Ensuring Australia's national security requires a close alliance with the United States. Critically evaluate this claim using relevant examples.

by Noble-Industries (student)

Ensuring Australia’s national security does require a close alliance with the United States (US). No other nation state on earth offers Australia the same national security benefits as does America. From an alliance that offers Australia a partner in the worst case scenario, to access to defence and intelligence technology and product, and as a means to influence global security decisions through our close relationship with US leaders. By providing an evidentiary base that examines the benefits offered through the existent relationship with the US, and by showing that no other nation state can offer Australia those same benefits, the case will be made that ensuring Australian national security does rely on our relationship with America.

The consensus view of the alliance between the United States and Australia is that it is generally beneficial to both states[1]. Historically it has long held association with the need to be aligned to the great maritime powers of the globe[2]. The strategic relationship between the US and Australia has been a core element in the construction of Australia’s national security framework since the conclusion of WWII[3]. The central role this alliance plays is due to a three significant factors. Firstly a shared commonality of culture which includes common economic linkages, institutions and values. Australia’s position as an outpost of Anglo-Saxon culture in Asia has given rise to the need to strategically ally ourselves with those that we identify on a cultural level as we seek to avoid strategic isolation[4]. Second we share commonality of wartime experience that led to the formation of the ANZUS Treaty. That second factor directly influences the third, the continued military and security related interoperability between the two countries including Vietnam and more recently the Long War of Terror. The invocation of the ANZUS Treaty post 9/11 has seen interoperability increased to unprecedented levels. That the alliance has been a core factor in Australian national security is without doubt, what remains is whether or not the alliance is worth anything to us as a nation state.

Phillips makes some very valid criticisms of the national security alliance. In essence he argues that merits of the alliance, as seen by the general public, are informed solely by foreign policy elites who are privy to far more information that the public. As Phillips argues, “informed proponents of the alliance are implicitly asking the public to accept elite reassurances that very significant, even vital, advantages accrue to Australia as a consequence of its ‘special relationship’ to the United States” [5]. This public assurance rests on the premise that whatever deleterious effects this relationship might have on how the rest of the world views Australia, the lapdog, the deputy sheriff, it is still worthwhile and the advantages outweigh the disadvantages[6]. In order to asses Phillip’s argument these advantages must be examined.

Ensuring Australia’s national security rests on the continued close alliance we have with the US and the benefits that the alliance affords us as a nation state. There are four principle benefits, without which Australia’s national security is diminished. These four principle benefits are related to kinetic security or actual war fighting, the access granted to national security materiel result for trade agreements, the access that Australia gets to US intelligence product and the increase in our ability to influence global security decisions.

Password

Confirm Password

I agree to the terms of service and privacy policy

This is a preview of the whole essay

Firstly looking at kinetic security there are a two significant benefits that Australia gains from its alliance, both of which are important to ensuring its national security. Most importantly there is the value of deterrence, most notably a nuclear deterrence[7]. This benefit ensures that in conflict with Australia other actors must factor in the relationship with the US and weight the possibility that ANZUS will be invoked and that the full weight of the US military structure will be brought to bear. Looking more at the here and now, there is the current conflict to which Australia is a party, the Long War on Terror and the associated campaigns in Iraq, Afghanistan and other global locations, we see that the partnership provides for a higher level of security. The fundamentalist forces engaged in various insurgencies and terrorist actions do not distinguish one western democracy from another. Rather we are conjoined into the common enemy. Ryan notes that, ‘the countries being targeted need to co-operate closely if they are to defeat the common threat” [8]. The likelihood of a full blown conflict with a rising power, i.e. China, is slight, China, according to Barnett is far too busy making money to consider kinetic warfare. None the less, should the unthinkable occur our relationship with the US provides a bulwark against aggression from that threat[9].

Secondly we look at the Australia-United States Treaty on Defence Trade Cooperation which aims to,” facilitate bilateral access to, and sharing of, equipment, technology, equipment-related information and materiel-related services subject to certain security and regulatory requirements” [10]. Currently only the United Kingdom has a similar defence arrangement. The Treaty provides three tangible benefits to Australian national security. The first is access to new defence and intelligence technology. The second is the deterrent factor which that access informs. Having access to the latest defence technology is surely a factor in how other countries view the vulnerability of our national security. Decisive lethality is premised on tailor made capabilities that Australia can develop, but only in close cooperation with the world leader in defence technology, the US[11]. Lastly the Treaty also informs how other countries see Australia in terms of its prestige. As one of only two trading partners fortunate to have access to the latest defence and intelligence technology we stand apart from other countries who are not granted similar access.

It is our access to intelligence that is our next real national security benefits accrued from the relationship with the US[12]. As we move further toward a limited warfare space, where actual large scale battle becomes a thing of the past, intelligence has rapidly become the cornerstone of national security. Traditional espionage and intelligence related counter terrorism are vital foundations of the Australia’s national security and access to the product generated by the leviathan American intelligent community is valuable. Access to intelligence product that we would ordinarily be unable to generate ourselves, most notably electronic, signal and satellite intelligence, allows the Australian national security community to make decisions that are better informed and therefore of more value to our continued security. Again in this area Phillips has some valid criticism, noting that the real value of intelligence is hard for the lay person to discern. With governments loath to reveal exactly what intelligence has been offered and exactly how that has informed our national security, understanding the benefits accrued from the ‘ special relationship’ are difficult. In terms that would echo a realist approach to these questions, surely it is better have to more information that not. If the lay person does not understand the value of intelligence, does not make that product less valuable. Again the prestige that the relationship gives us is almost as valuable as the actual intelligence product that we receive. It clearly indicates to our regional partners that we know more about the world that they may do, and that the decisions we make may be informed by additional intelligence. The use of the word may is deliberate, for with intelligence there is value in having an opponent just believe that you may know more than they do. This is what Nye and Armitage call ‘smart power’. Neither hard not soft it is the use of an integrated strategy based on mutual alliances and technology to deter aggression from other spheres of influence[13]. The access to the American halls of power grants us not only intelligence but also the ability to use that intelligence to influence global security decisions.

While the status of America as sole superpower may be in question in the coming decades of this century, as it currently stands America remains the sole superpower capable of projecting military and political power on a global scale. The close alliance, according to Fillilove, allows Australia a better chance to be able to influence the decision making process within the America system to the advantage of Australia.[14] This influence allows Australia to effectively punch above it weight as a middle power and positions it to influence global security making decisions. Additionally the US is not an isolated actor, it exists at the centre of a vast network of others international actors, tied by alliances and partnerships. America’s relationship to these other actors informs the level of influence that Australia wields internationally. As much as America relationship with partners such as Japan and India will affect Australian economic and security spaces[15], this is a two way street, giving Australia the ability to influence the fortunes of America’s wider community of allies. America is the only superpower with a truly global foreign policy. With access to that and the ability to sometimes influence that policy Australia is far better positioned in the national security space than we would be without that access[16]. Australia is not, unlike the UK, a member of the UN Security Council, the Group of 8, NATO or the nuclear weapons club. Therefore our close alliance to the US and the access that it grants us provides a significant benefit to this country.

Given the weight of evidence detailed as to the benefits offered from our current relationship with the US the question must be asked, can any other alliance offer the same range of benefits or are any other alliances that offer some of those benefits, even viable? In terms of matching our nationals military to another comparable or growing military only Chinas or a united Europe have the capacity to field technology based armies that can operate across global battle space, and then that capacity may be years away. The UK whilst an important ally does not offer all of the benefits and our existing relationship with the UK is very closely interwoven with our relationship with the US.

Therefore the only conclusion is that ensuring Australia’s national security does require a close alliance with the United States. It provides a solid strategic alliance that offers us the world’s foremost military should circumstances dictate its need. During times of peace or times, like now, of simmering insurgency, it offers us access to intelligence that we would ordinarily not be able to avail ourselves of. It offers us the ability to broker for access to military and intelligence technology that only one other trading partner has access to and finally our relationship puts us in the same room as the world most influential nation. While America power may be waning, it is a slow decline that is years away from positioning any other nation state ahead of the US in terms of brokering global security decisions. Australia’s has tied it national security to the US for over 50 years and for good reason. If Australia is sometimes seen in far flung corner of the world as the lap dog of America, then at least we stand next to the biggest dog in the yard.

Bibliography

Barnett, Thomas PM (2009) Great Powers: The World After Bush, G.P. Putnam’s Sons, New York

Beeson, Mark (2003) “Australia’s Relationship with the United States: the Case for Greater Independence,” Australian Journal of Political Science Vol. 38, No. 3, pp. 387-405.

Behm Allen, (2007) Strategic Tides: Positioning Australia’s Security Policy to 2050, Kokoda Foundation, Canberra ACT

Dibb, Paul (2007) “Australia-United States” in Brendan Taylor (ed.), Australia as an

Evans Grant, Grant Bruce, (1992) Australia’s Foreign relations, Melbourne University Press, Melbourne, Victoria,

Manicom, James and O’Neil, Andrew (2010) “Accommodation, realignment, or business as usual? Australia’s response to a rising China,” The Pacific Review, Vol. 23, No. 1: pp 23-44.

McLean, David (2006) “From British Colony to American Satellite? Australia and the USA during the Cold War” Australian Journal of Politics and History, Vol. 52, No. 1, pp. 64-79.

Tow, William T. (2005) “Sino-American relations and the ‘Australian factor’: inflated expectations or discriminate engagement?” Australian Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 59, No. 4, pp. 451-467.

Wylie, Robert, (Spring 2008), “Facilitating Defence Trade Between Australia and the United States: A Vital Work In Progress” Security Challenges, vol. 4, no. 3 pp. 115-134.

Internet

Phillips Dennis (2008) ‘Why the American Alliance should not be the Holy Grail of Australian Foreign Policy’, The Australian Review of Public Affairs, http://www.australianreview.net/digest/2008/07/phillips.html accesses 21.04.201

Fillilove Michael (2007), “Still Looking to America: Labour and the US Alliance” Lecture at Curtin University, accessed 21.04.2011

[1] D Phillips, (2008) ‘Why the American Alliance should not be the Holy Grail of Australian Foreign Policy’, The Australian Review of Public Affairs, accesses 21.04.201

[2] Lyon, Rod (2008) “Australia-US Relations: the future of the ANZUS alliance” in Carl Ungerer (ed.) Australian Foreign Policy in the Age of Terror , University of New South Wales Press, Sydney, pp. 52-74

[3] Beeson, Mark (2003) “Australia’s Relationship with the United States: the Case for Greater Independence,” Australian Journal of Political Science Vol. 38, No. 3, pp. 387-405.

[4] Manicom, James and O’Neil, Andrew (2010) “Accommodation, realignment, or business as usual? Australia’s response to a rising China,” The Pacific Review, Vol. 23, No. 1: pp 23-44

McLean, David (2006) “From British Colony to American Satellite? Australia and the USA during the Cold War” Australian Journal of Politics and History, Vol. 52, No. 1, pp. 64-79

[5] Phillips Why the American Alliance Should not be the Holy Grail of Australian Foreign Policy

[6] M Fillilove (2007), “ Still Looking to America: Labour and the US Alliance” Lecture at Curtin University, accessed 21.04.2011

[7] Tow, William T. (2005) “Sino-American relations and the ‘Australian factor’: inflated expectations or discriminate engagement?” Australian Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 59, No. 4, p 461

Dibb, Paul (2007) “Australia-United States” in Brendan Taylor (ed.), Australia as an Asia-Pacific Regional Power: Friendship in Flux? Routledge, New York, p. 33

[8] Phillips (2008)

[9] T Barnett, (2009) Great Powers: The World After Bush, G.P. Putnam’s Sons, New York, pp.363 – 364

G Evans , B Grant, (1992) Australia’s Foreign relations, Melbourne University Press, Melbourne, Victoria, pp. 239-240

[10] Wylie, Robert, (Spring 2008), “Facilitating Defence Trade between Australia and the United States: A Vital Work In Progress” Security Challenges, vol. 4, no. 3 p. 116

[11] A Behm, (2007) Strategic Tides:; Positioning Australia’s Security Policy to 2050, Kokoda Foundation, Canberra ACT p. XI

[12] A Behm, (2007) p. 78

[13] A Behm, (2007) p. 65

[14] M Fillilove (2006)

[15] Manicom, James and O’Neil, Andrew (2010) “Accommodation, realignment, or business as usual? Australia’s response to a rising China,” The Pacific Review, Vol. 23, No. 1: p 31

[16] Fillilove (2006)