Despite a lack of clarity in Hobbes’s position in terms of the subjective/objective notion, it is clear that Hobbes’s account of how we come to consider things good is refreshingly outspoken - unlike many of his predecessors, Hobbes believed that “faith was not knowledge” (Forsyth and Keens-Soper, 1988, p.126) and sought to find a realistic basis for moral judgement that was not based on the objective rules set by intangible religious deities. As a materialist (that is, one who believes that everything has a material/physical cause or explanation), Hobbes was not satisfied by theological reasoning and the notion of moral absolutes – it comes to light when reading ‘Leviathan’ that, in keeping with the desires of man - fundamentally the desire to preserve ones life - it is in his best interest to decide with other men on what the rules of society should be and, by way of the social contract agreeing to live by these rules, appointing an all powerful sovereign to enforce them. Thus, the moral rules in society are set originally by man and therefore are tangible – there is a problem with this however; the collective desires and aversion of man are bound to change with time, and it is debatable whether or not a ruler who is given such power would go to the trouble of adapting to reflect the opinion of his subjects, instead of choosing to enforce his own moral standards. And so perhaps in a practical version of Hobbes vision, the only way to attain the main desire of man – that of self preservation, and of a peaceful society – is at the cost of various other desires.
2). “In deliberation, the last Appetite, or Aversion, immediately adhaering to the action, or to the omission thereof, is that wee call the WILL; the Act (not the faculty) of willing” (Leviathan, Ch.6, p.127).
In this passage, Hobbes’s concepts of deliberation and will come to light. For Hobbes, man is not driven directly by desires and aversions at all times, but is able, as a rational animal, to deliberate – to weigh up the advantages and disadvantages of rival passions so as to arrive at a final decision; the strongest desire or aversion, which Hobbes termed the will. It is important to make clear that Hobbes is not stating that this means man possesses free will in the sense normally ascribed to it – the will is not a faculty of the mind, it cannot exist without the desires and aversions that drive it into action. Rather, what Hobbes means when he talks of man exercising his will is that man is free to judge between competing desires or aversion and act without anything standing in the way. And so, it is not free agency that Hobbes refers to, as although he believed man has the capacity to act freely so long as nothing stands in his way, these ‘free’ actions are still determined by our physically/psychologically driven desires and aversions.
It is this point that raises one of the first problems with this particular aspect of Hobbes’s theory. Can an act defined as a free act, a will, be determined? Surely this is a contradiction in terms. If it is to be believed that man has the capacity to choose between his actions, that they are not purely physical responses, then it must be true that a choice does exist – i.e., ‘I am free to go to class if I choose, but I could choose to do otherwise’. In Hobbes’s account though, this is not the case as the action – going to class – is already determined by the initial desire to do so, and so there is no real element of choice. This exemplifies a weakness in Hobbes’s compatibilist stance, as it is difficult to believe, despite Hobbes’s reasoning, that actions can be both free and determined. There is also a question to be raised by Hobbes’s belief that by exercising the will, man will always act upon his strongest desire. Is it not true that, in some cases, it is inappropriate to act on ones strongest desire? As Hobbes goes on to state later in ‘Leviathan’: “..men are…bound to observe [the laws], because they are Members…of a Common-wealth.” (Ch.26, p.311). What should happen then if a mans strongest desire, his will, would break one of these laws? One may have a desire to obey society’s rules, but the stronger desire may be to break these rules. In this case a conflict occurs which Hobbes fails to acknowledge.
3). “So that in the first place, I put for a generall inclination of all mankind, a perpetuall and restlesse desire of Power after power, that ceaseth onely in Death.” (Leviathan, Ch.11, p. 161).
Here, Hobbes makes one of the key points in ‘Leviathan’ – that man is, essentially, power hungry. By this, Hobbes did not mean simply that man seeks a crude control over others, rather, the power of a man lies in the means he has of acquiring some ‘future apparent good’ – the quest for what Hobbes termed felicity – simply put, man has power when he has the means to fulfil his desires on a long term basis – “to assure for ever, the way of his future desire.” (Ch. 11, p. 161).
Hobbes identified two kinds of power – natural: the ability man has naturally to get what he desires; and instrumental: power gained through the use of the natural powers coupled with skill to acquire what is desired. The latter is especially important if one is to assure the long-term fulfilment of desires, which is where the power struggle comes into play. It is evident that, with the nature of man being that of self interest, that if one is seen to have more power than another, the more powerful man is likely to use that power to obtain what desirables the weaker man may have to improve his power and increase his assurance of the future apparent good. The struggle occurs, then, when each man cannot afford to be the weaker – each man must assure that he is powerful enough not just to fulfil his desires but to ensure that no other more powerful than he can encroach upon his means to acquire that future good.
This appears to be one of Hobbes’s strongest arguments in the book – man craves power as power equates to eminence. If a man has, and is known to have, power then he stands in a certain relation to others – they will realise that trying to overpower him would be futile and so cannot only submit – be this by handing over goods, labour or simply by not challenging his eminence. Such a notion of power is instantly recognisable in many spheres of today’s society – perhaps most obviously within the workplace, where people struggle for promotions over others to gain a better standing within their company or field – and is a Hobbesian notion that is difficult to challenge.
From the passages we have discussed it is evident that Hobbes’s moral stance is one that can on some accounts be challenged, but it would be overly critical to say that it is deeply flawed. Hobbes offers a picture of man that is at times extremely grim, yet highly plausible all the same. For this reason, as philosophy seeks to discover why we are as we are; what causes us to act in certain ways and how society has come to be formed so as to best suit our needs, Hobbes argument must be considered amongst the most credible.
References
Forsyth and Keens Soper, ‘The Political Classics’, Oxford University Press, 1988.
Hobbes, T., ‘Leviathan’, ed.C.B. MacPherson, Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1986.
Bibliography
Forsyth and Keens Soper, ‘The Political Classics’, Oxford University Press, 1988.
Hobbes, T. ‘Leviathan’, ed.C.B. MacPherson, Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1986.
Popkin and Stroll, ‘Philosophy Made Simple’, ed. A.V. Kelly, First Edition, London, Heinemann, 1981.