Social Constructionism and Identity Concepts of Disabled People. This essays outlines social constructionisms main ideas focusing on its concept of identities as socially constructed and negotiated by everyday, power-influenced social interactions.

Essay

Social constructionism and identity concepts of disabled people

This essays outlines social constructionism’s main ideas focusing on its concept of identities as socially constructed and negotiated by everyday, power-influenced social interactions. Subsequently, it is argued that social constructionism explains the complex realities of disabled people’s multiple identities and challenges the stereotypical, prevailing discourse of a unitary disabled identity.

Social constructionism is part of the growing field of constructive psychologies (e.g. Gergen, 1985, 1994, Hall, 1992, Mahoney, 1988, Sampson, 1989, von Glaserfeld, 1984, Potter & Wetherell, 1987, Burr, 2003) that explore how humans actively, fluidly and meaningfully construct their everyday life as well as their experiences and selves (Phoenix, 2007, Raskin, 2002). Social constructionism’s emphasis lies on social processes. It assumes that our knowledge is linked to the constructions we make, sustained by social processes (Burr, 2003). Hence, social contexts construct our perception of ourselves (Phoenix at Ioannou, 2007).

Social constructionism’s hermeneutic approach (Phoenix, 2007, Gergen, 1985, 1994, Hruby, 2001) outlines that contextual, linguistic and relational social factors create identities as our “own theories of ourselves” (Phoenix, 2007, p. 47). Personal and social identity are inseparable and all identities are social (Phoenix, 2007). Different from Psychosocial Identity Theory (Erikson, 1968) or Social Identity Theory (SIT, Tafjel 1981), no stable core identity exists (Burr, 2003). Identities are fluid, changing and unstable due to shifting social surroundings or interpersonal relations (Giddens, 1991, Phoenix & Thomas, 2007).

Identities constitute resources to negotiate our everyday interactions (Widdicombe, cited in Phoenix, 2007, p. 76) and are shaped by social contexts that include relationships of power (Phoenix, 2007). Various identity positions exist from which humans actively create multiple, de-centred, provisional, dynamical, and sometimes contradictory identities (Phoenix, 2007, Burr, 2003). There are as many realities and identities as there are cultures, historical periods, new technologies, frameworks, relationships and ways of interaction, especially language (Gergen, 1991, Phoenix 2007). Language is vital because narrative accounts and discourses - our way of thinking and talking (Phoenix, 2007) - construct identities in everyday-life (Phoenix, 2007, Burr, 2003, Bartky, 1990). Processes of distinctions in language contribute to the making and validation of reality (Phoenix, 2007, Chiari & Nuzzo, 1996, Raskin, 2002). Moreover, language creates power-relations through discourses (Phoenix, 2007, Burr, 2003, Hall, 1992, Potter and Wetherell, 1987, Foucault, 1983, de Beauvoir, 1972). Groups of people, with similarities and differences in their identities, but who belong to the same social category, are often powerful enough to make others accept their constructs and can therefore negotiate their “reality” (e.g. masculinity, see Conell, 1995). Yet, among social categories, intragroup differences, based on different power-positions, nevertheless do exist (e.g. conflicting ethnical and political positions, Hall, 1992, or, among feminists, Bartky, 1990).

In the hermeneutic tradition, social constructionists use qualitative methods to collect subjective data to explore participants’ diversities of meanings, values and experiences (DSE212 Course team, 2007). Common methods that emphasize subjectivity, interpretation and reflexivity are discourse analyses (e.g. those of Hall, 1992 or Potter & Ewards, 1990), semi- or unstructured interviews (such as the 20-Statement-Test developed by Kuhn and MacPartland, 1954, or Kelly, 2005) or participant, unstructured observations (Banyard & Grayson, 2000).

Critics admonish social constructionism’s over-emphasized relativity, its confusion of realities and its lack of a stable core identity (Phoenix, 2007, Burr, 2003, Matthews, 1998, Gillett cited at Raskin, 2002). However, people tend to construct a consistent identity by cohesive autobiographical narratives (Bruner, cited at Phoenix, 2007 p. 73). Furthermore, relativism is an asset allowing a more flexible view of social life (Gergen, 1994).

Social constructionism’s flexibility is crucial when dealing with multifaceted contexts such as disability, a „complex dialectic of biological, psychological and socio-political factors“ (Shakespeare and Watson, 2002, p. 24).

Multiple identity positions provide a comprehensive approach to explore the identities of persons with disabilities, which aren’t solely based on their impairment. Qualitative research indicates that disabled people view their own limited embodiment as just one part of their shifting identities (Begum, cited at Phoenix, 2007, p. 87, Keith, 1994, cited at Phoenix, p. 85, Swan cited at Phoenix, 2007, p. 83, Schaller, 2008, Islam, 2008, Olney and Kim, 2001, Turner, 2001).

Social constructionism’s concept of permanent identity-change from setting to setting throughout a lifetime elucidates a lifelong process, allowing disabilities to be integrated into everyday-life step by step (Sidel, 2007). People who suddenly become disabled first experience a profound consciousness of embodiment (Morris, cited at Phoenix, 2007, p. 85) and then develop a sense of continuity and meaning regarding their life-history by autobiographical narratives (Peet, 2007, Gracey, Palmer, Rous, Psaila, O’Dell, Cope, & Mohamed, 2008). Also, those growing up stigmatised by their disability accept to embrace their otherness and learn to define themselves within a range of identities (Phoenix, 2007, Begum cited at Phoenix, 2001, p. 87, Schaller, 2008, Murphy, 1992). A qualitative research conducted with a group of “cognitive disabled,” which clarifies the importance of a subjective, explorative research-design, highlights:

“Once people felt that they had permission to freely discuss the things they did well, they generated a startling array and range of special skills and gifts (….) people were able to make the connection between their ‘problem’ and these special gifts” (Onley and Kim, 2001, p. 575)

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Disabled people carry equally important identities such as black, woman, disabled, book-lover simultaneously (Schaller, 2008). They also construct identities drawing on religious, sociocultural and historical differences, according to Islam’s (2008) semi-structured interviews with young Pakistani and Bangladeshi disabled people (see also Begum cited at Phoenix, 2001, p. 87). Embracing this diversity, social constructionism allows disabled people to define themselves through so-called “normal” identities. Many of them learn to resist other people’s constructions of themselves as being abnormal by an active process of identity-construction (e.g. Keith, cited at Phoenix, 2007, p. 85, Swan, cited at Phoenix, 2007, p. 83, Rabiee, Sloper & Beresford, 2005). Furthermore, disabled people, including children, apply their “disabled identities” differently in different settings, sometimes strategically, flexibly and ironically or for their own advantage (Watson et al. 2000), which contributes to self-consciousness and normality (Islam, 2008, Schaller, 2008).

However, the „slippery“ (Olney and Kim, 2001, p. 565) social group of „the disabled“ constitutes massive intragroup-differences (Peet, 2007, Deal, 2003). Although some findings suggest that disability represents a meaningful group membership (Phoenix, 2007, Rohmer & Louvet, 2009, Noonan, Gallor, Hensler-McGinnis, Fassinger, Wang & Goodman, 2004), a collective „disabled identity“ is nonexistent (Phoenix, 2007, Taylor & Bogdan, 1991, Higgins, 1992). Contrarily, a “hierarchy of impairment” might develop, for example between wheelchair-users and blind people or those with physical impairments and people with brain-damage or learning disabilities (Peet, 2007, Olney and Kim, 2001).

Another pivotal factor is language, expressed in narratives and discourses, that creates the identity of disabled people (Keith, cited at Phoenix, 2007, p. 85, Shakespeare & Watson, 2003, Kelly, 2005, Hughes, 2007). Whereas disability’s social understanding changes, society actively negotiates disabled people’s identities (Phoenix, 2007). According to actual social paradigms and power-relations, barricades are built up and dividing practices are being used to exclude individuals who are considered “different” by socially more powerful categories (Fine & Asch, 1988, Hughes, 2007, Foucault, 1983, 1997). This socially constructed dichotomy between “able” and “disabled” is crucial because “ability”, equal to productivity, determines the social perception of a person as fully functional, while differences diminish his/her status (Luborsky, 1994). Expressions like “disability/impairment” involve insufficiency and inferiority. Hughes (2007) exemplifies that debates about selective abortion, pre-natal screening or euthanasia even question disabled people’s right to live.

Contrariwise, language constructs alternative realities, such as

“there is no qualitative difference between disabled people and non-disabled people, because we are all impaired” (Shakespeare and Watson, 2002, p. 27).

Others define disability as a social problem caused by an exclusive society (DSE212 Course team, 2007, Hughes, 2007).

Critics might argue that disabled people who claim multiple identities might be regarded as mentally ill (Phoenix, 2007) and experience further exclusion. Yet, a subjective sense of continuity through autobiographical narratives prevents such fragmentation. Another counter-argument is that group identity exists and can be encouraging to adapt disabilities as a positive self-aspect (Phoenix, 2007, Onley and Kim, 2001, Oyserman, 2004), which supports SIT (Tajfel, 1981). However, this exclusive “minority group status” (Turner cited at Hughes, 2007, p. 675) is neither desirable nor is disability in its diversity a solid basis for togetherness (Hughes, 2007).

Conclusion

Social constructionism‘s hermeneutic approach, focusing on the construction of multiple identities in everyday social interactions and embedded in language-based power-relations, explains the multiple identities of disabled people. It challenges stereotypes and respects the complex social reality, especially people’s lived experience of disability. Its concept of diverse, dynamic and flexible identities overcomes disability’s social mark as “inability” by including a range of “normal” identities. That people are disabled both by their impairment and by social barriers due to power-relations stresses social constructionism’s importance as it clarifies disabled bodies’ potential and possibility. A unitary-concept would anticipate those multifaceted, equally significant identities and is therefore not only inadequate and inaccurate, but also dangerous.

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Part 2

Q 1

James did not consider respect and responsibility. He must protect the participants from undue harm. They should not experience more harm than they would encounter in everyday life. The most negative images might lead to psychological or even physical harm. James did neither intend to inform participants about the planned confrontation with distressing images nor to ask whether they previously had bad experiences or any relevant medical history. He did not tell the participants that they should inform him if any unforeseen negative consequences emerge while or after the research. This way, he could arrange appropriate assistance. Furthermore, he did not plan to re-induce a positive state of mind (desensitized). (108 words)

Q 2

Although James provides deliberately false information (perception vs. memory), it is justifiable regarding the nature and the outcome of the empirically valuable research. The real purpose is a comparable research topic. However, he should check whether alternative, similarly effective procedures avoiding concealment are available and determine how the former participants’ reaction to this minor deception in similar studies was. He could confidentially ask non-participating undergraduates about their opinion. He must inform the participants about the research’s real purpose immediately after completion during a process of debriefing and highlight their right to withdraw now or later. Besides, he should consult appropriately upon the way this revealing will be received (108 words)

Q3

The principles of mutual respect and responsibility are put at risk. The participants don’t have control over this research-stage, which is not covered by consent. Due to deception by omission and role-deception (confederate), participants are neither aware of taking part in an experimental setting nor know their right to withdraw. Besides, the deception includes asking for private information.

A high distress-level for participants might develop during the anger-situation. James disregards this possible physical or mental harm.

James missed to check whether in previous research, participants were typically likely to object or showed unease once debriefed. He must ensure strict controls, get disinterested approval and re-induce a happy mood state (108 words).

Q 4

The most critical point is the issue of deception by omission during the emotion-arousal procedure. The ecological validity must be weighed against the potential harm for participants.

James should try to develop a similarly effective alternative, e.g. showing anger or euphoria-arousing short movies/documentations, while the informed participants are aware that this is part of the research. Afterwards, he must desensitize the participants diligently (for risk control).

He must inform participants that extraordinarily disturbing scenes will be shown and hand out a clearly and understandably formulated consent form, which asks for any pre-existent psychological and physical conditions. It must highlight the participants’ right to withdraw at any time and to demand the destruction of their data. Anonymity must be guaranteed. James should stress that no negative consequences occur in case of withdrawal. During debriefing, participants must be informed fully about the research’s real purpose, be able to ask questions and consent retrospectively give (if necessary). If they were put into an anger-mood, they must be induced to a happy-mood (163 words).

Scenario 2

Due to deception by omission and role deception (stooge), informed consent (iv) was missing. Participants were not aware of the research. No information and no consent were given, while an invasion of privacy occurred. The participants could believe, although being in a public space, they were unobserved. As potential harm for participants’ psychological well-being cannot be eliminated, informed consent cannot be ignored. Because informing the participants before the research takes place would diminish severely the ecological validity of the research, informed consent must be gained after completing the recording (87 words)

Due to the deception – no information and no consent - the participants did not know their right to withdraw at any time (vii). It might be difficult, especially in an observational setting, to ensure participants appropriately that they have a right to withdraw from the investigation and demand the destruction of their data including the recordings. However, adhering to the principles of respect and participants’ control, participants must be aware that they cannot be forced to take part in a research. At least retrospectively, full informed consent must be given (87 words)

The principles in (xi) are breached. Although the research took place in a public space, people assumed and had a right to assume that while being in a urinal cabin, they were at least partly unobserved. However, hidden cameras filmed their urination. This violates participants’ privacy and dignity. Referring to our cultural values, it is not common that the urination process is observed. People might even get psychologically harmed when becoming aware that they were investigated and even recorded during this very private act (84 words).

d) No debriefing took place. The principles described in (xii) were dishonored.

The researches did not try to get informed consent after the investigation. Participants were not given information about the study, its purpose, content, planned publication etc. Participants were not told that they have a right to withdraw retrospectively and demand the destruction of their data. Without debriefing and discussion, unforeseen harm or misconceptions remained undetected. Neither dehoaxing, desensitizing nor further help was provided to the participants. However, a debriefing could not have healed the investigation’s unethical aspects.

(87 words)

Part 2 Question 2

In this no-consent and no-information study, participants remained anonymous. Researchers focused exclusively on the space between the participants’ genitals and the urinal. Nevertheless, given the presence of the confederate and the use of the periscope, the research must be regarded as an ethically not justifiable deception. It involves a severe invasion of privacy. Deception by omission in relation with infringing participants’ privacy whilst being in public spaces where they expect to be (widely) unobserved violates the principle of respect and ignores the possibility of potential psychological harm. If the researcher figures out participants' identity, he/she is required to fully inform them about the extent of the observation, the aim of the study, the use of the data etc. and must obtain permission to use a participant's data. Informed consent should be obtained retrospectively (previously would compromise the study’s outcome), to the extent that any data referring to the person must be destroyed immediately. This would help to protect participants' rights of self-determination and privacy (163 words)

Part 2 Question 3 (163 words)

The pilot study still involves role deception, but a less problematic invasion of privacy (no hidden periscope, the researcher stood by a wash-basin). Besides, 50% of the participants were informed of the study afterwards. Obviously, no harm was done, as there was no upset due to the debriefing and therefore no harm done to the participants. This changes the nature of the risk-benefit assessment. Although the research remains a “deception research”, it carries a lower risk of harming the participants. Nevertheless, the research stands ethically not acceptable. Only half of the pilot-study participants were informed and gave informed consent afterwards. Besides, it remains unclear whether the others received an ethically correct debriefing.

The result from the pilot study might alter the risk-benefit assessment in the main study in favour of the deception-research as there is less risk for undue harm. However, the original research involves a greater invasion of privacy and neither subsequent informed consent nor debriefing takes place. It remains ethically unacceptable.