Several times in the 2nd half of the century, the military has ousted the elected government of Turkey, but has handed power back to the civilians after year or so. Why has it not dispensed with civilian government altogether and assured direct rule it
"Several times in the 2nd half of the century, the military has ousted the elected government of Turkey, but has handed power back to the civilians after year or so. Why has it not dispensed with civilian government altogether and assured direct rule itself?"
Several times in the 2nd half of the century, the military has ousted the elected government of Turkey, but has handed power back to the civilians after year or so. Why has it not dispensed with civilian government altogether and assured direct rule itself?
Although there has been a consensus on noticing the recurring interventions of the army in Turkish politics, there is still no general agreement as how this is to be explained: different types of selected explanations will be explored in order to demonstrate the complex relationship between the military, the civil society and the State. In short, the use of the army to establish state institutions was not only unique in its form (given the historical context in which this occurred and in comparison with neighbouring states) but also unique in its consequences: military officers have already interrupted the democratic process several times, as well as apply decisions for the long term and tried solving short-term crisis through the renewal of the Turkish platform and through alternative policies.
How can one explain the resurgence of military politics in Turkey during crises? What has changed and what withers away within this mechanism of coup d'etat? What does the military role reveal about the nature of the Turkish State? Is it really possible to observe a clear-cut distinction between military rule and civilian rule in Turkey's recent history?
This essay will first explore possible theories of military rule in order to provide a clear typology of different military rule and how the population can view these regimes' legitimacy. Before demonstrating how Turkey's armed forces lies in a crucial trinity, it will provide contextual explanations in order to highlight the fact that each coup can be understood separately. Finally, it will conclude by suggesting that there are also long term explanations that reveal political characteristics inherent to the Turkish process of State consolidation.
)Theoretical explanation : Huntington's typology of military regime
The post-colonial era for a state is a period of insecurity and vulnerability, this consequently explains why this specific type of state has been characterised as highly centralised and heavily equipped in terms of military potential. On the other hand the absence of military government is only due to the political talent of a civilian political leader, rather than anything else inherently conducive to military intervention (Clapham, 1985: 137): the three coup d'etat in Turkey therefore reveals therefore the weakness of the State, and especially its lack of political autonomy. It can be argued that the army always intervenes for political purposes (Hale,1993:304), This intervention takes place in reaction to a socio-economic crisis during which the State loses its "monopoly of violence" (Max Weber) and a power vacuum is created. Furthermore, the level of popular support of a coup d'etat (which increases its likeliness) lies in the values the army can promotes: honesty, nation unity, efficiency and a belief in discipline (Clapham, 1985:144).
The unsophisticated political system, the quasi-absence of political systems and the distrust felt for the political elite were the main triggering elements conducive to a coup, which Clapham also identifies. However, one can also argue that the recurrence of coup d'etat lies in the fact that the army uses these characteristics to build up its political influence and intervene in critical situations: the recurrence of coup d'etat can foreshadow future military interventions and can also reveal how the military builds its omnipresence in the processes of decision-making.
After consulting the three different types of military regime that emerge in 3rd world countries (Veto groups, Nation's Guardian and Breatkthrough coups) it seems that the guardian coup best encompasses the Turkish case for several reasons (Hale, 1993:307).
It generally occurs in states in which the new urban middle class already enjoys unchallenged control: the RPP in a Turkey is a particular example because the first coup in 1960, for example, took place after the end of the one party rule (Clapham, 1985:144-146). Nonetheless, the army and the RPP accused the DP of maintaining a "tyranny of the majority" and of institutional mismanagement in order to justify the first coup, led by junior officers(Heper, 1991). This kind of coup doesnt generally aim at replacing a ruling class with another, or modify the whole political system through ...
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It generally occurs in states in which the new urban middle class already enjoys unchallenged control: the RPP in a Turkey is a particular example because the first coup in 1960, for example, took place after the end of the one party rule (Clapham, 1985:144-146). Nonetheless, the army and the RPP accused the DP of maintaining a "tyranny of the majority" and of institutional mismanagement in order to justify the first coup, led by junior officers(Heper, 1991). This kind of coup doesnt generally aim at replacing a ruling class with another, or modify the whole political system through an irreversible change: it is in this sense moderately conservative as it wishes to preserve the status quot but it is also prepared to solve dysfunction within the political system through repression, constitutional amendments... (Hale, 1993:310)
There are different factors that can automatically triggeer this type of coup: low popularity of the ruling elite, or severe economic crisis such as the unpopular austerity measures imposed by the IMF which aimed at reducing inflation. The ruling junta usually exposes the normal range of policy variation that might follows from the electoral victory of the opposition in a liberal democratic system : it will not adopt a reactionary or revolutionary attitude towards the role of existing insistitutions. What makes this process recur lies in the use of the language: words referring to doctor/cure or even re-education -"The corrective coup of 1980"- justify why in some case the politcal arena had to be 'renewed' (purge of opposition and of army officers) and achieve the same type of policies than the previous civilian government but in a better way and without bloodshed. Once the pupil/patient has completed his cure/re-education, he will be released to look after himself. (Clapham, 1985:144-146)
After having explained the basic principles of the guardian coup and its characteristics, it would be wise to discover why -technically- the Guardian coup does not stay in power. Two reasons can explain this hypothesis.Firstly, timing is an important aspect of this type of coup: it seems that the coup instigators have to take this parameter into account in order to push for efficient policies and preserve the high hopes of the popular support linked to this 'period of change'. Secondly, military strategists also seem to have taken into account the main problems of remaining in power: the transformation of the relationship with the civil society, the political exposure which could damage public credibility if the crisis reaches other parts of society, and composing a 'coalition' cabinet (lack of political skills). Finally, the Guardian coup which occured in Turkey are very different than in Latin America for example: due to the timing of its actions and its intimate relationship with the population based the military will not need to create relations of cronyism in exchange of political favours in order to eventually preserve a long term rule.
2)Contextual explanation: What is unique during each coup and its aftermath.
The theoretical approaches clarify the debate about the types of military regime but do not fully explain the socio-historical environment in which these political moves were made.
Focusing on different case studies seems to provide different types of information: the analysis of geopolitical rivalry can help to understand the relationship it has with the NATO, for example.
An explanation based on one specific historical/political context can also be used in order to perceive different "phases" in Turkey's political history: political "abertura" is intrinsically connected to level of influence the officer corps possesses (or the ideology it adheres to) because these coups occurred in a context of state formation in which state institutions didn't acquire enough autonomy.
It is equally important to highlight the fact that the army is not a coherent, monolithic structure in terms of political ideology: the army doesn't live outside Turkish life and this is why it has such a particular status in the hearts and minds of Turks (Birand, 1987:3 and Hale, 1993:304).
It would be tempting to reduce the army's role to that of of an institutional moderator, which has responded to three identitical crises every decade. Although long term trends and common practices can be noticed from a distant perspective, it is still necessary to outline the specific context of each crisis and the coup it triggered.
Some have argued that specific reforms implemented by the military after the coup do not only reflect the socio-political context in which they take place (neoliberal reforms, state planned economy, democratic elections) but also reflect the ideology the military has adopted. According to Birand, despite the army's political influence over civilian institutions in terms of organization, hierarchy and discipline, it is still a "microcosm of the larger society in which they are embedded" (Birand, 1987:3). Huntington proposes a slightly different account of military evolution because he correlates this behavioural transformation with societal change:
"As society changes, so does the role of the military. In the world of oligarchy, the soldier is a radical, in the middle-class world he is a participant and arbiter; as the mass society looms on the horizon he becomes the conservative guardian of the existing order. Thus the more backward a society is, the more progressive the role of its military; the more advanced a society becomes, the more conservative and reactionary becomes the role of its military." (Clapham, 1985:144)
To illustrate the argument whichs links specific historical phases to the economic reforms undertaken by a politicized military, some have argued that the promotion of state-planned economy by the junta in 1960 through the implementation of import-substistuting industrialisation, state allocation of foreign exchange and credit, and expansion of welfare entitlements in order to pursue social and industrial cooperation was reflected by the general trend of organising a national economy around state owned enterprises (Bromley, 1994: 127). Moreover, neo-liberal economic policies of the IMF austerity measures that were implemented during the army's intervention in 1980, reflect this argument centered on historical "phases" (contexts). Social stabilization and economic liberalisation were a response to persisting inequality and political mobilisation, which could have lead to an acute economic crisis and social breakdown. (Bromley, 1994:128)
Once the army managed to decrease the real wages and the social expenditure and brought back political stability, it handed back power to the civilians. It is possible to interpret this political act as a genuine interest in preserving the legitimacy of state institutions and in maintaining the democratic process in Turkey through constitutional changes and the organisation of elections. However, it is also possible to adopt a more cynical stance on the restricted level of democracy the military maintains each time it intervenes. In this case, Marx's metaphor in characterising the state as an 'illusion' is useful: the lack of stable structural foundations and the various competing ideologies in the Middle East forces the state to project an apparent coherence and the use of the military intervention is perceived as a political act voicing the popular will and trying to maintain the Kemalist legacy (Owen, 2000:2). One could argue through the use of this metaphor, that the military is in fact an omnipresent entity within the state. Rather than intervening in order to demonstrate its patriotic commitment and restore socio-political order, it actually sends a strong signal towards potential political rivals by overthrowing the legitimate government in power. The state is therefore much more chaotic than it seems to be due to the overarching presence of a solid military organisation within its structures.
Furthermore, the development of ideologies and of different political movements within the army -specific to a particular period- also bring more cohesion to the officer corps: the experience increases at the same time as the awareness towards political issues. For instance, the coup which took place in 1980 is generally characterised by a high level of planning prior to the intervention as well by the homogeneity of the officer corps: the unity of the military leadership and the level of coordination was vital in order to re-establish the democratic structures as fast as possible (Owen, 2000:193-194).
Finally other types of pressures can be noticed in accounting for the specificity of a coup. The pressures emanating from the US were crucial when Turkey joined NATO during this Cold war context. For example the massive provision of US economic and military aid after World War 2 in order to modernize the Turkish army (Johnston, in Bromley, 1994:126) influenced the military leaders in obtaining a more explicit "guardian role" due to external contributions to its budget and to the level of its equipment: the military was no longer dependent on state ressources and could increase its military capability at any time. The external support of the US not only supplied the military forces with additional ressources, because one can argue that it forced the army to remain powerful on an regional basis but also conditioned its democratic process in which the military could play a decisive role on the long term.
3)Long term explanation: What remains after each coup.
Finally, after exploring the specificity of each coup and how important this was in what are the long-term trends that can be spotted?
It seems that the main objectives of the army haven't changed much from 1960 to 1980. The Kemalist tradition is the main explanation for this case: the army outside and inside the country has always been a moderating factor with the legitimate right (or duty) to intervene in the name of nation (Birand, 1987:2). The army was in this sense, part of the State, because it had to preserve its "monopoly of violence" (Max Weber) as a guardian of Kemalism. Even if Mustafa Kemal had always insisted on separating the military from the politics, the army was generally seen as the institution that could pursue Ataturk's policies in domains of economic development, social modernisation or in maintaining a coherent national unity. It is possible to question whether or not the "Kemalist tradition" is the most important explanation, or could it be combined with other perceptions of Turkish political history.
One can argue that the reason why the military systematically hands back power to the civilians is because it is embedded in a situation of "mutual hostages". The reason why the military is omni-present in each middle eastern society lies in the mutual dependency with the state: the state needs the military to establish order and organise its protection, but the military needs the state in order to articulate its political interest and the allocation of resources.
Birand (1987) has argued that there is a post-kemalist trinity composed of the civil sector, the military and the state: each component possesses relatively equal levels of power and has a specific purpose in the state formation process. The military, in its "safeguarding" and "defending" role seems to benefit the Republic rather than the popular sovereignty according to the Constitution. The central role of the army in the Turkish political history originates at a time when the first Turkish officers were in the "nucleus of the Kemalist movement" (which subsequently became the Republican People's Party, RPP): this political basis was created in a context of state formation and institutional consolidation as it influenced the way the constitution was written (Birand, 1987:8). The constitution also seems to provide to the army the political legitimacy it needs each time it intervenes in order to restore the triangular relationship between the state, the army and civil society that gives Turkey its political specificity in the West and in Islam (Birand, 1987:2).The example of the Turkish army illustrates this last point because it seems that it possesses the same disproportionate amount of resources and the same level of politicisation that also characterises other armies in the Middle East: Egypt, Syria, Iraq. However, the training of the military and its commitment to constitutional regulations seems to be closer to the European model: professionalisation, salaried state bureaucracy, the system of conscription and the centralised revenue system (Hale, 1993:306).
Handing back the power to civilians: nationalist commitment or symbolic gesture?
Even if the 1924 Constitution clearly specifies that the political elite and the armed forces have to be formally separated: one could argue that this does not necessarily mean that the army is apolitical or that it is not allowed to interfere in political affairs. Moreover, some have also argued that the military's influence is still present in the political arena but that its interventions are more subtle and discreet: most recently, it maneuvered the removal of an Islamic-oriented prime minister, Necmettin Erbakan, in 1997.
The Turkish army is clearly not a Latin American army because it is organically connected to two other components: the civil society and the state. If the state or the civil society acts anti-constitutionally, the army will logically step in to re-establish this fragile balance of political power. It will also ensure that the Kemalist institutional legacies are preserved because this has always determined the political autonomy and conditioned the level of resources it utilises.
What is unique in the Turkish political process is the link the army maintains with political elite and its interest in preserving economic and social progress that seem to derive from Ataturk's will. Whether or not the army is genuinely only politicised during a short period of coup d'etat seems to depend on the view one can have about the nature of the Turkish state: some may argue that its lack of autonomy will force the army to take over governance during a short period of time, while others may perceive the various coup as strong political signals in order to demonstrate the level of influence the army can have toward different types of political pressures. As Turkey tries to reform in order to integrate the European Union, it can be imagined that the army will continue to act in this way by using a "soft power": in other words, it can be supposed that the army will try to sustain these political manipulation in a more subtle way.
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