The behaviour of the British in these states did not adhere to the traditional imperialist standard but was, in effect, an ‘empire by treaty’ (Cleveland 2004: 193). Unlike in African or Asian colonies, neither Egypt or Iraq experienced direct British colonial rule but were instead granted a limited form of independence that allowed them the freedom to manage domestic issues but had, as a caveat, the continued presence of the British military and the implementation of foreign and defence policy amenable to their imperial masters (Cleveland 2004: 193). The intrinsic conflict that rendered this process problematic can be summarised by Cromer, who states that the colonisers were;
‘striving to attain two ideals, which are apt to be mutually destructive – the ideal of good government, which connotes the continuance of his [English] supremacy, and the ideal of self-government, which connotes the whole or partial abdication of his supreme position.’
(Quoted in Wilson 1931: 72)
Whilst purporting to be installing a system politically superior to its predecessor, the British fail to cultivate any notion of political freedom, rights of the individual or mass representation that are traditionally linked with Western liberal democracy (Haj 1997: 81). Therefore, once true independence is obtained, the peoples of Egypt and Iraq are left with an inadequate understanding of a democratic political system, which could account for the primacy of the military within government and the erratic allegiance to democracy.
The lasting impact of the physical, and artificial, formation of Iraq is the key differentiating factor in relation to Egypt. The ‘sheer arbitrariness’ (Bromley 1994: 135) of the geographical delineation has affected the governance and existence of Iraq as a state. Formed due to a desire to protect Britain’s strategic interests within one sphere of influence, the population consisted of one-fifth Sunni Arabs, one half Shi’ite Arabs and one-seventh Kurdish tribes. Therefore;
‘In Iraq there is still…no Iraqi people, but unimaginable masses of human beings, devoid of any patriotic ideal, imbued with religious traditions and absurdities, connected to no common tie, giving ear to evil, prone to anarchy, and perpetually ready to rise against any government whatsoever.’
(Faisal 1933, Quoted in Yapp 1991: 70)
In addition to the inevitable conflict between the social groups, Iraq was also subject to great friction between the urban and rural communities, described as ‘two almost separate worlds’ (Batutu 1993: 503). Instead of seeking to resolve this great divide, the British solidified it by implementing a dual justice system that excluded tribal communities from national law, who were instead subject to the Tribal Criminal and Civil Disputes Regulation. This is a concrete example of the British governing principles of classification and differentiation (Haj 1997: 81), perhaps a more sophisticated notion of ‘divide and rule’. By reinforcing old divisions, the imperialists were able to manage smaller groups more effectively and, due to the lack of consensus, prevent the formation of an agreed national identity that would threaten their manipulation of the state. These social tensions have endured and much of the social instability can attributed to them.
The nature and creation of class within Egypt and Iraq relate to another decisive factor of British imperialism. The process of state building was accelerated via the creation of a new class of large landowners and the existing elites, previously loyal to the Ottoman Empire and therefore distrusted by the populations. The main focus of Egyptian politics was found in the capital city where the main political actors were drawn from a mere 53,000 individuals identified as ‘professionals’. Similarly, the first Iraqi elections results conferred power to tribal shaykhs, aghast and old notables (Haj 1997: 82), almost exclusively Sunni Arabs, which set a precedent for all preceding elections, where members of the assembly were chosen bi-il-tazkiya (unopposed). This contributes to the volatility of the regime due to the minority position, in sectarian terms, of those in power (Tripp 2002: 31).
‘In addition to the “old” aristocracy of officials, the ex-Sharifian officers and the Muslim Merchants, this new landed class had come to form the socio-political backbone of monarchical Iraq. And, as in Egypt, the new bourgeoisie was openly collaborationist with the colonial power, leaving the task of national struggle to the intelligentsia and the urban masses, and eventually to the army officers’ (Ayubi 1995: 95)
The fact that the first governments of both Iraq and Egypt displayed a continuity of Ottoman personnel and an inclusion of the new landed class reinforced the lack of legitimacy given to the system as a whole and prepared the climate for repeated military takeovers.
The illegitimacy of the client governments of Iraq and Egypt was reinforced by the choice of a monarchical system preferred by the British. The kings appointed in both states were, previously, respected figures in the Arab world and possessed natural authority, in addition to being predictably amenable to British demands. ‘Within the restricted field imposed by British control, the constitution enabled the king to keep a government out of, but not in, power’ (Bromley 1994: 130) and there is significant evidence of arbitrary dissolution of governments. The Egyptian King Faud (1922-36) repeatedly disbanded popularly elected Wafd governments, despite huge majorities, due to their distinctly nationalist platform. The fickleness of the British position is exemplified by their later coercion of King Farouk (1936-52) to appoint an enfeebled Wafd government due to their need for a neutral Egypt during the Second World War. This intense irony does not detract from the fact that the monarchs in Egypt and Iraq were very powerful political actors but were ‘so closely associated with the structures of colonialisation that they did not outlast them’ (Owen 1992: 19). The British imperialists exploited the constitutional power of the King to dismiss any elected government of nationalists ‘that threatened to tear up or amend the arrangements…defining Britain’s rights’ (Owen 1992: 19). Hence, once again, diminishing the authority of the regime they installed and creating a lack of respect for lawfully elected governments.
One lasting and significant effect of Western imperialism in Egypt and Iraq is the ideological legacy left behind and the ‘determinant role’ (Halliday 2005: 83) played by nationalism. Substantiation of this can be seen in the proto-nationalist revolts of 1919 and 1920 in Egypt and Iraq respectively. Opposition parties were united in the demands for total independence and, as ‘ideologies arise in conditions of crisis’ (Salem 1994: 4), nationalism provided an opportunity to ‘adopt many of the patriotic, secular and progressive outlooks of the West, recast them in nativist form, and then use them as a weapon against the domination of the West’ (Salem 1994: 71). When faced with the social ordeal of colonial rule, the populations of these territories search for new identities that can link the past to the future and demonstrate an awareness to create a strong state. However, therein lies the problem; the self-proclaimed Arab nationalist parties, such as Iraq’s Ba’ath Party, took control of a state whose very legitimacy they challenged, hence undermining the legitimacy of their claim to govern. Despite this, nationalism was the prevailing ideological response to imperialism and remained so. For example, Nasser’s longevity rests on the fact that he was everything the Arab world aspired to; ‘‘assertive, independent, and engaged in the construction of a new society freed of the imperial past’ (Cleveland 2004: 301). Therefore, British presence in Iraq and Egypt ‘gave birth to the familiar dialect by which imperial rule cannot help but generate the nationalist forces that will eventually drive it out’ (Owen 1992: 20).
The predominant role of the military in overthrowing government and the use of violent revolt to express discontent with a regime originated in the imperial era but has persisted well into the 21st century. Initially, the ‘weak consolidation of the state was shown by the spate of inconclusive military interventions in politics’ (Bromley 1994: 137) but gradually, regimes would only be seen as legitimate for as long as they could stave off a military coup d'état. The success of a takeover was not relevant as its very existence had achieved its aim of creating instability, thus, the army became the ‘arbiter’ (Cleveland 2004: 211) of politics in Iraq and Egypt and army officers ‘significant political players’ (Tripp 2002: 78). The prevalence of army-based revolts can be attributed, in part, to the creation of the landowner class and the subsequent repressive character of the states – the response by a middle-class military is therefore a logical progression (Bromley 1994: 161). The use of public disorder was equally significant as it was related closely to the nationalist opposition and therefore a ‘key element in the vernacular language of the argument against British domination’ (Tripp 1998: 112). However, the series of military regimes in Iraq left the country in a position of such political uncertainty that any reforms promised were rarely implemented.
The impact of Western imperialism on the process of state formation is multifold and rests on the specific understanding of a state and whether the Western construct can realistically be applied to the Middle East. For example, despite the formation of Iraq as a 'state' following the First World War, the components of Western statehood did not emerge initially, if at all. The consequence of a British presence in Iraq's formative years 'has been the creation of the most controlled and repressive society in the Middle East' (Bromley 1994: 135). Similarly, the emergence of a landed class and promotion of old elites contributed to the exploitative nature of the states. The installation of a pliable monarch detracted from the benefits of democracy and reinforced the assumed effectiveness of violent revolt and military takeover. In order to safeguard their strategic interests, the British embarked on a process of artificial state formation, both in the geographical and institutional sense, which reinforced social cleavages and constrained the natural evolution of both Iraq and Egypt into modern states.
Bibliography
-
Anderson, L. (1987) ‘The State in the Middle East and North Africa’ in Comparative Politics. Vol 20 (1): pp 1 – 18
-
Ayubi, N. (1995) Over-stating the Arab State. London: Tauris
-
Batutu, H. (1993) ‘Of the Diversity of Iraqis, the Incohesiveness of their Society, and their Progress in the Monarchic Period toward a Consolidated Political Structure’ in A. Hourani et al. (eds) The Modern Middle East: A Reader. London: Tauris
-
Beinin, J. & Lockman, Z. (1988) Workers on the Nile. London: Tauris
-
Bromley, S. (1994) Rethinking Middle East Politics. Cambridge: Polity Press
-
Cleveland, W. (2000) A History of the Modern Middle East. Oxford: Westview Press
-
Haj, S. (1997) The Making of Iraq (1900-1963): Capital, Power & Ideology. Albany: State University of New York Press
-
Halliday, F. (2005) The Middle East in International Relations. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
-
Hinnebusch, R. (2003) The International Politics of the Middle East. Manchester: Manchester University Press
-
Owen, R. (1992) State, Power and Politics in the Making of the Modern Middle East. London: Routledge
-
Owen, R. (1993) ‘Egypt and Europe: from French expedition to British occupation’ in A. Hourani et al. (eds) The Modern Middle East: A Reader. London: Tauris
-
Salem, P. (1994) Bitter Legacy: Ideology and Politics in the Arab World. New York: Syracuse University Press
-
Tripp, C. (1998) ‘Egypt 1945 – 1952: The Uses of Disorder’ in M. Cohen & M. Kolinsky (eds) Demise of the British Empire in the Middle East. London: Frank Cass
-
Tripp, C. (2002) A History of Iraq. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
-
Wilson, S. (1931) Mesopotamia 1917-1920: A Clash of Loyalties. London: Oxford University Press
-
Yapp, M. (1996) Near East Since the First World War (2nd edition). London: Longman
-
Yapp, M. (1987) The Making of the Modern Near East 1792-1923. London: Longman
-
Zubaida, S. (1993) Islam: the people and the state. London: Tauris
