ASEAN: Whiter Multilateral Approach?

While The ASC as embodied  in  the ASC Plan of Action does  not  only  provide  the  basic  guideline  for ASEAN’s  security  arrangement,  but  it  is also assumed as a new set of socio-political values for a further cooperation in the area of political development and  security. In general,  the ASC Plan of Action consists of  six main  components:  Political  Development;  Shaping  and  Sharing  of  Norms;  Conflict Prevention;  Conflict  Resolution;  Post-conflict  Peace  Building;  and  Implementing Mechanism.

What makes ASEAN distinctive against similar organizations is its unique method of conflict prevention and conflict resolution, known as the ‘ASEAN way’. The key characteristics of the ‘ASEAN way’ are its focus on informality (such as private low-key discussions preceding key meetings and the use of low-level confidence-building measures) and consensus-building (broad agreements being reached behind closed doors avoiding public divisions and legalistic procedures that limit members’ choices).

This unique characteristic is also the main constraint of ASEAN multilateral approach toward peace. The ASEAN way is not designed to resolve disputes and conflicting perceptions among the ASEAN states. While this approach has allowed ASEAN to survive and prosper, it is not applicable to ARF, which must function within very different parameters than ASEAN. The organization also practices a cautious diplomacy. The "ASEAN process" is about the management and containment of problems. It is a method of interaction that is still evolving, and it is a "consultative process" primarily motivated by the desire to create a stable intramural environment.

Since most of the members of ASEAN are developing countries, its makes them limited resources and power which force them had to struggle hard to maintain its leadership within an ARF containing several large powers. Japan and the US wanted more influence for themselves, and could threaten to use APEC as an alternative forum. China and India found ASEAN’s leadership a good mechanism for limiting US domination of the ARF. There was a tension between, on the one hand, the desire of many East Asian states (especially Japan) to keep the US engaged in the region to provide the balancer to China that they were unwilling to provide themselves, and on the other hand, the tendency of ASEAN to settle China, or not resist its involvement, while at the same time resisting, or not supporting, the maintenance of a US military presence.

It is easy to be dismissive about ARF’s incessant ‘dialoguing’ and apparent inability to confront conflicts directly, especially so in the wake of the East Asian economic crisis, which weakened ASEAN and ARF. But if viewed as the opening stages of an attempt to build a regional security regime in an area notable for the absence of regional institutions, it looks more impressive. This is reinforced by the promotion of norms regarding peaceful settlement of disputes, regular multilateral dialogue at several levels, and adherence to some international arms control agreements like those on nuclear non-proliferation. Although doing so slowly and unevenly, such cultivation does lay the foundations for elements of an East Asian security regime. These elements may not yet look very impressive when compared either with those in Europe or with the depth and extent of security problems in East Asia. But they look more successful when compared either with the absence of them before, or with the situation in other region in the development countries.

The test case for Southeast Asia will be South China Sea territorial disputes. The South China Sea is a semi-enclosed body of water surrounded by nine states with conflicting claims to the sea’s maritime zones and its many islands, islets and reefs. There are two main island chains the Paracel islands and the Spratly islands. The Paracel are claimed by both Vietman and China while there are conflicting claims to Spratly from these states as well as the Philippines, Malaysia, Brunei and Taiwan. In order to strengthen their claims, these states have engaged in a number of activities which include publicizing maps showing their claims, allowing tourists and journalists to visit their islands, granting concessions to oil companies in their claimed areas and building structures on the islands they claim.

In addition all participants with the exceptions of Brunei have sought to strengthen their claims by stationing troops on some of the reefs. The disputes is regarded as a potential flashpoint in Southeast Asia because not only does it encompass an amalgamation of security problems but it could also impact extra-regional powers as Japan and the US and thus spill over into a much wider conflict.

One of the key environmental and economic security issues that have given rise to tensions in the South China Sea is resource scarcity. The resources are both nonrenewable (oil and gas) and the renewable (fish). In addition to resource issues, the South China Sea also holds another economic security problem: a potential disruption to transportation since it is a major sea line that used to transport goods and people. It is estimated that more than 41,000 ships a year pass through the South China Sea.

Because Jakarta did not lay claim to any of the Spratlys as did Malaysia, the Philippines, and Brunei, it saw a potential role as a disinterested mediator. It also had an interest in avoiding conflict in the South China Sea that would interrupt the sea lines of communication (SLOC) throughout East and Southeast Asia. Beginning in January 1990, Indonesia sponsored an annual "Workshop on Managing Potential Conflicts in the South China Sea" where China could join other claimants to address non-sovereignty issues informally and privately. The agenda focused on cooperative study of various problems, including biodiversity, sea level and tide monitoring, resources assessment, and the safety of navigation and shipping. Jakarta had hoped that this forum would promote confidence building and ultimately advance preventive diplomacy toward reducing confrontation over competing claims. However, adamant Chinese opposition to discussing the claims discouraged this multilateral approach as a means of resolving the disputes.

Competing and overlapping claims over territories and resources in the South China Sea is a matter of serious security concern to the region. Amongst the claimants, China is the only major power and it reinforced the latent fears in ASEAN of Chinese hegemonism in Southeast Asia. China military posture in the area is bound to prove worrisome to the other claimants as the disputes have resulted in two bloody armed clashes between China and Vietnam in the last two decades. China has shown no hurry to resolve the dispute but it has demonstrated willingness to negotiate with the other claimants over the issue.

The practical difficulty of demarcating the sea boundaries, the poor prospect of fruitful bilateral talks and the clear obstacles to holding multilateral negotiations all suggest that a negotiated settlement is still far away, and that the potential for armed conflict can not be overruled. Under these circumstances, the best approach in managing the Spratlys issue is to continue with the engagement. Joint development and a code of conduct must rigorously be pursued as part of the strategy. Regional security forum and bilateral arrangements provide ready platforms to advance the engagement processes.

The primary reason for ASEAN’s inability to deal effectively with these issues is its normative attachment to the principle of non-interference. If regionalism is to be more than a process of multilateral policy coordination and negotiation of competing stakeholder interests, then a sense of collective inter-subjective identity among the region’s members is required. ASEAN has not yet achieved this identity, though efforts have been made in the middle of this decade to overcome this obstacle. A new ASEAN charter would modify the noninterference norm.

However insignificant they appear, the multilateral approach does represent a willingness on the part of states in the region to begin talking formally and regularly (however superficially) about their regional security relations. It seems unlikely that this development could go forward without US participation. ASEAN cannot by itself provide adequate regional leadership, though its ARF is better than nothing.

From its inception in  1967, ASEAN  embedded  a noninterference  norm  that  stipulated  consultation, consensus,  and  noninterference  with  respect  to  its members internal affairs, as well as any disagreements with each other. The consensus requirement reassured members that sovereignty would remain inviolate, and the domination of the sovereignty principle meant that serious differences among members would be deferred to defuse conflict. Thus, ASEAN’s approaches to conflict were not  geared  to  external  threats  but rather to helping its members achieve regime security vis-à-vis  their  neighbors  through  confidence-building via  consultations.  This “soft security” approach has contrasted sharply with bilateral security arrangements in Asia, which are geared exclusively to eternal threats.

However, the ARF’s consensus rule, adopted from ASEAN, has proven a serious obstacle to managing tensions that arise from the divergent strategic interests of ARF members. There is no enforcement mechanism or any sanctions against ARF members who choose not to comply. Moreover, the ARF consensus principle obstructs joint agreements. This obstacle could be overcome if the ARF adopted an ASEAN procedure used to bypass a similar constraint.

Little has been accomplished because neither ASEAN nor the ARF have been willing to tackle the core security issues affecting the region, be they external support for insurgencies, major refugee lows, or disputes over sovereignty of islands. Inclusive memberships in both organizations and the ASEAN consensus principle work against their security effectiveness. Absence of interoperability among the region’s armed forces, embedded suspicions about neighbors’ motivations, and an unwillingness or inability to set up effective arrangements to cope with transnational challenges all tend to move security cooperation by default to the bilateral—or at most trilateral—level where more effective collaboration exists.

Conclusion

The future of ASEAN multilateral approach toward peace lies in its member willingness to move on, deepen and expand areas of political and security cooperation, both in traditional and non-traditional areas. In the long terms, an ASEAN Security Community should be a community capable of managing, countering and defeating threats to regional security and stability. Each member state should be able to cope with such threats at national level, and has the capacity and willingness to contribute to a common effort at regional level. The Vientiane Action Programme (VAP) 2004-2010 and the long waited ASEAN Charter signed in 2007 hopefully will be a turning stone for the future of this cooperation.

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