Burma constitutes the rare instance of a military government undertaking thoroughly socialist and egalitarian policies. The political education of the Burmese military occurred in a particular political framework: the national independence movement or in the militant student organisation which eventually became the spearhead of the nationalist movement. Therefore, 'they were socialists who became soldiers, not soldiers who became socialists'. From as far back as World War II, the elite, who eventually controlled what became the army, viewed themselves as the driving force in the popular struggle for independence; "the commanders had made the decision on the eve of the war that Aung San should leave the military and assume the leadership of the political struggle for independence. From that period, the army felt it had a continous stake in the survival of the Union and the realisation of the goals of the nationalist movement." (Silverstein:p.80) Thus from the outset the coup leaders never seemed to doubt the legitimacy of their actions; the feeeling of historical mission was used by the Burmese military elite as a justification for its political activism and role expansion. The dissatisfaction with which the army viewed the political leaders was also fuelled by the internal rifts, corruption, and feuds which dogged the AFPFL.
By the very nature of its heterogenous identity; political cleavages and a breakdown in consensus appeared within the AFPFL which hindered the creation of a Burmese socialist state. The military leaders viewed with disdain the process and patterns of decision making at every level of government. They felt that inefficiency, corruption, and political considerations - instead of rational and professional criteria - charaterised governmental operations. The army believed that only [its] professional abilities and administrative expertise could secure and maintain a stable political order for economic and social development. Therefore, the army had an ideological justification for intervention, a sense of historical mission, and the confidence in its own professionalism and administrative competence to succeed where successive civilian governments had failed miserably. However, to fully understand why the military regime persists to this day, we also have to account for the structure of Burmese society, which contributed to a lack of political consensus and the weakness of civilian institutions.
The political culture of Burma, although in some ways quite advanced, was limited to the urban areas and riddled with communal, political, and religious cleavages. Thus there was a widespread absence of a politically aware public mobilised into effective associations, which could act as a brake on the ambitions of the army. The absence of an indiginous middle class, however small, also meant that the armed forces, and to a lesser extent the civilian bureaucracy, provided the only effective form for social mobility and advancement. This became a great benefit for the military government as it attempted to build a new political centre through the BSPPbecause it controlled the doctrinal 'input' at the military academy: "the officer cadets were taught not only the art of warfare, but also how they could serve the working people in the promotion of the people's economic, social, and educational interests." (Lissak:p.167) The selection of the officer corps in Burma was extremely rigorous and revolved around prior ideological commitment and participation in the BSPP. Therefore, the military regime attempted to control social mobility, and through this strengthen and widen control over key elements of Burmese society.
Thus, the Burmese military elite was ideologically driven and gradually extended its role into the economic arena through the Defence Services Institute. Following the coup it created the BSPP, the SAC's and the military academy, which increased its penetration into the educational, commercial, and agricultural areas. The army partly civilianised itself, acquired a corporative nature and became the main route to social mobility. This was facilitated by an ineffective and divided political opposition and an extremely weak middle class. The military elite's main argument and justification of these policies was "that there was no place for any alternative social doctrine or for any other competing social and economic organisation" (Lissak:p.239) In Ne Win's Burma there is no separation of powers within the state; all power- executive-legislative, and judicial-resides in the party. "In effect, the elaborate constitutional structure is a means by which the military retains control over all aspects of power within the state. The military control the BSPP, and Ne Win controls the military, inasmuch he maintains authority overall organs of the state." (Steinberg:.p87)
At this point in time, the continuing dominance of the Burmese military is under serious threat. The progressive mismanagement of the economy and a series of currency crises in 1987, led to massive civil unrest and a general strike in 1988. These demonstrations, calling for an end to military rule and a return to parliamentary democracy, were ruthlessly suppressed with many thousands being killed. However, in the face of continuing popular unrest the ruling BSPP party renounced socialism and promptly dissolved itself, only to re-emerge as the National Unity Party. SLORC was left in charge of the nations affairs until a general election could be held in the May of 1990. The military, believing that the population had been successfully intimidated, were confident that their new political vehicle would win the election. However, the opposition, under the banner of the National League for Democracy, swept to a stunning victory; capturing 392 seats out of the 485 available. SLORC immediately declared the result invalid, justifying its decision on the grounds that such a party 'wasn't fit for government'. Therefore, in the words of Silverstein, 'Burma today remains a prison, with the army acting as 230,000 wardens'. The carefully nurtured institutions of political legitimacy, which the military have fostered since 1962, were finally exposed as failures and the only justification for SLORC's continued political dominance lies in its armed might.
THE MILITARY IN INDONESIA
The military first tasted power in Indonesia when martial law was introduced in 1957. In the early 1950's various political parties had dominated a succession of governments under a democratic constitution, but the inability of coalition governments to overcome party differences and deal with regional rebellions had led to widepsread disillusionment and an increasingly radicalised electorate split evenly between the radical muslim's and the communists. To quell the rebellions, restore stability, and to re-establish his power base, Sukarno issued the decree for martial law. This ended in 1959, when 'Guided Democracy' was established. This uneasy tripartite alliance, between the commuinist PKI, the army, and Sukarno ended in 1965 with the failure of the pro-communist coup. The military, under the command of General Suharto moved swiflty into action: massacring hundreds of thousands of communist supporters and gradually easing the charismatic President Sukarno out of power. In March 1966, five months after the failed communist coup, the Indonesian military was firmly in control.
Under Suharto's 'New Order' the military dominated all aspects of the regime. Military officers were appointed to the key ministries in the cabinet and held important positions throughout the bureaucracy. They also made up an overwhelming majority of provincial governors and sat as appointed members in the national and regional legislatures. In addition the military controlled the internal security apparatus with which it ruthlessly hunted down any elements opposed to the regime. Not surprisingly, in the face of such bloodshed and brutality, there was very little resistance offered to military domination and the political parties, of all persuasions, acquiesced quietly.
The army immediately set about legitimising its rule through the military dominated GOLKAR (functional group) party. In 1973, after the security apparatus had weeded out any potential dissidents, the military forced all of the non-government parties to merge into two new parties which were both placed under leadership amenable to Suharto. Therefore, the 'New Order' elections, held during the 1970's and 80's, reflected a heavily managed and controlled electoral process designed by the military to demonstrate its legitimacy, while at the same time avoiding any real contest
among competing political forces. The continuing success of GOLKAR, in capturing increasingly large percentages of the national vote, are due in large part to the regime's structuring of electoral and party law and manipulating regulations to its own advantage. The non-government parties have to publicly proclaim their support for President Suharto and are prohibited to organise party branches below the provincial level. Thus the civilian opposition is effectively hobbled and faces great difficulties in mobilising popular support. Any civilians in the cabinet have tended to be military appointed technocrats or bureaucrats, and therefore, have lacked any organised political base of their own to champion policies which run counter to military wishes. This has been duplicated at the provincial level of administration, where governors are beholden to the military for their posts rather than the electorate. Other non-governmental organisations such as: trade unions, peasant associations, and professional associations were brought together in corporatist style under single organisations whose leaders were always tied, or had an interest in, the propagation of the regime. Therefore the military tightly controlled, or neutralised, any opposition. However, repression and tight political control alone do not explain the stable maintenance of military rule for over twenty-five years; for this explanation we must examine the nature of the Indonesian military and the structure of Indonesian society, plus the circumstances in which it functioned.
The role expansion of the Indonesian military into the political and economic arenas must be seen as a gradual process with its roots in the revolutionary war against Dutch colonialism (1945-50). During this period the guerilla leaders combined military and political roles and for a brief time were, in effect, the government. From this experience the armed forces formulated an ideology- the 'Dwi Fungsi' (Dual Function)- "Which asserts that the military does not have an exclusively military function but has an additional mission as a socio-political force with the permanent right- even duty- to participate in the political affairs of the nation." (Heinz:p.87) The military were thoroughly disatisfied with the democratic processes of the 1950's, regarding the politicians as corrupt, divisive, and ultimately threatening Indonesia's drive towards modernisation. The officer corps, therefore, took it upon themselves to assume responsibility for saving the nation. "At the head of the nations best developed and most powerful organisation, they sought to bring the army's presumed dedication, honesty, and skills to bear where the civilians had failed utterly." (Tilman:P.289)
Throughout the period of Guided Democracy the army gradually entered Indonesia's economic and administrative structures, sitting alongside the civilian managers of nationalised companies and administering the provinces. Thus the coup of 1966 was a culmination of a process, the process of a steady erosion of civilian roles and authority. This was a direct result of the political cleavages and lack of consensus which dogged Indonesian political life. The military sought to rise above politics and make decisions in a rational manner without regard to factional party politics Huntingdon's comment that " a military involved in politics reflects political divisions" seems very relevant here. (ibid)
Social and economic factors also played a significant role in facilitating military rule in Indonesia. " The Indonesian class structure lacked two important classes - a strong indigenous bourgeoisie and a big-landlord class - which in other countries have provided social bases for political movements which have to some extent been able to balance and limit the power of the central bureaucracy." (Heinz:p.90) In Indonesia the commercial classes were largely made up of ethnic Chinese, who, lacking a political base of their own, quickly tied themselves to the fortunes of the military regime, and in many cases acted as the civilian partners for army officers pursuing private business ventures.
From the outset, the Suharto regime gave high priority to creating political conditions favourable to economic growth. It encouraged foreign investment and allied itself with the western bloc. However, it was the explosive rise in the price of oil in 1974 which has secured the stability of the military regime and fuelled the patronage system on which it relies. The wealth from the oil revenues allowed the government to expand its social base of support as the benefits of growth spread to important non-elite groups. The major industrial developments and agricultural projects provided job opportunities and increased food production and purchasing power as the wealth 'trickled down'. Therefore, major foreign investment and aid from the west, plus the oil revenues, neutralised potential opposition and ameliorated social discontent. This is especially evident among Suharto's own officers, who, until the oil-boom had been prone to open factionalism and dissatisfaction with his rule. The funds from the oil wealth allowed Suharto to construct an elaborate patronage network which ensured consensual agreement around his rule. " The judicious distribution of opportunitiies to acquire wealth has been a crucial factor enabling Suharto to consolidate and maintain his political power." (Crouch:p.166)
Despite the drop in oil prices throughout the eighties, the Suharto regime remains comfortably in control. The New Order seems firmly rooted in a combination of authoritarion coercion, skilful political management, and economic success. Even allowing for intra-military conflict, concerning a successor to the ageing Suharto, increasing political pressure from the Islamic party; role expansion by the technocrats following economic dislocation; the military have embedded themselves far too deeply in Indonesian society to be easily removed, and will remain the dominant force in politics for the foreseeable future.
CONCLUSIONS
In this essay we have been accounting for the continued political dominance of the military in Burma and Indonesia. First of all we must recognise that the military in these countries emerged as part and parcel of the national liberation movements and were therefore already highly politicised. They in no way resembled the passive military establishments of Western Europe and the USA. They matured into powerful, professional organisations with their own corporate interests. When confronted with the political realities of factionalised party politics and the weakness of liberal democratic governments to achieve the aims and ideals for which they had fought, the temptation to seize the levers of power and establish a stable political framework, through which their country's could modernise, proved to great. The weakness of civilian associations and the low-level of the political culture facilitated the intervention of the military. Therefore, this is consistent with Professor Huntingtons analysis. However, to account for their continued dominance we mustn't simply concentrate on the political aspects of the military's role expansion. The military in Indonesia and Burma expanded their role into the educational, administrative, ideological, and economic spheres: crowding out civilian participation and becoming the main route for social mobility. During this process they have become self-perpetuating distributional coalitions embedded at the very core of their societies. This seems the best explanation for their continuing political dominance.
BIBLIOGRAPHY:
P. CAMMACK et al Third World Politics
W. HEINZ et al The Military in Politics
M. LISSAK Military Roles in Modernisation
D. Jenkins Suharto and his Generals
E. NORDLINGER Soldiers and Politics
M. OLSEN The Rise and Decline of Nations
J. SILVERSTEIN Burma: Military Rule and the Politics of Stagnation
D. STEINBERG Burma: Socialist Nation of Southeast Asia
HAROLD CROUCH Indonesia: Rise and fall of Suharto's Generals
(Third World Quarterly 1990)
R. TILMAN Man, State and Society in Southeast Asia
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