Even though the United Kingdom tried to avoid involvement in the Northern Irish problem, eventually an intervention became inevitable. Firstly, the Catholic minority in Ireland had begun to bring the problem to the centre of the British politics and therefore it could no longer be ignored. Secondly, the problem had become popular in the world causing the Britain's reputation to go down and embarrassing the kingdom. Thirdly, the United Kingdom's superpower status had significantly started to decline and it was clear that something had to be done to protect the Catholic minority. Moreover, the Northern Ireland's police forces could no longer deal with the problem and sustain order. At first, the Catholic minority welcomed the troops but soon the army became the cause of a further escalation of the conflict and the target of attacks by the IRA. In the next couple of years Westminster introduced several unsuccessful reforms that did not satisfy the minority. The government of Northern Ireland, which was in hands of the Ulster Unionist Party, in order to maintain stability demanded Britain to introduce a mode of repression: internment with no trial, so that aggressive nationalists could be interned without the necessity of trial. The law however turned out to be a terrible failure. What it caused was a unity of the Catholic minority, which started to stand up against the government and the army. It led to further disobedience of the law and violence. Soon Unionist paramilitary groups started to be formed, whose targets were the Republicans. The situation got even worse on January 30, 1972 when the British army shot thirteen unarmed civil right protesters who demonstrated against internment. The event is known as Bloody Sunday. The peak of violence was reached in 1972 when 468 people were killed. The result of it was embarrassment of Britain in the world community and worse relations with the United States. The United Kingdom decided to suspend the government of Northern Ireland and introduce the direct rule (O'Leary and McGarry 1996, pp. 171-177; Cunningham 2001, pp. 9-10). Since then there were a few attempts to reach an agreement.
On December 6, 1973 the Sunningdale Agreement was signed establishing a Council of Ireland. It was an attempt of introducing power sharing between Catholics and Protestants. However, the agreement did not have Protestant support. Having lasted for only a few months, the agreement was brought down in May 1974 after an Ulster Workers' Council strike (Cunningham 2001, pp. 15-16, Darby 1995, chapter 2). There were several reasons for the failure of the Sunningdale Agreement. The need for Irish unity was constantly emphasised, which built up Protestants' fears that they were a staging post to a united Ireland. It can be argued that the agreement might have had Unionist support if the 'Irish Dimension' had been de-emphasised (Cunningham 2001, pp. 15-16). The Unionist position was still strong at that time and they could not accept not having the majority. They were also absolutely against any influence of the Republic of Ireland on solving the problem. Moreover, the conflict was seen as an internal issue of the United Kingdom and had no international involvement (Ruane and Todd 1999, pp. 1-2).
Another attempt to reach a political accord was the Anglo-Irish Agreement (AIA), which was signed on November 15, 1985 by the British and Irish Prime Ministers. The aim of the agreement was to promote peace and reconciliation in Northern Ireland and better relations between Ireland and the United Kingdom. One of the terms of the AIA stated that the status of Northern Ireland could be changed (i.e. whether it was to remain in the United Kingdom or become part of the Republic) and how it could be done. The governments of both Britain and Ireland also committed to promote a devolved government of Northern Ireland. The agreement was also supposed to protect human rights and prevent discrimination (O'Leary and McGarry 1996, pp. 221-222). Reactions to the agreement were mixed. It had a great support in Westminster and the Republic of Ireland but the majority of both the Protestant and Catholic population of Northern Ireland opposed it. Some supporters praised it for the attempt of containing the IRA and Sinn Fein, others for it being the first step for a united Ireland. On the other hand, it was criticised for only pretending to address the problems and not actually solving them. Unionists claimed that it was the end of the Union and a deal between Irish Catholics and the British at the expense of Irish Protestants. Republicans criticised the AIA for giving up on the idea of re-integrating the national territory as stated in the Irish Constitution (O'Leary and McGarry 1996, pp. 222-223). However, it can be argued that the AIA for the first time gave the Republic a voice in Northern Ireland issues and showed Nationalists that unity could only be achieved if the majority of the population of Northern Ireland could be convinced to its advantages (O'Leary and McGarry 1996, p. 239).
On December 15, 1993 the British and Irish Prime Ministers signed the Downing Street Declaration (also known as the Joint Declaration). For the first time Sinn Fein was given a chance to be involved in the talks. It stated that any constitutional changes could only be made with the support of a majority of the Northern Irish population. Moreover, a united Ireland could only be created if a majority of Northern Ireland wanted it (Darby 1995, chapter 2; Cunningham 2001, pp. 90-91). This slowly led to the final peace settlement.
The Good Friday Agreement, or the Belfast Agreement, was signed on April 10, 1998. It was supported by 71 per cent of the population of Northern Ireland and by an overwhelming majority of 94 per cent in the Republic (Ruane and Todd 1999, p. 1). Some of its terms are for instance protection of human rights and the right to choose by a majority in Northern Ireland whether they want to be part of the union or a united Ireland. However, it is hard to predict if the conflict is actually over.
There are several reasons to believe that the peace settlement can be successful this time. The IRA and the Ulster Volunteer Force are believed by the British and Irish governments to have completely ceased fire and got rid of all of their weaponry (Gregory 2010). It is crucial because as Ruane and Todd (1999) argue, paramilitary organisations cannot be in possession of firearms for the conflict to be over (p. 143). The enhance of the Irish-British relations has helped with improving relations within Ireland. It helped Nationalists understand Britain's view on the conflict and the Irish culture and its separate tradition in Ireland. Relations between the government of the Republic and Unionists have also improved and even though there is still some hostility, there is also much more trust and understanding. Peace is also possible because Protestants no longer share the same view against the agreement – their opinion on this matter is split, and thanks to this it was possible to reach the agreement (Ruane and Todd 1999, pp. 154-155). It can be also argued that liberalism, secularism and religious pluralism cause an atmosphere of religious tolerance, which can ease tensions between Catholics and Protestants in Northern Ireland (Ruane and Todd 1999, p. 152). Moreover, since the 1970s the conflict drew more international attention, in particular from American presidents and the European Union (Ruane and Todd 1999, p. 2).
However, there are many issues that might cause a return of the conflict. First of all, there are still differences and inequalities in class, education, religion and culture. Polarisation of the communities can be a reason for further violence (Crotty and Schmitt 1998, p. 221). Moreover, even though the Provisional IRA and the UVF have ceased fire and left all their weapons, there are still some paramilitary organisations that support violence, such as the Real IRA, Continuity IRA and the Loyalist Volunteer Force. Some argue that Unionists can move to the opposition of the Belfast Agreement. The Catholic minority has increased in size and its economic situation has improved since the 1970s. If it continues to grow and becomes a majority, its demands can increase, which might lead to return of the conflict. It can be argued that the power balance between the two communities might not be long-lasting. The agreement makes the status of Northern Ireland dependant on the majority of the population. It can be an issue considering that the demographic balance is shifting (Ruane and Todd 1999, pp. 156-165).
In my essay I attempted to answer the question whether the current peace settlement in Northern Ireland can be successful considering the previous efforts. The problems of Northern Ireland have a very long history, which dates back to the twelfth century. I outlined a brief history of Northern Ireland and the conflict as well as the issues existing in the area because I believe that this knowledge is necessary in order to argue whether the conflict's end has been reached or not. The violent conflict known as The Troubles began in 1968 and took over 3,500 lives. During the conflict there were several attempts to reach an agreement, some of them being more successful than others. In 1973 the Sunningdale Agreement was signed introducing power sharing between Protestants and Catholics. However, it did not have Unionist support and as a result it failed only after a few months. The next attempt took place in 1985 when the Anglo-Irish Agreement was signed. Even though it did not successfully address the issues or resolve the conflict, it was the first time the Republic of Ireland had been given an opportunity to give their voice in the Northern Irish problem. Eight years later Ireland and Britain signed the Downing Street Declaration, which addressed a few important issues and for the first time Sinn Fein had been involved in the talks. Finally, in 1998 the Belfast Agreement was signed, which helped put an end to the conflict. There are some reasons to believe that the conflict might have been ended for ever. Most of the paramilitary groups have ceased fire; there is more trust and understanding in relations between Northern Ireland and both the Republic and the United Kingdom; many Protestants supported the agreement; there is more religious tolerance; and since 1970s the conflict was no longer perceived as an internal problem of Britain. However, it can also be argued that there are many issues that can result in a return of the conflict. There are still some paramilitary organisations that are ready to fight; in some time Protestants might no longer support the agreement; the demographics are constantly changing, particularly there is a growth of the Catholic minority. Therefore it is hard to predict whether the conflict has been completely terminated or whether it can return in the future.
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O'Leary, B. and McGarry J.: The Politics of Antagonism: Understanding Northern Ireland (2nd ed.). The Athlone Press Ltd: London, 1996
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