But closer examination suggests this progress may not be what it seems. Despite numerical reductions, the nuclear stockpile of both the US and USSR remains arguably even more potent than during the Cold War.[11] Reductions are mainly imposed on obsolete or surplus weapons systems. Verification of agreements to a level that would satisfy key stakeholders appears impossible. In essence, the UN has been unable to embed its ‘core’ arms control objectives or to effectively take negotiations through to full implementation of multilateral agreements. The current situation with Iran is a worrying example of the UN’s inability to achieve acceptable resolutions of problems that have the potential to lead to global war.
Despite a 2006 declaration by the International Atomic Energy Agency that Iran remained in breach of its nuclear arms control obligations, six years of UN effort has brought this issue no closer to resolution.[12] Two UN Security Council Resolutions have not swayed Iran from a path that could lead to either Israel or the United States pre-empting an Iranian nuclear weapons capability.[13]
Some commentators suggest that the system of international law built to control the spread of WMD is irreparably weakened by the unwillingness of nuclear weapon states to fulfil their nuclear disarmament commitments.[14] UN efforts to secure chemical and biological weapons controls have also been similarly impeded.
Chemical and Biological Weapons
The threat from Chemical and Biological Weapons is more pronounced than ever within the current international security environment. Despite international prohibitions on the manufacture of biological weapons, these have not always been observed.[15] The UN-sponsored 1997 Convention on the Prohibition of the Production, Stockpiling and use of Chemical Weapons (CWC), has been plagued by similar difficulties. These include the cost of enforcing compliance measures, unwillingness by a number of signatories to introduce legislation for national implementation, a lack of verification measures, and difficulties in defining which chemical/biological products are prohibited. It is also clear that some states sign treaties with no intention of complying.[16] A number of countries may have signed the CWC and BWC, knowing they are already in violation of its provisions. UN-sponsored Ad Hoc Groups are seeking to overcome these shortcomings through mandatory declarations and compliance inspections. However, these are almost always thwarted by a lack of consensus and cooperation.
A key challenge for the UN in embedding the CWC/BWC is, once again, its inability to take negotiation forward into implementation.
Coalitions of the Willing?
Instead of accepting UN efforts as the basis for international agreement, countries like the USA and Russia are increasingly relying on military solutions or coalitions of the willing to pursue their national interests. It remains to be seen, for example, whether the UN can chart a peaceful course for the current Iranian impasse, or if Israel or the United States will choose to take matters into their own hands. Regular examples of UN impotence often lead to criticism. For example, US efforts to establish an antiballistic missile (ABM) defence system contravene the 1972 ABM Treaty.[17] Russia’s sale of arms to North Korea and support of Iran’s nuclear energy system are other examples.[18] The lack of an effective ‘compulsion mechanism’ impedes the UN’s effectiveness. An additional impediment to progress is resentment by many states at what they perceive to be a lack of representation in the UN.[19] This resentment of the UN structure and policy is felt in its subordinate committees and acts to constrain discussion and progress. If the UN is to deliver on substantive arms control and disarmament in the future, this sense of ‘disenfranchisement’ by many member states needs to be addressed.
Conclusion
The end of the Cold War was considered an opportunity for the UN to play a more effective role in international peace and security. It is apparent, however, that little substantive progress has been achieved. Arguably, the UN may never have the will or authority to deliver on the aspirations of its founders. But aside from its deficiencies, the UN remains the only widely accepted forum for multilateral negotiation of peace and security issues. Its success in the future depends on a willingness to adapt itself to contemporary realities. In particular, the Security Council's composition and decision-making processes must be reviewed in order to enhance its legitimacy as an international peace and security broker. Given that its decisions ultimately depend for their effect on international support, the Council must be seen as impartial and not dictated to by the national concerns of powerful member states. Certainly many states see the UN as unrepresentative of the current realities of military power and economic influence.
Key impediments to UN efforts since the end of the Cold War include: the lack of an acceptable verification regime; the absence of a ‘compulsion mechanism’ to move negotiations to implementation; and the inability of the UN system to effectively reconcile powerful state interests within a multilateral, consensus-based negotiating framework. Consensus decision-making within such a large negotiating body as the UN has proven difficult, often leading to paralysis by analysis. Additionally, the lack of progress often gives rise to scepticism about the UN’s future effectiveness. In order to achieve greater success in the future, the UN will be judged on its ability to respond more quickly and effectively to peace and security issues. Some argue that it may already be too late for the UN to recover its international authority in these matters, but a potentially bigger problem that then arises is whether anything approaching the UN could ever be agreed upon by a world fractured by its competing national interests. The best option appears to be trying to adapt the UN’s structure and processes to the needs and realities of the future.
Student #u5015817
[1] United Nations, ‘The relationship between disarmament and development in the current international context,’ at , accessed on 25 May 2012.
[2] In the eight years following the Cold War for example, only seven vetoes were cast, compared to 240 in the first 45 years of the UN’s existence. Twenty peacekeeping operations were also mandated, which was more than the total for the previous 45 years. See Butler, R., ‘Bewitched, Bothered & Bewildered’, Foreign Affairs, September/October 1999, at:
[3] The US proposal is prohibited by the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty. See for example: Lagnado, A., & Whittell, G., ‘US will flout treaty Putin told, Weekend Australian, 28 July 2001, p.16.
[4] ‘China criticises Iran nuclear sanctions ahead of Ahmadinejad visit,’ 23 May 2012, found at: , accessed on 24 May 2012.
[5] ‘Arms control’ refers to the international processes and machinery aimed at limiting the possession or use of certain classes or types of weapons. See: , accessed on 21 May 2012.
[6] Non-proliferation is that aspect of arms control that seeks to stop an increase in the global presence of a particular class or type of weapon. In many instances multilateral negotiation is held under the auspices of the UN, with the UN Conference on Disarmament (CD) in Geneva as the primary forum. See: , accessed on 22 May 2012.
[7] See for example: Chirac, J., Blair, T., & Schroeder, G., (Editorial) ‘A Treaty We All Need’, New York Times, October 8, 1999, p.A27. See also: ‘The global non-proliferation regime,’ updated 21 May 2012, at , accessed on 22 May 2012.
[8] A Nuclear Weapon State is defined at Article IX of the 1968 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons as a State ‘which has manufactured and exploded a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device prior to January 1, 1967’. India, Pakistan and Israel are clearly nuclear states under this definition.
[9] , accessed on 22 May 2012.
[10] For a good overview of the UN’s perspective on progress in the daced after the Cold War, see: Annan, K., Address to the NPT 2000 Review Conference, New York, 24 April 2000, at:
[11]For a comparative analysis, see: ‘US – Russia nuclear arsenal data released,’ Agence France Presse, 2 June 2011, , accessed on 22 May 2012.
[12] New York Times, ‘Iran’s nuclear program,’ , accessed on 21 May 2012.
[13] See for example: ‘IAEA and Iran,’ , accessed on 21 May 2012.
[14] See for example Graham, T., ‘Nuclear Proliferation’, The George Washington Journal of International Law and Economics, vol. 33, no. 1, 2000, pp.46-69A.
[15] Laura H. Kahn, ‘The Biological Weapons Convention: Proceeding without a verification protocol,’ 9 May 2011,
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, , accessed on 20 May 2012. See also: Jonathon B. Tucker (Ed), The Chemical Weapons Convention, Monterey Institute of International Studies, 2001, , accessed on 20 May 2012.
[16] For an excellent table that highlights the inconsistency between what a country has publicly asserted it has in terms of chemical and biological weapons, see for example: , accessed 20 May 2012.
[17] , accessed 20 May 2012. The ABM Treaty specifically prohibits the deployment of nationwide missile defence systems by the United States and Russia. If the US proceeds with its Missile Defence Project, Russia would arguably be forced to substantially increase its arsenal in order to retain a credible deterrent.
[18] Franchetti, M., ‘Putin to sell Kim $955m in arms’, The Australian, Monday August 6 2001, p.8.
[19] Neither Germany nor Japan has permanent representation. For a good overview of this international resentment, see: Doxley, M., ‘United Nations: Lessons of Experience’, Speech to the International Studies Association Annual Convention, February 1999.
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