Conflicts are far more likely to be caused by greed than by grievance. Discuss (Collier, 2000)

220580 – Symeon Brown

Introduction

In his forward of the World Heath organisations 2002 Word Report on Violence and Health Nelson Mandela stated that forever, ‘the twentieth century will be remembered as a century marked by violence…’ with a ‘…legacy of mass destruction inflicted on a scale never seen and never possible before in human history’ (World health organisation; 2002). Mandela’s words mark the reality that in every year of the 20th Century there had been at least one episode of sustained violent conflict either in the form of civil or inter-state wars. However the post World War Two era marked a fundamental turning point in the ontological essence of armed conflict.

The end of the second World War birthed a new and far more polarized world order that promoted self-determination and identity politics within newly independent countries yet paradoxically greater integration as supranational bodies and dialoge began to take a greater role within the political arena. These seeds of globalisation changed not only the context of armed conflict but also the way that conflict is understood.

In the post World War 2 era 16.2 million people have died in civil wars; 5 times the 3.3 million people killed in inter-state wars (Anheier & Isar; 2007). This overwhelming statistic highlights the shift in the ontology and context of violent conflict. Mary Kaldor in her seminal work New & Old Wars (2006) defines this shift in armed conflict as the emergence of a new type of war that contrasts to the nineteenth century depiction by Clausewitz of states competing for political, economic and moral hegemony (Kaldor; 2006: 16-32). Kaldor describes these new conflicts as: lacking a clear ideology and coherent goal; ethnic; experiencing greater civilian participation and mercenarism (Kaldor; 2006).

The prominence of Kaldor’s new war’s particularly in Africa and Asia evident in the recent civil conflicts of Sri Lanka, Rwanda and Sierra Leone have placed an urgency upon political scientists to understand violent conflict in these realms in order to predict, resolve and prevent further civil conflict. Although the number of conflicts has decreased in the last decade the chilling words of Mandela are a reminder of the need for a comprehensive study of the roots of conflict. Furthermore the disproportionate amounts of civil conflict experienced in unstable post colonial states in Sub Saharan Africa [e.g. Sierra Leone] undergoing democratic transition further reinforces the need for conflict prevention in order to ensure consolidation of the state and subsequent political and economic development in these regions.

Violent conflict especially in the form of civil uprising is popularly understood as grievance based especially in the case of liberation/ rebel [depending on your perspective] groups in Africa rising up against corrupt governments (Collier; 2006). Christopher Cramer heavily draws upon the causal influences of inequality, social structures and poverty on armed conflict. However this view has increasingly become undermined and vulnerable to the rise of the economic theory of conflict lead by Collier that departs from a rational choice methodology analysing actors within conflict as economic agents suggesting that conflicts are far more likely to be caused by greed than by grievance. It is this debate that this essay will explore.

This essay will assess whether civil conflict is born from grievance or greed and will gauge whether conflict is best explained by the economic theory of conflict advocated by Collier or by grievances such as inequality. This investigation will first state Colliers economic theory of conflict. Secondly this essay will propose the position lead by Cramer advocating the fundamental role of grievances and intertwined causes of civil conflict. The third section of this essay will analyse a sample of contemporary civil conflicts and analyse the extent to which Colliers theory and the grievances are demonstrated to assess which theoretical position has best captured and explained contemporary conflicts. It is from this dialogue that a conclusion will be drawn. This essay will draw particular reference from the cases of Sierra Leone and Sri Lanka as they demonstrate a broad, contemporary and therefore fair scope of study. This essay will close with a balanced summary of the debate highlighted with a brief reflection on the implications of the conclusion established in this essay. In this essay conflict is defined as political violence within the context of a functional state in the form of rebellion, civil war and localised low intensity insurrection (Addison & Murshed; 2003: 391).

The Economic Causes of Civil Conflict

This is a preview of the whole essay

The Economic Causes of Civil Conflict

Collier as the leading exponent of the Economic theory of conflict proposes that civil war is systematically related to economic conditions such as the dependence on primary commodities and low national income [though not personal income] and not to exogenous factors of grievance such as inequality, poverty, a lack of political rights and ethnicity (Collier; 2006: 1). Collier argues that this is because ‘…civil wars occur where rebel organizations are financially viable’ (Collier; 2006: 1) and then proceeds to provide the example of FARC in Columbia and grounds their continuous expansion and assault on the state in their ability to fund themselves through cocaine production that earns them over $700 million dollars a year (Collier; 2006: 1). In proposing this pillar Collier dares to add a key dimension to our understanding of conflict in daring to suggest that it is not the motivation of conflict that is important but whether the rebel organisation can sustain itself financially. Not only does this have a consequential influence on the possible policies to combat conflict and assessment of conflict but consequentially reduces grievances to a secondary factor.

The economic theory of conflict dismisses the ‘claimed’ grievances of rebels as legitimate and genuine. Collier continues this argument in premising that grievance is the language adopted by rebels to attempt to gain public legitimacy and popular support both domestically and from abroad [not necessarily of states] for their civil assault (Collier; 2006: 1). The Economic theory of conflict completely attempts to dismiss the legitimacy and morality of the grievance based fight for justice so prevalent in civil conflicts involving liberation/ rebel groups clearly evident from the Eritrean – Ethiopian conflict in the protests of the Eritrean Liberation Party. Collier’s suggestion that PR is fundamental to liberation/ rebel groups is validated by the ANC’s tour of Europe and Africa to raise international support, funds, build a positive image and Mandela’s concession of this tactic within his autobiography however the very nature and undoubted moral legitimacy of the ANC struggle against apartheid that ignited great civil conflict in South Africa fundamentally undermines Collier’s cynical view against the legitimacy of grievance based conflict whom extends his cynicism in declaring that ‘grievance is to a rebel organisation what image is to a business’ (Collier; 2006: 2). Collier extends this in implicating rebellions, ‘…not as the ultimate protest movements but as the ultimate manifestation of organised crime’ (Collier; 2001:2).

The Economic Theory of Conflict premises:

‘…Rebellion is unrelated to objective circumstances of grievance while being caused by the feasibility of predation…rebellion is motivated by greed; so that it occurs when rebels are motivated by a lust for power; but rebellion occurs only when rebels can do well out of war’ (Collier; 2006: 5).

According to Collier these are deduced from his comparative study of 47 civil wars in which he concluded from his considerable research that countries which have a substantial share of their income (GDP) from export and primary commodities are radically more at risk of conflict for example at 26% of GDP the risk of conflict for an ordinary country is at 23% (Collier; 2006: 5). Collier asserts this to these commodities being most lootable, which not only makes rebellion attractive but sustainable (Collier; 2006). In addition to this Collier calculates that a country that has 10% points more of its young males in schools cuts its risk of conflict from 14% to 10% (Collier; 2006: 6).

Collier’s departure from a rational choice methodology that understands the actors of conflict as economic actors delivers both a thorough and strong scientific argument for greed [economic motivation] residing at the heart of conflict. Although the economic theory of conflict appears cold and extremely linear this is expectant of an economic model. Further variables Colliers model recognises include geography, history, economic opportunities and diaspora (Collier; 2006: 6).

The Case For Grievances: Does Inequality Cause Conflict?

Study of grievances has popularly departed from the point of inequalities and injustices as the initiator of mass protest and rebellion. This was certainly the case in the catalogue of anti-colonial movements however the forces within these countries have dramatically shifted since colonialism therefore changing the context of popular grievance. Collier’s dismissal of inequality as a key factor in conflict is validated by the research of Wallensteen and Sollenberg (Cramer; 2003:402). However Cramer refutes Colliers claims highlighting the ambiguities and the lack of definition that inequality is given in orthodox economic analysis undermines any assessment of the link between an inequality and conflict (Cramer; 2003: 398). Furthermore Cramer says the absence and failure to focus to abstract data on a micro level dramatically further undermines the evidence calculated by econometric models (Cramer; 2003).

Cramer highlights the research of Alesina and Perotti that reveal a positive correlation between inequality and political instability in contrast to Colliers findings (Cramer; 2003: 398). Binswager roots rural violent conflict within unequal land redistribution (Cramer; 2003: 398). Cramer unites these strands of research to highlight the contentious nature of inequality within society that do not necessarily directly ignite civil war but manifest itself as localised violence as the majority of civil conflicts and inequalities are felt at the local level outside of macroeconomic multivariate analysis (Cramer; 2003: 400). For example in the Zimbabwean war of Independence many peasants, used the war to pursue local agendas (Cramer; 2003: 400). Cramer extends this in proposing that these conflicts are created when economic and social inequalities are institutionalised within, ‘…the relations that produce outwardly visible signs’ (Cramer; 2003: 409) therefore ‘economic inequality is only hugely import to explaining civil conflict …in so far as the economic is considered inseparable from the social, political, cultural and historical’ (Cramer; 2003: 409).

Phillippe Le Billon arguably extends Cramer’s identification of the economic as entrenched within the political and cultural societal structures in his depiction of corruption as a stabilising force within weak states by providing reciprocity amongst competing political actors (Le Billon; 2003: 415). Le Billon’s position provides a paradox to Collier in its proposition that the greed that drives patron-client networks that is endemic within Sub Saharan African states in actuality prevents conflict rather than breeds it. Furthermore within states where ethnic discourse is prevalent and ethnicity the chief system of organisation, power client systems harbour strong networks and trust beyond tribal kinship and are therefore not only stabilising but are helping to consolidate the state and citizenship beyond the ruling class and ethnic boundaries (Le Billon; 2003: 416). However conversely if the existence of patron-client networks ensures cohesion then political change ignited by an ambitious government that challenges these networks would birth political grievances that fuel conflict. Furthermore such attempts Le Bellion suggests would criminalize the state by undermining its institutions and authority encouraging challenges and competition outside of the state that could produce mass rebellion (Le Billon; 2003: 418).

Cramer’s challenge to the reliability of the data raised by Collier against inequality and his forward of institutionalised inequalities planting local conflict critically undermines the economic theory of conflict by highlighting its simplicity and failure to recognise the fundamental role of institutions. Cramer also restores the legitimacy and prominence of grievances in motivating conflict. Le Billon echoes Cramer’s focus on societal structures. Le Billon’s argument documenting how greed within the state in actuality maintains stability severely mocks Colliers argument that conflicts are far more likely to be caused by greed than by grievance. However its stabilising effect remains tied to the political climate rendering it volatile and arguably a destabilising force as well as a stabilising force (Le Billon; 2003: 424). The next part of this essay will assess a sample of civil conflicts to deduce which consensus best captures the rationale of conflict.

Case Studies

The conflict of Sierra Leone was one of the most defining post cold war civil conflicts. In March 1991 The Revolutionary United Front a coalition of Liberian funded radical students, the rural poor and mercenaries invaded Sierra Leone led by Foday Sankoh. The RUF’s invasion sparked the beginning of a decade of conflict in Sierra Leone that involved a cocktail of internal and mostly external forces without clearly defined or coherent motives and goals supporting Kaldor’s argument that the war was about, ‘pillage not politics and about control of the lucrative diamond trade’ (Kaldor, 2001, 134) validating Colliers argument that conflicts are far more likely to be caused by greed than by grievance. This is further supported by Sankoh’s refusal to accept a peace agreement unless he was the Minister of Mining (Collier; 2006; 4). Collier refers to rebellion as, ‘the rage of the rich’ (Collier; 2006; 11). His comment is demonstrated by Sierra Leone’s parallel by Angola as Savimbi the UNITA head was recorded by speculation of having accumulated a personal wealth of $2 billion dollars from diamond mining (Collier; 2006: 20). Furthermore the successful secessions in Zaire, Nigeria and Indonesia occurred in the rich regions that homed the coppering mines and oil production respectively (Collier; 2006: 11). Evidence of these conflicts that are seemingly transparent in their economic motivation dare to consolidate Collier however the case study of Sri Lanka provides significant evidence against the economic theory of conflict.

Sri Lanka has been chequered by ethnic violence between the Sinhalese, Tamil rebels and Muslims. Kork records that these conflicts have their roots within inequalities entrenched within the social structures illustrating Cramer’s position that conflicts are created when economic and social inequalities are institutionalised within, ‘…the relations that produce outwardly visible signs [resources e.g. land distribution]’ (Cramer; 2003: 403). Kork highlights this in the study of the Behethkawewa Tank in which Sinhalese farmers were settled on a land by the predominantly Sinhalese government sponsored settlement scheme whom made a moral claim on the lands vacancy. To ensure a verdict in their favour the Sinhalese farmers utilised their alliances with Sinhalese district officers to pressure a favourable result against the Tamils strong claim. The award to the Sinhalese gave the Tamils a legitimate grievance that sparked conflict. Further evidence of structural inequality via ethnic discrimination in Sri Lanka between the Tamils and the Sinhalese highlighted by Kork is evident from the case of Menkamam Tank which ignited into Tamil rebels revelling and rebelling in the further discrimination by the Sinhalese (Kork; 2005: 209-210).

The Tamil retaliation at Sinhalese bias highlights the centralism of grievance caused by social inequalities in igniting conflict supporting the grievance consensus advocated by Cramer. Institutional inequality that breed conflict between ethnic groups was also echoed in Angola and Rwanda. According to Cramer it was the colonial legacy of the Belgians whose institutionalisation of ethnic divides continue to fuel ethnic discourse and culminated in the horrific Rwandan genocide (Cramer; 2003). The identical cases of institutionalised inequality in Angola, Rwanda and Sri Lanka expose how prominent inequality has been in the history of violent conflict (Cramer; 2003).

The case study of Sri Lanka also articulates the cohesion between greed and grievance as joint causations of contemporary conflict. Kork concedes the Tamil rebels would both collect taxes from TAMIL and Sinhalese farmers and aggravate their grievances to extort greater money from the farmers. Moreover the army then demanded a share. (Kork; 2005: 214) Kork argues that grievances intertwined with and driven by greed have been key components of both the Macro and Micro levels of a state characterised by the ‘localised opportunism of civilians’ (Kork; 2005: 214).

Conclusion

This essay aimed to conclude on whether contemporary conflicts are best explained by economic determination [greed] or grievance. The Economic Theory of conflict articulated by Collier openly dismisses the legitimacy of grievance as the primary motor of civil conflict placing economic determination as the chief goals of political violence. Collier is coherent in his emphasis upon economic determination not only as the chief goal but the key variable on whether a sustainable and effective assault is launched in which he is validated by the study of Sierra Leone. In comparison to the grievance based consensus The Economic Theory of Conflict offers us a structure that allows us to assess the sustainability of conflicts. This is fundamental in providing an effective framework that can progress our understanding of contemporary conflict. Furthermore the overwhelming transparency of greed as a driving force in many civil wars illustrated by the assault on Sierra Leone by the RUF appears to consolidate an already concrete consensus (Collier; 2006). However despite the clear display of consistent premises with predictive power and empirical evidence supporting the existence of greed within contemporary conflict the models departure from a rational choice methodology is far too simplistic and its failure to explain and account for the role of institutions, socio-political structures and its ignorance of the key role that inequality has played in the history of conflict reflects its inability to get to the very roots of conflict.

Cramer’s record of the institutionalised inequalities in Rwanda, Angola and Sri Lanka that birthed ethnic conflict in these regions and their manifestations of localised violence even dares to explain Kaldor’s new war by answering its lack of ideology, increase in civilian participation and most pressingly its manifestation as ethnic conflict. Furthermore Le Billon’s demonstration of greed’s [corruption] key role in ensuring political stability within weak states that appears to refute this essays title further dares to undermine the role of greed as the chief causation of conflict. However its attachment to a changing political climate renders it dangerously destabilising and so undermining to the complete consolidation of the state and good governance in the long term.

Despite its lack of depth the economic theory of conflict cannot be dismissed nor relegated. Kork highlights in his study of Sri Lanka that although the grievances that exist within the region are genuine and have their roots in inequalities the promotion of grievances by the Tamil rebels were conjured to extort money under the threat of violence (Kork; 2005). Kork even documents the prevalence of a culture of ethnic exploitation and code of greed through localised opportunism subsequently daring the conclusion that where ever grievance is greed is sure to follow (Kork; 2005; 214).

Both approaches provide considerable insight into explaining the dynamics of conflict however whether conflicts are far more likely to be caused by greed than by grievance appears to depends on the context of the conflict. This essay defined conflict as political violence within the context of a functional state in the form of rebellion, civil war and localised low intensity insurrections (Addison & Murshed; 2003: 391). This conception of conflict is far too broad to be conducive to a thorough analysis as the causation of an outbreak of ethnic discourse will differ in motivation and intent to that of a civil war like that initiated by the RUF. Therefore whether the conflict was caused by greed or grievance depends entirely on the category of conflict.

Bibliography

P. Collier (2006), Economic Causes of Civil Conflict and Their Implications for Policy, Oxford

H. Anheier & Y.R.Isar (2007) Conflicts and Tensions, Sage Publications

P. Le Billon (2003), Buying Peace or Fuelling War: The Role of Corruption in Armed Conflicts, Journal of International Development; Published online in Wiley InterScience () pp. 413 – 426

B. Korf (2005), Rethinking the Greed – Grievance Nexus: Property Rights and the Political Economy of War in Sri Lank, Journal of Peace Research (42. 2) pp. 201 – 217

T. Addison & M. Murshed (2003), Explaining Violent Conflict: Going Beyond Greed Versus Grievance, Journal of International Development; Published online in Wiley InterScience () pp. 391 – 396