Joing Declaration

THE SINO-BRITISH JOINT DECLARATION

An extremely important background aspect which preceded the negotiations was the fact that the imminent expiration on the lease of the New Territories on the 1st of July, 1997. The rationale behind the signing of the lease was the British fear of increasing European presence in the region. The British used the most favoured nation clause they had agreed upon with the Chinese to extend the Kowloon region so as to counter the French influence in southern China at the end of the 19th century. Therefore, the actors started the negotiation due to a time constrain and a need to renew a treaty that would decide the (economic) fate of the Hong Kong region. Another important pressure factor was the fear that the property market would collapse in 1997 since mortgages for property lasted 15 years and investors became more and more anxious.

The conditions in order for a negotiation to take place were fulfilled. The active actor was the Communist Chinese government, who started the proto-negotiation phase by sending quite obvious messages to the British government that it desired the handover of the whole Hong Kong region to the People’s Republic of China during visits of British high-ranking officials. The British only reacted both to these signals and to objective economic reasons. Furthermore, British colonial pride was in danger of being undermined by failing to respond to the Communist authorities. In the end, negotiation was less costly and less risky than not negotiating at all. One can characterize the negotiation as being distributive, i.e. competitive or zero-sum type where one party loses and the other wins. Nevertheless, it was perceived at the time that a successful outcome of talks between the two parties would lead to an increased economic and diplomatic relationship, a sort of win-win situation resulting from an integrative negotiation. In this case the British had more to lose, namely the Hong Kong colony and the territories around it, but by keeping them they would have risked more. After reaching an agreement with the other party, the British did manage to strengthen the bilateral relationship with the PRC.    

When addressing the issue of the two actors’ BATNA, which refers to the relative negotiating power of two parties depending on “how attractive to each is the option of not reaching agreement”, one must note that Britain’s BATNA was quite low at that moment since if it would not have negotiated, Hong Kong’s fate would have been decided in a unilateral fashion by an actor whose best alternative to the negotiation was more attractive than what the British possessed at the time. This was the case because Britain could not militarily defend the region in an effective manner against a potential Chinese invasion. In addition, Hong Kong received food and water supplies from its mainland “sibling”. Moreover, the Chinese did not shy away from making their BATNA visible since “the better your BATNA, the greater your ability to improve the terms of any negotiated agreement”. Before negotiations began between the two governments, the 5th National People’s Congress decided to amend the 1982 constitution by adding Article 31, which authorized the PRC to establish a special administrative region and emphasized that this region’s legal system shall be molded in accordance with the context, meaning that it would enjoy a high degree of autonomy, a separate political system and preserve its capitalist economy. Also, a deadline was set on September 30, 1985 for the end of the negotiation process, thus playing on the psychological factor of time. Therefore, one can argue that the Chinese used tactics of coercion, coupled with the objective pressure of the expiration of the land lease. Both parties adopted a position negotiation in trying to either defend or forward their interest in the region.  

Official negotiations

The official negotiations started in 1982 and this first phase of negotiations consisted in agenda setting and exchanges between both sides and it was conducted by Her Majesty's Ambassador in Peking and the Chinese Foreign Ministry. Margaret Thatcher characterized them as being “rocky” because the prime-minister “last visited Peking in 1982 the atmosphere was hostile as an agreement could not be reached”. Thatcher was trying to negotiate the prolongation of British forces in the region and an extension on the Hong Kong territory lease by counting on the increasing openness and economic reforms of the Xiaoping government, but the Chinese authorities adopted a different negotiation position. The PRC desired not only jurisdiction of the New Territories, as the Qing Dynasty’s successor, but it rejected the Nanking Treaty (1842), the Convention of Peking (1860) and the 1898 Convention, considered as “unfair and unequal treaties”. Consequently, British sovereignty over these territories was not recognized, but only their administration by a foreign power. This Chinese negotiating position corresponds to the second phase of the negotiation process, aiming at eroding the adversary’s position and on strengthening one’s own. By rejecting the preceding treaties, the Chinese authorities did not recognize the legitimate British rule over the desired territories, thus minimizing the latter’s continued administrative claims over them. In 1983, the PRC accused the British of using the economic ambiguity and political instability to intimidate the Chinese authorities into accepting the British position. It was clear that there was a lack of trust coming from the Chinese part and a worsening of the mood of the dwellers of Hong Kong itself due to the impasse in the talks and the secrecy of the issues discussed.

The first party to make a concession was the British delegation since Margaret Thatcher expressed the willingness of her government to “discuss on a conditional basis what effective measures other than continued British administration might be devised to maintain the stability and prosperity of Hong Kong and explore further the Chinese ideas about the future which had at that stage been explained to them, in order to see whether on this basis arrangements which would ensure lasting stability and prosperity for Hong Kong could be constructed.”          

The pattern of negotiation in the second phase, which was continued until the end of the negotiations, was for formal rounds of talks to be held between delegations led by Her Majesty's Ambassador in Peking and a Vice or Assistant Minister of the Chinese Foreign Ministry, supplemented as necessary by informal contacts between the two delegations. The Governor of Hong Kong took part in every round of formal talks as a member of the British delegation. The British delegation stated that it would examine together with the Chinese government the possibility of maintaining for Hong Kong a high degree of autonomy under Chinese sovereignty so as to preserve its flourishing and dynamic way of life. The PRC proposed the “One country, Two systems” principle, which upon reunification, Hong Kong will enjoy a high degree of autonomy, thus being able to keep its capitalist system and its rights and freedoms for 50 years from the 1st of July, 1997.

The Joint Declaration

The “Sino-British Joint Declaration on the Question of Hong Kong” was signed between the PRC, whose leader was Deng Xiaoping, and the Conservative British executive under Margaret Thatcher, on December 19, 1984 in Beijing. The location was another aspect which was in favour of the Chinese delegation, offering them a negotiating advantage and psychological comfort. The Hong Kong population was not consulted regarding this document, the overwhelming majority being in favour of the status-quo. According to this agreement, at July 1st, 1997 a transfer of sovereignty occurred, at which time Hong Kong ceased to be a Crown colony and became a Special Administrative Region. Until that moment in time, the British government would assure the region’s administration. The basic policies of the PRC toward this region were present in its statute, most importantly the “One country, Two systems” solution, which provides the status of Special Administrative Region to this former British colony. The Central People’s Government was to have control solely over defense and foreign relations. Also, the Declaration stated that these policies were to be enshrined in Hong Kong’s Basic Law. The Joint Declaration was registered by the two governments at the UN in 1985, thus becoming an international agreement which recognized the future status of Hong Kong. Nevertheless, the population was very skeptical regarding the promise of safeguarding the rights and liberties from mainland Chinese socialism.

In the post-negotiation phase, the two governments announced the creation of a new body, namely the Sino-British Joint Liaison Group, whose purpose was to maintain contact between the British, Chinese and Hong Kong authorities and to establish consultation on the implementation of the agreement. It would play no part in the administration or act as an organ of power. It would be set up after the Joint Declaration came into force and last until the year 2000.    

CONCLUSION

        From the information presented above, this case study denotes a negotiation in which one party held the upper hand in relation to the other. More specifically, Britain had more to lose if it refused to negotiate (a potential war which it could not win), while The People’s Republic of China was able to set the agenda in the pre-negotiation phase, namely to underline the fact that it desires full sovereignty over the then British-ruled Hong Kong, Kowloon Peninsula and the New Territories, without any British presence or co-administration. Nevertheless, the Xiaoping government realized that it would be very difficult to integrate Hong Kong’s market economy and proposed a compromise solution, namely the “One country, Two Systems” principle, which would allow a great deal of autonomy for the former colony under Chinese sovereignty. The same principle was used in negotiating with the Portuguese authorities regarding the handover of Macau in 1999. The bilateral setting was not favorable for the Hong Kong people to have a say in the secretive negotiation process since they were forced to accept what the two great powers would decide. Also, this long process led to an atmosphere of uncertainty which affected the region’s economy. The fact that the talks were held in Beijing and that there was a time limit to the negotiation process constituted additional pressure factors for the British delegation.

        All in all, the British government ended up in making more concessions than it had intended, but there was some compensation in strengthening the bilateral relationship with an emerging great Communist power. The PRC’s approach to the negotiation was determined, threatening at times and compromising to an extent that did not impede greatly on its goal. This tactic proved to be efficient at the end.    

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Specialized bibliography:

1. BÉJA, Jean-Philippe, “La démocratization impossible? “, in Hong Kong, 1997: Fin de siècle, fin d’un monde?, Éditions Complexe, 1993, pp. 61-107.

2. FISHER Roger, URY, William, Getting to Yes, Negotiating Agreement Without Giving In, 2nd edition, Penguin Books, 1991.

3. SCOBELL, Andrew, “Hong Kong’s Influence on China: The Tail That Wags the Dog?”, in Asian Review, Vol. 28, No. 6 (Jun., 1988), pp. 559-612.

Internet sites:

1. 

2.

3. 

4.  

5.