Lebovic (2004) complains that there has been little support in the democratic literature for the thought that democracies naturally tend to assist foreign peace operations. Much focus has been on the democratic peace theory. According to this theory, democracies rarely, if ever, fight each other because they share common values and domestic institutions that constrain them from wars (Rosato 2003, p. 585). As a result, there is a focus on the tendency that democracies live in peace with each other without considering how to spread peace and democracy around the world. The liberal peace theory suggests that under appropriate conditions democratic states tend to support peace operations as they help extend democracy and peace and protect human rights and because democracies direct their interests towards humanitarian objectives (Lebovic 2004, p. 911). Moreover, it seems that for many theorists associated with both the left and the right interventions that focus on promotion and preservation of human rights are expressions of our obligations to oppressed people from other countries (Jamieson 2005, p. 163).
As Lund (2002b) argues, conflict prevention refers to 'any structural or intercessory means to keep intrastate or interstate tensions and disputes from escalating into significant violence and use of armed forces, to strengthen the capabilities of potential parties to violent conflict for resolving such disputes peacefully and to progressively reduce the underlying problems that produce these issues and disputes' (p. 117 in: Ackermann 2003, p. 339). Despite the criticisms for its feasibility and viability in its early days, the idea of conflict prevention is now widely accepted on the regional and global level and it is openly discussed how to improve its methods (Ackermann 2003, p. 341).
The extended-deterrence theory is one way of describing how a third party can prevent or stop an armed conflict. We should imagine three states: attacker, target and the third-party defender. The potential attacker can either invade the target or decide to resist. According to this theory, the decision depends on the attacking side's predictions whether the defender will intervene or not. As a result, the attack will only occur if there is a high credibility that the third party will defend its ally. If the attacker is right, the war will be bilateral, but if it is wrong, it will become multilateral. Since a state will only attack its target if the likelihood of a third-party intervention is very low, most wars have been bilateral. Multilateral combats, such as the first and the second World Wars, are very rare exceptions. Moreover, alliances seem to be quite unreliable and only one in four is honoured when challenged (Werner 2000, pp. 721-722. Another possibility should also be shown in addition to the extended-deterrence theory. It can be argued that it is not only the third-party defender that influences the actions of the attacker but also vice versa. For instance, at the beginning of the Serbian attack against the province of Kosovo, the United States' response was rather weak. However, following violent actions against civilians by the Serbian military, the NATO forces led by the U.S. responded in a much stronger way. In this case the foreign defender's reaction was affected by the attacker's actions. Similar examples include the Korean and Vietnam Wars, the Finnish Winter War in 1939 and the Seven Weeks' War in 1866. These examples provide an explanation how the third party's response can be influenced by the attacker's moves (Werner 2000, pp. 722-723).
As I have mentioned, the United Nations have been involved in several foreign interventions over the past few decades. Some argue that the UN has been successful in their peace operations but many disagree saying that its interventions have either no or a negative influence (Diehl et al. 1996, pp. 684-685). There is no overall agreement on this issue but it is usually conceded that the UN has had some short-term success in intervening in international conflicts. However, even if it is true, it does not certainly mean that it is followed by a long-term attainment, i.e. prevention of potential future disputes (Diehl et al. 1996, p. 685). As the critics of the UN interventions say, there are studies which show that the UN involvement in conflicts is usually irrelevant or even counterproductive as it rarely leads to any decline of tensions between the disputing parties. The problem of the UN is that it fights the direct causes of the problems instead of their symptoms. Therefore it is rather unsuccessful in solving conflicts with broad issues and long and complicated histories (Diehl et al. 1996, p. 685). Normally the UN intervenes after the cease of fire but before a peace agreement is signed. This halts peace negotiations, and peace operations do not tend to get involved in diplomacy which could help resolve the deep-rooted issues. The peacekeeping operation in Cyprus is often shown as an example of a failure at dispute solution. On the other hand, the operations in Cambodia and Namibia, which occurred after the peace agreements, are argued to have been successful. In these cases the United Nations succeeded in providing grounds for a long-term peace settlement (Diehl et al. 1996, p. 686).
The United Nations is not the only institution that struggles with conflict prevention and resolution. As I have mentioned before, most scholars agree that in general there have been little success in foreign military and economic interventions. However, in the literature there have not been much focus on mediation and diplomacy involving third parties (Regan and Aydin 2006, p. 739). In fact, it can be argued that they are more useful and effective than military or economic interventions. While evidence suggest that military and economic interventions usually prolong the conflict, diplomacy tends to shorten its duration (Regan and Aydin 2006, pp. 740-741). Diplomacy's goal is to change the hostility between the parties to cooperation. Unlike armed interventions, which, as I have already said, focus on recent issues, mediation aims to settle the conflict and help put an end to the fighting parties' distrust and misperceptions of each other (Regan and Aydin 2006, pp. 740-741). In a situation of an absence of a foreign mediator, the fighting parties are unwilling to reveal their military capabilities, expectations of the outcomes of conflict and what kind of settlement they would accept because they are afraid that they would be exploited by the other side. It results in a failure of peace negotiations. However, it can be different if a mediator is present. A foreign negotiator can reveal information on both parties' military strength and their preferences of a peace settlement. Finally, it can help them find a fair and attractive solution to the conflict (Regan and Aydin 2006, p. 740). Some would argue that mediation does not have great results. In fact, only 30 per cent of negotiations involving third parties finish successfully. However, even if diplomacy more often fails than succeeds, it is rare that for it to increase the duration and the level of violence of conflicts (Regan and Aydin 2006, pp. 742). Therefore, as the evidence shows, mediation is more effective than military or economic interventions on their own.
Another way of preventing armed conflicts is using preventive military actions. Kofi Annan, at that time the Secretary-General of the United Nations, swayed especially by the 1994 genocide in Rwanda argued that the UN 'has a moral responsibility to ensure that vulnerable peoples are protected and that genocides never occur again' (Lango 2004, p. 250). However, it is sometimes problematic to justify preventive wars (Lango 2004, p. 249). According to Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, in a situation where a threat to the peace is existent, the Security Council can decide what actions can be taken. It is also allowed to pass resolutions that order the state to stop its actions threatening to the peace. If the state does not act accordingly, a military action against it can be taken in order to maintain peace (Lango 2004, p. 251). Therefore a unilateral pre-emptive (i.e. in a case of an imminent enemy's attack) military intervention is allowed by the Charter but a unilateral preventive armed actions (so those lacking a high likelihood of an enemy's attack) are not (Lango 2004, pp. 251-252).
However, even though a pre-emptive war is compatible with the United Nations Charter, there is still a question whether it meets the just war requirements. As Lango (2004) argues, in order for a preventive military action to be legitimate it should satisfy the threat and the magnitude conditions. The threat condition says that the states' acts are intentional, knowing, reckless or negligent. The magnitude condition is associated with the size of a potential attack. If a preventive war does not satisfy one of these conditions, it can still be legitimate if it satisfies the other (pp. 258-260).
What is more, a preventive war can only appease the just war principle if it satisfies the last resort principle. It means that measures other than military actions have to be taken first (Lango 2004, p. 260). But as it can be argued, the last resort principle does not require that all possible non-military measures be taken if it is predicted that they may not be successful (Childress 1978, p. 75 in: Lango 2004, p. 261). The reason for this is that if the state took peaceful measures instead of military actions, it could take too much time and therefore the magnitude of the threat would significantly increase (Lango 2004, p. 261). As some say, non-military and military actions cannot be taken at the same time and since an armed intervention is started, peaceful steps are not possible any more. However, this does have to always be correct. Sometimes a preventive war and non-military actions (such as diplomacy) can effectively be used at the same time (Lango 2004, pp. 261-262). It can also be argued that, as the goal of the just war principle is to reduce the lethality of war, it should be authorised to used minimal armed force alongside with maximal non-military actions if it led to a decrease of the threat (Lango 2004, p. 262).
In my essay I attempted to evaluate the role of third parties in conflict prevention and resolution. At the beginning I gave definitions of a conflict and a foreign intervention, and a few examples of types of intervention, which I thought was important before trying to answer the question. Then I argued that the United States is a power that often gets involved in foreign conflicts' prevention and resolution. Some claim that the extended-deterrence theory is an effective way of describing third-party intervention's effects. According to this theory, the attacker's decision depends on the third-party defender. However, it can be argued that it works the other way as well, i.e. the foreign defender's steps are influenced by the attacker, too.
The United Nations is an organisation whose goal is to promote peace in the world and therefore it often intervenes in violent conflicts. Unfortunately, as the empirical evidence shows, its effects are rather mediocre. Many argue that the UN has either a counterproductive or no effect on conflicts, as it intervenes in a wrong way or at a wrong time. However, it is not only the UN which struggles with preventing and resolving conflicts. In fact, military and economic interventions usually end up as failures. As some argue, diplomacy is a more effective way of conflict prevention and resolution and, unlike military and economic interventions, it often decreases the duration of disputes. The last possibility of foreign intervention that I showed is a preventive war. It means attacking a state which could be a threat to the peace. However, it is very difficult for such an action to be justified and to satisfy the just war principle's requirements.
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