The cause for nuclear arms control has been around for a significant amount of time, for example treaties like The Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) which was an agreement between the USA and the Soviet Union and then by Russia helped maintain nuclear stability during periods where nuclear stability seemed very difficult. So far as we can see efforts for nuclear arms control are a limited success as nuclear capabilities of countries is not spreading rapidly but nonetheless it is spreading and the thus the major nuclear powers are adding to their nuclear capabilities while the spread is occurring slowly amongst the lesser states such as Iran.
The effort to control nuclear arms has been occurring differently across the world, while some states are moving away from nuclear weapons whilst some states are moving towards it. Hedley Bull stated in 1961 ‘the issue of why states might seek a nuclear weapons capability and the consequences of such an action was already exercising the minds of policy makers and strategic analysts.
Unless a nuclear weapon or the key nuclear ingredients can be obtained off the shelf as a result of purchase or theft, a concern that has become more pronounced in recent years, the usual route for any state or non state actor seeking to acquire nuclear weapons would be via the development of the necessary technological infrastructure. The nuclear infrastructure will contain a range of nuclear, conventional, computational and electronic technologies and individuals with key scientific and technical skills.
The United Nations Commission for Conventional Armaments in 1948 introduced a new category of ‘weapons of mass destruction’ because of the effects of nuclear weapons and to distinguish nuclear weapons from conventional forms. As the Commission outlined the category WMD, included atomic explosive weapons, radioactive material weapons, lethal chemical and biological weapons and any weapons developed in the future which have characteristics comparable in destructive to those of the atomic bomb or other weapons mentioned.
There are good things to come out as the result of a nuclear powered world, as nuclear weapons can be seen as a means to maintain post since the Second World War. The use of nuclear weapons in war time makes the cost of going to war seem frighteningly high. This cost of war can be seen as a deterrent for countries to start a nuclear war.
Global efforts to constrain nuclear weapons acquisition began soon after the conclusion of the Second World War. In January 1946, the United Nations General Assembly passed a resolution establishing the UN Atomic Energy Commission (UNAEC). The role of the UNAEC was to make proposals for the elimination of nuclear weapons and the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes under international control. Due to disagreements between the USA and the Soviet Union these proposals were never implemented, thus failed co operation between the more powerful nuclear states can be seen as a factor for the limited success of nuclear arms control.
The issue of international atomic energy control was revisited following President Eisenhower’s ‘Atoms for Peace’ speech on December 1953. It was stressed that Eisenhower’s proposal was not a disarmament plan, but an initiative to open the benefits of atomic energy to the world community. The IAEA was established in July 1957, and it was this organisation that started to negotiate and implement the ‘Atoms for Peace’ idea. Although it was not until the 1960’s that this organisation was able to implement comprehensive safeguards to ensure that materials in the nuclear energy programmes were not diverted for military use.
Negotiations for the implementation of The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CBBT) began in the late 1950’s. This treaty dealt with the context of a Soviet Union, United Kingdom and United States moratorium on nuclear testing. This treaty also called for the three nuclear power states to engage in nuclear disarmament. However the negotiations did not end in an agreement mainly because the three states were unable to overcome differences concerning verification, namely the provisions for a system that could provide assurance of detection of violation, especially for underground testing. However the three states were able to come to some sort of agreement in 1963 when they agreed on the Partial Test Ban Treaty which forbade nuclear testing in the atmosphere, in outer space and underwater and meant that future testing by parties had to be conducted underground. This is a clear example when an effort to promote nuclear arms controls has had limited success.
The Treaty for the Provisions of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America which was opened for signatures in 1967 was the first treaty made for the prevention of nuclearisation of specific environments and geographical areas. Between 1958 and 1968 the issues posed by more states acquiring nuclear weapons received international attention. The Irish resolution was adopted by the UN General Assembly which called for limitations to prevent additional states from acquiring nuclear weapons and for all states to refrain from transfer or acquisition of such weapons. A breakthrough in the negotiation of a non proliferation treaty came as a result of Resolution 2028, adopted by the UN General Assembly in 1965 and the tabling of a joint US Soviet draft on March 1968. Following further amendments, the latter was draft was passed by the UN General Assembly in June 1968 and the Non Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Treaty formerly entered into force on March 1970.
Since 1970 anti proliferation measures have continued to evolve. The International Energy Association negotiated its INFCIRC/153 safeguards documents, which provides a model for all safeguards negotiated with parties to the Non Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Treaty, especially those involving equipment or material for the processing, use or production of special fissionable materials. Following the global expansion of trade of nuclear weapons and the events of 1974 in which India called a ‘peaceful nuclear explosion’ that it conducted, some nuclear suppliers were urged to undertake new guidelines in exporting nuclear technology, thus the Nuclear Suppliers Group formed in 1975 and agreed that additional conditions should be attached to sensitive nuclear exports like reprocessing and uranium enrichment plants.
The United Nations in a bid to control nuclear arms control held its first special session on disarmament in 1978 where China, United Kingdom, United States, France and Russia all issued unilateral statements on so called negative security assurances on the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against non nuclear weapon states. These assurances embraced specific qualifications related to each states nuclear doctrine and security arrangement, however only China was unconditional and it stated it would not be the first to use nuclear weapons and undertook not to threaten to use nuclear weapons against non nuclear states.
1987 saw seven missile technology exporters establish identical guidelines to cover the sale of nuclear capable ballistic or cruise missiles known as the Missile Technology Control Regime. This supply arrangement sought to limit the risks of nuclear proliferation by controlling the transfers of technology which could make a contribution to nuclear weapons delivery system other than manned aircraft.
In 2002 a new initiative known as the Hague of Conduct was launched to develop standards of appropriate behaviour in the transfer of missiles and missile parts.
In conclusion since 1945, both the nature and the context of nuclear arms control have altered markedly. At the end of the Second World War only the United States were in a position to build nuclear weapons. Since then knowledge of how to make nuclear weapons has diffused more widely. This has been coupled, throughout this period, by profound changes to global politics and epitomised by the momentous dislocation that occurred in the former Soviet Union following the end of the cold war. As a result of these development nuclear arms control has become a major issue on the international agenda. As you can see, there has been many code of conducts and treaties signed to stop the spread of nuclear weapons, but however these treaties only have a limited success as treaties require compliance from all parties and this compliance has been a major issue to why there has been only limited success in efforts to promote nuclear arms control. However on the contrary gradual spread of nuclear weapons is a better option than rapid change and in my opinion this is what all the treaties and organisations that I have mentioned to best, and the rapid growth of nuclear weapons will have a devastating effect on the global front as it will create panic and uncertainty across the world.
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Bibliography:
- The Globalisation of World Politics, Oxford:OUP- J Bayliss. S. Smith and P. Owens7
Web Reference:
- www.mthoiyoke.edu/acad/itrel/waltz1.htm