In all explanations of democratization economic development features in some shape or form. The modernization theory which can be broadly defined as casual chains, sequences of industrialisation, urbanization, economic growth, education, communication and political incorporation, among innumerable others: a progressive accumulation of social changes that ready a society to proceed to its culmination, democratization (Przeworski et al,1997, pg156). Lipset was a firm advocate and emphasises the vital role economic development plays in democratisation, seen as the last stage of modernization (Sodaro, 2001, pg352). His hypothesis contends that economic development would enhance democratic institutions by creating a broad middle class with cross cutting cleavages. This class progression would then have the effect of diluting conflict, moderating extremist views and encouraging the formation of democratic parties (Potter et al, 1996, pg24).Lipset maintained that this chain of events would have the knock on effect of producing a civil society that would push for regime change. One can deduce that the modernization approach sees economic development as a catalyst and necessary condition to consolidating democracy in the long run as societal changes such as higher levels of education, increased levels of communication and in general modernity enhance its sustainability.
Kitching maintains that “materially poor societies cannot produce the democratic life which is an essential pre-requisite for the creation of socialist democracies. Only economic growth- through industrialisation- can provide the platform on which democratic values, institutions and processes can be sustained”(Leftwich, 1996, pg9). One would have to suppose this is warranted, as what legitimacy does a democracy have if its citizens are starving, lack sanitation and the assess to basic education. An example of this can be identified in Africa where several states average GNP per capita less than $100 per year. The existence of poverty, the size of the rural economy, the small bourgeoisie and the high levels of cultural and linguistic heterogeneity conflate to create an unfertile ground for democracy to emerge. In contrast historical examples show how economic development has produced democracy in the long run. Under the auspices of growth-promoting authoritarian regimes, Chun’s South Korea and Chiang Kai Shek’s Taiwan became two of Asia’s best known ‘Tiger economies’ which eventually through a chain of causation transcended into democracies. From 1960 to the 1990’s their annual rates of growth (GNP per capita) were the highest in the world, with the exception of Botswana Economic development led to higher education levels, living standards and the provision services and public goods possible. This created a dense and complex civil society capable of managing and administrating democracy (Potter et al, 1997, pg236).
Despite of strong correlations exhibited between economic development and democracy, the modernization theory does not account for the many anomalies where countires progress to democracies without being economically developed, the classic example being India. The reverse situation can also be observed in countries such as Saudi Arabia and China, which demonstrate high levels of economic affluence yet reside under authoritarian rule. This has led to Potter et al stating that “the political consequences of economic growth are ambiguous” (Potter et al, 1997, pg 25). Thus to propose that economic development exclusively is a necessary and sufficient condition for democracy would be myopic, consequently individual cases demand a conjunctural explanation, rather than one which treats them as separate abstract cases (Parry et al, 1994, pg176).
Potter et al. consider China and India, the two giants of Asia, to demonstrate how “different political cultures, colonial legacies, party development and civil societies explain such contrasts more effectively” (Potter et al, 1997, pg203). In spite of India being less economically developed than China the existence of its pluralist political culture, its prolonged encounter with British colonial rule, its dense and autonomous civil society and party system, centred on the Congress party, are more attune to liberal democratic values than China’s (Potter et al, 1997, pg208).
Thus we can see that other theoretical approaches have much to offer in explaining the necessary and sufficient conditions for democracy. The Latin American experience challenged all presumptions about preconditions and it suggested that if there was a relationship between economic and political development it was not a straightforward one. Complex patterns of regime change were evident between 1970 and 1995 which saw dominant patterns of re-democratization, liberalisation and democratic deepening, all aspects of the Latin American experience of the “Third Wave” of democratisation. In the 1980’s economies in the region collapsed, which had the effect of significantly reducing production and ending imports. In this period of crisis and poverty, many countries including Bolivia, Peru and Ecuador ditched authoritarian regimes and turned to democracy. In Guillermo O’Donnell’s highlighted that socio-economic modernization failed to enhance the probability of democracy in Latin American context because popular-sector pressure became increasingly into conflict with socio-economic constraints on policy choice (O’Donnell, 1978, pg32).
Many theorists look to the transitional approach to explain the phenomena and the ‘skilful political crafting’ of political leaders which engineer its success. This approach focuses on political elites and certain choices and strategies which are beneficial to democratisation. It is claimed that in Latin American democratic transitions took an elite-controlled form through concession, negotiation, retreat and intervention (Potter et al, 1997, pg182). Therefore the importance of elites is said to be essential “To bring about democracy, anti-authoritarian forces must unite against authoritarianism” (Przeworski, 1997, pg 105). Key examples of triumphant transitions engendered by elites are Spain with Juan Carlos (‘reforma-pactada’) and the Netherlands. Even in spite of its heterogeneity, the Netherlands prompts a convincing argument for the role of elites in the democratising process. The societal-cultural differences in the Dutch model were rife: Roman Catholics and Protestants, distinct middle class liberals inclined towards private enterprise and a socialist working class backing labour unions, regulated and benefits, all thrashing about in the political arena. As Sodaro pointed out, heterogeneity is conducive to democratic instability, this it took the actions of elites committed to “tolerance and accommodation” to successfully transfer. “Through patient negotiation they worked out bargains and compromises aimed at providing each group with a fair chance at political power and relatively equitable distribution of state revenues proportional to the population”(Sodaro, 2001, pg182). In sum, a high level of socio-economic development although important, may not be as critical as the actions of the elite who play a fundamental role in channelling the states’ resources. Huntington famously concluded ‘in the modernising world he controls the future who organises its politics’ (Huntington, 1968, pg461). However despite this assertion, when national wealth is funnelled into institutions that are supportive of democracy, the chances for stabilising the regime are greatly increased.
Almond and Verba, part of the Structural of thought due to their work on civic and political culture and its relationship to democratisation. They hypothesised that successful transitions to democracy require more than just a consensus amongst elites, but also require a ‘compatible political culture’. A political culture conducive to democracy can be defined as, ‘a pattern of widely shared attitudes and values supportive of democratic institutions and procedures. In addition, an active ‘civil society’, in which ‘the population is organised into associations independent of the state’, can increase the chances for successful democratisation (Sodaro, 2001, pg222-273). The emergence of an organised civil society, characterised by the development of a stable party system, has been fundamental in explaining successful democratisations in Southern Europe compared with the difficulties encountered in Latin America. Ronald Inglehart, renowned for his study of 43 countries, has also supported the ‘political culture’ theory. While he agrees with the critics of Lipset who state that economic development may not bring around democratisation, he disagrees with the conclusion that an elite consensus and commitment to democracy are imperative to democratisation. Instead, Inglehart concludes that a vibrant civil society and political culture plays the decisive role over elites in supporting and stabilising transitions to democracy (Inglehart, 1990, pg215). China is a good example of a country with non-democratic cultural patterns and a tradition of lacking a strong civil society. Many map this to its Confucian legacy, which many argue, enables China to resist democracy.
Many theorists that contend democracy is most likely to endure when it rests on a socially homogeneous society. Inherent problems can occur in fragmented societies which are torn by deep ethnic, religious, class or other divisions (Sodaro, 2001, pg224). Highly polarized societies are assumed to provide too unstable a foundation for steady democratic governance. Two prime examples of this occur in Yugoslavia and Nigeria. However on the other hand there is compelling evidence that contradicts this thesis which only furthers the contention that it is not possible to find an infallible casual relationship between democracy and any intervening variables. Algeria for example, is the most ethnically homogeneous state in Europe and yet is under a communist single party rule. Additionally India has been a consolidated democracy since 1947, despite its religious, ethnic and linguistic divisions. Thus the homogeneous hypothesis is inconclusive and socially polarization, as some cases exemplify, make democracy difficult but not impossible.
Thus far the conditions examined for democracy have been located within individual countries. However a favourable international environment cannot only initiate democratisation but it can also play a role in determining its success. An indigenous political tradition interacting with the experience of colonial rule is thought to have an effect on democracy. Weiner (1987), among others, has pointed out the powerful, though by no means perfect, correlation between the survival of liberal democracy in developing countries and colonization by the British (Potter et al, 1997 pg205). It is argues that British democratic traditions have had a palpable and lasting effect on many countries. Democracy was fostered by native elites in respective countries as they could simply take up the reins of government, with the acquired understanding of democratic ideas and practices, after independence had occurred. Examples include Canada, Australia and News Zealand. Nethertheless many have not including Pakistan, Singapore and many African countries (Sodaro, 2001, pg 225).
In addition, Attila has concluded that the process of ‘democracy-democratisation’ is a function of the world system and not exclusively a domestic political formation instigated by domestic elites. From this standpoint, therefore the process of authoritarian regime collapses in areas such as Latin America, Africa and east- central Europe, followed by the gradual process of democratisation was possible ‘only by the extension of the core of the world system’(Atilla, 1990, pg109). This core, made up by the western liberal democratic states and international organisations, has had a dramatic impact on regions such as Latin America, Southern Europe and East-central Europe. In Southern Europe, the United States and the European Union have both helped foster democratisation throughout the region. Turkey has benefited greatly fro the targets set by the EU’s accession criteria, in addition to receiving financial support fro its structural funds. This support has helped usher turkey along the road to consolidation on reforms, such as those reducing the capabilities of the military, are being introduced to protect the democratic framework. While the international context may not be as important as ‘home-grown’ or internal support for democracy, the international context can still play a vital role in supporting transitions (Sodaro, 2001, pg225). Thus the function of international funding bodies such as the IMF and World Bank are significant and are important agents in the democratisation process.
Finally the international environment can produce a situation where countries benefit from a positive ‘neighbourhood effect’. Pressure mechanisms from leaders and the ‘demonstration effect’ can push countries in the right direct thus kick starting the democratic process. Latin America is the poster child for this process in contrast to the Middle East where norms encourage repressive authoritarian governments. This evokes the much debated issue that Islam and the Middle East are not compatible with democracy regardless of conditions. Many link the absence of modernity, including economic development as the root of the problem. Political liberalisation has been varying in its extent in Jordan, Egypt, Tunisia and Algeria but has generally been a response to the requirements of introducing different packages of economic reforms. Civil societies autonomous of and organised in political parties features rarely in the Middle-east, yet, Parry asserts continuing economic reforms and electoral process could eventually change circumstances and leading to eventual democratisation (Parry and Morgan, 1994, pg 199-215).
It is vital to remember that state plays a significant role in the process of democratisation. Leftwich highlights that ‘both good governance and democracy depend crucially on the character and capacity of the state which alone can institute and insist on it’ (Leftwich, 1996, pg17). Many emphasise that western governments and institutions can not insert good governance and democracy into a society at any point in its development. Thus it would be naïve to expect that countries such as China, Myanmar, Zaire, and Haiti trying to impose external conditionality will yield a stable democracy in the liberalist pluralist sense. Therefore the delivery of democracy or democratisation depends on the state and its politics’ which establishes and sustains character, competence and commitment (Leftwich, 1996, pg19).
In conclusion democratisation is an unpredictable and erratic process. This paper has attempted to establish whether economic development is a necessary and sufficient condition for democracy. At the same time it has explored other important variables and conditions which contribute to the process. The relationship between economic development and democracy cannot be dismissed and many examples exhibit strong evidence of a distinct correlation between the two. Sustained economic development can bring about clean water, food supplies, schools, roads and generally create a platform for democracy to flourish. Thus it is frequently argued that economic development is positively associated with democratisation. Diamond et al states ‘democracy is more likely to be consolidated in relatively wealthy countries and less likely to emerge in poor countries (Diamond et al, 1997, pg209). However other variables such as the role of elites the state of civil society the development of a political culture the supportiveness of institutions and the influence of the international environment, play important roles in assisting democracy and transitions. These variables can act independently of economic development, so we must reject the idea that ‘economic development is a necessary and sufficient condition for democracy’ but conclude that in can work in conjunction with other very important variables. Nethertheless economic development will always be ranked as one of the most desirable conditions for those states looking to democratise. Essentially one could content that the state is key as the architect for democratic success and Leftwich states ‘the current focus on governance and democracy as necessary ingredients of development misses the point that it is the character of the state alone which will give rise to them and keep them in place’.
