Addison (1987) claims that the war led to a genuine consensus on the need for the development of greater social security and welfare reforms, full employment, etc. This view has been accepted by the vast majority of authors, whilst others make slight adjustments to it and a small minority reject it. Those in favour of the consensus believe that in 1945 all the 3 main political parties went to the polls with their commitments to principles of social and economic reconstruction. The Attlee Government, which was appointed in 1945, was seen to embrace the principles of the consensus and even passed them on to the newly appointed Tory Party when they were defeated in 1951.
The postwar consensus is a concept which is often applied to British politics from the mid 1940’s to the late 1970’s, and which is often recognised to have perished when Margaret Thatcher took charge of a revamped Tory Party and started to make major changes. For members to the right of the political spectrum, the consensus was a disastrously misconceived concept which led to various crises of the 1970’s, economically and socially, whilst for others in the centre and centre left believe that the consensus has been a godsend and that it has brought harmony to a more equal society. Since the breakdown of the consensus, politics is seen to have become more divided.
The question is, however, over whether or not the postwar consensus actually existed in the first place. Critics of the consensus are quick to point out that during the alleged years of the consensus, there was considerable disagreement between the main parties. In the view of Kavanagh & Morris (1989) the consensus does not explain the true reality of British politics:
“disagreement about ends and means is the life blood of politics. Political disagreement arises inevitably from human diversity and clash of individual and group interests”
(p. 10)
Kavanagh & Morris look back to the views of Ben Pimlott, who believed that politicians in the 1960’s and 1970’s were divided on fundamental issues. Pimlott (1989) argues against the consensus by claiming that from the mid-1960s and onwards, Conservative opposition to the principles of universality became more and more significant. Two areas which Kavanagh & Morris believe help to support Pimlott’s thesis are education and immigration. Evidence over the past few decades has shown that Conservative and Labour Governments have differed in their views of schooling. Having witnessed the Labour Government in 1965 make comprehensive education compulsory, the new Conservative Government withdrew the order in 1970. The two Labour and Conservative governments which came into power in 1974 and 1979 respectively continued this trend. When the issue of immigration is brought to attention, it is clear that the two main parties differed in their views, since Labour have been receptive to immigrants and the Tories have been restrictive. Critics of the consensus have therefore pointed out that there has hardly been a consensus at all if politicians have differed in their views on certain issues and policies, and have only reluctantly allowed certain policies to be put into action:
“When one policy triumphs over another, it is tempting to regard the change as inevitable, and as part of a progressive, consensual evolution. Yet the reality of radical reform is that it has seldom come without a fight”
(p. 13)
If the views of such critics are to be believed, then the concept of the consensus can be called into question since there can only be a consensus if people are happily agreeing to political decisions regardless of which party is in operation. It is also recognised by authors such as Kavanagh, Morris and Pimlott that voters stayed loyal to their parties whilst the Conservative and Labour governments were in conflict with each other.
Aside from the controversy surrounding the issue over whether or not political parties were happily in agreement is the problem of defining the consensus itself. Some commentators have looked at the view of the consensus by selecting what policies they believe are important, whilst others have looked at the term in terms of what they believe common beliefs and moral values are. Pimlott (1989) claims that the biggest problem of the consensus is in defining what the consensus is, and that the British postwar consensus could be seen as the product of a consensus among historians on what political issues should be regarded as important. From this perspective the consensus has just been created by subjective statements which have attempted to idealise the years between World War Two and Thatcherism.
Kerr (1999) queries whether or not the consensus is just a framework created by historians designed to highlight contrasts between the Thatcher years and the pre-1979 era:
“The thesis’s ability to organise a contrast between the pre-1979 and post-1979 eras and thereby provide definition to the extent of supposed transformation in both periods, has meant that the idea of consensus remains an important myth across the whole political spectrum”
(p. 73)
He claims that the consensus has limited appeal in attempting to explain the complex governmental activities which followed the war and instead only helps us to understand the contribution of ideas from people such as Keynes and Beveridge in the postwar era, as well as showing how Thatcherism managed to turn these elements upside down.
The idea that a consensus existed between the mid 1940s after the Second World War until the late 1970s when Mrs Thatcher came into office has helped us to understand how British politics was generally in agreement over fundamental issues concerning the welfare of Britain. However, the view that such a consensus ever existed has been seriously contested, since many commentators have pointed to many areas where different political parties have been in disagreement and that changes in policies have only have always been challenged by the opposition. Even so, the idea of “the postwar consensus” has remained popular today and is taken for granted by many historical, political and social commentators, so its contribution to British politics can hardly be doubted.
Bibliography
Kavanagh D. & Morris P. (1989) Consensus Politics from Attlee to Thatcher. Basil Blackwell Ltd.
Kerr P. (1999) “The Postwar Consensus: A Woozle That Wasn’t” in David Marsh et al: Postwar British Politics in Perspective.
Pimlott B, Kavanagh D. & Morris P. (1989) “Controversy: is the postwar consensus a myth?” Contemporary Record Vol 2, no 6.
