Critically compare and contrast the democratisation of Egypt and Saudi Arabia

However, in recent years some reversal of these trends has been discernible.        

“The political opening that began in late 2004 in Egypt has been unlike any seen in the country in at least twenty years, perhaps in a half century. It has resulted so far in Egypt holding its first-ever presidential election as well as parliamentary elections that were significantly fairer and more transparent than in the past, although marred by violence. [T]here is now more opposition representation in Parliament than at any time since the 1952 Free Officers’ coup. The Muslim Brotherhood, an illegal organization but also the only effective opposition party, made dramatic gains in the fall 2005 elections.”

In 1999, President Mubarak pledged to hold free and fair Parliamentary elections, something which Dunne argues to be an implicit recognition that earlier elections were neither.  In May 2005 the Egyptian Parliament passed Constitutional Amendment Article 76, which called for the direct popular election of the President and the establishment of an electoral commission.  However, despite this, the 2005 elections were marred by violence and intimidation towards voters and accusations of irregularities. Despite the Presidential elections being widely publicised as being the first ‘multi-candidate’ elections in the country’s history, this was not the case in practice.  The ban on the Islamic party, the Muslim Brotherhood, considered to be the only effective and organised opposition party within Egypt, meant that they could not field a candidate and President Mubarak ran unopposed.  As regards the position of women in electoral politics, women have been able to both vote and stand in elections since 1956. 

   

As I noted above, the major difference between Egypt and Saudi Arabia is Egypt’s history of electoral politics, compared to Saudi Arabia’s current half a local election.  However, since the mid-1990s Egypt appears to have been attempting to undermine this tradition by introducing a number of reforms which are aimed at undermining the ability of its citizens to choose their political representatives.  There is some evidence, however, that this trend has been somewhat reversed in recent years.  Saudi Arabia, on the other hand, appears to be taking very small and very tentative steps towards increased political participation by their citizens in the choosing of their government.  However, in Saudi Arabia women are unable to enjoy even these small developments, being denied the vote; something which Egyptian women have had since 1956.

Executive Constraints

Kienle argues that the Egyptian President is the ‘kingpin’ in terms of decision-making.  By this he means that all decision making goes through the President and that he also has effective veto power over any decision.  However, he also points to the fact that in Egypt the judicial branch has far more power and independence than in many Middle Eastern countries.  Twice, in 1990 and 2000, the Supreme Constitutional Court declared that elections to the lower house of Parliament were unconstitutional and ordered re-elections.  The Court also has a history of overruling executive decisions. Owen argues that “[t]he Egyptian political system is dominated by the President who has either been granted, or has accumulated, vast powers.” Dunne argues that “by the late 1990s…parliamentary politics [had] become stagnant and virtually irrelevant to the life of the country.” This meant that one of the few sources of constraint for the President was effectively non-existent.  

In Saudi Arabia the King occupies much the same position as the President in Egypt, acting as the nexus of all decision-making.  However, in the mid-1990s a ‘Consultative Council’ of 60 appointed members was formed and expanded in 1997 and 2001 to 90 and 120 members respectively.  However, as its name suggests, its role is not legislatory but merely consultative in nature.  However, “while the verdicts of the Council are not binding on the King…usually either the ministers accept the recommendations of the Council or the two parties reach a compromise.” I would argue, however, that the constraints that the Council is able to place on the King are weakened due to their appointed nature, as their status depends on the King himself.  The judiciary does not act as a constraint upon the actions of the King; in fact its decisions are subject to review by the government.     

In both Egypt and Saudi Arabia the President and King respectively occupy central positions in the decision-making process and are able to act without consultation if they so require.  Constitutionally (although of course Saudi Arabia has no constitution) they are unchallenged in their authority.  Both countries have parliamentary organisations, but Saudi Arabia’s can be described as merely advisory, whereas Egypt’s actually has the power to make its own legislation.  However, Egypt’s judiciary has proven to be significantly more independent than its Saudi Arabian counterpart.    

Political Participation and Human Rights

I have decided to address these two issues together because, as I discussed above, I believe that they are intimately intertwined.  More specifically, political participation is not possible in any meaningful sense in the absence of a framework of at least basic human rights such as freedom of expression and rights for women.  In Saudi Arabia political parties, trade unions, collective bargaining and public demonstrations are banned.  Freedom of expression is severely restricted as no criticism of either Islam or the Royal Family is allowed.  Independent citizen organisations are also prohibited. Therefore any political opposition tends to be relatively disorganised in nature.  Examples of this can be seen in the petitions signed by groups of people since 1990 and handed to the King, which although not signed by a great number of people (at the most 400 and usually considerably less than that) do seem to me to represent a change in political participation in the Kingdom.  I would also argue that such petitions have become gradually bolder in their demands.  The first, signed by 43 ‘liberals’ and ‘secularists’ (academics, writers, businessmen and government officials) in December 1990 appealed to King Fahd for basic laws regulating the functions of government (for Saudi Arabia has no constitution, written or otherwise), ‘strengthening the principle of equality’ and eliminating discrimination based on ‘religion, tribal affiliation, family background or social status.’ In May 1991 over 400 Islamists, including leading ulama, presented a petition to the King demanding reform of the political and judicial system based on merit and achievement rather than kinship and ascription and the independence of the then-planned Consultative Council.  In September 2003, a petition entitled ‘In Defence of the Nation’ went further, accusing the regime of ‘ignoring popular participation in decision-making’ and called for them to ‘nurtur[e] a pluralistic atmosphere that paves the way towards acceptance of the different.’  These demands, although less concrete than in previous petitions, challenged the very basis of Saudi power, and are thus, I would argue, more powerful.  

In 2003 King Fahd announced the creation of three ‘National Dialogue Sessions’, one on Islam, a second on general topics entitled ‘Extremism and Moderation: A Comprehensive View’ and a third on the ‘Rights and Duties of Women.’  The first of these, on Islam, brought together members of the majority Wahhabi group with Shi’a and Sufi representatives.  This is seen by some as representing a step, albeit a small one, towards greater religious tolerance in the Kingdom, as Shi’as and Sufis have traditionally “not [been] considered brothers in faith by the dominant Wahhabis.” The second dialogue council actually put forward specific recommendations to the ruling family, including elections for the Consultative Council; encouraging the development of trades unions, voluntary organisations (in other words institutions of civil society); a clear separation of power, particularly between the executive and judiciary branches; and a general broadening of freedom of expression.  

However, Kapizewski states that the ‘impact [of the dialogue sessions] should not be over-estimated…some even believe the sessions were essentially gimmicks meant to co-opt critics and project a more acceptable face of the regime to both domestic and international audiences.”   Hawthorne argues that this was in direct response to the 2003 US war in Iraq, as this put pressure on Saudi Arabia both domestically and internationally.  Domestically, many Saudi citizens were angry at their leaders’ failure to prevent what they considered to be the ‘invasion’ of Iraq.  Internationally, Saudi leaders were concerned that the US ‘project’ to encourage more democratic governments in the region might target them next and so were anxious to seen to be as reformers.  Kapizewski also points to the fact that no action was taken by the regime on any of the recommendations made by members of the second dialogue session, as well as the fact that discussions in the third session ignored ‘controversial’ topics such as women being allowed to drive or leave the house without a male guardian. 

Women in Saudi Arabia “currently lead restricted lives: they are segregated in public places, cannot drive cars and must be covered from head to toe when in public.” They are also unable to stand or vote in elections.  However, there have been some small positive steps in the position of women.  In 2000, Saudi Arabia ratified the UN Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women; women are now able to present grievances to the Consultative Council; and ID cards have been issued to women for the first time, making them officially citizens in their own right, rather than dependents on their father or husband’s cards. Saudi officials have also “promised” that women will be part of the next scheduled elections in 2009. 

In terms of the general development of human rights in the Kingdom, in 2003 Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International were allowed to visit the country for the first time.  The National Human Rights Association, a ‘quasigovernmental’ human rights group was also set up in 2004.  Chaired by a member of the King’s Advisory Council it could only make requests which did not contravene Islamic Law.  As a result of this its impact has been minimal.  Hawthorne also argues that “these steps have had little or no effect on systemic human rights problems.” She cites the clampdown on civil liberties in response to the ‘terrorist threat’ within the Kingdom as evidence of this.  Finally, I would point to the arrest of several pro-reform activists, including some who had signed petitions to the King, as evidence that change in Saudi Arabia is only tolerated within strict limits – “no to change, yes to development”, in the words of Minister of the Interior Prince Nayef.

In Egypt, despite NGOs being required to register with the government in order to form, over 14’000 currently exist within Egypt.  However, the actual level of membership is not more than a couple of percent of the population.

In Egypt, as in Saudi Arabia, the opposition to the regime is both secular and religious in nature, with religious opposition being more effective.  The Muslim Brotherhood, as I have mentioned above, is considered to be the only effective opposition group within Egypt.  Secular groups, despite having greater freedom than Islamist groups, have failed to secure either electoral success or popular support.  The most prominent group, Kifaya, meaning ‘Enough’, a coalition of leftists, liberals and Nasserists, has failed to capture the same popular support as the Muslim Brotherhood. 

In May-June 2005 Parliament passed a number of pieces of legislation related to political participation, which the International Crisis group argues were designed to weaken opposition groups in the run-up to the election.  The Presidential Election Law

“Limited the election campaign to 21 days, instead of the 28 requested by opposition parties, and voting to one day, despite the fact that this would make proper judicial supervision impossible”   

The Political Parties Law requires applications to form new parties to be supported by 1’000 signatures instead of the 50 previously needed and also prohibits parties from publishing more than two newspapers.  It also empowered the Political Parties Committee (PPC)

“to freeze a party's activities if the party, or one of its leading members, begins to espouse principles differing from the original party line; or if freezing the party in question is ‘in the national interest’; and to ascertain that parties are pursuing ‘democratic practices’ and ‘the national interest’”

The PPC is dominated by the ruling NDP party and so their autonomy and ability to objectively decide when a political party is acting outside the ‘national interest’ is clearly called into question.

However, not all of the changes to the electoral system were negative.  As mentioned above, Constitutional Amendment Article 76 called for the direct election of the President in multi-candidate elections.  The Political Parties law also revoked the conditions that parties should not contradict the principles of Islamic law or the ideals of the 1952 Revolution and provided for new parties to be recognised automatically unless the PPC registered its refusal within 90 days of application. Hawthorne, however, argues that these measures, like the National Dialogue Sessions in Saudi Arabia, were merely a response to domestic and international pressure for reform in the face of the 2003 US war in Iraq. She points to the timing of the announcement of the package of reforms, “the first such…the government had carried out in more than a decade”, as evidence of this.   

In general human rights term, the creation of a National Human Rights Council was announced in 2003.  The regime also allowed the Egyptian Organisation for Human Rights to register as an NGO after years of rejections.  However, as in Saudi Arabia, Hawthorne argues that these are merely cosmetic measures which do not change the underlying human rights problems in the country, signified most starkly by the ‘emergency laws’ which have been in place since 1981 and the country’s weakening of civil liberties in the face of the Islamic ‘terrorist threat’. Kienle also points to the growing number of trials of civilians by military courts and of political prisoners and growing restrictions on freedom of expression and association in the form of civil society as evidence of a decline in Egyptian respect for human rights. 

However, Egypt has always had a more liberal attitude towards women than many of its Middle Eastern neighbors.  As noted above, women have been able to vote and stand in elections since 1956.  Women are not officially excluded from any types of employment and in 2005 Tahany Al-Gebaly was appointed Egypt’s first female Supreme Court judge. That is not to say that women in Egypt enjoy total equality with their male counterparts.  Bias in the labor market, for example, is rife, but this at least is something which is recognised by the regime. 

I would argue that the following similarities and differences between Egypt and Saudi Arabia can be identified with regards to political participation and human rights.  In both cases, the most effective opposition comes from Islamist groups, and it is questionable whether or not democratisation is their intention. In both cases too, the motives behind political change have been questioned, with the American war in Iraq identified by Hawthorne as a catalyst for what she claims to be nothing more than a desire to be seen as reformers.  In both countries, the level of engagement with what western scholars would call civil society is low.  However, in Saudi Arabia this is due to a national ban on all voluntary civilian organisations, whereas in Egypt such groups are allowed, although have to be registered and approved by the government.  In Saudi Arabia political parties are illegal.  In Egypt political parties are legal, but have many restrictions placed upon them both before they are allowed to officially register and after they have been approved.  Both countries have shown an official acceptance of human rights norms, with international and governmental groups being allowed to visit and established respectively.  However, in both cases, underlying human rights problems such as clampdowns on civil liberties in response to terrorist threats have remained.  In terms of women’s rights, Saudi Arabia does not allow women to vote, drive cars, work or leave the house unattended by a male guardian.  In Egypt, although men and women do not necessarily enjoy complete equality, women at least can do these things.        

Freedom of the Press

In Saudi Arabia all media organisations and operations are overseen by the Higher Media Council which is run by the Interior Minister, Prince Nayef.  Private organisations do exist but must obtain a Royal decree in order to operate and must also have their publishers and editors approved by the government.  The Saudi Press Agency dictates what stories and topics can and cannot be mentioned.  Foreign journalists must be accompanied by a minder at all times and foreign newspapers are heavily censored, even moreso than domestic ones.  Internet access is also heavily restricted across the Kingdom. However, in recent times some positive signs have emerged.  Criticism of the government is now allowed in the media, and some domestic journalists have written articles in the wake of September 11th that could be seen to be critical of Islam.  Criticism of the Royal family, however, is still taboo. 

In Egypt, the highest circulation figures are enjoyed by government controlled newspapers run by individuals selected by the Government Advisory Council.  Censorship was formally banned by the 1974 national constitution, except for foreign publications and during a state of emergency.  However, as noted above, a state of emergency was declared in 1981 and has been in place ever since.  The government has ordered all media organisations to avoid printing or broadcasting anything to inflame protests over the 2003 Iraq war or jeopardise relations with the US.  The Supreme Press Council, which is meant to meet every month to approve the setting up of new media publications and organisations, only actually meets once per year.  This obviously reduces the chance of any new organisation becoming authorised.  The 1996 Press Law allows for journalists to be imprisoned in libel cases or when found guilty of insults and defamation.  This law has been particularly applied with regards to stories concerning government ministers and several journalists have been jailed.  Ahmed Ezzedin of the private weekly newspaper Al-Usbu was sentenced to two years in prison in 2005 for accusing the Deputy Premier and Agriculture Minister Yusef Wali of lying.   President Mubarak announced plans in February 2004 to scrap the law, but this has yet to occur.

Thus we can discern the following similarities and differences between the position of the media and their relative freedoms.  Both Saudi Arabia and Egypt engage in censorship of the media, although I would argue that this is more overt in Saudi Arabia, where an entire agency exists for this purpose, than in Egypt.  Both heavily and overtly censor the foreign media.  In both countries media organisations must seek government permission in order to operate.  However, only in Egypt is any aspect of the media directly controlled by the government, Saudi Arabia only indirectly controlling the media through dictating who can edit and publish.  Also, in Egypt, some insincere discussions of media reform have taken place, although these have come to nothing.  There has been no official discussion of any kind in Saudi Arabia.  The Economist scores Egypt and Saudi Arabia 3 and 2 out of 10 respectively for their press freedom.

Conclusion

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