In realist view, the world is uncertain and dangerous. Realists assume that all states have some military power and no state knows what its neighbors’ intentions are. Waltz says, “Because some states may at any time use force, all states must be prepared to do so - or live at the mercy of their militarily more vigorous neighbors.” (Waltz, 1979, p. 102) However, Mearsheimer explains that there is “relentless security competition with the possibility of war looming in the background,” not a constant war. (Mearsheimer, 1994, p.9) Hobbes argues, “Man cannot assure the power and means to live well which he hath present, without the acquisition of more.” (Hobbes, 1651, p. 61). Similarly, Machiavelli states that “men never appear to themselves to possess securely what they have unless they acquire something further from another.” (Carr, in Betts, p. 91).
Thomas Hobbes characterizes human nature as “competition, diffidence and glory” amongst humans. (Hobbes, in Betts, p. 80).
The balance of power theory, according to Waltz, explains how states, being unitary actors who seek their own preservation in the first place (at a minimum) or seek universal domination (at a maximum), use all the means they have available in order to achieve a balance of power against their rivals. Waltz then divides those means into two categories - internal efforts, which include increasing military and economic strength and developing clever strategies and external efforts, which include forming an alliance or weakening an opposing one. (Waltz, 1979, p. 118) Once the balance of power is achieved, it becomes a game of preserving this balance to ensure the state’s survival. To reach such an equilibrium, and to achieve mutual goals and interests, states in an alliance must accept the restraints on them due to the framework of which they are a part. “Only if states recognize the same rules of the game and play for the same limited stakes can the balance of power fulfill its functions for international stability and national independence.” (Waltz, 1979, p. 120)
Liberalism
Liberalism can be defined as the “freedom for the individual,” as it believes, in contrast with realism, that humans are good-natured beings. For liberals, humans are beings of progress and strive for perfection during life. “Unlike Realism, it strives for, and believes in, improvement in human condition and provides a rationale for building cooperative institutions that can facilitate better lives for human beings.” (Keohane, p. 127) The main characteristics of liberalism are individual freedom, political participation, freedom from authority and equality of opportunity. (Doyle, p. 206, 207)
Liberals see a heterogenous state of global peace, in which the expectation of war disappears, instead of a homogenous state of war. “Liberal societies compete to become rich, glorious, healthy, cultured, all without expecting to have to resolve their competition through war.” (Doyle, p. 210) Although liberals agree with realists that the international system is anarchic, they also believe that international institutions are able to mitigate anarchy’s effects on interstate cooperation. Their contest is not a zero-sum game, but rather a positive- or negative-sum game, meaning that they can win or lose together (Doyle, p. 211). Liberals distinguish between liberal and non-liberal societies, capitalist from communist, republican from autocratic. These differences reflect the differences in international behavior. “The aims of the state, as do the aims of the individual, go beyond security to the protection and promotion of individual rights.” (Doyle, p. 211) According to liberal institutionalists, institutions are to facilitate cooperation among states, but many critics say that they cannot force states to behave in ways that are contrary to their own selfish interests.
Kant, in Perpetual Peace, stipulates three “definitive articles” of peace. The first article states that “The Civil Constitution of Every State Should be Republican.” (Kant, in Betts, p. 136) Kant argues that if the consent of the citizens is required in order to decide that war should be declared, it is natural that the people will not be willing to pay the costs of the war from their own resources and take upon their shoulders the devastation that war leaves behind. (Kant, in Betts, p. 136). The second article states that “The Law of Nations Shall be Founded on a Federation of Free States.” (Kant, in Betts, p. 137) The concept of pacific union between liberal states is a treaty of the nations among themselves, which prevents wars and steadily expands. The third article states that “Cosmopolitan Right should be limited to Conditions of Universal Hospitality.” (Kant, p. 105)
The theory of democratic peace is built on the claim that democracies are inherently more peaceful than autocratic states. (Walt, p. 39). It can be crudely defined as “democracies do not fight each other.” Although democracies seem to fight wars often, like other states do, they very rarely fight against each other. Walt says, “Democracies embrace norms of compromise that bar the use of force against groups espousing similar principles.” (Walt, p. 39)
This perspective suggests that, for example, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the newborn democracies should embrace each other in their emerging markets and live happily ever after; instead, we have witnessed years of bloody conflict. According to this perspective, we would expect “mother Russia” to support the newly emerging democracies; instead, we witnessed the blockade of Georgian goods at the Russian market, closed borders, and in 2008, military invasion of Georgia. Many believe that Russia wanted to demonstrate its sphere of influence and to show Georgia, Ukraine, and the West, that there is no way Russia is going to respect the acceptance of these countries in NATO. As a realist would say, it is the underlying balance of power being the main underlying purpose for their actions, and not the liberal democratic peace, because even democracies fight each other.
Constructivism
Rather than a theory, we could call constructivism an ontology—a certain set of assumptions about the world and the motivation of people. Therefore, constructivist theories are quite diverse and do not offer a unified set of explanations on any of the issues mentioned above. Realism and liberalism tend to focus on material factors - power or trade. (Walt, p. 40) “Constructivists contend that their theory is deeper than realism and liberalism because it explains the origins of the forces that drive those competing theories.” (Snyder, p. 60) According to Hopf, constructivism offers alternative understandings of the issues discussed above (in the sections on realism and liberalism) including balance of power and the meaning of anarchy. However, instead of taking the state for granted and assuming that it simply seeks power, constructivists “regard the interests and identities of states as highly malleable products of specific historical processes.” (Walt, p. 40) While realists view the war as unavoidable and the international system as static, constructivists argue that interests and identities change over the course of history, allowing cooperation between states which were previously enemies. A good example might be the European Union in which member countries after World War II learned how to cooperate in order to be better off altogether. For constructivists, to explain the behavior of states, we have to recognize the importance of identity and interests. Some constructivists admit that ideas will have greater impact when backed by powerful states and reinforced by enduring material forces (Walt, p. 43). However, a constructivist would not agree with the assessment that material power is all that matters - their main concerns are norms, ideas and discourse. Some constructivists might actually agree with the realist view of balance of power, but they would add the reasoning and background.
Hopf contends that constructivism in general “does not specify the existence, let alone precise nature of its main causal/constitutive elements: identities, norms, values and social structure” (Hopf, p. 189) . He also states that constructivism is weak in dealing with what precisely norms are. “Constructivists are good at describing changes in norms and ideas, but they are weak on the material and institutional circumstances necessary to support the emergence of consensus about new values and ideas.” (Snyder, p. 61) Constructivism might be a way to approach international relations theory, but the fact is that theory does not create practice, as constructivists assume, but practice theory, as Machiavelli states: “Good counsels, whencesoever they come, are born of the wisdom of the prince, and not the wisdom of the prince from good counsels.” (Machiavelli, p. 50)
Conclusion
Realism is often criticized for not being able to explain contemporary world politics because it oversimplifies things and the world we live in today is much more complex and complicated. Realism has been valid for over 2,500 years. We have witnessed even recently that when it comes to the point no international law, treaty, or institution can stop one state from invading another. I agree with Walt that “each of these competing perspectives captures important aspects of world politics” and that the “‘compleat diplomat’ of the future should remain cognizant of realism’s emphasis on the inescapable role of power, keep liberalism’s awareness of domestic forces in mind, and occasionally reflect on constructivism’s vision of change.” (Walt, p. 44) Realism builds on fear rather than hope. The first duty of political leaders is to prevent the worst. As Waltz says, “although many academics (and more than a few policymakers) are loath to admit it, realism remains the most compelling general framework for understanding international relations.” (Waltz, p. 43) States are still worried about the possibility of major conflict. They still keep their arsenals fully armed, even though their economic ties may be very healthy and the possible costs of a conflict are high. The Kantian paradise we want to live in is great, but whether we like it or not, there are wolves in the backyard.
Works Cited
Carr, E.H., Realism and Idealism., in Betts, R.K., Conflict After the Cold War; Arguments on Causes of War and Peace. 4th edition, New York: Columbia University Press, 2012
Doyle, M., Ways of War and Peace. New York: Norton 1997
Finnemore and Sikkink, International Norm Dynamics and Institutional Change. International Organization, Autumn 1998
Hobbes, T., Leviathan, or The Matter, Forme, & Power of a Common-Wealth Ecclesiasticall and Civill. London 1651
Hobbes, T., The State of Nature and the State of War., in Betts, R.K., Conflict After the Cold War; Arguments on Causes of War and Peace. 4th edition, New York: Columbia University Press, 2012
Hopf, T., The Promise of Constructivism in International Relations Theory.
Kant, I., Perpetual Peace, in Betts, R.K., Conflict After the Cold War; Arguments on Causes of War and Peace. 4th edition, New York: Columbia University Press, 2012
Kant, I., Political Writings. Cambridge University Press
Keohane, Twenty Years of Institutional Liberalism. International Relations 2012 26: 125
Mearsheimer, J., The False Promise of International Institutions. 1994
Machiavelli, N., The Prince, On War & The Art of War. Rockville, 2007
Snyder, One World, Rival Theories.
Walt, S., One World, Many Theories. Foreign Policy, Spring 2008
Waltz, Theory of International Politics. Boston: McGraw-Hill Higher Education, 1979
Waltz, Man, the State and War. New York: Columbia University Press, 2001
- Most of the works cited are from the Conceptual Foundations readings library in pdf format. In some cases, I wasn't able to find the year when the book/ article was published.
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sudzume (student)
