The SGCI is the centre for co-ordinating policies and discussions with the French representatives in Brussels. Due to fears the officials were becoming unduly ‘pro-European’ the then Prime Minster Pompidou insisted that all contact between Paris and Brussels must be transmitted through the SGCI. This has given the SGCI a solid basis in domestic policy for many years allowing flexible negotiations and well briefed French officials. (Para phrased Anne Stevens, The Government and Politics of France, second edition (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 1996).pp331 332)
At an historic level the growth of the SGCI shows how domestic EU policies have become part of domestic politics breaking down the traditional ‘Presidential’ rhetoric of De Gaulle that ‘European policy-making as foreign policy’ continuing the time line of semi-presidensalism. ‘In fact France was the only member normally represented by its head of state, rather than its Prime minister, at the European Council until Finland joined in 1995.’ The SGCI powers were always limited but its influence as a broker grew and the growing power and authority of Prime ministers ensured this. The developing relationship and increased power of the SGCI are seen in Jospins government in 1997. Pierre Mosovici, working as the Delegate Minister For European Affairs, used his close relationship with the Prime minister and the Foreign Affairs Minister to ensure that French negotiators had full authority of the government, holding a strong position to ensure agreements. Reiterated by his strong links with President Chirac helping develop the Nice treaty. Given the added strength of the executive it is clear that in the 1990’s and beyond French members of parliament began to have a stronger input into European policy.
From 1992, the constitution was changed for the ratification of the Treaty on European Union. Article 88.4 demands the government presents to parliament ‘any proposal for Community instruments which contain provisions which are matters for statue law as so soon as they have been transmitted to the council’. All proposals were then passed from the SGCI to Council of State, then it is decided if parliament has the law-making abilities, showing a direct link between domestic policy and policy making.
As Guymoarch concedes that overall pattern of adaptation is confused but the main change are from the 1990s with a central role for the Prime minister with increased function and dialog at parliamentary level.
The main policy and policy-making ‘Europeanisation’ has been that of decreased power of the executive, whereby inter-ministerial disputes at EU level can be negotiated for a positive domestic outcome, it is an acceptance of Europe due to the not always formal routes of French politics with developing ties in Brussels to ensure French domestic policies are carried out with informed EU notions. This complex view of French negotiation I believe filters into domestic polarisation of public opinion. In the 1992 referendum to approve or reject the Maastricht treaty, only a narrow majority was achieved (51/49). This does have links to the discord of voters towards Mitterrand, However Cole suggests ‘we interpret the results, the 1992 referendum illustrated a degree of polarisation over the issue of further European integration’ the polarisation ran through class cleavages and the notion of winners and losers in European integration, he recalls Hoffman’s view of a dynamic France and a static France. I would like to describe this as an informed domestic France and excluded working class France. This to me suggests that the makeup of voter are an educated middle class who can appreciate the subtle political bargains in Brussels and feel confident in the position of France as an improved instructor to European policies helped by the Europeanized French administrations. This elitist view of party politics links towards Smith’s less positive view of the SGCI role in ‘Europeanization’; it is not just seen as an increase in power of the prime minister but an exclusion.
A Smith
In conclusion this essay used a specific body to show the arena for the main ‘Europeanization’ of domestic policies and policy-making, created by an intermediary. It paints a picture of a confusing pass of information at ministerial level. France’s main ‘Europeanization’ is entrenched with negotiations as it still looks to sit at the top table of not only Europe but also globally. Many questions could be asked with a simplistic historical account of ‘Europeanization’ of domestic politics; however this essay highlighted the need for a more transparent integration, greater ministerial input was achieved from the 1990’s, backed up by the regional funding and other EU based inciatives although the thought of integration still invoke feeling of winners and losers.
C. Radaelli, ‘The Domestic Impact of European Union Public Policy: Notes on Concepts, Methods and the Challenge of Empirical Research’ in A. Smith, ‘The Europeanization of the French State’, A. Cole et. al (editors), Developments in French Politics 3 (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005).p 105
A. Smith, ‘The Europeanization of the French State’, A. Cole et. al (editors), Developments in French Politics 3 (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005).p 110
Cole 1998 p 254/ elgie 178 french plictics 178
Guy page 120 develop in French poli 2 both
Cole p 249 French politics and society