the world, including other Western European nations. As Blair faced such resistance, it became clear that he needed to act with caution in terms of completely cooperating with the U.S. plan for a war in Iraq. If no, the tremendous popular pressure could result in “parliamentary rebellions.” If the widespread disappointment and anger in the British public escalates any further, there are very serious implications for Blair himself, let alone his foreign policy. Blair was “already increasingly isolated and unpopular” before the crisis with Iraq, and if things with the war end up going horribly awry, Blair’s position as Prime minister could be put into serious jeopardy. As the point of no return in Operation Iraqi Freedom drew near, Blair was seemingly confronting his continent, the United Nations, most of his own political party, and most of the population of his country, which to some is summed up by saying he is “throwing away the last of his good will.”

As there were serious possible consequences for his continued support of the United States’ plan to attack Iraq, it is clear that Blair must tread carefully in the way he does or does not respond to the anti-war movement. Before we examine the way that Tony Blair behaved in light of a lack of widespread popular support for the war, it is useful to explore how other states in similar positions to that of the United Kingdom behaved. The other two powerful states that make up the Coalition of the Willing are the United States and Spain. As war was looming in Iraq, polls conducted by CNN/Gallup/USA Today indicated that 40% of Americans say that they oppose a U.S. ground-troop invasion of Iraq. This is hardly widespread popular support for a war in Iraq, and a growing anti-war movement confronted the decision makers in Washington as they made their war plans. As the peace movement gathered steam, activists questioned the lack of government reaction, and eventually President Bush’s response was that he “doesn’t make public policy based on the size of demonstratons.” The U.S. response to widespread protests and anti-war sentiments was clear: they matter little in determining a course of action.  In Spain, anti- war sentiment has been even greater than its counterparts in the coalition, with one poll indicating that only 14% of the people in Spain have a  favorable opinion of the United States’ plans in Iraq. Analogous to Blair and Bush, the Prime Minister of Jose Maria Aznar’s response was to stand firmly by what he believed to be the right course of action, and that was to back the U.S. stance on attacking Iraq. Aznar defended his position to his people by saying that “not acting to rid the world of weapons of mass destruction is neither politically nor morally acceptable.” Whether Aznar’s behavior reflects a desire on his part to make Spain a prominent country in this international crisis or his aspirations for a leading seat in the European Union, as some have suggested, his response to a lack of support for the war was to publicly defend his stance on a political and ideological basis.

As it is clear by simply examining what happened in the past month, Blair did not back down from his agreement with the United States’ plans to attack Iraq. Just like Bush and Aznar, he was in a position to defend his choice to a divided people, in which there were serious threats to his policy and his role as leader. The response of Tony Blair, and in turn the United Kingdom, to war with Iraq has been simple: to defend the decision to attack to disarm Iraq tirelessly to his people, whose complete support he wanted, but was willing to act without. Blair made every effort possible to dismantle the arguments against going to war, and against himself as Prime minister. In a speech to Parliament on September 24, 2002, Blair made his case for an invasion in Iraq: “ I hope we can do, secure in the knowledge that should Saddam continue to defy the will of the international community, this House, as it has done in our history so many times before, will not shrink from doing what is necessary and right.” Throughout the crisis, Blair continued to espouse what he believed was the very real and dire threat of Saddam’s regime, and his belief that to act would be to uphold the legitimacy of the United Nations. Blair worked hard to show he wanted the best for the Iraqi people, and was not eager to cause bloodshed for either them, or coalition forces. He did his best to quell the fears and address the concerns of an anti-war population, for example, as he continually repeated that “Iraq’s oil was never mentioned” when he talked about the war with President Bush. Even on the very precipice of war, Blair remained collected and continued to speak for what he believed was right, saying “what is at stake . . . is whether the international community is prepared to back up the clear instruction it gave to Saddam Hussein” Blair displayed a great deal of courage and conviction as he defied much of his country and his own party. He believed irresolutely that he “doing the right thing on Iraq” and he was confident that he would be on the winning side when all was said and done. Some of Blair’s campaigning for his Iraq policy must have worked, as even just before the war began, his personal approval ratings were on the rise, showing that Britons, even if they disagree with him, respect this principled man. No one can rival the continued popularity of Tony Blair, and he clearly worked with the affection his people have for him as he defended his policy to them. Tony Blair is in many ways an extremely fascinating person to watch respond to public opinion, because as Sir Timothy Garden, former assistant Chief of the Defence Staff described him, “ of all prime ministers, he has had the touch- knowing what people are thinking.”  As the war wound down, Blair had to face some of the casualties caused by the way he pursued his objectives in the war without more public support, including the United Nations, the European Union, and his own political status. Though he was up against significant opposition, Tony Blair responsded to anti-war sentiment, not through changing his decisions or actions, but by attempting to address the concerns of his population with his certainties about Iraq, his rapport with his nations as their leader, and as many truths at his disposal that pointed to the necessity of going to war with Iraq.

It is not insignificant that the Prime Minister’s actions were not impaired or changed by popular dissent, and his actions are based on sincere beliefs about the interests of Great Britain. Now that we have examined the way that Blair did respond to the dissent in his state, it is useful to scrutinize the interests he was willing to risk so much to defend. To begin, the state of Britain has strong interests and historical associations in the entire Middle East, and the Persian Gulf region in particular. The United Kingdom also shares the same authority that was exerted and made clear in the first Gulf War, that of representing the UN forcefully and of working to ensure stability. Another element of the first Gulf War that may have influence Blair’s decision to act in Iraq was the fact that some say that Britain may have even made a profit from that war, due to the cost being offset by financial contributions from other countries.  Granted, Blair wouldn’t have predicted financial gains in this war, especially considering the diminished amount of international support, but it establishes a legitimacy of action in this arena. In addition to the ongoing interest, there has been continued bombing: U.S. and U.K. forces had been unilaterally bombing Iraq from December 1998 until the attacks were escalated in Operation Iraqi Freedom.  Past relationships with Iraq and the region establish a basic level of interest, but there is obviously more at stake. Iraq has the world’s second-largest proven oil oil reserves, amounting to 11 percent of the world’s oil, and though it is overly simplistic to say that this war is only about oil, it is in my opinion impossible to ignore as a factor. Especially when you consider that the United States and the United Kingdom acted virtually alone in sanctions and in the war, and they are the headquarters of the four largest oil companies, it is difficult to ignore the possible relationship between oil interests and United Kingdom interests in Tony Blair’s eyes.

Aside from interests in controlling the region for the sake of the region itself, Tony Blair probably had greater United Kingdom interests in mind when he bucked popular opinion to support a war in Iraq. The argument that the United Kingdom is simply complying with the United States, and has no will or motives of its own, simply does not hold up in light of the not small goals Tony Blair and all of the UK have for the future of the state. Obviously, the UK recognizes the importance of their special relationship with the United States, and there are certainly many interests that the two nations have in common. More broadly, the British and American interests are compatible and complementary, upon the shared “understanding of the stability of the international order and of the main threats to that stability.”  Therefore, British interests, economic and other wise, are bound up with the preservation of the international order that they helped create with the U.S., they share some responsibility for international security. Tony Blair definitely believes in the power of the United Kingdom to continue to a very important player in the international scene, as does he believe in the EU and his having an important role in it. As one columnist put it to the extreme, he “wants to make Europe the only other superpower, and he wants to be its President” Tony Blair was able to act in the face of public hesistant to go to war because of the integrity.

The United Kingdom, despite a forceful peace movement acted to join with the United States with Iraq