The first and foremost characteristic of a legislature is its intrinsic link to the citizens of the state via representation. As John Stuart Mill wrote in 1862, in a representative democracy the legislature acts as the eyes, ears, and voice of the people:
"...the proper office of a representative assembly is to watch and control the government: to throw the light of publicity on its acts, to compel a full exposition and justification of all of them which any one considers questionable; to censure them if found condemnable....In addition to this, the Parliament has an office...to be at once the nation's Committee of Grievances, and its Congress of Opinions."
Mill argues that the legislature, and representative democracy in general, is the most legitimate form of governance. However he does not consider how ‘representative’ representatives really are. In any political system – democratic or authoritarian – it seems to be an almost certainty that there will be an emergence of a ‘political class’, as Robert Michels’ powerfully theorised ‘Iron Law of Oligarchy’ states. We may assume such a class to be characterised by private education, wealth and specialised knowledge in law (the current Labour and Conservative Party leaders are both Oxbridge-educated barristers). If viewed as a specialisation of labour, it may be necessary for a specific class in society to assume power in the legislature in order to produce an effective law-making collective. Edmund Burke, in his 1774 speech to the electors of Bristol implied that such a state of affairs does, in fact, provide legitimacy to the system:
“You choose a member indeed; but when you have chosen him, he is not member of Bristol, but he is a member of parliament. If the local constituent should have an interest, or should form an hasty opinion, evidently opposite to the real good of the rest of the community, the member for that place ought to be as far, as any other, from any endeavour to give it effect.”
Thus representation – investing power on the behalf of constituent citizens – provides legitimacy in the democratic system. Whether the legislators are seen as ‘one of the people’ or not, their role is legitimate because they are for the people i.e. periodically they must contest an election which should determine whether or not they have satisfied their electors.
Legislatures adopt policies and make laws through the process of deliberation. While usually based on some broad set of principles contained in written and unwritten constitutions, decisions need not proceed from the rule of law or specific legal precedents. In this way legislatures differ from the courts; its capacity as a forum for debate acts as an authority on whether government policy should be given assent or not. The consequent necessity of the executive to persuade to the legislature that what it wants to do is right ultimately enhances the political legitimacy of the regime. Following from the previous argument that the legislature is made up of representatives whose function is to serve the people they represent, it is thus ensured that the political system serves the needs and wants of the people as a whole.
However, although this legitimises the process, does the process legitimise the system? In thinking of a broader definition of power than the Dahlian notion of power as influence, we can think of power as agenda setting, as suggested by Bahrach and Baratz. Taking the UK as an example, tbe legistative process for proposing a bill begins with the taking of focus groups or perhaps lobbying from an infuential trade union or business sector. It is essentially the mandate of a government thinktank or the executive itself which can effectively determine which agendas are brought to the fore for the legislature to consider, and which policy issues are never debated. However, this does nothing to diminish the perception of legitimacy. It is becoming increasingly clear that the legislature is as much central to the legitimacy of the system as a symbol as well as a functional institution.
The notion of the legislature being perceived to be legitimate is equally important, and perhaps more important than it being legitimate in practise. This is central to why people are satisfied with obeiance of a particular regime. One example is the Supreme Soviety of the former Soviet Union, which, as a legislature, was merely a rubber stamp for government policy. However, the fact that it was felt necessary to have such an institution at all delineates the importance of the legislature as symbolic of holding the government to account.
In addition to their official lawmaking capacity, most legislatures perform a unique educational role. Individual legislators simplify complicated issues and define policy choices. They use their resources and expertise to filter information from many sources and to resolve conflicting ideological positions, ultimately presenting their constituents with clear-cut options. This educational function has become increasingly important as societies have become more complex, as the scope of government activity has become more extensive, and as the public has gained increased access to legislative proceedings, particularly via television.
Max Weber, primarily a sociologist, offers three ideal types for legitimacy; in practice a legitimate political regime will exhibit a mix of these ideals: traditional, charismatic and rational-legal legitimacy. It would appear that, as a law-making institution, the legislature is only one characteristic of legitimacy, not the characteristic. For example, Hitler’s Germany was primarily obeyed because of the leader’s charisma and ability to manufacture a cult of personality. The Queen is still head of the state in the UK, but not because she is perceived to be representative of the people or because she is central to the legislative process; her legitimacy is much more traditional in nature. It would appear that the relationship between the legislature and the legitimacy of the system becomes more tenuous the further away one gets from the ideal of democratic republicanism.
However, the centrality of the legislature to legitimacy is not just based on political organisation – every country's political system develops and evolves according to its history, makeup, and political and social conditions. When a country tries to graft another country's political system onto its own, it rarely works. This was the case, for example, when Nigeria tried to adopt the U.S. presidential system some years ago. The system failed because it did not provide a role or outlet for dissenting parties. As a result, revolts in the form of military coups ensued. There has been no sustained stability in Nigeria since. Therefore, although Nigeria constructed a legislature – with the aim of creating an effective and legitimate system of governance.
As a case study, Nigeria exemplifies how the legislature, whilst central to legitimacy, is only one component among many in the complex manchinery of legitimising a political system. As discussed there are overwhelmingly powerful arguments that argue for representation, deliberation and education as virtues of the legislature which make it an essential provider of legitimacy. However, it has been examined that this is not always the case in more authoritarian regimes, or even those with different historical and cultural traditions. Yet, it is safe to say that, as far as Western liberal democracies are concerned, the legislature is the most important, effective and legitmate aspect of the political system.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Barrie Axford et al (1997) Politics. New York:Routledge
P. Bachrach and M. Baratz (1962) ‘The Two Faces of Power’, in F.G. Castles, D.J. Murray and D.C. Potter (eds) Decisions, Organisation and Society. Harmondsworth:Penguin.
Edmund Burke (1744) Speech to the Electors of Bristol. http://press-pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/v1ch13s7.html
Andrew Heywood (1997) Politics. New York: Palgrave
Robert Michels (1905) Political Parties. http://socserv.mcmaster.ca/~econ/ugcm/3ll3/michels/polipart.pdf
Michael Rush (1992) Politics and Society. Herts.: Harvester Wheatsheaf
Axford et al (1997) pp. 165
