Issues with Aid conditionality & Sovereignty
The issue with the conditionality of loans and the sovereignty of Tanzania arise from the fact that conditionality is essentially 'an exchange of policy changes for external financing’ (Kahler, 1992 p.89). Whilst Brown (2013, p.273) is correct in arguing that conditional loans do not question ‘the right of African states to govern their own societies’, they do crucially question the way in which African states govern their societies. Therefore in his statement Brown fails to acknowledge that sovereignty does not just revolve around rights of rule but also around choosing the methods of rule.
The breach of sovereignty that arises from these conditional loans is exemplified in in the Charter of the United Nations (1945) which states that “…all peoples have the right to freely determine, without external interference, their political status and to pursue their economic, social and cultural development, and every state has the duty to respect this right in accordance”.
According to this statement it is clear that by attaching conditions to their loans the donor organizations are undermining Tanzanian sovereignty. Whilst it can be argued that Tanzania does not have to accept this aid, there are few other alternatives for the state as it lacks sufficient natural resources or fiscal structures from which to draw wealth.
Overcoming these issues
The only way for Tanzania to regain its positive sovereignty is for the state to become economically self-sufficient, thus no longer being reliant on foreign loans. This must start with a restructuring of the tax system in order to raise revenue. This is a point underlined in the report by TWAWEZA (2013) which highlights Tanzania’s generous tax exemptions in comparison to its neighbours Kenya and Uganda. If Tanzania was able to raise more tax revenue then it would be able to stand stronger in its negotiations with conditional loans, thus exerting an increased level of sovereignty. The generous nature of Tanzania’s tax system is exemplified by the fact that it’s tax burden is only 14.6% of its domestic income (Heritage.org, 2013). In comparison, the majority of industrialized states receive up to 45% of their GDP from tax revenue.
Suggestions for the African Union
In order to preserve the sovereignty of African states, it would be beneficial if the African Union set a maximum quota for the percentage of a states revenue that is received from donors. This would mean that states would be less inclined to become reliant on conditional loans from donors and would instead seek more revenue from domestic sources, therefore strengthening their sovereignty. Whilst this may leave states poorer in the short term, in the long term it would allow them to gain independence from the unpredictable nature of conditional loans and allow them to exert an increased level of sovereignty over their economy.
Natural resources
Overview
Following on from the issue of aid, a rather different challenge to sovereignty in Tanzania is the issue of resource control. Rather than being a sovereignty issue for the state of Tanzania, this is instead a challenge for the sovereignty of Tanzanian individuals over their land.
Following the resignation of Nyerere, numerous policies have been implemented in order to privatize the Tanzanian economy and in doing so attract foreign investment. Whilst it seems inaccurate then to assert that the Tanzanian state’s sovereignty has been compromised in this case, this does not mean that the sovereign claims of Tanzanian individuals over their land have not been undermined.
Issues
The sovereignty issues that arise from selling land and natural resources to foreign investors in Tanzania result from from the sovereign claims of individuals to their land. As Lissu (2001) asserts, many Tanzanian miners and farmers deem natural resources to be their land, and so, to sell this land to foreign hands undermines the individual sovereign claims of the people. This is a point reinforced by Emel et al. (2011, p.76) who argue that the “independent Tanzanian state has coercively opened up territory for foreign mining capital at the expense of local populations”.
The shift from supporting the sovereign claims of Tanzanian individuals of their land to multi national businesses can be shown by events of 1996 whereby the population of the Bulyanhulu area were displaced in order to make room for the Canadian transnational Barrick Gold. As Emel et al., (2011, p.75) asserts “this moment represents a change from encouraging the interests of small-scale miners toward the unabashed promotion of large international mining capital”. In doing so the Tanzanian state has clearly undermined the sovereign claims of its people to their land
Does anything need to be done?
In terms of sovereignty over land, this analysis leads to the question of what the aim of sovereignty really is? If the focus of sovereignty is on the economic development of the state then sovereignty hasn’t been compromised. However, if we chose to interpret a more individualistic version of sovereignty whereby the individual sovereignty of Tanzanians over their natural resources is included, then clearly the increasing privatization of natural resources is a huge challenge for Tanzanian sovereignty.
Suggestions for the African Union
It would be beneficial if the African Union would put restrictions on how much of a states natural resources it can sell to private companies and foreign states, this is particularly important due to the fact that the sale of some lands and resources have led to the displacement of Tanzanian’s.
Alternatively, the African Union could allow African states to privatize their natural resources, so long as the private companies and investors come from preferably the same state, or failing that, from within the African Union. This would lead a sense self assurance for Tanzanians that their land was not the subject of Western exploitation and that instead it was being developed in their sovereign interests.
Food
Overview
The issue of food production as a challenge to Tanzanian sovereignty is similar to the issue of resources as it revolves around the citizens and their desire for self-determination. In Tanzania it is a particularly prominent issue due to the fact that the country has been experiencing insufficient food production. In a similar sense to resources this raises the question, what is more import food sovereignty or development? This report aims to show that food sovereignty and development need not oppose each other and that Tanzania can develop whilst still maintaining sovereignty over its methods of production.
Issues
The main challenges to Tanzania’s sovereignty in terms of food production come from the World Bank. As Holt-Gimenéz and Patel 2009: 45 argue, the World Bank is staunchly against the current Tanzanian method of farming focused on small plots and the dominance of family labour. Instead the World Bank advocates the introduction of large commercial investors in order to fulfill the potential of the land. Such a stance is dangerous for the sovereignty of the Tanzanian people as it could lead to land grabbing and thus the displacement of the locals who occupy these lands.
Solution
In order to maintain its sovereignty over its food production the Tanzanian state needs to undergo development without privatizing. This is in line with the developmentalist theory advocated by Clark and Jung (2002) who argue that developing states should act as a correcting forces in guiding their markets towards economic development. As well as effective state planning, the Tanzanian state needs to invest heavily in food production. This is a point raised by Maltsoglou & Khwaja (2010) who contend that as a result of government negligence to agriculture, 70% of the agricultural land in Tanzania is still cultivated using hand hoe as opposed to modern methods.
Suggestions for the African Union
The role that the African Union can play in helping maintain the sovereignty of Tanzanian peasants over their land would be to ensure that a significant portion of the government budget is spent on agriculture. For example in 2010 under 8% of the national budget was assigned to agriculture. The African Union needs to set a minimum quota that African states are forced to spend on agriculture in order for the peasants of these states to protect their land from privatization. Without this quota food production will remain backwards and the claims of the World Bank for privatization of lands and thus the undermining of sovereignty will become more appealing for the leaders of states.
Conclusion
As this report has shown, the challenges to Tanzanian sovereignty exist not only to the state, but also to the people of Tanzania in the sovereignty over their resources. Whilst the challenges to the sovereignty of Tanzania do not necessarily hinder its development, they have been shown to undermine the cultural ties of its citizens to their land. In order for Tanzania to increase the level of sovereignty it exerts, the African Union must put in place a number of quotas that will stop the Tanzanian economy from being controlled by foreign and private interests. Regardless of the levels of development that cooperating with foreign and private powers may bring, crucially Tanzania is at risk of not being able to determine its own future.
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