“Where there are alternative proposals that might win majority support, the choice is often decided by which proposal is backed by the commission. Although this delegation of the right of make proposals gives the commission a certain formal power to set the agenda, in the intergovernmentalist view, the commission does not determine the direction in which the EU moves.” (2011, p.262)
This view believes that the commission’s mediatory role is only that of directing member states as it is they who have set the agenda, the commission only helps them to determine the exact details. There have been criticisms of this mediatory role due to a lack of transparency. It poses a difficulty for the member states to keep a complete account of everything the commission does during this process as the commission mostly has a greater overall knowledge than the member states do. Nevertheless it is possible for the member states to monitor the process through a system known as comitology. The alternative view of the commission’s role is that it acts in an autonomous way and actually provides policy leadership. To reinforce this view point theorists point to the commission’s sole right of initiative in the legislative process. The commission is not obliged to only draft proposals at the request of the member states, if the commission believes an area is a cause for concern it can act on its own initiative to adduce a solution. The commission will usually try to use its right of initiative to conceive a solution that it not likely to come up against opposition, in this way it could be argued that the commission, although it holds the right of initiative, as it is trying to satisfy both the member states and the other EU institutions its actual role as policy initiator is weakened.
One commission function that is a constitutional obligation is to set the European Union’s legislative agenda. This is one of the main functions of the European commission. Christiansen claims that;
“The commission is central to the integration process because in most areas of EU policy making it carries the sole responsibility for proposing new legislation” (in Richardson, 2006, P.100)
The legislative role of the commission involves proposing new legislation to the parliament and council, this is known as the ‘right of initiative.’ In order to draft a new legislation the commission is in constant consultation with various experts in the field that the particular legislation concerns. After the law is drafted by the commission’s departments and it can be agreed upon by 14 of the 27 commissioners then the draft is sent to the council and parliament where it will be debated and amended. It is then decided if the draft will be adopted into EU law or not. However, for some member governments the synergy between the three institutions in the legislative process has been cause for contention. This is due to the issue of the commission delegating to the other institutions. The argument then is how much power and influence the commission really has in the legislative process. Spence (2006 p.9) argues that;
“Although the commission retains the sole right to initiate legislation within the EU framework, it has sometimes been more of a formal responsibility than a source of authority. Both the council and the European parliament have frequently asked the commission to undertake studies or propose legislation – there has been a ‘trigger mechanism,’ in other words embedded in the system from the very outset which enabled the council in broad terms to set the agenda and undermine or usurp the intended role assigned to the commission”
In other words, often though it is the commission’s responsibility to propose and draft EU law, the request to initiate said legislation can come not from member governments but from the council and parliament. However the commission does have the right to refuse, a right that it has been known to exercise. Another factor that reduces the commissions powers in this role is the network of experts and advisors that it has to consult throughout the legislative process, which further encroaches on the commissions independence and input into this process. This system is known as comitology and it is composed of national government officials. It has been argued by some that a number of systems of comitology puts the authority in the hands of member governments and out of the hands of the commission as member governments can press their own agenda and wishes onto the commission. Under the comitology system there are four types of committee; advisory, regulatory, management and regulatory with scrutiny, they each perform a different role of comitology procedure. The advisory procedure gives the commission a deal of freedom in its role. Even though the commission is bound to take into account the opinion of national experts, it ultimately has the final say. In the regulatory procedure however, it is possible for the decision making powers to be taken out of the commission’s hands. The committee must agree with the commission’s proposals and if it does not, the commission is obliged to refer the committee to the council and the European Parliament. The council is then able to make amendments to the legislation. Under the management procedure it is once again up to the committee to agree with the commission, and the commission must once again refer them to the council, but in this instance, QMV is used to come to a mutual decision. In the regulatory procedure with scrutiny the council and European parliament enforce a system of checks and if either objects the legislation cannot be passed. It has been argued that this system of comitology weakens the commission’s role in the legislative procedure, as even though draft legislation is supposed to come from the commission, the council, parliament and national governments also have ways of attenuating the commission’s authority. However despite its criticisms in the past the comitology system has been amended in order to address concerns. One such concern was its lack of transparency. This was due to the way in which the committees functioned, which was seen by some as uncommunicative. It was also argued that the system did not adhere with the notion of separation of powers. Hix et al argue that:
“By allowing member state governments to scrutinise the executive powers of the commission, the comitology system undermined the principle separation of powers between the legislative authority of the EU (the council and the commission) and the executive implementation authority (the commission)” (2011, p.39)
it was also criticised that in this comitology system, the only institution that could be referred to was the council, but this was amended in the Lisbon treaty as was the concern of secrecy as since 2008 all committee documents became available in a public register, thus the commission does at times work to reform areas where it is felt that it is not carrying out its functions satisfactorily.
Another function of the commission is to enforce EU law i.e. to establish if each EU member state is carrying out EU law correctly. If the commission deems that a member state has contravened European Union law, there are certain measures it takes to amend this. First it will send out an official letter, asking the member state in question to correct this and adhere to EU law. If this is unsuccessful then the commission must refer the matter to the European Court of Justice (ECJ). The ECJ has the authority to impose fines on the offending member state. This function of the European Commission is perhaps one that highlights the most some of the flaws in the commission’s ability to carry out its functions. This is because carrying out the role of European ‘watch dog’ is not an easy task for the commission. It is essential for the commission to have comprehensive knowledge of what is happening at national level, which can be difficult to obtain. To keep a track of this, the commission relies on a number of sources including articles in the press, and also complaints made by organisations or individuals known as ‘whistle blowers’. Relying on such a system can mean that certain violations are not detected. Furthermore, the commission’s powers are severely restricted when it comes to enforcing EU policy and its main authority lies with its power to refer member states to the ECJ. A further restriction of the commission in this role is a limitation of resources, on top of its limitation of information. Due to this it is often reliant on the cooperation of the offending member state to carry out this role. The member state’s acquiescence in this matter comes from two places, firstly the whistle blowers that inform the commission of a violation and secondly, from the cooperation of the member state in implementing EU law. According to Warleigh:
“This function of the commission highlights the institutions ambivalent role within the European Union system. While it must supervise the member states’ implementation of the European rules, it also has to be politically astute enough to take a cautious line and back down when necessary.” (2002, p.54)
Although officially the commission’s responsibility, due to the nature of the system and its reliance on assistance in this role from outside sources, this function of policy enforcer holds many limitations for the commission.
A further commission role is the implementation of European Union budget. . of the Treaty on the functioning of the European Union states that "The Commission shall implement the budget in cooperation with the Member States… on its own responsibility". This infers that the parliament and the council decide upon the amounts to be collected and how they will be effected, and the commission, with the cooperation of the member states, carries out budget implementation. Despite this when put into practice the commission plays a relatively restricted role in this actual process. It is estimated that 76% of the budget is spent on ‘shared management’. This means that it is the member states that distribute the funds and oversee the budgetary outlay. However it is still the responsibility of the commission to ensure the proper management by the member states of the budget to prevent corruption. It does this through a number of checks and balances. It is then the commission’s responsibility to recover any irregularities in the funds, although this system relies on the cooperation of the member states with the commission and its fraud office. This means that the commission’s actually authority in this role is still dependent on member states. The extent of the commission’s role in the budget implementation process depends on the method of implementation used. Budget implementation happens in four ways; the first, known as centralised direct management means that the commission staff spend the money directly. In this case the commission holds the responsibility for budget implementation solely. However, there are some instances where the budgetary implementation is delegated by the commission. In centralised indirect management the commission delegates responsibility to external agents. This is due to the commission being unable to implement the budget itself, for example awarding study grants. Due to the large amount of administration required the commission cannot carry it out itself and must therefore delegate to external organisations. In shared management the commission shares implementation with EU member states. Despite the commission’s shared responsibility, it will only allow this if it is completely certain that the country will follow regulations for ‘sound financial management’ and there are checks and balances in place to ensure no irregularities occur. In this way the commission still retains some authority in the matter. The fourth method is joint management in which the commission delegates to intergovernmental or international organisations but again the commission must be completely satisfied in the organisation’s ability to follow procedure correctly. These different methods of implementation give the commission different levels of authority in this function, depending on how involved it is in the implementation process.
The European commission was created to be a supranational institution that is separate from national level politics and as such the college of commissioners is expected to put European Union matters first, above national concerns. Since its beginnings the commission’s overall function in the European Union’s political system has evolved. One of the main functions of the commission is the right to initiate legislation, a role that is a complex one due to the system of ‘comitology’ put in place in order to assist and keep check on the commission. Due to the comitology system it is argued if it is really the commission that holds the authority or if its role in this matter is simply a formality. A further role of the commission, to enforce EU law also holds its limitations due to the limitations in the actual powers that the commission holds in this area, as it relies heavily on the cooperation of ‘whistle blowers’ to gain knowledge and the ECJ to actually enforce the law. Implementing the EU budget, another commission function is also a complex role as a result of the need at times to delegate this role to third parties, which often can take this function out of the hands of the commission. As a result of these complexities it is debated just how well and to what extent the European commission carries out its various functions within the European Union political system.
References/Bibliography:
Bache, I, Bulmer, S & George, S (2011) Politics of the European Union, Oxford, Oxford University Press, Third Edition.
Cini, M (2007) European Union Politics, Oxford, Oxford University Press, Second Edition.
Edwards, G & Spence, D (2006) The European Commission, London, John Harper Publishing, Third Edition.
Hix, S & Høyland, B (2011) The Political System of the European Union, London, Palgrave Macmillan, Third Edition.
Peterson, J & Shackleton, M (2006) The Institutions of the European Union, Oxford, Oxford University Press, Second Edition.
McCormick, J (2011) European Union Politics, Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan.
Richardson, J (2006) European Union Power and Policy Making, Oxon, Routeledge, Third Edition.
Warleigh, A (2002) Understanding European Union Institutions, London, Routeledge.
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