Since the Clinton administration did not care about humanitarian issues, we can conclude that they were not following a liberal approach. The critical theory relies on the governing authorities wanting to maintain the status quo, but since it was a revolutionary upheaval, the critical approach can not be definitely divulged. Since nationalist interest had priority over humanitarian issues, the realist approach is the most fitting.
China and Russia are two members on the Security Council which have veto powers, and both have provinces where human rights violations are allegedly taking place. Russia has Chechnya and China has Tibet, so it is conceivable that they both wanted to avoid creating a precedent in the tradition of the U.N. which could lead to a humanitarian intervention in their countries. There could also be a fear of the U.N., and certain western countries, of imposing their values and dominance in the shadow of humanitarian intervention. These factors can be attributed to a pragmatic, realist view of worrying about their national security, rather than human suffering. There is a view that by denying the mission of humanitarianism, they are denying the advancement of western values, which is an indication of critical theory, but it would be secondary to realism because the western powers were unwilling to go into Rwanda. In conclusion, realism has been the dominant approach in regards to the inaction of Rwanda.
Kosovo
Kosovo was a small province in the state of Serbia, and it wanted greater autonomy because it was made up of ethnic Albanians, rather than Serbs. Kosovo is remarkably different from Rwanda since the humanitarian intervention “has been criticized for being too much, too soon”, because the NATO’s air bombings could have worsened the violent ethnic cleansing. President Milošević was the nationalistic leader of Serbia and was a major participant in “the expulsion of over a million [ethnic] Albanians and the deaths of thousands”. “Worse, the bombing fed into the cycle of violence of Serb versus Kosovar versus Serb, which continues today”. To understand the criticized mission in Kosovo, it is necessary to take into account Kosovo’s strategic value, the world’s failure at Bosnia, and the need to redefine the goals of NATO.
Kosovo was of strategic value to NATO because the Former Yugoslavia and the Balkans in general, are full of different ethnic groups which could brutally destabilize the region. First, if the Balkans became violent, it could undermine Europe. Second, by being in NATO’s backyard, the conflict could cause it’s members to lose confidence in the organization. Finally, the Balkan states are the crossroads between Catholic/Protestant Western Europe, Orthodox Eastern Europe, and Muslim Middle East. This means they are of strategic value because the location is vulnerable for a future conflict; the different cultures make it more susceptible to rivalries, therefore, having a foothold in the area could grant NATO easier access in the future. Strategic value has nothing to do with humanitarian moral values, except to make it more appealing, so the liberal approach was not used. The possible future conflict makes it more pragmatic for NATO to be there earlier, so that portion is realist in nature. The culture crossroad and the need to stabilize Europe suggest the critical theory, which seeks to create trans-national loyalties, rather than ethnic loyalties.
Serbia has gone to war with Slovenia, Croatia, and a particularity vicious war with Bosnia. The European community, the U.S., and the U.N., in the Serbian/Bosnian War, were unable to agree on what actions could or should be taken, until the finale. There appeared, in the genocide of Kosovo, to be a moral reason to save lives, because they could or did not in the Bosnian War, which was a similar circumstance, and so the politicians wanted to save lives which they could not before. There was most likely an ulterior motive, in that the politicians did not want to look like they are unable to get the right result when given a second chance. The moral choice to save lives, simply because one can, is a liberal ideal. The decision to worry about the outcomes of the choice without taking into consideration things other than national security could be realist.
The goals of NATO had to be redefined, and Kosovo became the opportunity. NATO was created during the Cold War, to act as a defence pact against the Soviets. When the Soviet Union fell in during the end of 1991, the NATO pact had no clear enemy, nor a clear goal. Its existence was in jeopardy. NATO, in order to survive, needs to have a resolve which binds its members together; Kosovo was an answer. NATO’s self-preservation was paramount, so the defence pact became “a global vigilante [which went against] international law. NATO violated that law in Yugoslavia”. It created “a [new] kind of twenty-first century mission statement that views Europe as a whole, taking into account the dangers posed to the West by instability and ethnic conflict in the East”. The action, besides binding its members together, also remade Russia in a new image. “During Operation Allied Force, Russian President Boris Yeltsin declared that World War III was imminent”, which suggests that the intervention in Kosovo made Russia a common enemy to reunite the defence pact. To remake and renew NATO by using the excuse of humanitarian intervention suggests the realist theory because it focuses on the maintaining of power. The critical approach could be argued since hegemony involves reinforcing main ideologies and certain ideas, which it did in the case of NATO. In conclusion, there is a combination of the liberal, realist, and critical approaches regarding NATO’s actions in Kosovo.
Iraq
Iraq is a situation clouded in the aura of conspiracy and intrigue. In 2003, American troops invaded Iraq to displace the dictator, Saddam Hussein, a man responsible for gassing the Kurds in Northern Iraq. The Americans claimed they invaded Iraq because Hussein had weapons of mass destruction which would have destabilized the Middle East. They could not find the WMD, so Hussein’s ability to disrupt the neighbouring peace is called into question. Hussein’s treatment of the Kurds was invoked, and the Bush administration declared it to be a humanitarian issue. Things seem too veiled to fully comprehend, but to understand the invasion it becomes necessary to study Iraq’s strategic value, the influence the invasion would have had on other nations, and the exportation of American values.
Iraq is an oil producing nation. In this modern world, the lack of oil can stop the military industrial complex. By going into Iraq, America developed cheaper and easier access to oil, which temporarily fuelled the economy. Second, Iraq is situated in the center of the Middle East, and is beside Syria and Iran, two members of the Axis of Evil. Having military bases in Iraq gives America greater ability to influence the region, and to be in a better position if it should go to war with Iran. The critical theory can be applied since oil is being moved from the periphery into the center, which is America, and it is controlling a larger share, almost a monopoly of oil. It could also be termed realist because it would be in America’s greater national interest to have more bases in the Middle East, in case an actual war does happen.
The Axis of Evil, and other nations, paid particular attention to the Iraq invasion, because it heralded a new American foreign policy, and set a precedent. America showed that “as war grows more unconventional, more undeclared, and more asymmetrical, with the element of surprise becoming the dominant variable, there will be less … time for democratic consultation”. If international law is easily disregarded, other nations can not have a guarantee that they will not be invaded. It reminds other countries to fear the military might of America, since it is so strong, it can ignore international law. This is a dangerous route to take because the greatest fear is invasion, so in order to generate the greatest amount of fear in other nations, it is necessary to increase the likelihood of intervening militarily, but it can then easily change into a real invasion. To create fear in other nations seems to be realist, in that it focuses on national security. It is also similar to critical theory which states that the center power is giving the periphery no chance to organize against it, in that it is making a rigid political system.
Finally, America appears to be exporting values like democracy and individual rights. Different cultures have different values, and western values might not necessarily work in those other cultures. A homogeneous society is often less prone to violence than a heterogeneous society, because it has less variables, and more ways to unite the state. It could be deemed America’s interest to promote its values in order to have common shared traits with other nations. This suggests the critical theory because it is creating trans-national loyalty, a loyalty to American ideals, rather than ethnic or national loyalties. The Iraq War was not started for humanitarian reasons, so the liberal approach is gone. Critical theory can be applied in terms of gaining oil from new American frontier, and by advancing America ideals. The realist theory is viable because national security dictates that military bases should be placed in Iraq in case of a possible war in the Middle East. Therefore, the realist and critical approaches are dominant in terms of the Iraq war.
In conclusion, humanitarian intervention is a controversial topic because it could be done for less noble reasons than the relief of human suffering, as in the case of Iraq. Humanitarian intervention could also promote and increase the cycle of violence, such as in the case of Kosovo. Finally, humanitarian intervention could rely too much on public opinion to be effective, like in Rwanda. Yet, humanitarian intervention is a noble goal in its ideal form, and may be too alluring to the average person to ever disappear. Realist theory seems to be dominant in all the scenarios, but especially in terms of Rwanda. Critical can explain major parts of Kosovo and Iraq, while the liberal theory can only explain part of Kosovo. Humanitarian intervention and its relationship to the approaches of international theory continues to dictate the question of morality, power, and culture.
“Humanitarian Intervention: Definition and Criteria,” The Center for Strategic Studies (CSS), Strategic Briefing Papers, Volume 3; Part 1; June 2000 ISSN 1175-1452 pp. 1
Nicholas J. Wheeler and Alex J. Bellamy, “Humanitarian Intervention and World Politics”, in John Baylis and Steve Smith (eds), The Globalization of World Politics, An Introduction to International Relations, Second Edition, Oxford University Press, 2001, pp. 480, (ISBN 0-19-878263-2)
Qtd. in Rwanda Report, “Report on the Independent inquiry into the actions of the United Nations During the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda, Security Council, UN, 16 October, 199. .
Qtd. in Documentary: “Triumph of Evil,” PBS, 1999, 50 min.
Nicholas J. Wheeler and Alex J. Bellamy, “Humanitarian Intervention and World Politics”, in John Baylis and Steve Smith (eds), The Globalization of World Politics, An Introduction to International Relations, Second Edition, Oxford University Press, 2001, pp. 481, (ISBN 0-19-878263-2)
Nicholas J. Wheeler and Alex J. Bellamy, “Humanitarian Intervention and World Politics”, in John Baylis and Steve Smith (eds), The Globalization of World Politics, An Introduction to International Relations, Second Edition, Oxford University Press, 2001, pp. 482, (ISBN 0-19-878263-2)
Dennis, Kucinich, “What I learned from the War,” The Progressive, Madison, 1999, p.6
Samuel Huntington, “The Clash of Civilizations”, in Karen Mingst and Jack Snyder, Essential Readings in World Politics, W.W. Norton Co. 2001, p. 194-179.
Dennis, Kucinich, “What I learned from the War,” The Progressive, Madison, 1999, p.6-7
Alan W. Dowd, “NATO After Kosovo, Towards “Europe Whole and Free,” Policy Review, January 2002, p. 1
Alan W. Dowd, “NATO After Kosovo, Towards “Europe Whole and Free,” Policy Review, January 2002, p. 2
Robert D. Kaplan, “Supremacy by Stealth”, The Atlantic, Volume # 292, # 1, July/August 2003, p. 79