Majority voting still occurred after the ‘compromise’ when the decision was not against the explicit wishes of any member state, but the ability for members to ‘veto’ decisions, meant that integration was considerably slowed down. Many decisions had to be taken at the lowest common denominator, with no high policy proposals getting through the veto. Indeed the only constitutional change that was achieved during the 1960’s was the signing of the merger Treaty in 1965, which rationalised the institutions of the three separate Communities. Until his resignation as President in 1969, de Gaulle was responsible for obstructing Community development in three major ways: through opposition to enlargement, via the ‘Luxembourg Compromise’ and by refusing to extend the powers of the Community’s existing institutions (Holland: 1994).
With de Gaulle gone, the process of integration started again with the Hague Conference in 1969, where a new agenda of integrationist policy was proposed and agreed. Included was a plan to allow the Community its own financial resources, and a plan for the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). The first enlargement of the community happened in the 1970’s, with UK, Ireland, Denmark and Norway joining. However, soon Margaret Thatcher replaced Edward Heath as Prime Minister and integration again came to a halt.
“Thatcher represented the reincarnation of the Gaullist tradition; just as de Gaulle has stymied any concessions that encroached on French sovereignty in the 60’s, Thatcher was committed to opposing any federal attack on British national independence” (Holland: 1994: 45).
At her first European Council meeting in 1979, Britain’s budgetary contribution was raised as an agenda item. Only Britain and West Germany were net contributors to the CAP (Common Agricultural policy), and as one of the less prosperous European countries, Thatcher lobbied for a reform of this clearly unfair budgetary mechanism.
“Britain’s relatively small agricultural sector meant that its contributions to the Community budget had always exceeded funds accrued through agricultural subsidies” (Holland: 1994: 44).
Consequently, although given approximately two-thirds of the contribution for 1980 – 1981 back in rebate, Britain demanded more, which resulted in a decision-making deadlock. Between 1980 and 1984, the Community struggled to continue with its program of integration in the face of the ‘British problem’ (Holland: 1994). Although some integrative policies such as the further enlargement of the Community went ahead, it was not until the 1984 Fontainebleu meeting, that matters were resolved and integration could continue. With Jacques Delors as the President of the new European Commission in 1985, Europe could again be seen as ‘the engine of integration’ (Holland: 1994: 49). The creation of the Single European Act began with the 1985 Milan conference and was eventually ratified in 1987. It made major changes to the Rome Treaty, increasing Parliaments’ power and majority decision-making, setting a deadline for the completion of the single market and codifying the EPC. After 1987, integration was able to get underway again.
The federalist movement was championed by federalists such as Jean Monnet, Walter Hallstein and Altiero Spinelli, they believe that states cause war through nationalism. The Euro-federalist aims to create a federation of Europe. As an integration theory, federalism is better at describing the end product than the process by which that end is achieved. The “federalist approach is more strategy for fulfilling a common purpose and common needs than a theory explaining how these integrative forces arise” (Cram: ).
Federalist integration requires the establishment of two separate but co-ordinate levels of government. Clearly in the period described above, there was little move to transfer sovereignty from national governments to the central institutions, although the creation of supranational institutions is arguably a federal move. De Gaulle, an avid nationalist was totally opposed to any federalist overtures, as was Thatcher in the 1980’s. With the use of the ‘veto’ by member states to promote national self interest and the recession in the 1970’s which forced all the member states into a period of self-interest, realist politics, there is no real case for federalism in this period of European integration.
A theory started by David Mitrany in the inter-war years, functionalism was not a theory of European integration. It attempted to create a framework for peace. Indeed, Mitrany was directly opposed to the integration of Europe. A central tenet to his work was his opposition to nationalism, and the territorial organisation of power. He argued that “nationalism at the nation-state level must not simply be replaced by nationalism at the European level” (Cram: :41). Nationalism and states as the main actors on the international stage were the cause of war, as did federalists. His belief was that functional agencies should assume supranational authority over a range of policy areas where the needs had cross-national boundaries, which could be better dealt with by joint government, an idea similar to that of subsidiarity. Coal and steel production or agriculture could be removed from national control and decision-making capabilities could be given to a functional agency separate from any nation-state (Holland: 1994). This did occur to a certain degree in the creation of technical agencies such as the World Health Organisation and the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO). However, Mitrany failed to realise the political nature of such organisations, which he felt would be independent of government, although they were appointed by that government. Functionalism assumes that once the process of functional organisation begins, the power of nation-states to act independently would be greatly reduced, as a mesh of interdependent relations ensues. This was clearly not the case in the period between 1967 and 1987, where France and Britain were acting independently of the other Community members. This was also not the case for Greenland, who left the EC in 1982. Mitrany believed that there would be a gradual change in popular attitudes through the experience of co-operative activity, taking loyalties away from the nation-states and placing the focus on to transnational institutions. However, during the twenty years described, the loyalties of nations remained firmly with their nation-states and in no way transferred to the institutions of the European Community. With the need for all six member-states to unanimously agree on policy after the Luxembourg Accord in 1966, nationalism and independence was at its strongest.
“The practical reality of the Community drew critical attention to the inadequacy of the general theory of functionalism as an appropriate explanation of the process of integration” (Holland: 1994: 16).
The response to the failure of functionalism to explain European integration, was the emergence of another theory; neo-functionalism. Generated by Ernst Haas, it was specifically designed to address the community experience and the process of political integration itself. It did not assume that states were the only actors on the international stage or that they were able to act independently. For neo-functionalists, the actions of states were influenced by various pressures from interest groups, institutions and multi-national corporations. There was no concept of transcending the traditional territorial division of states, they were simply to be replaced by new territorial based organisations at the European level (Cram: ). Haas argued that successful integration is dependent on the idea of ‘spill-over’ (Holland: 1994). This means that integration, once it affects one sector it will necessarily affect related sectors and a ‘spill-over’ effect will occur, increasing the integration process. The ‘snowball’ effect identified by neo-functionalism was not limited to sectoral or political spill-over. Geographical spill-over meant that co-operation between one group of member states was likely to have effect upon excluded states. Less ideological than functionalism, neo-functionalism emphasised the key role played by interest based politics. Haas saw that states would be more supportive of integration if they learned of the benefits that would ensue as a consequence. This he believed would lead to a transformation of nationally centred belief systems.
“As the process of integration proceeds, it is assumed that values will undergo change, that interests will be redefined in terms of regional rather than a purely national orientation and that the erstwhile set of separate national group values will be gradually superseded by a new and geographically larger set of beliefs” (Cram: :45).
Initially the neo-functionalist approach was viewed to have encapsulated the European integration process quite well. The ECSC had ‘spilled-over’ into the EEC and Euratom, the Rome Treaties had been signed in 1957, providing a good example of sectoral spill-over, and in the 1960’s, a number of members of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) had begun to apply for membership of the EEC. Political spill-over was evident as interest groups mobilised, for example around the issue of the Common Agricultural Policy (Cram: : 47). However, with de Gaulle vetoing Britain’s membership application, which stopped the geographical spill-over and the oil crisis of the 1970's meant that sectoral spill-over was seriously curtailed. The Commission seemed unable to fulfil its neo-functional role as the instigator of spill-over due to France’s 1965 ‘empty chair’ policy. The events of the 1960’s, caused neo-functionalism to lose credibility in explaining the integration process and political scientists turned to intergovernmental theory as a way of explaining the new developments.
“The initial expectations associated with the Community institutions were largely unfulfilled and spill-over and progressive integration did not seem to be occurring, rather the persistence of national self-interest indicated that the community was closer to an intergovernmental grouping than any putative federation” (Holland: 1994: 17).
The theory of integration used most commonly to describe this period in European Community history is intergovernmentalism. This was based on the idea that the dominant actors on the world stage are states, acting out of self-interest. From this perspective, the interaction between states in an international environment was central and the balance of power was constantly shifting (Cram: ). Stanley Hoffman a proponent of the intergovernmentalist school of thought suggested that national governments were more “obstinate than obselete” in the process of European integration (Cram: 48). This was a serious challenge to the snowball effect of co-operation in the neo-functionalist approach. Clearly, during the period between 1967 and 1987, national governments were playing a major role in the process of integration. The use of unanimity for policy affecting areas of national self-interest after the Luxembourg Agreement meant that states could bargain with other states to achieve their goals. The intergovernmentalist argument is a strong one on this issue unlike the neo-functionalist view, which suggests that states will be carried along by the snowball effect.
“ Increasingly it was recognised that integration was not an inexorable process, in which national governments found themselves caught up, but a process which might just as easily ‘spill back’ or ‘spill around’” (Cram: 49). Hoffman made a distinction between ‘high politics’ (foreign policy, security and defence) and ‘low politics’ (economic and welfare policies). Obviously national governments would integrate some low political areas but when dealing with high politics, they would maintain tight control over decision processes. This is shown by the unwillingness of de Gaulle, to end unanimity in favour of majority voting, give the Community its own financial resources and increase the power of its institutions in 1965. Instead, of heralding the institutionalisation of majority decision-making, January 1966 saw the successful defence of national sovereignty through the Luxembourg Accord. The British also showed an unwillingness to give up their sovereignty to a supranational body and Thatcher waged war against promoters of any federalist moves. Due to the ‘veto’ powers of the member states, many policies which appeared at all radical were being returned to the commission and by consequence, only low politics issues or decisions which had little integrative impact were decided upon in the 1970’s. There were some economic and political developments, but none to the extent of the 1950’s and early 1960’s.
Having examined all the major theories, which aim to explain European integration it is clear that none of them have a definite explanation for the major developments in the period between 1967 and 1987. Until this era arrived, neo-functionalism seemed to have encapsulated the process of integration with its central tenet of sectoral and political spill-over and was seemingly able to predict the way forward. However, “as the EEC faced a period of stagnation, shaken by international events and the actions of domestic leaders, the snowball of neo-functionalism seemed to have melted” (Cram : 49). With the nationalistic views of de Gaulle and later Thatcher, dawned a new period of European integration, of intergovernmentalism. States reasserted themselves as independent and dominant actors and were not keen to give away their national sovereignty. The period of stagnation could be viewed as the fault of Charles de Gaulle and his own intergovernmental views, however, it is argued that integration will naturally occur in peaks and troughs.
“In any international system, diversity would arise out of both the natural plurality of domestic imperatives and the fact that every state’s situation within the system would be unique. So the twin pulls of global and domestic would tend to create centrifugal tendencies” (Rosamond: 2000:76).
Intergovernmentalism itself does not completely explain the developments which occurred in this period, due to the integrative progress which was made. During the 1970’s, the policy making competence of the EC continued to expand, enlargement occurred in 1973 and was accompanied by the introduction of the EC regional policy and European Regional development Fund. The origins of the EMU lie in the 1971 Werner Plan and there was the launch of the first EMS (the snake) (Mazey: ). Also, in 1975 during the supposed ‘stalled’ years, the Council of Ministers considered 329 proposals from the Commision and adopted 75 percent of these, within two years (Mazey: ).
The European Court of Justice
More facts on intergovernmentalism.
Better conclusion - look at title – explain the major developments – some developments, integration == neofunctionalism????
