With the increased complexity of the European Union due to its recent (and approaching) expansion there is a need to consider the European identity on a deeper level, how to create a ‘dynamic’ solidarity that is ‘related to the process of growth and development’. Originally the European Union was a community based on common economic interests and was created to promote stability and security in the post war region. France and Germany came together to construct a union that would prevent similar nationalistic conflicts as WWII, at the same time trying to rebuild their economies and re-establish their international political position. Today, that founding creation appears but a sapling of the modern European Union, one that attempts to embody concepts of unity, humanism and democracy. Yet regardless of its expansion and increased responsibilities and institutions, the EU has little altered its technocratic foundation. On January 29, 2003 during the summit in Brussels various representatives of EU member states came together to discuss the problem of European identity and common culture. The general conclusion was that the EU could not possess a traditional identity, and if it does construct an identity it cannot be realised on the basis of political and social institutions. The EU must look beyond the traditional identity and even beyond the idea of nation-state in order to resolve the issue considering that it has no common history, culture or language. Ferrari suggested that ‘one should try to elicit the core values underlying {European solidarity}. Various suggestions have been made, such as ‘constitutional patritoism’ that creates solidarity through common political values and goals as outlined in the constitution, Mayer considered music and art to be a basis for European identity, and yet this is not singularly European, and finally asserting identity by focusing on the diversity of Europe. The debate regarding a solution, however, is far from over, and the urgency of such a solution is becoming increasingly clear.
The simple word ‘Union’ means to unite, to come together, to even ‘be one’. To find ‘unity’ in ‘diversity’ seems almost a contradiction of terms. Europe, indeed, is a region of unique cultures, countless languages, different ethnic communities – it is, in essence, a reflection of the globe in itself. However it appears that this unity is slowly breaking apart with increasing nationalism in different member, and even potential member, states. On both the elitist and citizenry level, member states are either distancing themselves from the European Union or demanding that their national interests be focused upon. It appears that Europe is making use of its union not to ensure security, stability and promote peace, but to achieve greater national sovereignty and further national interests. This may be caused by increasing uncertainty about integrating eastern European states and what affect this will have on the EU as a whole. At the same time, with enlargement comes new members with new national interests and expectations which will increase competition within member states. Its apparent therefore, that member states still see themselves as German, French or Polish, and loyalties are focused on their nation-state rather than the European There is no identity or culture to connect these different states, to promote that allusive ‘unity’ and ensure the long sought after ‘peace’. National identity is formed out of historical memory, common culture, sometimes common ethnicity and religion, and often common language. The operative word obviously being ‘common’, a difficult necessity for Europe, considering it has no common history, language or culture to speak of. The European Union even lacks a founding myth, like that of the French Revolution, America’s Independence Day or Poland’s memory of Warsaw. There are few tangible elements within the EU that promote unity amongst the people of Europe. There is a flag and even a hymn, but both symbols are of little value without the myth to sustain them and create meaning. Schools continue to teach the histories of their nation-state, which enforces a certain amount of nationalism to be passed on to the next generation. It appears that Europe either needs to reconstruct its history or create a founding myth in order for the people of Europe to transcend patriotism to the nation-state and feel ‘European’.
At the same time, identity can be constructed in opposition to the ‘other’. France is French because it is not Britain; America is American because it is not Afghanistan. Is it not possible, therefore, for Europe to be European because it is not any other continent, because it has transcended the nation-state, and in this way it is unique from other countries and even continents? For the EU to be an influential player in the international realm it needs to differentiate itself from other states and feel strong and stable in its self. It may be time for the long discussed cosmopolitan approach to be considered by the EU, for Europe to ‘evolve’ and become a federation, a united actor portraying the future to the world. A future of peace and stability despite diversity. The concept of cosmopolitanism is hardly new and in 1848 during the Peoples Spring, Europe was looking to protect itself again both non-European states and itself through the construction of a Federal Europe. Although this did not occur the theories that developed during this era were not forgotten, and come to the foreground of political discussion today. Very simply cosmopolitanism transcends nation-states, it looks to avoid nationalism and promote universal peace for all of humanity. In regard to identity, cosmopolitanism expresses a need for the identification of humanity that we are all created and therefore are all equal. Rather than being an alterative to nation-state democracy, or even a confederation, cosmopolitanism is said to transcend these political systems and rather evolve from them. People would no longer be separated by boarders but would embrace a common political culture familiar throughout the world. Some Europeans felt that if a federation was not constructed soon it would lead to a return to ethnic, cultural, religious specific identities; people would turn again to single communities that would inevitably result in conflict. Strangely enough, some years this did occur in the form of the Nazi Regime, and now Europe has its second chance to prevent the menace of dangerous nationalism, and rather promote a ‘European nationalism’. Habermas concedes that ‘nation states are running up against the limits of their own capacities’ and therefore a new system must be adopted. If the EU is unable to function as a union of entirely separate states, then it is imperative that it realise its potential as a federation. That is not to say that regions will mirror one another, nor that it will remove that diversity from different states or ignore their own identities and cultures, but that states will embrace a new identity, a transnational national identity. This identity can be based on the common values of the Union, those of liberal democracy, humanism and the political will of the region. Conceivably this will lead to increases civic solidarity, increase unity and result in ‘perpetual peace’.
Perpetual peace, though, seems a long way off considering the present social atmosphere among EU member states. Germany, one of the founding members of the European Economic Community, appears to be lacking that sense of European patriotism and is distancing itself from the European Union. As the strongest economic member of the EU, Germany has been primarily responsible for subsidising new member states and is the largest contributor to the EU budget. For a state previously thought to become a strong and independent nation, Germany is irreversibly interlinked with other European states and it has been suggested they are unable to cope with social and security matters on its own. After decades of war and economic instability, constant military restrictions and recurrent feelings of guilt, Germany decided to join with France in an attempt to redeem itself and reclaim some economic strength. Germany needed to find some way to again be accepted by the international community, and proved its new humanitarian position in its interests regarding Kosovo and situations in Eastern Europe. The new-found bond with France portrayed its willingness to become an active member in the global market and more so, to compromise its interests and prevent any resurgence of overly nationalistic past. Today, though, Germany has taken a step toward redefining itself in regard to its identity, and looks to reassert its sovereignty. Feeling the affects of its economic relief to other member states and the EU as whole, yet perceiving little improvement for their own state, Germany has made moves to distance itself from the EU on an economic level. It has limited its assistance to accession states and its contribution to the EU budget in an attempt to focus on national interests rather than the improvement of the European community. This has resulted in a ‘reconsideration of the values that [underpin] European Policy’, that it is necessary some congruence be established between Germany and European interests. It is not that the EU needs to be more considerate of Germany’s interests, but that Germany, the EU and all states need to establish common values and common interests in order to sustain this enlargement process and ensure stability for the EU. If Germany feels that it’s nation-states interests are being overlooked, then inevitably it will distance itself from greater responsibilities to assist its own peoples. What can be concluded from this is that Europe, as previously iterated, needs to see itself as, if not a state and federation, a union progressing toward a future that will result in the realisation of European interests, rather than German or French or otherwise. If the EU loses Germany’s economic power, even to a degree, it is threatened by financial disaster, it will not be able to expand, nor even sustain those newly ascended states that require subsidy. It has been said that ‘Europe is a project of the future’, it will never reach those aspirations without some common identity that binds states together. If the German people had some sense of common identity they may thwart pressure on their government for increased economic assistance (that is, other than urgent and immediate economic assistance) for the greater good, in order for Germany to help its brothers in the EU. Jeffrey concedes that Germany is heading toward ‘externalisation’, that is a renewed focus on domestic politics; if other states follow this move it will inevitably result in further competition between ‘sectoral interests.’ Without the realisation of Europe’s common purpose the EU is likely to disintegrate as states find renewed passion for national interests and ‘love for their own land’, leading to internal conflict that can only lead to disaster on political, social and economic levels.
Protecting its economic interests, however, is not the only issue within Germany. There has been a resurgence of German nationalism in recent years, Germans reclaiming their pre-Nazi identity which obviously concerns the European Union and its stability. German individuals such as Schroder and Staub appear to be promoting nationalism within the state, Schroder commenting that the EU needs to be less ‘interventionalist and more respectful of national and regional autonomy’. With further enlargement set to occur in 2007, many Germans, concerned with the affect the inclusion certain post-communist and eastern European countries will have on their state, are embracing the idea of increased national sovereignty at the expense of a less powerful EU. Obviously there is a lack of European identity, for Germany to continue perceiving itself as a sovereign entity that ‘makes use’ rather than ‘being a part of’ the EU, it appears EU expansion and even success is far from being possible. National identities can be manipulated by persons with interests in power or conflict, as has been proved in Germany’s own past, without a greater identity, that of being ‘European’ it is still possible for those persons to create controversies between member states. National identity opposed to the European Union is at least a hindrance and at worse a threat to security and stability. At the same time there is much support for EU enlargement and integration within Germany, however, without the citizens of Germany feeling a greater sense of European identity and being able to perceive its interests being fulfilled by membership within the EU, it is possible enlargement, let alone the EU as a whole, will be unsuccessful.
Germany, though, is but one of many states experiencing issues of nationality within its boundaries, nor concerns about losing its individual identity and sovereignty. Poland has a long history of external dominance, from the first and second world wars to Soviet power. Poland was long devoid of national identity, simply because an identity was forced upon them. In 1989 Poland was freed from Soviet dominance and began its journey to rediscover its national identity, since this time it has become a respected member of the international community and a new, though sometimes awkward, member of the EU. Before independence Poland turned to Europe and saw ‘freedom, normalcy and economic rationality’, it was where Poland belonged and regardless of Soviet domination, Poland perceived itself as truly Western. After the end of the Cold War Poland had not only to rebuild its economy, but establish itself as a democratic state and become an active member in the international market. Finally having become a full member of the European Union and re-established itself in the international community, one would presume Poland would be embracing all that the EU offered, this is not the case. Poland’s new found nationalism has resulted in constant conflicts within the EU and hostilities between itself and other member states. It has been a struggle for Poland to ascend from its soviet past to become a member of the EU, to rediscover itself on an ideological level and re-establish it’s position internationally. As such Poland has become a highly nationalistic state, a sense of victory is sustaining this social atmosphere, the new-found independence will not be given over easily and the EU appears to be realising this with constant debates on economic and political decisions. Michnik iterates that the people of Poland feel cheated by the EU and dominated by stronger member states, having not been appropriately subsidised on its accession and requesting more votes in order to protect their sovereign interests. Furthermore Poland retains certain hostilities regarding its history. With this renewed nationalism Poland is reliving its past, going over archives, remembering its lost histories during occupation, which has resulted in requests for other states to acknowledge their past, such as that of Germany during the Second World War and its treatment of Poland. Obviously this has caused tensions between Poland and other member states, Poland seems to be fighting a union it is supposed to be a part of. Poland’s attitude toward the EU is not a constructive one, Michnik mentions during his nationalistic piece an author who readily expresses this anti- European attitude; “The narrator encounters in Paris a minister of the Georgian Government-in-exile, who warns him; “Do not have confidence in Europe, because Europe will not help you. Europe will betray you. You can only count on yourselves”. Poland retains its sense of itself versus the rest of the world, its tormenting history has resulted in very nationalistic sentiments which are leading to conflicts within the EU. Again it is clear that without a sense of brotherhood between member states the EU will not be successful, and is only likely to encounter further problems with expansion. Poland is a clear example of the need for a firm set of European values to be established, that member states can retain their identity while embracing the unity of all European states to ensure peace and stability. Poland most importantly needs to be ensured of peace, that they are not being threatened or dominated, but that the EU is trying to work together to prevent a resurgence of past conflicts. Unless the EU constructs a European identity to unite its states it looks a very disruptive future.
The European Union was at first a technocratic union that sought economic development for Western states, and has since evolved into a political and social development for the future. As the union continues to expand and integrate new and diverse states it needs to become more aware of the social needs of its citizenry. There needs to be a European identity with which all states can consider themselves working together for the good of Europe as a whole. Identity is not merely something which occurs within a nation-state, but a necessity for states, for them to function, to ensure patriotism and a civil society. EU’s lack of this important social tool has obviously led to conflicts, hostilities that may be resolved if only states felt a bond with one another. This transnational identity is not a new concept, and actually exists today in the form of Afro-Asianism and Arabism – identities that transcend boarders. Therefore if it is already in existence, it is possible for the EU to forge a new European transnational nationalism that will bind states together and ensure that they work together for the good of all rather than compete with one another for their own nation-state interests. This flaw of the EU became clear in the recent referendum on the constitution in which the citizens of France and Britain were opposed to the proposal of common values for the EU. Therefore the identity of Europe cannot be based on a text, there needs to be a myth, a history with which the people can find meaning and belonging. This history can come in the form of the history of Europe, that there have been conflicts in the past and yet hope has been renewed in the form of this European Union. For these conflicts to be prevented though, Europe needs to redefine itself, possibly by transcending the nation state and embracing a cosmopolitan system in which state histories can be retained while new histories are created through the experiences of Europe, a great body of states, a democratic federalism ensuring peace and security for all its citizens. For states such as Germany and Poland it is imperative that nation-state allegiances be subdued for the benefit of the EU, Poland needs not forget its past, and can continue asserting its pride in that region, yet find commonality with other member states – rather than fighting them for a past Europe is trying to over come. Similarly Germany must perceive its economy as more than an institution for the domestic interests of its nation-state, but as a great benefit for Europe as a whole. It can redeem its forgotten past while embracing a future in which it is not feared or repressed. Whether European identity is based on a constructed myth or the constitution, it is essential that one be developed, although it seems unlikely today with the resurgence of nationalism in certain states. Europe may be diverse, but appears yet to be truly united.
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