How did the ANC fit into the widerframework of South Africa's nationalist movements?

The South African Natives National Congress, later to become the African National Congress (ANC), was founded in 1912 in reaction to the formation of the Union of South Africa without the participation of the majority of inhabitant who were black. As Davis notes, the ANC was "the first modern, nontribal organisation of blacks formed to discuss black interests under white rule" and, until recently, it was probably also the most unsuccessful (1987, p3). Analysing the dominant tradition in the ANC is not an easy task given that the organisation's ideological and, in particular, its strategic position has not remained static throughout its history. The following discussion therefore will concentrate upon continuities and change in the outlook of the ANC. I will argue that while its commitment to multiracialism has remained steadfast, even when this commitment threatened to split the party and indeed did so with the breakaway of the Pan African Congress (PAC) in 1959, other traditions within the ANC have not been so stable. The demands of the party have undergone a transition from the early position in which the reality of white rule was accepted and the party saw its role as being little more than protecting the few remaining black privileges to a more activist platform and the demand of equal rights for the black population. The methods of protest used have changed considerably through the 20th Century from a belief in constitutional action and negotiation to a campaign of mass, but still non-violent action, to sabotage and ultimately a full blown commitment to an armed struggle. Moreover, the organisational structure, membership and leadership of the ANC have undergone profound change. The following essay will examine these features of continuity and change within the ANC before looking at other political traditions in the African Nationalist Movement. This second section will concentrate on the communist movement, the PAC and the black consciousness movement (BCM) using primarily the criteria of ideological stance and methods of protest, as discussed above, as grounds for comparison. It is recognised that other groups such as the trade unions, student bodies, the UDF, the National Forum, Inkatha, etc also played important roles in the development of African nationalism. However, given the confines of this essay, I will not be examining these groups.

`Firstly, I will consider the dominant tradition within the ANC which I believe to be its unswerving commitment to a non-racial or multiracial society. Under its first leader, Dr Pixley Seme, the party proclaimed its commitment to nonracialism, that is, it viewed the peoples of Africa as one, regardless of skin colour. Throughout its development, the ANC has clung to this commitment. It has always advocated a multinational Union, insisted upon a non-racial principle as being the only solid foundation for sound government of the society and never sought black domination of the state (WALSHE, 1970, pp412-4). This position can clearly be seen in the ANC's 1956 endorsement of the Freedom Charter drafted by the 'Congress of the People' the previous year in Kliptown. The Charter stated unequivocally that "South Africa belongs to all who live in it, black and white..." (quoted by DAVIS, 1987, p7).

`Walshe suggests three principal reasons for this continuity in the political stance of the ANC (1970, p414-7). Firstly, he argues that nonracialism was founded in a strong aversion to the racial outlook and racial discrimination of Union's Native and later Apartheid policies. Secondly, it is suggested that, given the interdependence of the races in the functioning of the South African economy, the ANC recognised that on practical grounds there could be no segregation. Thirdly, Walshe believes that various ideological influences, such as the Cape tradition, Christianity and mission education which was seen to embody and imbue a non-racial humanitarian ethic, ...

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`This ideological stance had an important advantage for the ANC in that it allowed it to work and cooperate with other non-black, but also suppressed, constituencies and organisations. This can clearly be seen with the ANC and the South African Indian Congress jointly launching the Defiance Campaign in 1951 and with the working of the Congress Alliance in which the ANC linked up with Coloureds and Indians. Moreover, the fact that the ANC never believed in black exclusivity in the fight for black emancipation even allowed it to cooperate with white dominated groups such as the communists and certain white liberals who were sympathetic to their cause. In contrast, as will be discussed later, other nationalist groups adopted a far narrower outlook, believing that the struggle for African emancipation was essentially a blacks only affair. I would argue that this denied these groups the broad base of support and legitimacy needed for success and, along with other factors such as organisational structure, explains why the ANC was ultimately the most successful African nationalist movement.

`Next, I shall examine the strategies adopted by the ANC to bring about its goal of a democratic society grounded on non-racial principles. It is in this area that, I believe, the most major changes have occurred within the party. From its establishment in 1912 until the Sharpeville shootings and its subsequent banning in 1960, the ANC advocated non-violent tactics in its struggle. However, two differing strategies can be identified even within this period. Until World War II, the ANC was pledged to constitutional protest such as negotiation, petitions and deputations. The policy during this period was characterised by cooperation and compromise with the government as the party believed it could bring about change through the education and enlightenment of the whites in power (COPE,1965, pp141-6). However, re-election of the Smuts government in 1943 on a platform of white supremacy (after the blacks had believed Smuts was moving left and the repeal of the pass laws was a real possibility) convinced the ANC of the futility of passive negotiation (DAVIS, 1987, p5). This marked the beginning of a new era, in which the rise of the Youth League was also crucial, where a more comprehensive set of demands laid down in 'African Claims' coincided with the acceptance of the need for more forceful, but still peaceful, mass confrontation and non-collaboration. Thus, the ANC launched its first mass protest in 1952 with the Defiance Campaign and this method of protest, including boycotts, strikes, civil disobedience etc, continued until 1960.

`The Sharpeville shootings of 1960 and the banning of the ANC demonstrated the failure of peaceful tactics. The ANC in exile was forced underground and, out of sheer desperation, adopted a policy of sabotage (DAVIS, 1987, pp14-21). Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK) was set up in 1961 to carry out the sabotage campaign. However, by 1963 (and with relatively little success in the intervening period) MK was smashed by government security forces. Thus, in 1963 and in face of the failure of all other tactics, the leadership of the ANC became convinced of the need for armed guerrilla warfare, a strategy it remained faithful to until the negotiations and eventual overthrow of the Apartheid regime in the 1990s.

`Next, I shall briefly look at how the membership and organisation of the ANC has changed throughout its history. In its early years the ANC was essentially a middle class, elite organisation with only a very small membership. Moreover, until the 1950s it remained a loose movement of geographically dispersed provincial organisations with no effective central co-ordination. These organisational weaknesses were only partially addressed when Mandela organised the 'M-plan', a cellular, hierarchical network, in the early 1950s to protect the party from government attempts to suppress it. Furthermore, the recognition of the need for mass action after World War II led to a partially successful attempt by the ANC leadership to extend its membership and become a mass organisation (although membership fluctuated according to the issues at stake and the particular campaign).

`After the failure of the sabotage campaign in 1963 and with its leadership captured (only Oliver Tambo remaining free in exile), "the Congress seemed on the brink of collapse" (DAVIS, 1987, p21). This heralded a long period of reconstruction of the party, particularly after 1969, as the leadership decided to return to the work of methodically building a party infrastructure which could withstand the pressures of underground operation. The cells established under the 'M-plan' which until now had remained largely dormant were revived and an effective organisation was established to prepare for armed insurgency when the conditions were right. In 1976 came the Soweto uprisings. Although the ANC had little involvement with the riots and kept a relatively low profile during this time, it was the main beneficiary of Soweto. As the uprisings were crushed by the security forces, black youths fled the country and flooded to join the ANC in exile. For the first time in its history, the ANC had achieved mass membership at the same time as having an effective internal organisation

`with which to counter the government.

`I will now consider the other political traditions found in the African nationalist movement, beginning with the Communist Party. In 1928 the Communist Party of South Africa reversed its previous white protectionist position and, following the Comintern line, began to work for a black Republic of South Africa (DAVENPORT, 1991, p272). However, it was not until the early 1950s, by which time it had been banned and reformed as the underground South African Communist Party (SACP), that it began to have an impact upon opposition black politics.

`A fierce debate concerning its role in a response to the black nationalist struggle was carried out in the Communist Party throughout the 1940s and early 1950s( EVERETT,1991, pp27-39). The minority view held that the class struggle was of primary importance and should not be deflected by racial and nationalist struggles. By this standard, the ANC could not be trusted to safeguard working class interests. In contrast, the majority view of South Africa that eventually emerged was what Everett terms 'Colonialism of a Special Type'. According to this view, South Africa was unique in that it contained two nations: a white semi-independent state and a black colony. Consequently, it was accepted that the class struggle was affected by divisions along racial lines.

`In 1962, with Moscow's approval, the SACP adopted a framework allowing it to collaborate with the ANC (although, in reality, it had been involved with the ANC for the previous three decades). The SACP would assist the ANC as the leading force in the first stage of the revolution aimed at destroying white supremacy after which the SACP would ignite the second stage to establish a socialist state. The ANC itself, and in particular the Youth League in the late 1940s, had been suspicious of the communists. However, with the acceptance of the need for mass action in the early 1950s, it began to appreciate the benefits of an alliance. Indeed, over the next few decades this alliance proved crucial to the survival of the ANC. The expertise and experience of the SACP in covert surveillance, military techniques, weaponry, etc proved invaluable as the ANC entered an era of violent struggle. Moreover, when in exile and cut off from internal sources of revenue, the SACP through its links with Moscow was able to provide aid.

`Therefore, whilst the ultimate goals of the ANC and the SACP may not have been identical, they were in sufficient harmony to allow the two groups to work together to achieve African liberation. As Davis notes, "The ANC was by no means a communist organisation itself, but it had come to rely on the SACP during a period when its own resources were sparse" (1987,p34). In addition, it should be remembered that this cooperation was only possible because of the nonracial stance of the ANC and that the partnership made more fruitful when the ANC embraced violent opposition as its primary tactic.

`I shall now examine the PAC. In contrast to the SACP which believed its goals would be most likely to be met by tying its fortunes up with the ANC, the PAC believed that rupture with the ANC was essential if black South Africans were to be liberated. In the late 1950s, a split emerged within the ANC between moderates who believed in nonracialism and the benefits of multiethnic alliances and activists who objected to the ANC's cooperation with non-black organisations (COPE, 1965, p150). This culminated in a formal breakaway by some members of the ANC, led by Robert Sobukwe, and the founding of the PAC in 1959.

`The Africanist ideology of the PAC can be contrasted to the nonracial stance of the ANC. It adopted a slogan of 'Africa for the Africans' and was bitterly opposed to cooperation across racial lines. Although its conception of who the Africans actually were was constantly subject to change, the PAC certainly had a far narrower conception of who the black people were than either the ANC or the later BCM. Furthermore, the PAC adopted a far more militant, radical platform. It endorsed the earlier Youth League's Programme of Action and the 1952 Defiance Campaign and looked to extend such mass action. As it sensed competition from the breakaway party, the ANC announced massive demonstrations against the pass laws at the end of March 1960. This was pre-empted by the PAC which announced its campaign would take place a week earlier (DAVENPORT, 1991, p357-9). These more radical mass actions which can be attributed mostly to the input of the PAC resulted in police panic at Sharpeville, the massacre of 69 Africans and the subsequent banning of both the ANC and the PAC.

`Despite the mass support that the PAC had attracted, given that it had only been in existence for one year, its organisational structure was not sufficiently developed to allow it to make the transition to an effective underground organisation (even the far older ANC struggled to make this transition). However, the ideology of Africanism did not die. It was to make a reappearance in a slightly different form with the emergence of the BCM in the 1970s.

`The BCM