The 1997 British General Election: Labour reborn

Scammell and Harrop rebut Linton’s assessment of newspaper influence, claiming that the Conservative party’s disastrous leadership crisis, ‘Black Wednesday’ and the reputation of ‘sleaze’ that stuck to Hamilton, Riddick, Tredinnick among other MPs, contributed to the British public’s increased ‘loathing’ of the Tories – “Labour’s finest hour owed much to Conservative weakness” – which swung opinion against them. Major’s unpopular re-election exposed divisions within the Tories, leading to predictions by The Sun and The Mail  “…that [his] triumph meant inevitable ruin at the general election.” Also significant was the growth of a media-savvy adversary, of whom “…the Conservatives failed to come to grips with…”  Labour was rigorously transformed by Blair, who captured the public’s imagination and became a much more attractive option for the print-media, who, while inherently conservative, became “disorientated” with the Tory cause, and Major’s leadership. During this period Labour’s capture of public opinion was extremely high – between 53% and 50% throughout 1996, while press-share also increased, with papers like the Daily Star and The Sun – traditionally Conservative publications – experiencing 22% and 44% increases in Labour support amongst readers respectively. Clearly, this shift away from the Tories was not simply the engineering of the print-media, but a culmination of a poorly managed leadership crisis and growing public antipathy. Keeping Major, “…effectively ruined [the Tories] chances of all-out endorsements from the Sun and its Sunday stablemate the News of the World…” 

The Sun’s support of Labour between 1992-97 represents the evolution of British print-media. While it famously declared “Who Blairs Wins” and allowed Tony Blair to virtually became a ‘columnist’ its support was "permeated by reservations", as illustrated by an editorial which stated, "...when we think [Labour] are wrong, we will shout so loud we will deafen them." Indeed, The Sun maintained a slight Conservative bias through the 1997 campaign, framing 38% of articles in favour of the Tories to Labour’s 34%, as illustrated by its final editorial before the election: “A Conservative vote is not a wasted vote…”. Deacon et al find in The Sun a perfect case to illustrate their ‘Corridor of Uncertainty’ theory – conservative values of Euro-scepticism, anti-Unionism and anti-Welfarism pervaded The Sun’s newsroom despite Murdoch’s well-publicised shift to Labour. The result of this clash of ideologies was “coverage [that] was strangely compromised.” Its endorsement was largely symbolic rather than opinion changing, and illustrated how the pendulum had swung for the party – and the success of Blair’s “political project”. Public opinion was already moving against the Conservatives, and the print-media, were well aware of the ideological shift under way. The Times’ Daniel Finkelstein states, “…it simply wouldn’t have made any sense… to go into the next election trying to persuade a readership that really wants something different, that they didn’t.”  Linton describes the motivations of ‘Murdochites’, who, as media proprietors are “…99% motivated by commercial considerations” and who are able to “…weigh up the benefits of backing the winner”, an assessment which entirely applies to 1997.

While the role of newspapers in determining the outcome in 1997 is debatable, one area they are certainly influential is ‘framing’ the election. Issues such as European integration and political ‘sleaze’ were given extensive coverage at the expense of ‘the economy’, ‘crime’ and ‘employment’; issues which would have favoured the Tories had print-media attention not been elsewhere. The focus on Europe and ‘sleaze’ proved decisive in exposing a divided and directionless Conservative party in 1997, encouraging a wave of support for Blair’s New Labour amongst would-be Conservative supporters, showing an area in which the print-media hold great influence.

"Overall, during the 1997 campaign more than twice as many people were reading a newspaper that backed Labour as were reading one that supported the Conservatives." However, this Labour support was to a large extent weak and issue-specific, and fits Deacon et al's term "hollow-centred partisanship." While tabloids like The Sun, News of the World, Daily Star offered luke-warm support to Labour, they were just as capable of criticism, such as The Sun’s warning, "...when we think [Labour] are wrong, we will shout so loud we will deafen them." Deacon et al argue that the support of these papers was "permeated by reservations"; none more so than on the issue of European alignment – over which The Sun, News of the World and Mail on Sunday “…could not quite suppress [their] doubts…”, with News’ “sinister silence” and The Suns’  "Is THIS the most dangerous man in Britain?"  editorials.

A "least-worst rather than best-case" mindset existed amongst Fleet Street's shrewd 'media barons', and, in 1997 New Labour was the former - "...their loathing for an increasingly divided and directionless Tory party" pushed many papers in a more liberal direction. Daniel Finkelstein critiqued this change; "...in the end [tabloids are] selling copies to people who have strong views of their own - they have to make sure they're in synch with it." Norris builds on Finkelstein, stating that the press, "follow the lead of their readers in the polls..." This helps to explain why such a large 'corridor of uncertainty' existed in 1997 – seven 'fence-sitters' with a combined readership of about 13.5 million people Britain's partisan press were exercising pragmatism. Curtice reaffirms this, stating, “What…was surprising about the behaviour of the press was not how many newspapers defected from the Conservative camp, but that there were not more.” Suggesting that the print-media won the election of 1997 over-states the importance of this one media form, and under-states the freewill of individual voters, of whom 81% said “No, I can make up my own mind” in an Echo Research poll on newspaper effects upon political allegiance. Curtice concludes, “…people choose to read a newspaper that chimes with their own views.” In sum, the election served to weaken the partisan ties the print-media had with the Conservatives. The majority of tabloids and broadsheets were, to varying degrees, torn between traditional loyalties and the reality of 1997 – “Conversions to the Labour cause were far from unconditional” Scammel and Harrop argue, compellingly, that the 1997 General election led to the beginning of a ‘de-alignment’ in the British press, leading to a new era of “weaker partisanship”, the consequence of an evolved, “less strident” political environment.

Word Count: 1,998

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Bibliography:

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