Interactive and human resources are the subject of special attention from the government regarding the organization and cooperative work, particularly in regard to the personnel responsible for implementing public policy. Real efforts are being made in training of all actors involved in one way or another in policies and who must decide on subjects extremely precise (police, customs, judiciary, medical, tax specialists ...).
The information resource is, in turn, a crucial issue in the strategy against the demand for drugs. It aims to "prevent individuals on the dangers of drugs" and "[to] convince them to abandon their consumption and / or initiating treatment" and "reduce risks related to drug use”( World Drug Report 2000). It manifests itself in information campaigns, school programs and education initiatives in the various disciplinary communities worldwide, such as the establishment of an "International Day against Drug Abuse and Trafficking illicit drugs", launching an international campaign on the theme "Drugs, let’s talk about it" radio advertisements, teaching notes and leaflets published in several languages (UN website).
The use of force resource is also very active in the repression policy, through mobilized police forces. But public actors seem constrained by other resources such as time and majority resource: The speed of propagation of the drugs problem allows no respite in the fight, especially since it is in human lives that delays are paid and multiple pressures on international organizations from different msember States do not allow them to optimize their action (Pélicier 1997).
The target groups of public policy on drugs include private actors outside government control. They represent groups or individuals whose behaviour is considered as the cause of the problem and on which public policy seeks to impose a change (Koepfel 2001). Under the policy of reducing drug supply, these are the "Narco-State" country producers of illicit drugs, the mafia, "criminal enterprises to aim high profit"(Cretin1997), the "ant traffic"(Grimal 2000) that are smugglers, drug tourists, brokers and dealers, as well as offshore banks, which are used to "launder" the extraordinary profits of the traffic. Resources of these target groups are diverse and varied: human resources for manufacturing and distribution of drugs, considerable financial resources for the mafia with an annual turnover estimated at 500 billion dollars (Becker 2004), which fund the infrastructure needed to bypass the repressive forces (helicopters and private airports, high-speed boats, submarines, corporate relay ...), interactive resource important to the careful organization of traffic, and of course the excessive use of force (Grimal 2000). With regard to target groups of the decreasing demand policy, there are drug users, but also, through information campaigns, all potential users, like children of addicts or those from disadvantaged families or depressed people.
Partnership obligations are aimed at changing the behaviour of the medical profession as a whole, social workers, leaders of businesses, patrons of bars or clubs, media, teachers (Drug Report 2000) ... These groups targeting reduction demand are much more passive and have only limited resources, whether in personnel, money or infrastructure. Constraints of all these groups are the various measures that can take the international community in accordance with its fight against drugs. The various governments may also be considered as target groups to the extent that the international authority required an effort from them in implementing their regulations.
The last players of the base triangle of this policy are the ultimate beneficiaries, bringing together the individuals directly affected by the scourge of drugs. These drug users, viewed as dependent and sick people, the public authority must protect them against themselves. It may also include in this group, victims of crime due to traffic activities. Through the application of public policy, these individuals are allocated a number of resources, financial (reintegration assistance ...), legal (can demand the right to received treatment ...), human and heritage (centres care with skilled and listening personnel ...). Some restrictions remain: the power of persuasion of the mafia and drug dealers, the factor of drug addiction that can "fall again" at any time, insufficient number of public care, the price of some processing, stigmatization and marginalization from which drug addicts are subjected (Pierre 1999).
To these three groups of players may be added a group called "third party actors" composed of guerrillas and terrorists who were getting in drug traffic a source of considerable funding and who are then affected by the application of the anti drugs. Civil society as a whole can be described as "third profiteer" since it benefits from improved well-being through reduced criminality induced by public policy (White 2004).
International policies against drugs are aimed to fight against an illegal phenomenon and interactions between groups have, legally, no places to be. Even if the financial power of drug trafficking generates a corruption phenomenon in some states, it is within the international community that individual states play with "gray areas"(Knoepfel 2001) of politics. The main interactions of the players who took part in the decision process are in the opposition that still exists between the northern states, foremost among them the United States, which promote anti-drug based on supply reduction, and the southern states, especially Latin Americans, who insist on the need to reduce demand. Another main disagreement remains: one between the States which, like the Netherlands, prefer a tolerant approach to better control the adverse effects of drug abuse by not rejecting the drug illegally, and those, like France and the United States, who believe that a repressive approach based on an aggressive implementation of drug prohibition is the best way to contain the development of the drug phenomenon (Laniel 1998).
The UN Conventions are, in large part the result of compromise between these opposed views. The many and opposed bureaucratic interests that the United Nations are at stake do not help. This rather confusing situation is further complicated by the presence of civil societies around the world, more or less well represented by NGOs, which have also their own interests and positions that may object to the other NGOs, States or United Nations bodies. The main resource used in the international community and that weighed on the decision guidance is money. That is why the American view of the fight against drugs is a priority and it is not surprising given that "the contribution to the international drug control of U.S. government agencies, non-governmental pressure groups and citizens is immense. Equally immense fortunes that the U.S. government allocates drug control beyond its borders (White 2004).
II - Targeted policies
1. Politico-administrative program of public policy on drugs
The politico-administrative program of public policy in the fight against drugs takes the shape of various resolutions and decisions opted by UNODC in its many sessions and meetings. The introduction of the United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances of 1988 expresses clearly the will of the international community "wishing to conclude a comprehensive international convention, effective and operational aimed specifically against illicit traffic in which it is considered the various aspects of the whole problem." (UN Report 1988).
Legislative decisions are defined in the four international conventions on the fight against drugs. The program first establishes the public policy objectives: to address the phenomenon of the increasingly threatening expansion of drug trafficking and drug abuse. This is considered as a social evil, addiction is a real public health problem. States should intervene in the name of protecting citizens in order to reduce "negative externalities of social cost"(Kopp 1994) that the phenomenon poses to society. In addition, by increasing globalization and liberalization of international trade, the drug is now internationalized, and as no activity is as lucrative, traffic has increased. The mafia and politics corruption are broadening their effects to crime, the financing of local conflicts and terrorist now appearing as a formidable diplomatic and economic weapon.
Political institutions, economy, society and the individuals themselves being threatened, the objectives of the international community are consequently clearly defined: it is to "integrate the fight against drug abuse both parts of the supply and demand "(Nahas 1990): the reduction of supply must have a national and international law enforcement and calls for the full cooperation of producing countries. Programs reducing demand imply a prevention program, screening and drug rehabilitation. The program is guided by a logical course of action that rationalized its activity, clearly establishing a causal hypothesis and an interventional hypothesis:
If the various UN bodies involved in the fight against drugs repress the traffickers, both at the production and distribution level as for the conversion of illicit profits in the international economy, they establish a real health treatment program for drug addicts and a real effort of prevention and information. Then producers, traffickers distributors, mafias, offshore banks and consumers will reduce or even stop their illicit activities, and then, civil society as a whole, consumers and victims of trafficking and crime are driven out of danger. The various policy actors are clearly defined (see Part I).
To achieve its ambitions in the fight against drugs, public policy must provide the international community with the necessary tools for intervention, in turn prescriptive tools, incentives, informational or self-regulation depending on the angle of attack. Traffic control passes first through an action in the drug-producing countries, which are the source of the problem. The policy of limiting the supply of drugs is building a real planning system for the manufacture of drugs, limiting the production based on medical need for a system of prior authorization (Becker 2004), ensuring that the export of narcotics is not exceed the ratings of the countries of destination (Articles 23, 26, 27, 28 and 36 UN convention 1961). The agreements also establish a system of crop substitution and creation of local industries in order to overcome the action of pulling planes and destroying illegal refineries in close collaboration with development assistance agencies. The supply reduction also requires harmonization of laws and a reconciliation of the repressive practices worldwide. Interpol, as the World Customs Organization, standardizes its controls, collects, processes and disseminates information, participates to the training of States law enforcement agencies and facilitate procedures (procedures for extradition, police interventions in the waters international , monitored deliveries ...)(Articles 6, 7, 8, 9, 10 and 11 UN Convention 1988).
But it is also to act against money laundering and the conversion of profits from the drug injected into the global economy. Specific services in this struggle were created as the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), which adopted fiscal measures to present the 4000 Offshore Banks in 60 tax havens (Becker 2004). These banks are then assigned to remove the banking secrecy, with the obligation to retain documents relating to customers, the vigilance and cooperation (FATF 1996).
Regarding the policy of demand reduction, the measures taken in this regard are listed in the action plan "comprehensive multidisciplinary scheme" (20th GA 1998) : they must be based on regular assessment of the nature and extent of drug use, this appraisal must be done carefully and periodically by States and cover all areas of prevention, thus including information, education, public awareness, early intervention, counselling, treatment, social rehabilitation, assistance and access to services.
The arrangement for the policy implementation is explicit: These requirements call for a partnership between governments, government agencies and the wider civil society. The conventions also apply to establish the skills of stakeholders, who are responsible for crimes committed on their territories and by their citizens (A4 UN Convention). Different agencies provide the resources necessary to implement such measures by participating in the financing of national policies, through UNFDAC, offering technical assistance in the implementation of international orders, assistance in drafting laws national, in providing necessary information to develop prevention programs, supervising and coordinating international action.
2. Example of the FTAA
The Summit of the Americas in Miami in 1994 is the first step in the creation process of the Free Trade Area of the Americas. Goals of the plan of action are aimed to preserve and strengthen the democracy community in the Americas, that goes through a fight against the drug traffic and related crimes. Behind the apparent consensus of Miami lies a complex problem. Issues related to drug trafficking are both economic and social policies. One can therefore question the ways and means used by the FTAA and the chances of success facing the reality of drug traffic.
This example illustrates perfectly that the difficulty and complexity of the fight against drug traffic is also a local issue.
A. The apparent attachment to the anti-drug
The first goal in Miami was to preserve and strengthen democracy. To this end, the action plan defines in paragraphs 4, 5 and 6 the fight against corruption, the problem of illegal narcotics and related crimes and to eliminate the threat of terrorism nationally and internationally (Dabène 1998).
Drug trafficking is defined as a serious threat for societies, free market economies and democratic institutions. The social costs, the economic drainage and insecurity related to narcotics justify the adoption of integrated and comprehensive measures:
- Adoption of a legislation authorizing to block and seize products issued from money laundering with intergovernmental redistribution of assets seized.
- Collaboration with financial institutions.
- Enforcement activities against narcotics networks.
- Public Awareness Program.
- Aid to alternative agriculture.
- Increased control of precursor chemicals.
- Control the flow of arms, ammunition and explosives.
- Development conferences and cooperation with the EU and the OAS.
During the Summit of the Americas in Santiago, Chile rejected to support the democratic ideal as well as the fight against drug. Education has become the top priority. However, the FTAA members reiterated their desire to fight against drug trafficking. The action plan is still vague and emphasizes the need to respect national sovereignty and the principle of non-interference.
The Declaration of Principles and Action Plan, ratified in 1998 highlight the complexity of the fight against trafficking of narcotics. The pragmatism displayed in Santiago brings some questions about the effectiveness of the FTAA in the fight against drugs.
The fight against narcotics trafficking is a double-edged sword. At the international level, there is a consensus to condemn all kind of traffic. Yet the political issues are numerous and the coin has other sides.
The South American governments that signed the principles statements and action plans in Miami and Santiago are the same government accused of political collusion with drug networks. Ernesto Samper in Colombia is accused of collusion of the army with drug traffickers in Peru to finance the fight against the Shining Path. There are also abusive prefects, judges and officers arrests in Bolivia and money laundering by the former dictator Hugo Banzer. The drug is politically used in Chile and parliamentary officials are arrested in possession of substantial quantities of drugs. Similar acts are observed in Central America (Washington office 1991).
The mistake would be to put all the blame on South American countries and their leaders. The United States, beyond the health and social cost of drugs, obtained and still derives substantial benefits from the drug trade. In the past, it allowed them to support various cons-revolutionary movements and halt the rise of socialist movements. The fight against drug trafficking is a new pretext for the U.S. to maintain military forces, in violation of the duty of non-interference. 80% of the cocaine available in the U.S. comes from Latin America. Washington considers the drug trade as an internal matter. The military force has been involved in violation of the Posse Comitatus Act of 1878 stating that the military should not interfere in internal affairs. The CIA, DEA, the Pentagon, the Coast Guards and the Southern Command are involved in activities on U.S. territory and outside (Aguirre 1997).
B. The questionable effectiveness of FTAA in the fight against drugs
The intention is laudable but the practice remains marginal. The 5 annual ministerial meetings in Denver, Cartagena, Belo Horizonte, San Jose and Toronto had for theme trade and business. The fight against drug traffic was demoted in the order of priorities at the summit of Santiago.
Actors have an interest in limiting the fight against drug trafficking. Some see funding sources for political interests or justification for the maintenance of armed forces and circuit command shortcuts. Economic resources and social impact of the drug culture limit the course of actions (Drug Observatory Website 2011).
FTAA itself has only weak coercive in its struggle. The recall of the principle of national sovereignty limits the possibilities of multilateral actions. The FTAA has neither body nor powerful coercive forces of development assistance for the development of alternative crops. The United States provides with the essential of this aid. It represents 20% of U.S. foreign aid in the region (FTAA 2011).
The outcome of the FTAA and its willingness to be more than a classic economic union yet brings back the issue on the negotiating table. Moreover, the ineffectiveness of the drug war creates problems. The presence of repression forces reinforces the military power in countries where they had attempted to impose a civilian control model. This causes further clashes between farmers and governments that could destabilize the country on the political point of view. U.S. assistance is no guarantee that it is sometimes used to support anti-revolutionary movements or other action in violation with human rights. Yet the FTAA puts human rights and social issues at the heart of the debate. The solutions to the drug trade are far from satisfactory and the mainland must make concerted significant progress in this area if the FTAA wants to succeed and comply with the terms defined in 1998 in Santiago.
III- Evaluation of public policy challenges and debates
1. Accomplishments & Policy Limits
Today, it appears that the international community has never had such an important activity in the fight against drugs.
For instance, the amount of opium and heroin exported from Afghanistan was halved in 2010, according to a report from UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon released during march 2011. In addition, 1,277 anti-drug operations were conducted in Afghanistan in 2010, allowing the seizure of nearly 52 tons of opium, 7 tons of heroin, 65 tons of hashish, 3.4 tons of morphine and 180 tons of chemical precursors. 64 laboratories for the manufacture of narcotics were destroyed, while 1,186 people suspected of drug trafficking, including ten foreigners, were arrested.
The 2000 UNODC report sum up the results of public policy (Drug Report 2000): During the second half of the 1990s, production of opium (the raw material for the manufacture of heroin) has remained stable and coca leaf production has declined in Bolivia and Peru between 1990 and 1999, but this decrease was more than offset by an increase during the same period by the multiplication of illegal culture areas in Colombia. Some countries like South Africa, Afghanistan and Burma just beat past production records. In addition, improved agricultural techniques have resulted in enhanced efficient productivity.
The international community also faces the problems of underdevelopment in producing countries. Indeed, the main resources of Narco-State come from agricultural drugs production and it is difficult to replace these traditional cultures by highly profitable alternative crops. Eradication policies have also moved the illicit crops to remote areas and consequently less controlled (Grimal 2000). The refineries destroyed are quickly rebuilt and crops destruction does not reduce consumption because supply is still greater than demand (Kopp 1994).
In addition, there is an exponential growth in production and traffic of synthetic drugs (Drug Report 2000). From the perspective of law enforcement, the World Customs Organization has been registering real results since the global seizures increased sharply between 1980 and 2011. However, this success is relative, because these seizures represent only 5-10% of the quantities of illegal products and less than 2% of the money recycled by mafias.
Thus, despite the success of some major operations (dismantling "Colombian cartels, considerable reduction of the operational capacities of the Italian mafia), it appears that this repression is not efficient because it contributes to increasing drug prices, thereby promoting crime and rising profits of traffickers, without lowering consumption (Grimal 2000).
Moreover, there is undoubtedly a problem in resource management: policies for prevention, treatment and drug addicts care seem to have trouble to be articulate and in the management of interactive resource, because of the multiplicity of actors and interests engaged. Meanwhile, being awareness of the global nature of production, trafficking and drug use led international organizations to engage in a real "war on drugs" that is becoming increasingly economical. But if the objectives are clear, the weak means deployed on the financial side and the limited numbers of countries implementing international recommendations really do not allow optimistic fight issue.
The drug market is valued at $ 500 billion per year and the UNDCP has an annual budget of $ 75 million, limiting the action capacity of the body, which is increasingly under pressure of time and of adaptation to target groups various measures undertaken aim. The cognitive resource is also into question because it may promote the spread of drugs, the expansion and transformation of the phenomenon causing feelings of rejection, overreaction or marginalization of drug addicts (Pélicier 1997). It is therefore a particularly difficult resource to manage.
Obstacles to the development of an effective policy also reside in the fact that governments have difficulty in understanding the phenomenon in all its complexity, its comprehensiveness and its duration. Its underground nature prevents the creation of an accurate information base, especially since many communities are reluctant to reveal their figures and the "rites" of this world are still poorly understood. Medical doctrine is still unclear, blurred by the incessant bickering of experts on the causes of the phenomenon.
2. Challenges
But one can also question the public policy logic of action. According to Pierre Kopp (Kopp 1994), the government intervention is based on two types of logic: "The paternalistic approach is to give [the government] the mission of protecting citizens from themselves”, because addiction and drug dependence lead to individual that do not behave rationally and puts their life in danger. But some will dispute the role of moral guardian, the government interference in regards to individual privacy rights. The operation can take a different approach, the "externalities" one: international action is justified by the fact that while the drug leads to external effects, apart from the individual effects, that are significant and costly to society (in terms of prevention, care...). For the same author (Kopp 1997), a public policy "under the constraint of prohibition" should focus on reducing the negative externalities of drugs social cost rather than concentrating its efforts on reducing consumption. The international public authority, which acts by a closed political-administrative arrangement, is hampered by the complex phenomenon that affects individuals and their freedom at the same time it constitutes a real social problem. For some, fight against drugs is rendered ineffective by an internal conflict of priorities. The “pro-control " actors, ask for increased repressive measures, and" anti-control" are for a lighter plan of action in this area, are in total disagreement (Crozier 2001). There is indeed a real ideological gap between proponents of a "drug-free society" and those who feel the need to "live with" and therefore give priority to reducing risks (Grimal 2000).
Such a debate within the international community can not lead to a real coordination effort: By putting in place a framework with substantive limited content, the international authority has to deal with jurisdiction conflicts: the laws differ from one country to another (especially in regards to penalties use) and judicial systems from the different countries do not cooperate very often.
This problem of vertical coordination and harmonization of instruments for the fight led some governments to question the relevance of distinction between licit and illicit drugs and to consider the decriminalization or legalization of certain drugs.
The main problem is the sovereignty obstacle: it is not enough that all states get involved in the fight against drug trafficking to the issues and to formulate unified solution. They need to harmonize standards, qualifications, and offenses relating to this type of criminal offense (Becker 2004). There is still no common policy framework because national laws remain disparate. Attorney Benedict Dejemeppe has shown that European countries that have yet the same values of human rights, differ on the intervention of justice and continue to maintain an arsenal that reflects their very specific regulatory sovereignty (Dejemeppe 1998).
States are not rational unitary actors: it exists among them a "multiplicity of government stakeholders” (Becker 2004), competing and more or less in permanent contact between them, which are more willing to defend their own interests and goals and their own definitions of priorities and procedures.
In June 1998 the Special Session of the UN General Assembly on drugs launched a vast program of eradication of illicit crops, providing for their complete destruction by 2008. In April 2003, the CND has assessed the project mid-term while recognizing that the goal is not reached. It seems that the balance of power within the international community must change the views of the difficulties of the "war on drugs", "more harmful than drug abuse itself”(UN 1998), and a strategic shift was to take place for a deliberate policy of "harm reduction". Some countries, like Canada, may create a gap in favour of more tolerant universal policies, ranging from "risk reduction" to legalization, to decriminalize the use, that gap would grow as that the dominant political will be powerless and will have adverse effects more serious than the harm they claim to fight.
But as globalization spreads, the proliferation of conflicts are still fuelled by drugs and the developments of synthetic drugs are increasing, it is unclear how the supply of drugs could decrease. Furthermore, with trade and financial market liberalization, and because tax havens continue to prosper, it is unclear how the drug money may stop to irrigate the economy.
While health issues, economic, financial and policy are obvious, the amount spent on prevention, care, anti-money laundering, alternative crops and development of producing countries are derisory. Margaret Anstee, Under-Secretary General of the United Nations, responsible for coordinating the fight against drugs, believed that all programs against drugs in the world were worth "less than a bag of heroine”. This gives an idea of the disproportion of the fight.
References
- Monographic books with one author or more
Becker, Howard S. 2004. “Framing policy on drugs”. Political Communication and Society, Pepper.
Cretin, Thierry. 1997. “World mafias, transnational criminal organizations: present state and perspectives”. Paris: Puf.
Dejemeppe, Benedict. 1998. "The spider in the web" in De Maillard, A world without law.
Grimal, Jean-Pierre. 2000. “Drugs: the new globalization”. Paris: Le Monde Actuel, Gallimard.
Jacques, Jean-Pierre. 1999. “To end addiction: psychoanalysis and providence legalized drugs.” Paris: DeBoeck University.
Knoepfel, Peter, Corinne Larrue and Frederic Varone. 2001. “Analysis and control of public policy”. Geneva, Basel, Munich: Helbing & Lichtenhahn
Kopp, Peter. 1997. “The drug economy”. Paris: Insights, Discovery.
Pélicier, Yves, Guy Thuillier. 1997. “Drugs”. Paris: Que sais-je, Puf.
- Articles in periodicals
Kopp, Peter. 1994 "The effectiveness of policies to control illegal drugs." Futuribles 185 (March)
Mr. AGUIRRE. 1997. “Drugs, Washington alibi in Latin America”, Le Monde Diplomatique, (April)
- Government Documents
France. Ministry of Interior. 1998. “Drugs, proper use of Paris public policy”. The Journal of Homeland Security.
French Association for the United Nations. 1995. The UN and drugs Paris: A. Pedone.
Washington Office on Latin America. 1991. Clear and Present Danger. The U.S. Military and the War con Drugs in the Andes, Washington DC.
- Documents of international organizations
World Drug Report .2000. United Nations Office for Drug Control and Crime Prevention, Oxford University Press.
Proceedings of International Symposium 1988 in Gabriel Nahas and Colette Latour, Drugs and Society (Paris: Masson, ed 1990)
Website of the UNODC (United Nations Office on Drug and Crime): www.unodc.org for the United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances of 1988 and for the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs of 1961
United Nations website: www.un.org for the Report of the General Assembly of UNODC, 9 December 1995, the Catalogue of the FATF, 1996 and for the Mission Report of Laurent Laniel, twentieth session Special UNGASS devoted to the world drug problem, New York, 8-10 June 1998.
O. Dabène, Regional integration in the Americas, Etudes du CERI, No. 45, September 1998
- Websites
Website of the American NGO "Common Sense for Drug Policy" www.csdp.org
Website of the FTAA - http://www.sice.oas.org/ftaa_f.asp
Website of the Geopolitical Drug Observatory - http://www.ogd.org
