Kosovo, Rwanda, and Iraq - The role of the UN

Authors Avatar

        The great thing about theory – especially theory pertaining to international relations – is that it is malleable and essentially only theoretical.  That is to say, it can never fully be applied universally.  Or rather that can be done, but only until a new and unpredictable variable is introduced which renders the theory null.  It can therefore be stated that theories such as realism, liberalism and Marxism, can all be applied in one way or another to different phenomena.  For instance, international conflicts such as the Rwandan genocide, the war in Kosovo and the war in Iraq can all be viewed through different theoretical lenses.  This paper intends to review and analyze these case studies of modern and contemporary conflicts and determine which theories – if not singularly – apply best to the situations questioned.  Though realism appears to be at the outset the single most prevalent theory, it is entirely viable to see in which ways the other mainstream approaches can be applied.  One need only look at certain details in order to visualize how the way in which these crises played out can be attributed to other theories.

        The first crisis to be looked at will be the case of war in Kosovo.  Reading through a number of published documents pertaining to or evaluating what exactly happened in the Balkans during the spring of 1999 leaves absolutely no doubt that the machinations of the international actors were cemented around a realistic approach to and outlook toward world affairs.  Which elements pinpoint realism as being why events transpired the ways they did?  Mainly evaluations and statements made by key players.  These shall be looked at more closely.

        Madeleine K. Albright, who served as President Bill Clinton’s Secretary of State, has disclaimed in her address tot the House International Relations Committee a number of ideas hinting that the way in which events played out in Kosovo were based on a power struggle and national interest.  She has admitted that “we were engaged in diplomacy backed by the threat of force,” and that “[s]ince that time, we have used diplomacy to back NATO’s military campaign.”  Despite negotiations, which are supposed to be the more pacific approach to resolving diplomatic conflicts, the threat of force was used and later implemented in order to push forth with failed resolutions.

        Though she also claimed that the present U.S. forces in Kosovo were representative of “America’s commitment to the Allied cause,” she nonetheless was encouraging the House not to allow legislation requiring the removal of these forces from this NATO operation.  It is possible to suspect a need to keep these forces grounded – even if it is for an “allied cause.”  She also goes on to explain that the “problems that have plagued the Balkans – of competition for resources, ethnic rivalry and religious intolerance – are by no means restricted to that part of the world.”  This is not only evidence displaying the fact that nationalism is at the heart of this particular conflict – that is to say that Milosevic’s forces were in a power struggle with other rival forces – but also a global evaluation of how the world works, indicating a realist perspective.  

It is necessary to state however that she does admit the cooperation of certain other actors in resolving the conflict which has already begun: “efforts by Greek NGOs and the International Committee of the Red Cross,” and saying later that in order to provide stability and democracy that it would take “a coordinated effort” and “a commitment from us…the involvement of the European Union and the international financial institutions.”  Liberalism and the cooperation among actors other than just the states that it encourages is therefore used as a reparative tool and not one necessarily by which conflicts are dealt with in the immediate.

Join now!

Other indications of the presence of realistic forces at work during the many days of this war can be found in criticisms of NATO itself and how it handled the war.  For instance, the use of brute force in order to make the Serbian forces concede in which an attack on the headquarters of Serbian state radio and television in Belgrade constituted a war crime.  Others included the continuing bombing of bridges even after evidence showed that civilians had been struck.  This demonstrates the Machiavellian-type lengths to which NATO would go in order to obtain its objective.  

National interest ...

This is a preview of the whole essay