Governance and security in Northeast Asia. The purpose of this paper is to reveal new phenomena in security issue pertaining to the region of Northeast Asia, which relates to integration and fragmentation in Rosenaus terms. Integration will be

Global Governance and International Organizations Rhee Sungchul

Research Term Paper 2004470016

GSIS, Korea Univ.

Governance and Security in Northeast Asia

I. Introduction: Global Governance and Regional Security

Global governance concept is arguably well established in the field of global politics and international organizations. Although still vague in definition, global governance was ‘officially’ conceptualized by the United Nations: the sum of the many ways individuals and institutions, public and private, manage their common affairs. It is “a continuing process through which conflicting or diverse interests may be accommodated and co-operative action may be taken.” Such definition is not much different from what was observed by James N. Rosenau: integration and fragmentation.

Domestically, the robust government system of long history is losing ground to the governance concept of recent vintage. Government is not the only entity that can manage and solve important domestic problems. Regarding corporate governance, managers came under tight ‘surveillance’ by activist shareholders in many nations. South Korea also experienced diffusion of corporate authority after it went through bottom-up restructuring after the 1997-98 financial crisis that had swept East Asia.

In fact, in such issue areas as environment, human rights and humanitarian intervention, domestic or international, governance concept has taken deep root. Particularly in international affairs, major actors have been diversified to include international organizations and non-governmental organizations (NGOs). They are not less significant than state actors.

With regard to security governance, however, very little progress has been made even since the demise of the Cold War in the 1990s. Security issue may be the last realm state actors have superiority to other non-state actors. That is why many of scholars in the academia of international security are so reluctant to employ governance concept as an analytical tool.

However, in the post-Cold War era, more and more actors other than states are voicing over traditional security issues in narrow sense as well as in broad sense. Although state actors are still dominating national and international security affairs, they no longer seem to be in a monopolistic position keeping out non-state actors.

The purpose of this paper is to reveal new phenomena in security issue pertaining to the region of Northeast Asia, which relates to integration and fragmentation in Rosenau’s terms. Integration will be focused on state-level while fragmentation will center on diffusion of actors in security governance. Although being trapped in the Cold War structure, new signs of international institutionalization and super/sub-national governance are witnessed. Such observation leads to the argument that post-Cold war concept of global governance is instrumental in understating Northeast Asia, the last region of Cord War structure in the post-Cold War era.

II. Regional Security in Northeast Asia: Lack of Institutions

Geographically Northeast Asia includes North and South Koreas, China, Japan, Russia, Taiwan, and Mongol. Five out of them are participating in Six-Party Talks, a denuclearization on the Korean Peninsula and peace-building negotiation process in Northeast Asia. Although controversial, the United States of America is a non-resident member state in Northeast Asia. It is the most influential actor that dominates security order in the region.

Northeast Asia is a sub-region of the East Asia that includes Southeast Asia. However, security governance in Northeast Asia is relatively independent from that of Southeast Asia although comprehensive consideration is necessary in a broader perspective that encompasses the whole East Asia.

For the present, lack of institutions and governance may be the most accurate description of regional security in Northeast Asia. The U.S. and North Korea are still technically at war even after the armistice in 1953 that ended a hot war on the Korean Peninsula. In conservative perspective, neo-realism among major state actors prevails and there is very little room for security cooperation across the region other than alliances.

The lack of security institution and governance is continuous closely with the U.S. strategy in the region. It has long been based upon bilateral alliances with South Korea and Japan, a quasi-trilateral-alliance. Such U.S. hegemonic strategy shows hub-and-spoke pattern in the region rather than multilateral security cooperation.

In May 1994, South Korea proposed official level form of Northeast Asian Security Dialogue (NEASED). Such an overture was a remarkable one under the security regime in Northeast Asia but is still in the air. The prospects for realizing the NEASED-like institution depends on the successful outcome of the Six Party process that is to be discussed in detail.

In the absence of security institutions, Northeast Asian countries availed themselves of the ARF (ASEAN Regional Forum). It is the only security forum that involves the whole East Asia, from south to north. The 23-member ARF, which was established in 1994 as an outgrowth of ASEAN (Association of East Asian Nations), was the most prominent official effort, serving as cooperative security network that extended to East Asia.

North and South Korea, Japan and the U.S. are member states of the forum, although they don’t belong to ASEAN itself. North Korea has actively participated in the annual ARF conference since 2000. North Korea’s participation in the ARF process was a “significant step in the rapid evolution of the situation on the Korean Peninsula and thus in the security environment of the Asia-Pacific region.” North Korea’s ARF-membership often brought chances to have bilateral talks with the U.S. and South Korea on the sideline of plenary sessions.

ARF is, however, under criticism for its lack of willingness and capability to ...

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ARF is, however, under criticism for its lack of willingness and capability to articulate its views over sensitive security issues in the region. It is generally defined as a forum for very low level of multilateral security cooperation or regional security governance. Its contribution to Northeast Asian regional security was not considerable enough to be decisive.

Lack of robust institution in security affairs across the region is more discouraging against the backdrop of viable economic cooperation among East Asian countries since the financial crisis in later 1990s which swept both Southeast and Northeast Asia. Japan’s proposal to establish the Asian Monetary Fund (AMF) was recorded as one of the most ambitious initiative in institutionalization process in East Asia, although it was confronted with and frustrated by the opposition of the U.S. and the International Monetary Fund, it. Such an overture later led to Chiang Mai Initiative (CMI) and Asian Bond Market Initiative (ABMI) that may develop as a super-national regional governance structure.

III. Security Governance and Institutionalization in Northeast Asia

1. State-Level Integration and Institutionalization

(1) Six-Party Talks

Six-Party Talks is a multilateral negotiation and dialogue process to address North Korean nuclear issue and other related security issues. In the process participate all of the most important six state actors on and around the Korean Peninsula. Although faltering after four rounds of plenary sessions held in Beijing, it is regarded as the most developed multilateral security dialogue framework in the region.

Six-Party Talks is a very unique framework that best reflects security order in the region. It includes two Koreas and two other states – the U.S. and People’s Republic of China - that fought the Korean War; and two more states who are important actors in the region. Out of six, three are permanent member states of the United Nations Security Council. That is why great power concert is envisaged regarding Korean problem in spite of South Korea’s effort to have it settled by Koreans.

Other optimistic scenarios of institutionalization take two forms. One is the multilateral security cooperation forum like ARF and the other is collective security system.

The formation of the Six Party process has given rise to the possibility that a more formal organizational framework for multilateral security cooperation in the region could be established. Successful conclusion of the talks could bring about formal organizational framework such as aforementioned Northeast Asian Security Dialogue (NEASED) – a Track I framework for multilateral security cooperation. It is precisely the manner, or the form, of the development of the current six party talks that generate the prospect that a NEASED could develop from a successful conclusion of the talks.

In similar context, South Korea envisions the Six-Party Talks as the Asian version of the embryonic stage of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), which was launched in 1975 through the adoption of the Helsinki Final Act. Korea has been consistently striving to recreate the CSCE and its successor Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) experience on the Korean peninsula. Multilateral security cooperation is a viable option for South Korea.

Regional order after the Six-Party Talks might alternatively take the form of a collective security arrangement. This could readily grow out of the exchange of security guarantees among the great powers and the Koreans in any settlement on the peninsula, and out of the guarantees the great powers will have to give in support of the settlement and verification of it.

Any optimistic scenario is dependent upon the success of the Six-Party Talks – peaceful settlement of nuclear issue on the Korean Peninsula.

There were also some signs of institutionalization of the talking process. Working Group (WG) was organized as a standing process of discussion. But, it was not much different from the plenary session and fell short of envisaged one. South Korea has been most eager to realize the institutionalization of the talking process. It proposed to enlarge the Working Group into the Secretariat, which is unrealized as of the year of 2006.

(2) Gaeseong Industrial Complex

Gaeseong Industrial Complex, built under the Kim Dae-jung’s ‘sunshine policy’ initiative, is an equivalent of Foreign Direct Investment in international economic perspective. South Korean businesses built factories there and are producing various commodities. Out of 8,000 people there, most of employees are North Koreans.

The area of Gaeseong, which is situated on the borderline between the South and the North Korea, was once a place of strategic importance for North Korean military. That is why the complex is not merely a symbol of economic cooperation between North and South Korea but also relates to security issue.

Gaeseong Industrial Complex is contributing substantially to the easing of military tensions. It is also South Korea’s belief that building a place for experiment for peace in the sensitive area serves as an outstanding example in confidence-building measures. It is also cross-border cooperation that is significant step toward regional integration.

In governance perspective, Gaeseong Industrial Complex is also an experiment of new form of sub-region specific governance, which neither of Koreas has ever experienced before.

2. Integration and Fragmentation: Non-State Level Efforts

Integration efforts are not monopoly of states any more. The following cases are at the crossroad of integration and fragmentation. Fragmented actors other than states actively participate in the state-level security integration efforts. Specifically, epistemic community has taken significant part.

(1) Northeast Asian Cooperation Dialogue (NEACD)

In April 2006, delegates from the six nations – the U.S., North Korea, South Korea, China, Japan and Russia – gathered in Tokyo, Japan. Participants included U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Christopher Hill, North Korea’s top nuclear negotiator Kim Kye Gwan, Chinese vice Foreign Minister Wu Dawei and other counterparts. They were attending so-called quasi-Six-Party Talks, a private-sponsored security conference dubbed as Northeast Asia Cooperation Dialogue (NEACD). Six-Party Talks to resume in Beijing was in a deadlock after the U.S. imposed financial restrictions on North Korean companies over alleged illegal activities.

NEACD is sponsored by IGCC (Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation), the University of California, San Diego. Since launching in 1993 by Susan Shirk, IGCC’s director from 1991-1997, sixteen annual sessions have been convened.

Generally, five representatives from each country participate in the NEACD meetings: one policy-level official each from the foreign and defense ministries, a uniformed military officer, and two participants from private research facilities, think tanks, or universities. Government officials participate in their individual capacities. That is why the NEACD is defined as track 2 but called track 1.5 process. NEACD is, however, funded by the U.S. Department of State as of 2006.

NEACD conference held in Tokyo in 2006 opened a new chapter regarding the facilitating role of civilian epistemic community in security affairs. It almost substituted the official Six-Party Talks. North Koreans were active participants in Tokyo session, in contrast to their previous reluctance to join. North Korean top negotiator met with his South Korean and Japanese counterparts. There was a flurry of diplomatic activity on the sidelines of the private security conference. However, the U.S. top negotiator Hill refused to meet vis-à-vis his North Korean counter part, urging him to return to the Six-Party Talks as early as possible.

In line with Six-Part Talks, NEACD is expected to lay the ground for the future institutionalization of security in Northeast Asia. It presented a form of global governance projected in specific regional security.

(2) The IISS Shangri-La Dialogue: Track 1.5

Shangri-La Dialogue (Annual Asia Security Summit) is a security conference sponsored by the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) since 2002. It is very unique experiment in multilateral security diplomacy. Defense ministers from 23 Asia-Pacific countries attended the 2006 conference held at Shangri-La hotel Singapore. It has become a recognized part of the infrastructure of Asian defense diplomacy.

The process is multi-fold. Firstly, the on-the-record plenary sessions offer a platform for ministers and national security advisors to clarify and expand on government policy, and to be challenged by an expert group on policies and assumptions, in this way informing and refining the quality of wider public debate on Asian security. Secondly, the off-the-record break-out groups, also involving senior officials, provide a private opportunity for professional discussions to analyze more deeply pertinent strategic issues and to advance policy aims. Thirdly, the multilateral lunches and dinners help to cultivate the sense of a defense and security community where shared interests can be protected and advanced.

North Korea, however, did not participate any of five sessions since 2002.

3. Fragmentation Without Integration

NGOs in North East Asia are emerging as an important actor in regional security governance. They are posing bottom-up challenges to top-down structure of global and national security affairs. At stake is relocation of U.S. military camps.

Relocation of the U.S. forces stationed in Seoul and northern Gyeonggi Province to Pyeongtaek is a good example. It has been promoted according to the U.S. Global Defense Posture Review (GPR) completed by the U.S. Department of Defense. The GPR depicts global transformation in the operations and deployment patterns of the U.S. military. The scheme was reflecting post-Cold War change in global security environment. The U.S. government forged with agreement with both governments of South Korea and Japan respectively regarding relocation of its military forces.

As for South Korea, such a plan made in ‘high politics’ had significant regional impact and faced severe protests from non-state actors: residents and NGO activists. They unleashed strong protests and held large-scale demonstrations. It was different from protests of the past as it challenged the U.S. military strategy of global scale. If relocation were not accomplished in a timely and proper manner, it would pose a severe damage to operational capability of the U.S. forces in the East Asia as a whole. This case applies to the U.S. forces in Japan, too.

It is an unprecedented case in that policymaking surrounding the American military presence in these societies extends beyond the high politics of national security planning agencies or national political leaders. Outside of the government, and often in localities far from the center of national power, the goals and the impacts of U.S. military forces deployed in the Asia Pacific region are viewed in terms of their social costs rather than their strategic value. The national government’s policy agenda is increasingly questioned and challenged by local governments and citizen activists. Domestic political change has increased significant pressures from within that cannot be ignored by the global superpower as well as national governments hosting U.S. forces.

IV. Limits and Possibilities: Collision of Perspectives?

In theoretical perspective, the case of Gaeseong Industrial Complex reflects the change of state actors: North and South Koreas. North Korea opened up a locale of strategic importance. South Korea’s approach to it reflects middle-range theories of functionalism or neo-functionalism of liberal tradition. Success of economic cooperation will have “spill-over” effect to other issue areas including security. There seems to be discrepancy of perspective between North and South, however.

South Korea under Roh Moo-hyun government does not see North Korea as an enemy any more. The concept of ‘main enemy’ was removed from its national security agenda. North Korea is now among security threats surrounding Korean Peninsula. It is a phenomenon of change in identity forwarded by constructivist approach. Economic interest from Gaeseong Industrial Complex is minimal for South Korea. Instead, it is more meaningful as an area of confidence-building-measures (CBMs).

Change of identity and constructivist approach can also explain South Korea’s willingness to address Northern Limit Line (NLL) issue in the West Sea. South Korea benefited greatly in security as well as fisheries by occupying sea area south of the NLL, a sea border with North Korea tilted toward south. Roh’ government is mulling over relinquishing sovereignty over the area as it accepts the notion that South Korea does not have any legal base to occupy the area. It is contrasting with North Korea’s “tit-for-tat” strategy to readjust the sea demarcation in its favor in compensation for linking North-South Korean railways that trespasses the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) on the land. For North Korea, the NLL and railway cases seem to be in the same line with Gaeseong Industrial Complex, as it seeks benefits from institutionalization of cooperation. There exists collision of perspectives.

South Korea’s constructivist approach to integration and institutionalization collides again with realist approach of the U.S. Bush administration is not happy with Gaeseong Industrial Complex. South Korea has had very difficult consultation with the U.S. regarding supplying the complex with ‘strategic’ materials such as laptop computers. For the U.S., Gaeseong Industrial Complex was nothing more than a cleavage in regional security front effectively benefiting North Korea. Jay Lefkowitz, Bush’s point man on North Korean human rights even raised the question on alleged exploitation and low wages in the complex.

It was the U.S. administration under George W. Bush that proposed Six-Party Talks. In 2006, it went very close to successful negotiation with North Korea’ denuclearization. The Six-Party Talks, however, has been stalled since the last round in November, 2005. High hopes have been diminished with the unexpected events involving financial measures against the Banco Delta Asia - a Macao bank suspected of aiding North Korea through money laundering. The foundation of the Six-Party Talks is very weak as it much depends upon the U.S. identity - specifically under the Bush Administration - which sees North Korea as a rogue nation. Political realism still prevails. That is why the U.S. multilateralism is criticized as “a la carte.”

The ‘death’ of KEDO (Korea Energy Development Organization) is another discouraging picture of multilateral institutionalization in regional security. KEDO is an international institution established to advance the implementation of the October 1994 Agreed Framework which dissolved the 1st North Korean nuclear crisis. KEDO as a security regime raised hopes among neo-liberal institutionalists and constructivists as it meant evolution of cooperation realized in Northeast Asian security affairs.

However, KEDO ceased to exist in 2006 after faltering for years since the U.S. approach toward North Korean changed from engagement to containment. It also meant South Korea’s neo-liberal and constructivist approach was prevailed by the U.S. neo-realist approach in Northeast Asian security affairs. For realists, institutionalization is dependent upon the willingness of states, the major actor in international affairs.

U.S. neo-realist approach in security affairs is now faced with challenges posed by non-state actors as discussed above. Remarkably, demonstrations against relocation of U.S. forces to Pyeongtaek continued to June 2006 when security concern was rising high as North Korea poised to launch long-range missiles.

IV. Conclusion

Although the concept of global governance is still vague, it has taken root in the academia, international organizations, and NGOs, all of whom are enlarged actors in global governance environment. Such global change, although restricted by prevailing realism, is in effect affecting even superpowers’ national security strategy.

Changing governance in Northeast Asian security affairs is witnessed in two directions: integration and fragmentation. Integration involves institutionalization efforts on state level towards super-state level. Symptoms of fragmentation are apparent in weakening state monopoly of security affairs and strengthening role of non-state, sub-state actors.

Thus change in security environment in the region requires change in analytical framework. Although fragile under the Cold War structure in the region, the concept of global governance projected to the Northeast Asian region is entitled to gain more and more ground.

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