EU technical assistance to East Europe and the newly independent Commonwealth of Independent States came at a time when the EU was formulating a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). The CFSP was seen as necessary for the EU, a major economic power, to play a greater role in international affairs, take on a greater role in the trans-Atlantic relationship and to ‘develop externally apace with internal developments (single market, single currency, enlargement).’ A common European foreign policy was also seen as important for EU citizens. Furthermore it was thought that common foreign policy strategies pursued by all of the member states would allow the EU to ‘punch above its weight’ in international affairs and would create a more effective mechanism for European concerns to be voiced internationally.
The CFSP was initially founded by the Maastricht treaty that noted ‘the Union shall define and implement a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) covering all areas of foreign and security policy.’ The CFSP has provided the framework for European Union action toward countries outside of the Union.
The EU CFSP approach to Central Asia reflected the relative lack of importance the EU as an international actor has placed on the newly independent countries of the region. From 1991 to 1999 the EU spent 4.2 Billion Euros on Central and Eastern European countries. Yet over roughly the same period (1992 and 2002) the EU spent some 366.3 million Euros on bilateral TACIS technical assistance in Central Asia. The huge disparity in financial assistance between what Central Asian received in terms of aid compared to central European countries and Russia could be seen as an exercise in geo-political security.
For comparison, the EU’s per capita support for Central Asia between 1995 and 2002 has been around 4 Euros. The Balkans have received 246 Euros and the southern Mediterranean countries 23 Euros. Analyzing this financial aid date it is evident that the EU forges relationships with countries perhaps not on their shared values of democracy, but rather with the intention to promote stability and security in its closest neighbors. Instable and weak democratic governments in the Balkans pose a more immediate security threat to EU members than instable and authoritarian governments in Central Asia.
Newly independent countries in Eastern Europe struggling with the transition from command economies and one party state governments to democratic market based countries presented greater and closer security challenges than those countries undergoing the same changes in Central Asia.
1.3 Recent developments in the EU’s approach to Central Asia
The formation of the CFSP signaled a new development in the development of Europe as an international actor working to expand its reach and effectiveness in the world. The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the invasion of Afghanistan in 2001 and the European ‘big-bang’ enlargement in 2004 dramatically re-focused and re-oriented European Union foreign policy into an outward looking, pre-emptive geographically focused engagement to regions to the east of Europe.
The Iraq-war marked a time when a Europe was strongly divided, yet provided the impetus for a strategic European defence strategy. Adopted in December 2003, the European Security Strategy (ESS) marked a major step in the formation of a strategic concept for the EU. ESS outlined key threats to the security as terrorism, WMD proliferation, regional conflicts, state failure and organized crime. To deal with security threats the ESS declares that the best protection for European security is a world of well-governed democratic states.
Through European engagement with its partner countries around the world, the ESS provides a security dimension to those engagements. The promotion of democratic and well governed states is seen as a security imperative for the EU, therefore it is expected that the EU would be an active promoter of the values and principles it itself is built upon. To achieve this, the ESS envisions a strategy of ‘preventive engagement’, a strategy where the European Union becomes involved in conflict situations and potential humanitarian crises before situations become more serious.
It is therefore important to place the over-arching framework of European Union interaction with outside members with this Security strategy in mind. An additional and recent development which has particular salience to the Central Asian region was the German EU presidency launch of the EU and Central Asia Strategy for a New Partnership in 2007.
The Central Asian strategy whishes to contribute actively to dialogue between civilizations which will be achieved by regular political Foreign Minister dialogue, a European Education initiative which will build a “e-silk highway”, an “EU rule of law initiative” and a regular result oriented “Human Rights dialogue” and a regular energy dialogue with each of the Central Asian states. The inclusion of rule of law initiatives and ‘result’ oriented Human rights dialogue are expressions of the salience the EU places upon human rights and rule of law. The report envisions the EU helping Central Asian states in their .
strengthening of their commitments to international law, the rule of law, human rights and democratic values, as well as to a market economy. This will apparently promote security and stability in Central Asia.
The EU makes further reference to the need for Central Asia to play a vital role in providing secure and stable energy to Europe. Kazakhstan’s oil reserves are twice that of the North Sea and Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan’s gas reserves are estimated at being the 5th and 8th largest in the world. Security and stability in Central Asia is seen as vital to the energy security of the EU and its strategy for future relations reflects this. Between 2007 and 2013 the EU will allocate 719 Million Euros to the region.
1.4 EU Normative Expansion _
There is debate however as to the rational for the externalization of EU policies, norms and values. The various EU expansion rounds can be seen in a security sense, by extending the Union’s norms, rules, and opportunities it has made instability and conflict in the wider region much less likely. This is evidenced in the various EU expansion rounds, each time the EU has expanded member states are pursuing security objectives, stability and good governance have been extended. When a discussion of European Security is initiated, the role of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) cannot be underscored.
Since 1949 the NATO collective security alliance has proven to be the cornerstone of the Trans-Atlantic relationship. The expansion of NATO into Eastern Europe, territory formerly occupied by the Warsaw Pact countries, is also an exercise in security. NATO Partnership for Peace (PfP) programmes are bilateral relationships which allow partner countries to build up their relationships with NATO. NATO PfPs have been signed with the five Central Asian countries, which address issues such as Terrorism, organized crime and drug trafficking. NATO involvement in Central Asia dramatically increased following September 11th, which highlighted the strategic importance Central Asia occupies on the Global War on Terror. Although NATO and the EU both pursue similar foreign policies, the EU places a far greater importance on shared values; democracy, rule of law and market economy.
EU and NATO expansion has occurred at relatively the same time, to almost the same countries. NATO expansion is seen as a largely security related endeavor, while EU expansion is seen in a greater political and economic light. NATO expansion is not so much about democracy promotion
but rather security promotion.
1.4 Mechanisms for EU value expansion into Central Asia
As previously mentioned the EU began technical assistance programs to newly independent Eastern European and CIS countries. These focused on infrastructure developments, structural problems associated with reforms, and came with little in the way of conditionality requirements. Beginning in the late 90s however, the EU approach toward its new neighbours began to focus to a much greater degree on the idea of ‘convergence’ of values. Countries the EU engaged with where expected to begin to converge, or adopt their governments, societies, economic structures and methods of governance to bring them closer in line with the EU. For potential member countries, the adoption of the legal code and framework of the EU, the Acquis communautaire was a clear expression of the adoption of EU norms.
To address the technical aspects of the adoption of the rules and regulations of the European Union, the EU began in the 90s a comprehensive engagement strategy with Eastern European countries, which initially began with the TACIS and PHARE programs. which began with the creation of the Partnership and Cooperation Agreements (PCAs). The PCAs between the EU and Central Asian countries where ratified in the late 90s, and have provided the legal framework for bi-lateral relations. All of the Central Asian countries except for Turkmenistan have ratified the agreements.
The PCAs are ‘based on the respect of democratic principles and human rights, setting out the political, economic and trade relationship between the EU and its partner countries.’ Because the PCAs state that the EU- third country relations are based on the respect for democratic principles, in countries where democratic principles are not strongly upheld, there is the assumption that measures by the EU would be taken to ensure compliance with ‘democratic principles’.
The PCAs provide a legal framework for greater cooperation with member countries, proving in theory a chance for the EU to promote its values abroad.
1.5 EU policy and EU reality
TACIS and PHARE assistance is provided on the basis of certain shared economic and political values, in particular, respect for democratic principles and human rights. EU assistance is in theory conditional based on shared values, democratic governance among them. The reality in EU aid does not match up with level of rhetoric espoused in official EU documents. It would be hard to say that the EU and Russia have shared political values, in particular on the matter of respect for democratic principles. However this policy-reality gap has not stopped the EU from providing 2.7 billion Euros in assistance to Russia. The case of Uzbekistan provides another instance where EU policy rhetoric falls short of action. The EU – PCA with Uzbekistan in Article 1 states that the objective of the partnership is to ‘support the Republic of Uzbekistan’s efforts to consolidate its democracy.’ TACIS assistance to Uzbekistan has amounted to a total of 161. 5 million Euros and under the PCA the EU provides 10 million Euros of aid annually. The May 13th 2005 Andijan killings which saw casualties caused by Uzbek security forces during a demonstration ranging from 169 (government figure) to 745 (opposition political party) saw a limited and ineffective EU reaction. Uzbekistan’s refusal to sanction an independent inquiry into the massacre resulted in the European Council impose an embargo on export to Uzbekistan of arms, military equipment, visa restrictions on Uzbek officials responsible for the indiscriminate use of force, and a suspension of scheduled technical meetings under the PCA.
Included in the European Council report was a need for the re-orientation of the TACIS program support to increase focus on the needs of the population, democracy and human rights. The EU has not cancelled the TACIS program nor moved in any way to impose sanctions upon the EU – Uzbekistan trade relations, which amount to some 1.5 billion Euros a year in trade, even though the respect for democracy, by both parties, constitutes essential elements of partnership and of the PCA agreement.
A further examination of EU aid allocations per country seemingly negates EU stated rhetoric, which says that the closer the convergence to EU liberal democratic values, the closer the potential relationship. Based on 2006 figures EU-TACIS program funding per capita for Uzbekistan is (EUR0.64), Kazakhstan (EUR0.87), Tajikistan (EUR2.16), Kyrgyzstan (EUR2.0) and Turkmenistan (EUR1.33). According to the Bertelsmann transformation index, Turkmenistan ranks below all other Central Asian states, and ranks last in Freedom House’s Democracy Score Ranking for 2006 with a score of 6.96 / 7.00, with 7 representing the lowest level of democracy advancement. Turkmenistan’s per capita aid funding from the EU is higher than Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan although it ranks lower on the Freedom House Score Ranking than both of them, and shows the least ‘convergence’ on EU liberal democratic norms and values. Might there be another explanation as to the high level of EU interaction with this dictatorship?
Turkmenistan posses one of the worlds largest reserves of natural gas, and there is European diplomatic pressure to build an oil and gas pipeline across the Caspian sea to by-pass existing pipelines from Central Asia which run through Russia. The EU is seen as determined in their pursuit of better access to Turkmen natural gas which would included a pipeline across the Caspian Sea to Azerbaijan and Georgia. Short of massive crackdowns on Turkmen civil society one can expect continued EU interaction, co-operation and financial aid with Turkmenistan and Central Asia to continue.
1.5 EU Democracy promotion tools
The consequence of the EU being built upon the principles of democracy results in a perceived moral necessity for the EU to continue to ‘export’ those principles to the world, in short the European Union seeks to expand its value system, and it is uniquely positioned to do.
What has been the EU approach to inducing substantive change within countries not yet members of the Union? Historically the EU has used a plethora of tools to induce change. Financial assistance, trade concessions, co-operation agreements, political contacts or even membership have all been related to the protection of human rights, democracy promotion or market reforms. In order for these tools of change to be effective the perceived benefits of changing the nature of the political regime to bring it closer in line with European norms and values must be greater than the perceived costs. The EU has attempted to offset these perceived costs through the process of conditionality; ‘Conditionality entails the linking, by a state or international organization, of perceived benefits to another state (such as aid or trade concessions), to the fulfillment of economic and/or political conditions.’
The Partnership Agreements provide a legal framework for EU benefits to be withheld or provided, based on partner country cooperation. This enables an institutional linkage between democracy promotion and incentives to democratize. The philosophy of the EU is to prevent the violation of democratic principles within partner countries through an institutional support to democratic transitions. This is achieved through technical assistance to reform the judiciary, financial support to NGOs working in the field of human rights and the European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR), which promotes democracy and human rights in regions around the world. The EIDHR budget of 120 million Euros helps to bring all of the European Union’s activities for Human Rights under a single program.
The EU pursues a general policy of increased economic, political and social ties with countries that undergo democratic and market based economic reforms, the closer the countries come to converging toward European values and norms, the closer the multi-faceted relationship becomes. To provide incentive for countries to engage in democratic and economic reform, the European Union must provide benefits for undertaking change.
Conditionality has been used by the EU to bring about a convergence of norms and values in eastern European countries, which has resulted in the EU expansion to Eastern Europe, the most successful wide scale application of conditionality incentives to promote positive change within countries. A variety of factors affect the success of EU conditionality yet no formula for success has been found, and its implementation and success rests on several factors. It is right to assume that the greater the benefits - more money, greater trade access, increased security – the greater the chance of success in achieving substantive domestic reform and policy implementation.
Negative conditionality involves the withholding or even withdrawing of benefits resulting from a current relationship. The EU has a broad range of tools available to it, tools which can be used to exert pressure on to a state. These include Economic sanctions, visa-travel bans, freezing of assets and reduction of economic aid are tools available to the European Union when countries do not uphold the terms of agreements with the EU. Perhaps the best known example of negative conditionality, or at least an example where economic sanctions resulted in progress towards greater democratic governance was the case of the apartheid regime in South Africa. Even this example has been questioned as to the effectiveness of the various sanctions imposed upon the regime.
Negative conditionality can also be effective in bringing increased domestic opposition to bear against the current ruling regimes. The EU as an actor can ‘shame’ domestic governments into becoming more responsive and pro-active in their adoption of democratic norms. the EU can essentially ‘blame’ the ruling government for causing the country to loose out on benefits from a closer relationship with the EU. The case of Slovakia in the mid 90s is often cited as an example of the EU using the benefits associated with full membership being withheld from Slovakia as an example of active conditionality.
The EU’s decision not to invite Vladimír Mečiar, the Prime Minister of Slovakia in 1997 to the Luxembourg European Council to begin accession negotiations because of lack of progress on the Copenhagen Criteria. The Copenhagen Criteria where criteria prospective EU membership states had to meet before becoming full EU members; functioning institutions which guaranteed democracy, the primacy of the rule of law, human rights, protection of minority rights, the existence of a functioning market economy and the legislative ability to absorb EU legislation and rule. Slovakia under Mečiar was seen as not satisfying the Copenhagen Criteria. Other countries began accession negotiations and the EU action was seen as instrumental in having Vladimír Mečiar being removed from office one year later by the electorate of Slovakia. Slovakia under the new Prime Minister Mikuláš Dzurinda began accession negotiations with the EU shortly after his assent to power and entered the European Union on May 1st 2004.
The EU was able to bring external pressure to bear onto a country by withholding membership accession talks to promote greater democratic reform. Given the large structural differences between Central Asia and Slovakia a comprehensive comparison is hardly accurate. However several brief lessons learned from the EU engagement with Slovakia may be disseminated. EU action was effective when it removed a key benefit to Slovakia, which was EU membership. Expected financial aid accorded to new EU member states would be lost, as would entrance into the European economic zone would be severely constricted. Furthermore there where no powerful competing foreign policy actors, which could offer Slovakia other benefits associated with closer co-operation. When examining the case of Central Asia and EU democracy promotion, important structural factors have continued to hamper the growth and spread of democracy in this region.
Obstacles to the European Unions democracy promotion in Central Asia
Despite concrete and extensive with Central Asian countries since 1991, the region has shown remarkably little progress towards a ‘Dahl’ definition of democracy, as previously demonstrated. It is then important to ask the question – why has democracy not established itself within Central Asia as a form of governance, or more salient to this paper; what obstacles to the normative expansion of EU guided democracy are present within Central Asia?
The European Union has developed a supranational foreign policy, one which is in theory the common foreign policy articulation of its 27 members. This may be true, yet EU member countries have continued to pursue their own self-interested foreign policies. European Council Statements said that the EU was committed to the territorial integrity, sovereignty and political stability of Iraq . yet countries such as UK, Spain, Poland and Italy evidently interpreted the council statements differently, or did not support them. A divergence in EU stated foreign policy and its member’s foreign policies and domestic energy companies have undermined and weakened EU democracy promotion efforts within Central Asia.
European energy companies such as Royal Dutch Shell, Total SA, BP PLC, Barren energy (England) and Maersk oil (Dutch), to name but a few are actively engaged in Central Asia, signing billion dollar energy deals with central Asian governments. What is important to note in these deals is that they are often facilitated and supported by European governments. For example in September the British government signed a memorandum of understanding with the government of Turkmenistan to improve access for British Petroleum (BP) and Barren Energy to Turkmen natural gas. A spokesperson for the Department for Business, Enterprise and Regulatory Reform stated that “The Caspian region has a lot of potential. We hope that British companies will be able to assist in the energy development of Turkmenistan.” Expanding upon this example it is clear that EU member countries are pursuing independent traditional foreign policy goals. These include the acquisition, control and development of natural resources in countries which share little in the way of ‘shared values’ with the partner country, or stated EU foreign policy statements. Although it is unfair to criticize just the U.K. Department for Business for dealing with a authoritarian government based on little in the way of shared values, it is rather damaging and hypocritical when the European Commission Director for the Caucuses and Central Asia states that “The main objective of the European Union is to provide energy security to the EU countries.”
Providing energy security to the citizens of the EU is important, but what is particularly revealing about this statement that irrespective of the countless EU policy documents, discussions about building bridges between civilizations, promoting democracy and good governance and encouraging countries to ‘converge’ on EU liberal democratic norms what actually drives EU foreign policy at the end of the day is providing security to EU countries. EU democracy promotion policy is pursued with vigor, great commitment and is constantly seen as an integral part of any and all relationships the EU builds around the world. Unfortunately this does not extend to practice.
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this is the sort of stuff that gets points. Academic porno
implicit jab at the Commies – nicely done.
And that is the academic facial blast
Why is this not at the end of the sentence?
Why is this not at the end of the sentence?
That’s excellent. Toss something in about NATO for extra points. (i.e. this explains why NATO bombed the crap out of the Balkans and can’t find 6 helicopters for Afghanistan)
What? Gaenzle’s going to have problems with this.
This is the “ass to mouth” transfer; nicely done.
Your numbers are all fucked./
Put this in a footnote (or slim it down a bit)
your numbers are missing here.
Write “supernatural” and see if he catches it…
Of the UK? Or of Turkmenistan?