Geopolitical Analysis of Regional Security Issues Surrounding Europe

by andra624 (student)

University Degree Social studies

The Bucharest Academy of Economic Studies

Master in International Business Communication

Basic Geopolitics and the International Business Environment

Regional Security Issues

Surrounding Europe

Coordinator:

Prof. Dr. Claudia Popescu

Student:

Anghelescu Andra

2011

Abstract

The European neighbourhood, harshly geographically definable, has in common the more or less stable conflicts. The European Union divides this neighbourhood in three parts: Euromed (Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, Palestinian Authority, Israel, Lebanon and Syria, included in the Process of Barcelona), Eastern Europe and Caucasus (Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova, Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Georgia) and Russia. The two first zones are included in the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), and the last one has a special policy EU-Russia Strategic Partnership based on four common spaces.

The different means of action of the ENP is financial tools used in bilateral action plans including political and economical reform. In order to understand what could be a more efficient relation between the EU and its neighbours, we should define the geopolitical systems, then to track back the background of the conflicts, then to analyse the current features relative to the different systems, and then to see what could bring the development of a regional-based European Neighbourhood Policy.

Introduction

Six geopolitical systems can be defined on the basis of geopolitical realities, and even if it is restrictive while countries and systems are connected in a more complete way:

System MAT (Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia)
System LAW (Libya and Arab World)
System EJIPT (Egypt, Jordan, Israel, Palestinian Territories)
System ILS (Israel, Lebanon, Syria)
System AGA (Armenia, Georgia, Azerbaijan)
System BUM (Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova)

Historical backgrounds of the European Neighbourhood Systems (ENS)

The European surrounding is not only close to Europe in a geographical way, but also in culture, values, religion, politics and all the fields that can define the strategic orientations of a political entity. In a single word, we share a common history.

MAT

Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia, former French colonies, used to live the Roman Empire, the Barbarian invasions (Vandals in Cartage), the Arab ruling of the VIIIth century, the rise of the Dar al Islam (Ottoman Empire), the colonialism, the fights in Europe in the two World Wars, and the rise of free nations during the Cold War. It is the common place, especially in Morocco, with Spain, where the explosion of intellectual pre-Renaissance thought would become the basis of the re-birth of post-Middle Age Europe, with wise thinkers like Avicenna, Al Farabi, Ibn Rushd and his ‘counterpart’ in the Jewish community, Moshe Ben Maymoun. This place has been the laboratory of Berber Almoravid (Murabitun) and Almohad (Muwahhids) rulers. The Arabo-Andalusian culture links deeply this system to the southwest Europe. The acquisitions of coastal Algeria by Sultan Mehmed II in the XVth century and of Tunisia in the XVIth century will link these countries to the huge Ottoman Empire. The Spain and French influences, as well as the colonial impact are also a feature of the region, with the share of Arab and French languages. The three countries also have huge diasporas, especially in France.

Morocco and Algeria had three serious topics of divergence. The first one is the Sand war, in 1963-1964, about a border dispute of the Tindouf and Bechar areas. The second one was the diverging political systems and orientation, a conservative monarchy for Morocco and an Arab republic for Algeria. The third reason is the support of Algeria to the Polisario Front, the independence movement of Western Sahara, ruled by Morocco since Spain left it in the mid-70s. Tunisia is not evolving in these Saharan affairs.

LAW

The recent developments in world news of Libya show how the relations this country has with western powers is particular. Before knowing the Roman Empire and then the Vandals, Libya knew the Greeks. It was, even before, the country of the famous Punic civilisation. In the VIIth century, the Arabs invaded Libya and then, in the mid-XVIth century, it was the turn of the Ottomans. In 1911, Italy defeated the Empire and made the three regions a European colony and introduced the Greek name of Libya. Only in 1951 Libya turned into the pro-West independent, constitutional and hereditary monarchy of the United Kingdom of Libya. In 1969 the Libyan Arab Republic was proclaimed by Muammar Abu Minyar al-Gaddafi. If the Kingdom was close to UK, US and in diplomatic relationship with the USSR, and backed Arab independences, it was in the Arab League’s conservative block. But after playing the oil weapon in the crisis Libya has been rejected by the international community. Letting down this strategy and the plan of getting weapons of mass destruction, Libya started to normalize its relations with the West.

EJIPT and ILS

The well-known system of Near East includes of course also Lebanon and Syria. And EJIPT system represents today a system in itself, even if the historical background before the Second World War could extend it to other regional entities.

This system is obviously in the heart of European concerns since centuries. The Greek cities and the Roman Empire dealed and integrated the region. The Christian schism between Roma and Byzantium provoked the modification of the European concern in the oriental part of the Roman Empire, led to the Greek influence more than the Western one. It remains that such cities like Antioch, Alexandria or Jerusalem, part of the Byzantine Empire, are still important in European culture.

An important feature of the Near East history related to today’s geopolitical stakes is of course the crusades. The crusades have been the harshest recurrent attacks to implement European Christianity in posted reason and to conquer and to pillage the region in hided reason. The fourth crusade, in 1204, showed the reach of wealth by the participating entities while it turned to the sack of Constantinople and not to the “liberation” of the holy city of Jerusalem. And the Kingdom of Jerusalem (1099-1291) and the Christian States are an important part of European feature of history, and first of ...

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AGA

The Transcaucasus is not a part of the Euromed area but this ex-USSR region is a part of the ENP. This region integrates in the meantime two of the earliest Christian states (Armenia and Georgia) with different ethnicities, culture, languages, and a Turkish-speaking Sunni country (Azerbaijan). The movement of the three main Empires of the region (Russian, Ottoman, Persian) decided a lot in the history of the region. Today, the north part of the mountain chain, Ciscaucasus, is a part of Russia and includes few republics of the Russian Federation (Dagestan, Chechnya, Ingushetia, North Ossetia, Kabardino-Balkaria, Karachay-Cherkessia, Republic of Adygea). Ciscaucasus and Transcaucasus, after a lot of different moves of the three empires, had a more or less stabilized territory integrated in the USSR. But the collapse of this last one provoked the secession of the three Transcaucasus states. The two Chechen wars did not allow the independence of this little Ciscaucasian republic, and troubles in the 90’s have been numerous.

Europe as a whole started shyly too to intervene in this region to improve the situation and to develop cooperation between the different Transcaucasian actors. Concerning Ciscaucasus, as a part of Russia, the implication of Europe is almost inexistent.

BUM

Like the AGA system, the BUM system is born with the collapse of the Soviet empire. If we can hardly consider a single and homogenous system between Belarus, Ukraine and Moldova, we can consider it as a system while it has few historical common features, while it defines current Eastern EU borders, while every one of them has currently more or less conflictual relationships with Russia, and while every one of them has to define itself geopolitically as an entity included between the two main powers of Eurasia: the European Union and the Russian Federation.

The historical relations between the three East European countries and Europe are quite different. Belarusian state disappeared in the XVIth century while the Poland-Lithuania Lublin traeaty entered into force. Two centuries after, it has been integrated in the Russian empire. Independent in 1918, the occidental part is integrated to Poland in 1921 (Riga Treaty) and the oriental part is then integrated to USSR. It is independent since 1990 before entering the CIS and then to sign the creation of Belarus-Russia Union in 1999.

Ukraine has been the cradle of the Slavic state of the Princes of Kiev before being also more or less integrated to the Lithuanian-Polish Confederation in the XVIth century. After the Cossack Hetmanate, it has been once again divided between Poland and Russia in the XVIIth century before being shared by the Russian and Austro-Hungarian empires in the XVIIIth century. Ukraine lived shortly, like Belarus, in independence between 1918 and 1920 and its integration in the USSR (1922).

A part of Moldova was integrated in the Roman empire before being a principality from the XIVth century. From the XVIth century, the principality of Moldova has to pay the Ottoman empire to keep its autonomy. In 1812, the country is integrated in the Russian empire and Bessarabia will recover its independence like Ukraine and Belarus, only in 1918 when Transdniestria will become part of the Soviet empire until 1940 when Bessarabia will be annexed by this last one. Like Ukraine, Moldova quitted the USSR in 1991 and entered the CIS after that Transniestria claimed its independence (1990). In 1992 began the Moldova-Transniestria conflict.

All these systems have in common some historical background which defined for a part the current relationship they have with Europe. They are also more or less linked by conflictual or constructive relationships between their different components.

2. Current geopolitical interests and strategic realities

The MAT system is currently definable by three stable countries which chose different ways of governance but which are historically and geopolitically linked by common interests:

Geostrategic place, between Europe and Black Africa
The reorganization of islamic terror networks toward an Al Qaida network in western Maghreb
The political stability of the region with a hereditary king, and two long-term presidents
Energy sources (Trans-Mediterranean gas pipeline)
Immigration issues as transit countries for Morocco ( Ceuta and Mellila) and Tunisia (Italy)
Inner migration flows toward Europe
Preservation of traditional culture

But despite these common interests, the relationships of the three countries are not that developed. The border frictions between Morocco and Algeria have reduced the cooperation capacities between the two countries.

The stakes are as huge as this system is important for Europe. The European Union should realize its need to improve its relationship with western Maghreb and, in the same time, to help to improve the neighbouring relationships between the system’s actors.

The risks are indeed real:

The development of a new wave of armed actions by Islamic, developing its activities from guerrilla in Algeria to terror attacks in Morocco, and the creation of a network of cells under the label Al Qaeda.
The freedom of expression, of the press, and of political participation are still concerns in the three countries, where the equilibrium between stable regimes and the democratic rolling governance are not yet established.
The unregulation of human migration flows, from inside or outside could cause some stability, security, economic, humanitarian troubles to the countries, especially in Morocco and Tunisia.

Concerning its external relations, the MAT actors are quite divergent. The three countries manage indeed very different types of relationships with the north coast of Mediterranean sea. Morocco is certainly the closest country of Europe in the European Neighbourhood Policy. Algeria has a very particular relationship to Europe. Its first commercial partner is the United States, and if the country is dependent of Europe, its relations to France are currently blocking a bit the advancement of advanced EU-Algeria partnership. Tunisia has a quite good relationship to Europe but there are issues related to democracy and press.

The LAW system is an internal-external European neighbourhood system. If Libyan relationships to other Arab states have never been at the point to concretize politically by a federation, the Libyan leader backed Arab nationalism, nasserism, palestinian cause, and independence from the western powers by a broad range of means. Today, with the turnover of Libya toward the west, it is still linked to Arab world by few issues:

Stability of the central Maghreb, between the MAT and EJIPT systems
The implication of Libya in the Israeli-Palestinian and conflict and the US Iraqi strategy[1]
Libya represents approximatively 5% of the production and capacity of oil of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC)
The so-called “Libya Model” can be seen as an example of goodwill for the improvement of western and some Arab or Muslim states.

Of course, even if the “Libya Model” is claimed to be a success, the country is not as close to the European Union as Morocco, for instance. The Arab states are probably satisfied as well to see Libya improving its foreign relations. But some risks remain regarding to this particular actor of the European neighbourhood:

The freedom of expression and the democratical process are still limited in a neighbourhood that the EU would like rightful and democratic.
If the process of normalization is more than engaged, the relationship to the Arab states has not been redefined at a comparable scale, point which can be seen as antagonism between the backing of Arab nationalism and the will of cooperation with the Europeans.

The EJIPT system is a complex system where forces and counterforces are permanently changing, some entering, some other outgoing. But the normalization of the Israeli-Egyptian and Israeli-Jordanian relationships have been the first steps to a regional stabilization, even if the number of topics of conflicts still remains very high for such a small geographical area. In a way or the other, the becoming of the four actors concerned here is linked:

Egypt and Jordan are the priviledged mediators between the Arab world and Israel as the intense diplomatic activity demonstrated it for the Arab Peace Agreement proposal.[2]
Egypt and Jordan are geopolitically linked respectively to the Gaza strip and the West Bank. Israel is obviously linked to both.
The pacification of the region cannot be achieved without the goodwill and the efforts of the four actors.
The emergence of a Palestinian state is linked to the security of Israel.

It would be useless to enumerate all the possible divergences of the different inner actors of the system. But we can make few statements, as the EJIPT system is full of risks. Let’s list some of them:

At the first terror attack, the current efforts to go toward a two-states solution are probably ended.
A persistant dichotomy in the Palestinian political head would drive the Palestinians to the impeachment of the improvement of their situation.
The continuation of corruption will bring the continuation of tougher choices in polls.
A continuing blocus of Gaza would probably induce more and more extermism.
The refugee camps in different countries around and even in Cisjordania could repeat the events we have seen in Nahr al-Bared.
If Jordan and Egypt, because an external event or a hypothetic change of regime, let down their efforts for a palestinian state, it is less than probable that Israel and the Palestinian Authority will be confident enough in each other to continue the process.
The development of terror attacks in Jordan and Egypt risks to strengthen the regimes and to begin by this way a vicious circle of terror attacks / repression, destabilizing a bit more the region.
External risks and unplanifiable risks can occur in any moment.

Related to its external relations, the EJIPT system is obviously linked to so many actors that it would be also useless to try to be exhaustive. But let’s remark some particular actors of the moment. Lebanon is of course one of the countries related to the system, and the war of 2006 proved that Israel is still concerns by the becoming of its northern neighbours, and especially with security matters.

The ILS system is of course related to the EJIPT system. But by its contemporary history and by the fact that its three actors, Israel, Lebanon and Syria, are currently evolving in connected movements, it composes a system by itself for several reasons.

The Lebanon civil war has seen the direct or indirect implication of its neighbours.
The fact that the strategy toward Syria is at the heart of the political polarization of the Lebanon political scene and of its politics shows that its Eastern neighbour is still at the heart of Lebanon governance’s concerns.
The cultural diversity of Lebanon and Israel can potentially be a topic of cooperation.

This system composes, with the EJIPT one, the most riskful of the European neighbourhood and the concern of the European Union is high for this system. A certain number of risks can indeed be identified:

The political instability in Lebanese political governance remains very important and the destabilization of the country with a return to the dark years of the civil war is still in every minds.
The development of armed conflict between the Lebanese army and the Fatah al Islam group poses the question of radicalism and possible destabilization of Palestinian refugee camps.
It also poses the question of the implication of Lebanon in the Palestinian entity becoming.
The American strategy toward Syria, qualified by the current administration as a so-called “rogue-state”, will influence the becoming of the ILS system.

The external relationships of thee ILS system are, as the ones of EJIPT system, as complex as it includes various actors. The American strategy in Near and Middle East is to put pressure on Syria and to back Israel militarily, politically and at the UN Security Council. The European position on this system is a bit more balanced. It is true that the European states back as well the current Lebanese government and defend the right of Israel to have a secured territory. But through the European organization, it is recalled that the escalation of armament and the military intervention are not a mean to impose peace contrarily to constructive dialogue, in harmony with the European Security Strategy (ESS)[3], with the strategic culture of the European Union, and with its belief in the international law.

The AGA system (Transcaucasus) issues, i.e., can hardly be defined without Ciscaucasus, i.e. Russia. But let’s try to focus on the three Transcaucasian states. Few features are linking them.

They are post-socialist countries in transition, former republics of the USSR.
They are belonging to a close and specific region, between the Black and the Caspian seas, with a chain of mountains separating them from Ciscaucasus.
If the three countries are culturally accurately identified, they share a hard past between empires and enjoy independence after the multiple integrations in these empires.
Producers of natural gaz and oil being at their eastern side and the huge European consumers being at their western side, they can be seen as a transit region for natural resources supplies.
Between Iran, Turkey and Russia, they are at the crossroad of strategic interests for these three actors, as well as for the US and the EU.
The geopolitical composition imposes a regional cooperation between the three entities.

These links are mostly potential while the number of troubles remains high. The threee states, which aspire to grow up sufficiently to deal in position of force with the five huge external actors hardly find the necessary resources by themselves without coopering. The resultant of such statement is that the AGA system reveals huge stakes in term of European security.

The presence of Russian troops in South Ossetia increases the risk of friction between Georgia and Russia.
The general instability of Transcaucasus threats the development of the three countries.
The situation in North Caucasus, and more precisely in Chechnya is not without impact on the situation in the
The Ciscaucasus being a point of focus of some radical Islamist groups, the Transcaucasus is concerned by potential collateral implications.

The external relations of the three Transcaucasian states are strongly associated to their relations to five actors: Russia, Iran, Turkey, the United States and the European Union. Russia is an ally of Armenia, and is in open conflict with Georgia on several topics (NATO, Russian troops in secessionist provinces, American approach, energy networks with the recent Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline). Its relations to Azerbaijan are mixed. But in the three states, Russia remains economically a major actor and investor. Cultural or political claims could lead to separatism of this ethno-culturally Turkish people. The question of natural resources of the Caspian Sea has also been a source of troubles with Turkmenistan as a third party. Turkey has a high concern on its little Azerbaijan neighbour, even if the only border is the one with the region of Nakhichevan. They do not have diplomatic relations and the Armenian-Turkish border is closed. The United States and the European Union have quite close positions. If the US are implicated a lot in the east-west axis because of the resources, of the neighbouring of Iran and of the access to Central Asia, the European Union is also involved in several partnerships in regional cooperation, security matters (CFSP/ESDP), energy and development.

The BUM system is the only system to have long borders with the European Union. Their relations are much less associated than their possible interests.

The three countries define the continued area between the EU and the Russian Federation.
The energy flows from Russia to Europe, even if the EU tries to limit its dependency from Russia, are still important and the three countries are on the way of pipelines: Belarus to Poland, Ukraine to Slovakia and Moldova to Romania.
Historical and cultural features link Ukraine to Belarus.
The transition economies (mainly Ukraine and Moldova too) can be enriched by sharing common experiences and by expanded commercial exchanges.

The very definition of the BUM system is however irrelevant regarding to common strategies while it regroups two geographically huge countries and a small one, while one of them is quite autarkic -at least on its west side- (Belarus) when another is turned toward a EU membership despite a balance politics EU-Russia (Ukraine) and that the last one, also EU-oriented, has so serious economic troubles that it cannot expect to be candidate before years. Moreover, every country deals with its own troubles.

Democratic rights are discussed in Moldova.
Ukraine has a quite persistent political instability
Belarus has been criticized by the Council of Europe for undemocratic electoral process, limited press expression, political imprisonments and the existence of death penalty.
The economical difficulties of these three countries are serious tasks (financial backing, unemployment, immigration) for them first and then for the European Union.
The existing traffics and corruption are a threat to wealth of these countries, social development and to political stability.
The more or less advanced partnership with NATO creates tensions with the Russian Federation.

Regarding to BUM external relations, three main actors can be listed: Russia, the US and the EU. Considering Russia, it is certain that the loose of influence on the ex-USSR territory represented a difficulty for the Eurasian giant. The Eastern European part represents of course a privileged area of action for Moscow, while more than the languages, it has a lot of interests in this huge geopolitical area bordering the European Union and tempted by NATO. The EU tries to implement a real dialogue with the three countries even if it is hard regarding to each countries difficulties and of bilateral dispute like the Polish-Belarusian one and regarding too to it hard relation to Russia which dislike the investigation of the EU in its former controlled area. The US try to content more or less Russia in expanding their field of partners to ex-USSR actors, a strategy which works differently following the countries but that is, even in principle already active, and therefore active.

Conclusions

It is clear that the European neighbourhood is full of dysfunctions. Of course the European Union in itself is not empty of, but its regional enhanced cooperation nature and its principles and aims diverge deeply of some features which have been seen here. The question is therefore, while the European Union does not wish to conciliate its principles with the harsh conditions of some neighbouring states, how to converge with them toward a more secured neighbourhood.

The number of issues related directly to security matters is numerous. More numerous even are the number of countries sharing these troubles. Solving problems in neighbouring countries is more than necessary, it is imperative. It shows also that while these troubles are common to countries and/or shared by them, a regional analysis and strategy is justified.

This could help to allow the European neighbours to share and to develop the greatest chance of the European Union: peace and stability.

Bibliography

High-Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy, A Secure Europe in a Better World - European Security Strategy, 2003, Brussels
Commission of the European Communities, Wider Europe – Neighbourhood: A New Framework for Relations with our Eastern and Southern Neighbours, 2003, COM(2003) 104 final, Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament, Brussels
Commission of the European Communities, European Neighbourhood Policy Strategy Paper, 2004, COM(2004) 373 final, Communication from the Commission, Brussels
Cameron, Fraser, coll. Rosa Balfour, The European Neighbourhood Policy as a Conflict Prevention Tool, 2006, European Policy Centre – Conflict Prevention Partnership Publication
Biscop, Sven, Prof. Dr., The European Security Strategy and the Neighbourhood Policy: A starting Point for the Euro-Mediterranean Security Partnership?, Royal Institute for International Relations, Brussels, 2005
Hauser, Gunther, Kernnic, Franz, European Security in Transition, Hampshire, 2006.