Britain’s Road To Europe, 1945-75.

PL705

Prof. John Young

David Clarke.

Essay II

CRITICALLY ASSESS THE TERMS OBTAINED BY THE HEATH GOVERNMENT FOR EEC MEMBERSHIP.

In the early years of the 1970s British foreign policy underwent its greatest face-lift in the twentieth century.  After much wrangling and heated parliamentary debate, Britain finally joined the European Economic Community (EEC) in January 1973.  There was never any doubt that Edward Heath would pursue entry into the EEC with greater vigour and enthusiasm than his Labour predecessor, Harold Wilson.  By the time he obtained office Heath was already well established as a pro-European.  His views had been shaped early in his life.  Heath had visited Europe as a student, and had served in the military in both France and Germany after the Second World War.  In 1950 his maiden speech had supported involvement in the proposals of a European Coal-Steel Community, as envisaged by the Schumann Plan.  This was the precursor to the EEC, as created in 1957.  By 1961 Harold Macmillan had given Heath the responsibility of negotiating the first British application.  However, Heath’s European credentials, John Young states, should not be over-estimated.  Heath did not visit France until his teens, he had never acquired a foreign language, and after his speech on the Schumann Plan little was heard from him on the issue. 

Nonetheless, according to Robert Armstrong, entry was “one of the two highest things” on Heath’s agenda when the Conservative Party assumed office in mid-1970, though the issue was not given a role in the election campaign.  This probably reflected low public interest in, and even hostility towards, the European issue following General de Gaulle’s second crushing veto, and also an effort to quash antagonism toward the question of Europe, which existed especially on the Conservative Right.  Nevertheless, only twelve days after taking office Heath’s government entered into negotiations with the Six on the basis of the Labour Party’s application for entry, which was still regarded as ‘on the table’.  Heath deliberately stuck to the pre-arranged date and venue – 30 June, Luxembourg.  He was determined that there should be no delay on the British side: the nearer to his election victory the better for his standing on other issues, he figured.  Bernard Porter has argued that such an eagerness to begin negotiating indicated the enthusiasm, almost desperation, of Heath to gain entry into the Community.  Such a display, he states, can only have contributed to weakening Britain’s negotiating position.  Heath’s unequivocal aim was to join the Community straight away, as the existing Six knew only too well.  This may well have enabled the Six to settle on better terms for themselves, and worse ones for Britain, than if Britain’s negotiators had been less overtly willing to get in.  The Labour opposition repeatedly claimed that they could have negotiated more favourably for Britain, though this may be seen as political expediency to paper over the deep divisions prevalent at that time: Labour, it must be noted, were still divided over the actual principle of entry.

Porter is adamant that the terms obtained by Heath were “bad”, and labels the only significant concessions being won on the transitional arrangement of British entry, concessions he believes were inevitable anyway.  It is clear, however, that the disadvantages of late entry necessitated Britain’s adherence to the rules and practices that had already been established in the Treaty of Rome in 1957.  The controversial Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) was one particular bone of contention, as it favoured the large agricultural sectors of the Six – and especially France – but there was no way to fundamentally alter it at such a late stage.  As such, it may be counter-argued that the terms obtained were the only ones available.  Young has stated that indeed the British bargaining position was weak, and that the French made the possibility of failure in the talks appear high, so as to push for every concession they could from the British negotiators.  However, he argues that – contrary to Porter’s opinions – “it would be wrong to suggest that the terms represented anything like a ‘sell-out’ by Heath.”  The terms obtained, he insists, appeared reasonable at the time.  In any case, Heath hoped to fully achieve his objectives, strengthening Britain’s position, once actually inside the Community.  For Heath, entry was the main priority.

The Labour government had prepared a dossier for the opening of negotiations, which the Conservatives, once in office, were able to utilise as it stood.  Barber’s opening address in Luxembourg was actually the speech prepared for Labour’s George Thomson.  That the majority of the preparation had been done by the Labour government prior to 1970 meant that the Heathmen could crack on almost straight away.  Initial negotiations bore some successes – Britain would be granted full voting rights in the European institutions immediately upon entry, despite not fulfilling all the duties of membership until after the end of the transition period.  Britain would have 36 members of the European Assembly, 24 seats on the Economic and Social Council, and 2 judges for the Court of Justice.  These adjustments were relatively simple.  More complicated – an indication for the future of the negotiations – was the decision to be made for the duration of Britain’s period of transition, during which applicants were to progressively undertake full commitment to the rules and practices of membership of the Community in full.  Such participation meant the abolition of tariffs against the member states, and application of the CAP.  British negotiators asked for a three-year transition for industry, and a six-year period for agriculture, and even longer for the financial contribution they would have to make.  In December, Geoffrey Rippon, heading the negotiating delegation, insisted that industry and agriculture could both make the transition required within five years, but maintained that the financial aspect would need longer periods.  Through the course of the negotiations the question of Britain’s financial contribution to the Community’s budget was to be a constant problem, along with a number of other issues: Britain’s application for Community preference; New Zealand dairy goods; cane sugar; sterling; and finally, ridiculously, fish.

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Britain, as an industrial nation, could expect little return from the CAP, which represented the majority of the EEC budget, but entry to the Community would mean that Britain would have to put in a larger amount.  The EEC took 1% of all members VAT, and all tariffs on external trade.  For Britain, this would mean a huge contribution.  Estimates in 1970 indicated that the net cost of Britain’s entry would be somewhere in the region of £550 million and £750 million, perhaps forcing the government to deflate the economy in order to restore the balance of payments.  Reaching an ...

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