After the September 11 attacks and subsequent retaliation against the Taliban, the Bush administration's policy focused on safety and protection of U.S. interests in the Middle East. Part of this philosophy was manifested in Bush's famous “Axis of Evil” speech, where he mentioned North Korea, Iran and Iraq as the major threats to the United States in the following years. These countries, he said, were developing weapons of mass destruction, did not share an ideological basis with the United States, and were thus a threat to her future safety. Yet, of the three countries mentioned Iraq seemed to be Bush's focus. There are many reasons for choosing Iraq as the first target amongst the many cited. Though we had fought wars against all of the countries previously, the most recent and quickly won war was against Iraq. Iraq also has less than half the population of Iran, and a more divided citizenry. If we fought Iran, we would be up against a more religiously motivated enemy, as we learned in 1979. Also, Iran has a more developed military-industrial complex. If we fought North Korea, we would be up against the enemy with the most developed weapons of mass destruction, which could lead to massive U.S. casualties. However, U.S. military policy over the last thirty years has been to have the absolute least number of military casualties at all whatsoever, as shown in conflicts like Somalia, Kosovo, Libya, etc.. Also, fighting North Korea would not help the Bush administration's objective of a democratized and peaceful middle east. So, it seemed Iraq was the best choice of any of the above mentioned countries to establish a democratized government in line with U.S. ideologies.
Saddam's major concern in 2002 was keeping himself in power, and the major threat to his power, as he saw it, was military coups and Iranian sponsored Shiite uprisings. So when the United States started to express a clear interest in Saddam's weapons programs, Saddam downplayed how serious the United States really was. The idea that the United States would invade Iraq seemed far fetched. On the other hand, the idea that a high ranking general within his army, perhaps sponsored by Iran, would lead a coup against him seemed a very real and probable threat. In 2002, when the United States demanded that Saddam let UN weapons inspectors go about their jobs unfettered, Saddam was hesitant. He was trying to play two sides of two games at once. He wanted to let the United States know that he had complied with the UN resolution to dismantle his weapons of mass destruction and at the same time cast a shadow of doubt as to whether he still had some of those weapons hidden. By casting that shadow of doubt, Saddam believed he could prevent another Iranian invasion. Also, the idea that Saddam and only his most loyal supporters had knowledge of some weapons of mass destruction could be a deterrent against a renegade general within his army. So Saddam's major concern was not the United States and his subversive actions as viewed by the United States clearly reflected this attitude.
After Saddam let UN weapons inspectors in and they did not find any illegal weapons, the United States still waged war. But war is very costly, so this puzzle needs a closer look. Since safety was the number one stated concern of Unites States officials, the war was intended to preempt a war on U.S. soil that would be even more costly to the U.S. A war on U.S. soil could severely damage infrastructure and the economy, and lead to an unimaginable number of military and civilian casualties if Saddam used the weapons of mass destruction in question. So it seemed to be in the best interest of the United States to remove Saddam from power. Also, defeating the autocratic Saddam and establishing a dominion of democracy in Iraq might have affected Iraq's neighbor and fellow Axis of Evil member, Iran. Saddam's shadow of doubt that he created and unwillingness to comply with UN weapons inspectors led to a perfect opportunity for the Bush Administration to further their interests through what was initially thought to be a quick and cheap war. Ultimately Saddam was trapped in a corner, where if he complied with the United States demands he would have lost power, if he fought the United States he would have lost power, and if he didn't create the illusion that gave the reason for the United States to wage war he would have lost power over Iran. So Saddam's unwillingness to give up his power and the Bush administration's focused interest in the Middle East became a diplomatically unresolvable issue-- a bargaining failure. Diplomatically unresolvable issues, though, are generally resolved with war.
Bibliography
Gordon, Michael and General Bernard Trainor, Cobra II: The Inside Story of the Invasion and _ Occupation of Iraq (New York: Pantheon, 2006), pp.55-137
