"Citizens of the ten new Member States still do not have full rights of citizenship." Critically discuss.
"Citizens of the ten new Member States still do not have full rights of citizenship."
Critically discuss.
By its very nature, the European Union is destined to grow. Article 49 of the Treaty on European Union establishes that "any European state which respects the principles of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms and the rule of law may apply to become a member of the Union."1 Since the fall of the Berlin Wall and collapse of communism 15 years ago, Article 49 was inevitably set to be implemented eastwards leaving the matter of time hinging on the question of how fast the former communist countries will meet the political and economical requirements to suit the Union's standards.2 By 2002, among thirteen candidates, eight Central and East European (CEE) countries, namely Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Slovenia, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia plus two Mediterranean islands namely Cyprus and Malta were approved to fulfil the "Copenhagen criteria" by the beginning of 2004, setting therefore "the biggest and most ambitious enlargement in the EU history."3
For many external observers and analysts, however, the enlargement is often viewed in a rather abstract way, as it appears merely in terms of ten new states or ten new economies, thereby encouraging blindness towards the essence - nearly 75 millions of EU new citizens... At the end of the day it is the people who embrace the notion of a state and run its economy; it is they whose vast majority has supported the idea of joining the EU in national referendums4, and it is they who, upon joining, have arguably become unwelcome among many of their co-citizens from the old member countries (EU-15). Be it the legal expressions of such inhospitality or other possible obstacles in the newcomers' integration, their rights of citizenship are widely questioned today as being incomplete. To examine such assertions, this essay will look at the concept of the European citizenship as such and discuss the degree and the legitimacy of its practical application on the citizens of ten new Member States.
Article 17 of the Treaty of Rome establishes that "every person holding the nationality of a Member State shall [automatically] be a citizen of the Union"; the concept of European citizenship was one of the dominant ideas in the Maastricht Treaty5 and was given a special importance in the Treaty of Amsterdam6; the European Court of Justice in Rudy Grzelczyk v. Centre Public d'Aide Sociale d'Ottignies-Louvain-la-Neuve7, has stated that Union citizenship will be the "fundamental status of nationals of Member States"... By all legal means, the idea of the common European citizenship is an inalienable part of the EU foundations. As such, EU citizenship gives its holders unique political, economic and civil rights and freedoms within the Union, while in the context of the given topic, there are two problematic aspects in which citizenship of the Union is to be examined: minorities' rights and, to larger extent, free movement of workers.
Starting with the latter, there is to mention that in addition to free movement of services, goods and capital, 'free movement of workers'8 is one of four fundamental freedoms that are essential to the establishment of the internal market, the existence of which is often viewed if not as an ultimate, but as one of the key goals of the Union. In theory, the nationals of all ten new Member States are now officially EU citizens with the right to live and work in any Member State. The reality, however, is that domestic objections in employment policies have already led fourteen of the original EU states (with exception of Sweden) to impose employment or welfare access restrictions on citizens of the new Member States. The so-called "transitional measures" that however do not apply on Cyprus and Malta9 thanks to their small size and relative economic strength, are due to be in force for a maximum of seven years10 from the day of enlargement, as it was set in the Accession Treaty signed between EU-15 and ten approved candidate states in April 2003 in Athens. Among fourteen "old" Member States, most decided to keep the current working permit system, with Germany and Austria imposing extra measures on the freedom to provide certain services, and Italy, Portugal and Netherlands having set additional immigration quotas. Less limitations were laid down in UK and Ireland, where apart from the access to social welfare, and compulsory registration (UK only) no restrictions apply.
Considering the practical dimension and policy issues of such steps, there are three main points of view to examine: the EU-15's, the CEE's and the Internal Market's as a whole. As for EU-15, several arguments may be suggested. The most widespread is that immigrants reduce average incomes, displace local workers from employment and increase the burden on social and welfare services. In his book "What Kind of Europe", professor Loukas Tsoukalis emphasises the political matter of the immigration problem, pointing out that "there is a widespread fear (mostly exaggerated) among Union citizens that enlargement will lead to large ...
This is a preview of the whole essay
Considering the practical dimension and policy issues of such steps, there are three main points of view to examine: the EU-15's, the CEE's and the Internal Market's as a whole. As for EU-15, several arguments may be suggested. The most widespread is that immigrants reduce average incomes, displace local workers from employment and increase the burden on social and welfare services. In his book "What Kind of Europe", professor Loukas Tsoukalis emphasises the political matter of the immigration problem, pointing out that "there is a widespread fear (mostly exaggerated) among Union citizens that enlargement will lead to large new flows of immigrants. Immigration has already become a major political issue, and is often linked in the public mind to the increase in criminality..."11 Although the mentioned exaggeration might appear to be a fair point, especially in the light of the rather small flow of immigrants to the less or non-restricted states so far, and, in the experience of previous enlargements rounds12, the overcautious approach of the countries like Germany and France seem reasonable, given the relatively high unemployment rates and already soaring percentage of foreign labour on market. Moreover, it has still been a very short period of time since the enlargement to settle the general tendencies in immigration, thus the transitional policies can neither be certainly proved effective nor mistaken.
From the CEE countries' perspective, the restrictive measures that are generally seen as negative and discriminative among the public, may eventually appear as rather beneficial for their own development in the long range. Practices like brain-drain and the recently developed trend of youth-drain are undeniably malicious for every economy; hence as long as they are brought under control by legitimate measures, the latter, namely the restrictions are justified. To support this idea, I would refer to the term 'transitional period'. There is more in it than meets the eye; relying on fast economic growth rates of the new Member States, the EU expects them to reach certain standards in their first years of membership, whereas potential emigration of workers, especially young and ambitious, (as it is mainly them who statistically migrate the most) may constitute a significant barrier in reaching this goal. Furthermore, many ideologists see such a category of economic migration as "irresponsible and immoral" as it deprives the origin countries of their "energy, talent and skills."13 Considering the flip side of the coin there is to mention that for poorer states, the remittances often improve the welfare of migrants' non-migrating families and bring considerable capital to the home countries14, while short-term migration may also contribute to the acquisition of skills abroad; however in a longer perspective towards becoming fully integrated members of EU, CEE countries are nonetheless expected to adopt the mentality of intensive internal development, thereby improving their GDP by steady economic growth rather then by sending own labour abroad. Yet again, there is to mention that all the above is made on hypothetical assumptions of an increase in the number of migrants, the future level of which is uncertain and can only be predicted.
While talking about the agenda behind the restriction policies for the European Market as a community entity, it is obvious that the issue is primarily economic. The common opinion is that despite the provision of the Article 14 of TEC15 the "EU is still working at the completion of the internal market."16 The subject becomes increasingly relevant in the light of the enlargement as the expanded market brings upon itself a new task of completion, whereas "the successful undertaking of this task involves not only actors on the supranational EU level but also the individual EU Member States, their firms and citizens."17 In terms of the discussed topic, it is apparent that in the Union's interest, even if regarded as purely economic for this matter, any possible infringement with the balance of a labour market is highly unwanted, thus the restrictions are to be seen as a necessary precaution. The point is supported by the prevalent academic opinion that "the difference in economic status of the candidate countries from the existing EU members is feared to imply an enormous continuing pressure for migration which would be threatening to the economies of both the origin and the receiving regions."18 The potential growth in migration is also seen as a means of "perpetuating inequalities between regions and reinforcing a core and periphery structure to the European economy in which some regions are in a virtuous circle of autonomous economic growth and high income and others trapped in a dependency situation of low growth and low income."19 In addition, the Union could face difficulties in monitoring the quality and qualifications of the labour from CEE, therefore the transitional period should serve a good time interval for new Member States "to reform their public educational institutions in such way as to guarantee a competence of workers in compliance with the union norms."20
Considering the legal aspect of what is seen as a major obstacle for CEE citizens to attain full citizenship rights, namely the transitional period restrictions, there is a long history of legislation, which proposes that states are in some cases allowed to restrict their immigration policies in breach of the free movement of workers principle. Article 39 (3) of the TEC allows for "limitations justified on grounds of public policy, public security or public health" to the rights of European workers in their free movement, while the scope of those grounds are to be found in Directive 64/221. Although at the time when the directive was issued in 1964 it was mainly aimed at restricting the rights of particular individuals, it found its wider implementation during the completion of the Accession Treaty where the transitional agreements for the freedom of movement of workers in the enlarged Union were laid down. In the future however, the somewhat restrictive situation can only be improved as the European Commission in its practical guide for the enlarged European Union emphasises that "no Member State will be allowed to take away any rights already granted."21 Moreover, there will be a preference rule, meaning that when a job is offered to a foreigner, citizens of newly joined states must get priority over people from non-EU countries. Alongside the mentioned 2+3+2 scheme, this should raise optimism among those who are determined to migrate in the future. Concluding the free movement of workers issue, it is eventually acceptable to assert that citizens of the ten new Member States still do not have full rights of citizenship. However, the negative implication that often goes along with the statement is rather flawed, as it should be understandable that at this point the rights are not taken away, but just temporarily not given, while the mentioned policies are supposed to serve a sufficient logical explanation to those claiming injustice and discrimination.
Less justification however can be found to a problem that is often ignored by the EU officials; the ethnic minorities' situation in the Baltic States remains one of the most controversial issues in enlarged Europe dealing with no less then an essential matter of human rights. In addition to the basics set in Article 14 of the European Convention on Human Rights22, Article 12 of the EC Treaty provides that any discrimination on the grounds of nationality is prohibited and, since the entry into force of the Amsterdam Treaty in May 1999, a new article23 empowers the EU24 to take appropriate action to combat discrimination based on among others racial or ethnic origin; yet the Russian speaking minority in Latvia and Estonia sees itself as widely discriminated against since these countries gained independence from the Soviet Union 13 years ago. Amounting almost 30% of the total population both in Latvia and Estonia, many ethnic Russians, despite being born in these countries have a bizarre status of 'resident aliens', most of them however without having any other 'foreign' citizenship. Moreover, recent reforms in the Latvian educational system have almost completely ruled out teaching in Russian at schools, depriving therefore thousands from their culture and national identity. The ethnic tensions in Latvia have recently reached even higher level as the Government gave its support to the nationalist tribute parades held by Latvia's 'Waffen SS'25 veterans.
So far the whole issue was largely avoided by the EU during the accession talks, and after the enlargement this problem still does not seem to have a visible solution, while "no organisation on the European level is really willing to protect the interests of the Russian speaking population within the EU."26 Latvian officials, in their turn, often respond in rather cynical way, tending to claim that "Europe will not reject us, whether or not our schoolchildren protest in the streets."27 Apparently it will not, as long as it applies inexplicable double standards towards what should be an unshakable element in the European foundations. On the day of the enlargement, alongside the big celebrations, swarming protests were held in Latvian capital Riga by thousands of its Russian speaking residents28 whose main message to the EU was that such discriminative practices should be treated as intolerable on a European scale, whereas indeed, unlike the previously discussed 'barrier' for attaining the full citizenship rights it seems to lack any logical and legal reasoning.
Save for the Baltic problem, it may be concluded with a certain degree of confidence that every new European State and its citizens have gained a whole new range of rights and opportunities upon joining the EU, be it the full political powers, economic prospects, cooperation in the areas of justice, as well as foreign, security and defence policies. Yet without prejudice to the newly joined states, their expected response and conduct may be characterised by the well-known proverb: "when in Rome, do as Romans do", whereas indeed, having received the great opportunity to integrate within one of the prestigious clubs on a global scene, the newcomers, before being confidently able to claim privileges would first have to prove the expectations placed in them. In order to succeed in such a responsible task, new Member States would have to stay logically conscious to the fact that any temporary restrictions should only be seen as an integral part of the steady expansion process, during which its 'architects' would try to avoid any possible slumps in building an ever-stronger Union.
Bibliography
* Nugent, N., "European Union Enlargement", Palgrave Macmillan, 2004;
* Rosamond, B., "Theories of European Integration", Macmillian Press, 2000;
* Tsoukalis, L., "What Kind of Europe?", OUP, 2003;
* Vickerman, R., Piracha, M., "Immigration, Labour Mobility and EU Enlargement", accessed on 13.11.04 at http://www.kent.ac.uk/economics/ research/1europe/ RIIAChapter-final.pdf
* European Commission booklet: "Free Movement of Persons. A Practical Guide for an Enlarged European Union", accessed on 12.11.04 at http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/negotiations/chapters/chap2/55260_practica_guide_including_comments.pdf
* European Commission booklet: "More unity and more diversity; The European Union's biggest enlargement", accessed on 11.11.04 at http://europa.eu.int/comm/ publications/booklets/move/41/en.pdf
* http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/2266385.stm; accessed on 11.11.04
* http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/3677383.stm; accessed on 14.11.04
* http://www.migrationinformation.org/Feature/display.cfm?id=224; accessed on 12.11.04
* http://www.sovereignty.org.uk/features/articles/imig2.html; accessed on 12.11.04
* http://www.strana.ru/stories/01/12/24/2258/213109.html; accessed on 14.11.04
* IOLIS 2004/5 ed. "European Citizenship" Workbook.
Art. 49, with reference to Art. 6.
2 Known as "Copenhagen Criteria" set by 1993 Copenhagen European Council.
3 European Commission booklet: "More unity and more diversity; The European Union's biggest enlargement", p.3; accessed on 11.11.04 at http://europa.eu.int/comm/publications/booklets/move/41/en.pdf
4 All except Cyprus held referendums on membership in 2003, and all voted in favour. The Yes vote ranged from 54% in Malta to 93% in Slovakia. The average was 78%. Turnout ranged from 46% in Hungary to 91% in Malta; source: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/2266385.stm; accessed on 11.11.04.
5 Title 1, Art. B.
6 Art. 8a that establishes citizenship of the Union stressing that the European citizenship is complementary to national citizenship, not a replacement.
7 C-184/99 [2001] ECR I-6193, para. 31.
8 Art 39(1) of Treaty Establishing the European Community (Treaty of Rome) 1957.
9 Malta itself has the right to impose safeguard restrictions due the scale of the Maltese labour market; source: "Free Movement of Persons. A Practical Guide for an Enlarged European Union", p.5; accessed on 12.11.04 at http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/negotiations/chapters/chap2/55260_practica_guide_ including_ comments.pdf.
0 Under the 2+3+2 scheme, which purports that two years after the accession, the Commission will report on the situation, and States will have to announce the system they wish to use from then on. After following three years the States will be invited again to open their labour markets entirely; only if they can show serious disturbances in the labour market, or a threat of such disturbances, will they be able to keep the permit system for the next two years only. (For source, see footnote 9.)
1 Tsoukalis, L., "What Kind of Europe?" P.172, OUP, 2003.
2 The accession of Greece (1981), Spain and Portugal (1986) prompted very small-scale emigration, despite differences in per-capita income similar to those that exist today between the EU-15 and the new Member States. Moreover, after the end of similar transition periods, emigration continued to be negligible. (accessed on 12.11.04 at http://www.migrationinformation.org/Feature/display.cfm?id=224)
3 "Economic Migration Myths"; accessed on 12.11.04 at http://www.sovereignty.org.uk/features/articles/ immig2.html.
4 In Poland alone, the remittances were estimated to have increased by over 80% between 1994 and 1998 amounting to over $1 billion by 1998; source: Vickerman, R., Piracha, M., "Immigration, Labour Mobility and EU Enlargement", p.14; accessed on 13.11.04 at http://www.kent.ac.uk/economics/research/ 1europe/RIIAChapter-final.pdf.
5 "The Community shall adopt measures with the aim of progressively establishing the internal market over a period expiring on 31 December 1992."
6 Nugent, N., "European Union Enlargement", p.160, Palgrave Macmillan, 2004. (Ch. 11"The Operation of the Internal Market", by Ambrosi, G.M.)
7 ibid.
8 Vickerman, R., Piracha, M., "Immigration, Labour Mobility and EU Enlargement", p.3; accessed on 13.11.04 at http://www.kent.ac.uk/economics/research/1europe/RIIAChapter-final.pdf.
9 Ibid.
20 In relation to the EU laws on the mutual recognition of diplomas and certificates; source: Nugent, N., "European Union Enlargement", p.164, Palgrave Macmillan, 2004. (Ch. 11"The Operation of the Internal Market", by Ambrosi, G.M.)
21 "Free Movement of Persons. A Practical Guide for an Enlarged European Union", p.3; accessed on 12.11.04 at http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/negotiations/chapters/chap2/55260_practica_guide_ including_comments.pdf.
22 see also Art. 6(1) of the Treaty on European Union.
23 Article 13 (ex Article 6a) of the Treaty establishing the European Community.
24 More precisely the Council, acting unanimously on a proposal from the Commission and after consulting the European Parliament; accessed on 14.11.04 at http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/docs/pdf/ brochure_roma_may2002.pdf)
25 An armed wing of the Schutzstaffel (SS)- a large paramilitary organization that belonged to the Nazi party during the World War II; In addition to the all-German units there were the SS Freiwilligenverbände (SS Volunteer Units) form many other countries including Latvia, where they were responsible for thousands of civilian deaths, largely from Russian and Jewish minorities.
26 From an interview with Tatyana Zhdanok, the Latvian human rights activist and the first ethnic Russian ever to have won a seat in the European Parliament, accessed and translated from Russian on 14.11.04 at http://www.strana.ru/stories/01/12/24/2258/213109.html
27 From an interview with Vaira Vike-Freiberga, Latvian President; accessed on 14.11.04 at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/3677383.stm
28 ibid.
0329397
2
