Bradford Riots. In this paper we focus in particular on the Bradford riot of July 7th 2001 and specifically the views of the local South Asian community.

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THE BRADFORD 'RIOT' OF 2001: A PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS

Introduction

In 2001 Britain saw another summer of rioting in its cities, in Oldham on May 26th, Leeds on June 5th, Burnley on June 23rd, and Bradford on July 7th. Although comparable to those of 1981 and 1985, in significant ways these 'riots' were quite different from earlier years, and mark a new departure in Britain’s racial politics. In this paper we focus in particular on the Bradford riot of July 7th 2001 and specifically the views of the local South Asian community.

Britain has witnessed sequences of 'riots' involving racial factors since the late 1950s, when Whites and African Caribbeans fought in Nottingham and in Notting Hill, London (Fryer, 1984:376-81; Ramdin, 1987: 204-10). The 'riots' of 1981 and 1985 have been seen by subsequent commentators as community insurrections against the police. The antecedents on those occasions involved heavy policing of predominant African Caribbean communities.  Furthermore, of particular relevance here was the 'riot', which took place in Manningham, Bradford on 10—12th June 1995, mainly involving South Asians. This was again popularly blamed on heavy policing, although the official reports simply blamed it on 'anti-social' individuals (The Bradford Commission Report, 1996: 11).  The 'riots' of 2001 are more complex: whilst there are characteristics similar to those before where policing is involved, other factors have also emerged.  There are both elements of 1950s-style race 'riots' with South Asians and Whites attacking each other's properties, and collaboration between Whites and South Asians confronting the police as a common adversary.  

In addition these 'riots' cannot be divorced from a context in which minority ethnic communities were alarmed by the mobilization of neo-fascists such as the British National Party (BNP) and the National Front (NF). The 'riots' of 1958 were also related to neo-fascist mobilisations (Fryer, 1984:378; Ramdin, 1987: 206-8).  Ethnic minority communities in all the areas where violence erupted have had their lives marked by ongoing, mundane and persistent racism.  It is important to note that the signs in some places were clear beforehand.  The spread of unrest was linked to an increase in racial violence, the long-standing mistrust and disillusionment with the police, the overt and taunting presence of the BNP and other far-right groups and the entrenched poverty and unemployment which existed within the cities (Ray and Smith, 2002).

There are real issues of economic and social deprivation for Pakistani and Bangladeshi communities. More than 80 per cent of the Pakistani and Bangladeshi community live in households whose income is below the national average; on average, households contain twice as many people as White households; more than half of Pakistan: and Bangladeshi households live in the most deprived 10% of wards in England, compared with only 14% of White households; Pakistani and Bangladeshi men are 2 ½ times more likely to be unemployed than White men and those in work receive only 2/3 of the average earnings of White men (Modood et. al. 1997; the Guardian 7 August 2001). However, the towns where the 'riots' occurred have variable proportions of people of South Asian origin among their populations, and variable proportions reporting themselves as Muslims (see Appendix tables 1 and 2).

The role of the NF in provoking the 'riots' was revealed in a Times report of the court appearance of ten of thirteen NF members arrested for provoking public disorder. They         had marched through a multiethnic area of Oldham shouting racist abuse, chanting ‘rights for Whites’ and bearing a Union Jack. All were from outside of Oldham. Addresses given in court were from Birmingham, Essex, London and South Wales. Oldham was clearly the target of a nationally co-ordinated NF campaign. (The Times, 19. 6. 01)        .  On 23 April, St George’s Day, BNP leader, Griffin announced that he would be standing in Oldham West in the forthcoming general election after national media reports that in Oldham there were more racially motivated attacks on Whites than Asians (The Times, 24. 4. 01). Apparently Oldham had been the focus of a struggle between Britain’s two principal neo-fascist organisations – the BNP and the NF – with the BNP starting to recruit in the town some 18 months previously.  Both use the language of ‘racial justice’ for Whites as illustrated in the slogan ‘Rights for Whites’ (The Times, 28. 5. 01). The BNP claims to have built its membership in Oldham from just two in 1999, to enough to have an organised presence in every local council ward in the town, and planned to stand candidates for every seat in the 2002 local elections in Oldham (The Times, 8.6.01.)

Although the BNP has publicly condemned violence, it is exploiting the 'riots' triggered by the NF and Combat 18 to cultivate support. The BNP (as its website makes clear) has singled out Muslims as its chosen enemies. It claims to offer a radical alternative to the mainstream parties who have abandoned White working class areas.  Therefore, instead of any progressive alternative it has presented ‘racial’ solutions to real problems. The BNP saw the violence that summer as its best opportunity in years to put its anti-immigration views onto the political agenda, asking for Belfast-style peace walls to divide Asian and White communities in Oldham and a boycott of South Asian businesses.  Its agenda remains ‘repatriation’ for Asians and the black communities.

As the Labour Party has neglected its core White working class social base, the BNP has seen the opportunity to mobilise this group under the theme of ‘rights for Whites’. Its deputy leader has recent convictions (in 1986 and 1991) for violence against ethnic minorities, and the leader Nick Griffin has a recent conviction (1998) for inciting racial hatred (Observer 1.7.01).  ‘Rights for Whites’, has become a powerful frame for working class grievances in northern towns, and BNP voters are quick to use this language to legitimise their political allegiances:

‘I voted BNP and I don’t worry who knows it. Everyone in the street voted for them. This morning I feel like someone is actually fighting for the White people of Oldham, for their rights.’ (Quote from Rhona Norton BNP voter in The Times, 9.6.01.)

In this paper we have two principal aims firstly to outline some of the principal feature of the 'riot' on 7th July 2001, why it happened and its political significance for the Pakistani community in particular. This immediately raises issues of how different sections of the community evaluated the 'riot', and in particular the differing perspectives of the first generation migrants compared to the younger second and third generations born in Britain.  However, central to understanding these 'riots' are the neo-fascist mobilisations that have occurred around them. The most serious of the 'riots' – in Bradford, Burnley and Oldham – were in part motivated by resistance to racist mobilisations by neo-fascist groups and parties.

Theorising the 'riots' of the 1980s.

Views of the 1980s wave of 'riots' as 'irrational' are not unknown (see for example Jahoda, 1982: 96-7), and claims about the effects of unemployment and urban deprivation were also made (Benyon, 1984). However, sociological discussions were more circumspect, stressing that unemployment often leads to a retreat from political action (Roberts, 1984), or that it generated a predisposition towards 'violent protest' without clear political goals (Benyon and Solomos, 1987). When the evidence is inspected more closely, only about half of those arrested in July 1981 for instance were unemployed, very much what one would expect among inner city young people at the time (Beynon, 1984: 41-2).

In contrast there were also those who saw 'race' as central to understanding the 1980s 'riots', where unemployment and other deprivations are simply expressions of the wider structural subordination of 'Blacks' in Britain. In particular these approaches emphasised the 'militarisation' of policing methods with respect to 'Black' neighbourhoods (Gilroy, 1987: 236-45; Lea and Young, 1982; Reicher, 1984). These accounts see the immediate causes of the 'riots' as the activities of the police. The response was not one of 'irrationality', despite the obvious emotion expressed during the events. Some of rioters exercised considerable control and selectivity in their actions when defending their 'territory' against the 'incursions' of the police. These include rioters directing traffic in the 1980 Bristol riot (Reicher, 1984: 6-10) to defending shops where children were sleeping (Gilroy, 1987: 238-41). The human targets of the rioters were, with a few notable exceptions, the police and media workers, and the property destroyed either that of the police or unpopular local business people.

These analyses in our view are now seriously dated. In certain respects they represent analytically flawed accounts. Reicher (1984) and Gilroy (1987) (who bases much of his argument on Reicher's article) in particular have what we would call a 'romantic' view of the 1980s 'riots'. Their discussions have the effect of erasing certain aspects. In particular they tend to ignore the role of South Asians in the 'riots' of the 1980s. People of African-Caribbean origin were a minority of those arrested for offences during the 1981 'riots', however, this is not to say that they were 'multi-racial insurrections' (Keith, 1993).

The most systematic attempt to generalise about and theorise the 1980s 'riots' is found in Waddington (1992). Presenting a rather formal model reminiscent of Smelser (1962) he argues that the rioters were economically deprived and saw mainstream politics and illegitimate as they could not influence decision-making, suggesting that they had norms and behaviours seen as either illegitimate or criminal. Routinely these groups are seen as hostile by the police and negatively stereotyped by the media. During the 1980s he argued that the moral panic around 'Black crime' and subsequent police responses were critical here. These group regarded their urban spaces as 'their territory' to be defended against the police, and there are often rumours and expectation of conflict with the police. In these situations 'riots' arise in response to particular events such as an arrest, and the conflict escalates into violence on both sides.

We are inclined to be critical of Waddington's approach, as his model is very generalised and he argues that it can apply to urban 'riots', violence in industrial disputes and football hooliganism. Consequently, important factors tend to be introduced descriptively, rather than analytically. As 'riots', picket line violence and football hooliganism all take a similar form - they are all 'public disorders', the model assumes that there is some essentially similar underlying sets of factors or succession of events. However, we feel that this confuses the form of the action - it is violent; with its substantive content - the reasons why its happens. Waddington presents his account as a series of discrete levels of analysis, but on closer inspection some factors appear at several levels. For instance policing appears throughout, but it is not an analytical focus in its own right. Finally, using Waddington's model it is difficult to explain why 'riots' come in waves.

Looking back on this literature with the benefit of hindsight there are obvious continuities and discontinuities, but there are also some important aspects of the 1980s 'riots' that seem to have been 'lost' from the literature. Firstly, the 'riots' of 1981 and 1985 should be seen as part of the same 'wave' of action starting in the late 1970s, and that they were often in response to neo-fascist mobilisations. The parallels with 2001 are striking in this respect. In 1981 a new anti-immigrant 'Nationality Act' was being debated in parliament (compare to Asylum Seekers), and (usually NF) marches were banned for periods of up to a month in Leicester, Wolverhampton, Leeds, Barnsley, Doncaster, Rotherham, London, Sheffield and Oxford. On 23rd May 1981 in Coventry 10,000 White and South Asian people marching for protection against racist attacks were met by a counter-demonstration of neo-fascists from the NF and the British Movement, and on 1st July 1981 disturbances around a neo-fascist skinheads' concert in Southall led to disturbances between the local South Asian community and the police (Cowell et. al., 1981).  Secondly, there is a tendency to focus on the social base of the 'rioters' as being 'African-Caribbean' young men. This ignores the role of South Asians and Whites in some 'riots', as well as the involvement of women, children and older people in some instances. In this respect there is a sharp contrast with 2001.

The 'riots' of 1991-95 have received less attention from sociologists. With one exception they were in largely 'White' areas, and thus lacked the social drama of ethnic conflict. Studies have focused on the disorganising effects of economic marginalisation and unemployment, as mediated through criminally violent masculinity (Powers and Tunstall, 1997: 43-9). Interpretations of these 'riots' have been decidedly 'de-politicised'. Campbell (1993) saw them as a masculine response to the crisis of unemployment. It is not a crisis of masculinity, but crime, violence and rioting were distinctly white, male working class responses to economic marginalisation shaped by the 'negative' models of masculinity presented in the media. More pertinent to our discussion here is Burlet and Reid's (1998) analysis of the Bradford 'riot' of 1995, that was a response to police action. Although the events share many characteristics with the 'urban riots' of the 1970s and 1980s, they emphasise the 'gendered' character of the events and the role of unemployed young Pakistani men. The Bradford Commission Report was more blunt. The 'riots' were caused by the 'anti-social' behaviour of those who took part (The Bradford Commission Report, 1996: 11).

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Finally, there are attempts to see the 'riots' of the 1970s through to the 1990s as forms of working class protest (Hasan, 2000). This is based largely on an overview of riots of the 1980s and 1990s and tends to reduce the meaning of the riots to the facts that overall a wide range of people of diverse ethnic origin were involved. It is not only a questionable generalisation about what that ethnic diversity means in the context of those riots (Keith, 1993: 116), but also if applied to 2001, where South Asian and White with more often in conflict, ...

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