“..Remember that Absolute Monarchs are but men, and if government is to be the remedy of those evils, which necessarily follow from Mens being judges in their own cases, and the sate of nature is therefore not to be endured, I desire to know what kind of government that is, and how much better it is than the state of nature, where one man commanding a multitude has without the lease liberty to anyone to question or controle those who execute his pleasure? And in whatsoever he doth, whether led by reason, mistake or passion, must be submitted to? Much better it is in the state of nature wherein men are not bound to submit to the unjust will of another…” (Hampton, Jean “Hobbes and the Social Contract” (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1986), 192)
The main issue addressed here, is whether it is rational for men to enter into a commonwealth, where the monarch is also a man, who is also in a state of nature; meaning that nothing could stop a sovereign from acting on his own interests. “Who would not desire to live in his Common-wealth where the sovereign may lawfully kill a thousand innocents every morning to his breakfast?” (Hampton, 190) this question is asked sarcastically by bishop Bramhall. If the sovereign does anything to endanger the people’s survival, he will eventually not be obeyed, since the whole purpose of the sovereign, (which is to protect people), has diminished. In the state of war, “every man has a right to every thing, even to one another’s body”(Hampton, 98). This would include the sovereign leader If one contrasts the natural situation of “limited violence among equals” with life in a commonwealth in which all people are subjected to the absolute power of one man or assembly able to use them, or kill them, a rational person would chose to stay in state of nature, where the risks are much less. Nevertheless, even if some form of government did arise, it would not succeed in Hobbes’ state of nature anyway, due to men’s struggle for power.
No one form of government is perfect; but all forms of government will fail if we are in Hobbes’ state of nature. Hobbes himself puts forth the argument that a constitution cannot be set up, and that division of power in a society will only lead to chaos. Within division of powers among leaders, we have, Hobbes says:
“Not a government…. not one independent Commonwealth, but three independent factions, nor one representative person, but three. In the Kingdome of god, there may be three persons independent without breach of unity in god that reigneth, but were men reigne, that be subjects to diversity of opinions, it cannot be so.” (Hampton, 102)
Hobbes maintains that what destroys a sort of constitutional regime is the impossibility of agreement on the interpretation or enforcement of any moral rules or principles. He states that aristocracy, and democracy are simply impossible because of the nature of human beings-their self-interested motivations and their inevitable conflicts, would not allow the rising of any of these forms of government. However, Thomas Hobbes does justify the presence of a monarchy. He states that since men are in a state of war, they have the desire to escape it, and the only way of doing that is by submitting their rights to a powerful government.
“The final cause, end, or design of men…is the foresight of their own preservation, and of a more contented life thereby, that is to say of getting themselves out from that miserable condition of war…When there is no visible power to keep them in awe, and tie them by fear of punishment to the performance of their covenants...”(Wotton, 187)
He states that by fear of government, the people will come to obey it. “The force of words, being…too weak to hold men to the performance of their covenants; there are in man’s nature, but two imaginable helps to strengthen it. And those are either a fear of the consequence of breaking their word, or a glory, or pride in appearing not to need to break it.” (Wotton, 190) Hobbes, however, fails to see that even this form of government is impossible to keep. His last quote implies that the government has nothing to fear, since they are in power. If they have nothing to fear, will they not act on their own selfish interests? If other forms of government are impossible to keep due to the state of human beings, a monarchy is surely to fail as well for the same reason. This suggests, that in the state of nature, no form of government will be better than the other. People will continue to pursue their own selfish interests, and there would be no way of stopping them.
There is a certain way, however, in which a government is set up, that will be to the benefit of everyone. That is, by people consenting to the form of government in power. David Gauthier takes this approach in his interpretation of Leviathan; he claims that in Leviathan, Hobbes no longer has the subjects surrender their right, because in his final statement of the content of the social agreement, Hobbes writes:
“A commonwealth is said to instituted, when a multitude of men do agree, and covenant, everyone with everyone that to whatsoever Man or assembly of men, shall be given the major part, the right to present the person of them all, everyone, as well he that voted for it, as he that voted against it, shall authorize all the actions and judgements, of that man, or assembly of men, in the same manner, as if they were his own, to the need, to live peaceably amongst themselves, and be protected against other men.”(Hampton, 115)
Gauthier argues that here, that the word “authorization” could be defined as the appointment of some man or men to be one’s representative. Generally, Gauthier is seen to take Hobbes’ idea of government in a more “Lockean” way. That is to say, Hobbes is actually saying that people can consent to the form of government, and choose their own leader, in agreement with him, in order to live in peace. He even goes as far to say that the people could rebel and continue rebelling if they believe they will be killed on surrender. “For they but defend their lives.” Furthermore, he states that it is in the sovereign’s best interest to rule benevolently, rather than harshly: “it is a weak sovereign, hat has weak subjects, and a weak people, whose sovereign waneth power to rule them at his will” (Hampton, 133)
Therefore, from these arguments, it is possible to escape the state of nature if men choose to live under a sovereign, and chose their own leader.
“For if he voluntarily entered into the congregation of them that were assembled, he sufficiently declared thereby his will, to stand to what the major part should ordain…and whether he be of the congregation or not, and whether his consent be asked, or not, he must either submit to their decrees or be left in the condition of war he was in before, wherein he might without injustice be destroyed by any man whatsoever.” (Wotton, 191)
If men do not voluntarily chose their own sovereign, or do not participate, they will be thrown back into the state of nature.
One very important aspect failed to be mentioned above, is that in the state of nature, it is simply impossible for men to choose their own leader. This is because all men are power seeking, and therefore, would all want to become the leaders, and also, it is impossible for men to come to agreements within themselves on whom to chose as their sovereign. In regards to Gauthier’s “lockean” interpretation of Leviathan, he fails to see that humans are not capable of choice; Locke and Hobbes have a different interpretation of the state of nature itself, also, he fails to see that the relationship between the leader and his subjects would not be about setting out the duties and obligations that the sovereign owes the subjects. Hobbes himself attacks this principle, maintaining that the no civil union can be created by such a contract because it would make the subjects the final judges of the sovereign’s performance, thus bringing everyone and everything back into the state of nature, the state of total chaos. Hobbes also contradicts himself, when he states that it is up to the subjects whether they follow the sovereign or not. Bramhall states:
“ Either it must be left to the soveraign determination, whether the subjects security be sufficiently provided for, and then in vain is any mans sentence expected against himself, or to the discretion of the subjects, (as the words themselves do seem to import) and then there need no other bellowes to kindle the fire of a civill war, and put a whole commonwealth into a combustion, but this seditious article.” (Hampton, 102)
Bramhall’s point here is that even though Hobbes does admit that the subjects decide whether or not to continue their obedience to the sovereign, the commonwealth will inevitably degenerate into chaos and civil war.
“If the natural condition of mankind (is one) in which each individual is independent of any formal legal ties, how is it possible for men to perform such complex, apparently unified and obviously legal acts as consenting to the establishment of a sovereign, transferring their authority into his hands and contracting to acknowledge the legitimacy of his laws?”(Hampton, 137)
This is a question asked by many historians and political theorists who deny the justification of Hobbes’ social contract. It cannot be put in any simpler words, if humans’ state of nature, was really a state of war, as Hobbes depicts it, there would be no way to escape it; more importantly, under no form of government would we be able to escape it. People would be too selfish, too power-seeking to agree to live under a sovereign; instead, they would all be fighting for the sovereigns’ position. Also, if any form of government does arise, it would fail almost immediately, because there would be nothing to stop the leader(s) from pursuing their own selfish interests, and hence, leading everyone back into the state of war.
Reference List:
Fukuda, Arihiro. “Leviathan and the English Republic” Sovereignty and the Sword: Harrington, Hobbes, and Mixed Governments in English Civil Wars Oxford: Clarendon Press. 1997
Hampton, Jean. Hobbes and the Social Contract Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 1986
Leyden, W. Hobbes and Locke: The Politics of Freedom and Obligation London: The Macmillan Press. 1982
Watkins, John. Hobbes’s System of Ideas Newcastle: Athenaeum Press. 1989
Wotton, David. Modern Political Thought Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Company, 1996