The Hydrogen bomb is a pivotal piece of technology in the twentieth century.

Introduction

The Hydrogen bomb is a pivotal piece of technology in the twentieth century. Its highly debated and controversial introduction, as well as its political and strategic significance shaped the decade of the 1950’s. The bomb’s materialization is a defining issue of the Cold War, shaping the relations between the United States and other nations, particularly the Soviet Union. The hydrogen bomb, also referred to as the “Super”, served to escalate tensions and an arms race between the United States and the Soviet Union, and paradoxically preventing war between the two super powers. In essence, the hydrogen bomb was created and utilized as a political, economic and strategical device rather than a military necessity.

Context Within The Cold War

When examining the decision of the United States’ to build the hydrogen bomb and the bombs subsequent role in the nations defense, the situation of the United States must be explored. The relevant period begins with the termination of World War II. The Soviet Union was a primary Ally of the United States during World War II. It was the only other power to come out of World War II with enough strength to challenge the emerging American powerhouse.

In fighting and winning against Germany, the Soviets occupied practically the entire eastern half of Europe. The Soviets installed pro-Communist governments in these territories. This set up a situation in which Europe was divided. Eastern Europe was a collection of Communist nations forced into an alliance with the Soviet Union. Western Europe remained a capitalist stronghold with favorable relations to the United States. The Soviet’s did not intend to relinquish their newly established hegemony in Eastern Europe. In 1946, Churchill delivered a famous speech summarizing the situation. In the speech, Churchill declared that an “iron curtain” had fallen over Europe. Berlin soon became a city literally divided by this “iron curtain.” In June of 1948, the Soviet Union blocked off West Berlin, dividing the city into two. 1

In 1950, the situation intensified when the Security Council issued the infamous NSC-68 document. NSC-68 warned of a surprise attack by the Soviet Union. Eventually, the document was incorporated into the United States foreign policy and escalated tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union. The United States would now practice a policy known as “rollback”. Containing the Soviets and limiting their expansion was no longer adequate. Now, the US would now actively attempt to drive back the Soviet hegemony. Shortly after the publication of NSC-68, the US defense budget increased by nearly 350%. 2

At the same time, events of the Korean War escalated tensions further. Korea brought the United States to the forefront with Communism in Asia. It broadened the Cold War in terms of scope as well as stakes. At one point Truman even considered the use of nuclear weapons again in the Korean War. 3

Types of Bombs-Capabilities

Furthermore, Nuclear bombs can be classified into two distinct categories: fission weapons and “atomic” bombs. The more powerful fusion weapons are known as “hydrogen” or “thermonuclear” bombs. Both types of bombs are set off by chain reactions, giving these bombs far greater power than conventional weapons. The type of atomic weapon used during World War II was caused by a fission reaction. The fission process involves splitting atoms to create an explosion. 4

Nearly all bombs produced after 1952 by the United States were the fusion powered hydrogen bombs. This type of weapon requires an implosion-type atomic blast to create the heat and pressure necessary to fuse the nuclei of two hydrogen isotopes, deuterium and tritium. For such a fusion reaction to succeed, the fission explosion of the atomic bomb must generate fantastic amounts of heat and temperatures, equal to that found at the sun's core. 5

The "yield," or explosive power of both of these nuclear weapons is measured in kilotons or megatons. A kiloton is the equivalent of the explosive force of 1,000 tons of TNT, a chemical explosive. Hence, a megaton is equivalent to 1 million tons of TNT. The atomic bomb dropped on Hiroshima used around130 pounds of uranium and produced a 15-kiloton blast. Hydrogen, or fusion, bombs have delivered yields of nearly 60 megatons. Therefore, as demonstrated by these figures, the hydrogen bomb was a major upgrade in the nuclear arsenal. 6

Password

Confirm Password

I agree to the terms of service and privacy policy

The raw power of the blasts created by these nuclear weapons themselves is devastating. But the longer-term effects of nuclear war could be even more severe. Some scientists theorize that during a nuclear war smoke from firestorms set off by a series of blasts would blanket the atmosphere. In theory, this blanket of dust from the blasts could block the sun; causing a "nuclear winter" that would lower the Earth's temperature and eventually kill off most higher life forms. 7

Patient exposed to radioactive fallout 8

Nuclear blasts also create "fallout," highly radioactive debris that can be carried into ...

This is a preview of the whole essay

Patient exposed to radioactive fallout 8

Nuclear blasts also create "fallout," highly radioactive debris that can be carried into the atmosphere, travel thousands of miles and linger in the environment for years.

Body

Origins-The Atomic Bomb

Like many other aspects and elements of the fifties, the hydrogen bomb originated from events of World War II. Although scientists knew about the atom’s basic structure since the 1800’s, only six years elapsed between the period when a fission reaction was achieved and the explosion of a nuclear bomb. In January of 1939, nine prior to the outbreak of the Second World War, German radio chemists discovered a new nuclear reaction. The new reaction was fundamental to the building of the first atomic weapons. 9 This new reaction initiated a chain of interest in nuclear programs in countries with potential resources, especially the United States.

The birth of the Manhattan Project in 1942, developed out of a fear that the Germans were developing a nuclear weapon. The creation of the atomic bomb, the precursor to the hydrogen bomb and the nuclear age, arose in a hostile climate of worldwide destruction. Nuclear fission was first discovered by the Germans, and the United States believed they were in a race with the Germans for the first atomic weapon. This belief was held by President Roosevelt, Secretary of War Stimson, General Leslie Groves, and President Roosevelt. By December of 1942, a Manhattan Project team headed by Enrico Fermiproduced the first artificial fission reaction at the University of Chicago. Three years after its inception, the Manhattan Project achieved its goal of developing an atomic weapon. On July 16, 1945, the US detonated the first atomic bomb near a location at Alamogordo, New Mexico. The ensuing explosion, codenamed the Trinity test, caused an outburst equivalent to approximately eighteen thousand tons of TNT. 10

The Trinity Test 11

Later, two similar bombs were used on the Japanese cities, Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The two atomic bombs, Fat Man and Little Boy, were dropped from the plane the Enola Gay. The devastation at both of these Japanese cities was catastrophic, and the new weapon caught the Japanese off their guard, essentially causing a premature end to the war in the Pacific. The causalities related to these two bombs were estimated to be around 200,000 people. 12

The bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki were hundreds of times more powerful than any other explosive previously used. The development and usage of these fission atomic bombs ushered in a new era of technology and weaponry, and marked the beginning of a nuclear age.

The Debate-Whether to Build the Super

As a result of the use of atomic bombs on Japan, a great race ensued over building a more powerful hydrogen bomb, code-named the “Super”. A few years before Hiroshima, the first thoughts of a fusion bomb creating a highly explosive reaction found in a hydrogen bomb was theorized. However, it was put on the backburner in favor of a more rapid development of the fission “atomic” bomb. And even though there was little theoretical or experimental success, most of the scientific community agreed that it was feasible. But following the catastrophic destruction caused by the bombs dropped on Japan, research on the hydrogen bomb was temporarily discontinued. 13

However, in October of 1945, Edward Teller went to Robert Oppenheimer, known as the father of the atomic bomb, for a collaboration to build a hydrogen bomb. Oppenhiemer refused, starting a trend of dissention towards the bomb. This primarily occurred because of morality reasons. “Oppenheimer made it very clear after Hiroshima and Nagasaki that the small amount of work already done on “The Super” at Los Alamos should be discontinued.” 14 Thus, between the end of the war and the initiation of the hydrogen bomb program in 1950, very little attention was devoted to developing a fusion-powered weapon.

Some scholars and military personal call for preventative war and first strikes against the Soviet Union while the United States had the upper hand in nuclear weaponry. Prior to 1949, the Soviets did not possess the bomb and had virtually no means of retaliation against a nuclear strike. In 1948 a tentative plan was proposed to Truman by the Joint Chiefs of Staff dubbed “Halfmoon.” 15 The plan called for a preemptive nuclear strike on 20 Soviet cities. Obviously, Truman did not approve the plan.

It was the events in 1949 that completely changed policy makers’ attitudes towards the development of a hydrogen bomb. On September 23, 1949 President Truman made the following announcement, “We have evidence that within recent weeks an atomic explosion occurred in the USSR. Ever since atomic energy was first released by man, the eventual development of this new force by other nations was to be expected.” 16 The Soviet detonation of their first atomic bomb was made for monumental changes in the attitudes of American elite policy makers, science community, and the public in general towards the Soviet Union’s military capability. The detonation of the atomic bomb by the Soviets had cost America a huge military, psychological and strategic edge. Prior to the Soviet’s acquisition of the atomic bomb, the United States was the lone nuclear power. Essentially this meant that no other country could challenge the United States strategically or military because of our ability to wage a one sided nuclear war. This gave the United States a huge advantage in influencing other countries in aspects of foreign policy and exerting its dominance in general. A general fear of losing military and technological superiority to the hostile Soviet Union that was permeated during 1949. It was in this climate of uncertainty and anxiety towards the Soviets, that the hydrogen bomb was first genuinely looked into being developed. 17

Even so, intense debates continued regarding the building of the “Super”. The Soviet explosion triggered an interagency debate, dividing the scientific community, the national security managers, and the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC). The reaction of the Scientific Community was mixed. Oppenheimer felt that if Washington overreacted, an escalation of an arms race with the Soviet Union was inevitable. Edward Teller, who eventually became the key person in developing the hydrogen bomb, was the chief advocator for the Super. Teller, along with physicists E.O. Lawrence and Luis Alvarez, lobbied for the development of the Super and considered the Super vitally necessary for the nation’s defense. 18 In late 1949, the issue of Communism was very prominent on the public and political agenda. It was essentially “political suicide” for any politician to appear soft on communism. Therefore, it is no surprise that the decision to make the hydrogen bomb, in order to technologically outpace the Soviets, was highly political. The National Security Managers and politically elite were divided on the issue as well. For the most part, Secretary of State Dean Acheson was less concerned with theoretical projections and chose to concentrate on fulfilling the objectives of the President’s program. Conversely, political analyst and drafter of NSC-68 George Kennan dealt with the inherent destructive nature of atomic weapons in general and how destruction would be greatly increased with thermonuclear weapons. David Lilenthal, the chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission was closely aligned with Kennan’s. Lilenthal stated that the arms race existed in a new way. The Super would not make the US more militarily defensible than before. Lilenthal stated, “It may well close the door on a continuation of our present policies for promoting peace.” 19 Lilenthal, Kennan, along with Oppenheimer, reiterated both points of moral and practical opposition to the Super. They cited the extreme dangers to mankind, including possible global effects of radioactivity. They also stated that these powerful weapons were built for genocide. Moreover, the economic and military costs outweighed the potential benefits. An atomic bomb was already powerful enough to level virtually any city. The three argued that hydrogen bombs were militarily impractible since they would serve virtually the same purpose as the atomic bomb. In addition, they harbored some concern that the Russians could read the decision to build the Super as a drastic escalation or even a prerequisite for a declaration of war. 20

Those favoring the Super did not want to place an artificial ceiling on military advancement. They were also extremely fearful that the Soviet Union was already working on a thermonuclear weapon and feared the consequences of a theoretical Soviet monopoly. If the Soviet Union alone possessed the bomb it would have a number of consequences. First, the American population would be demoralized. In addition, the United States would be technologically inferior to the Soviets and possess less war waging potential. The Soviet’s political position would be bolstered, and the potential for Soviet blackmail would also increase. Commissioner Strauss made his views very clear in a letter to President Truman on November 25th. "I believe that the United States must be as completely armed as any possible enemy. From this, it follows that I believe it unwise to renounce, unilaterally, any weapon which an enemy can reasonably be expected to possess. I recommend that the President direct the Atomic Energy Commission to proceed with the development of the thermonuclear bomb." 21 Finally, Truman turned to a special committee of the National Security Council for advice. This committee consisted of Acheson, Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson, and Lilienthal. Both Acheson and Johnson agreed that the U.S. had no alternative but to proceed as rapidly as possible to develop an H-bomb. As political pressure mounted in January in favor of the H-bomb, Lilienthal knew he had been defeated. The Special Committee of the National Security Counsel recommended that the Atomic Energy Committee investigate the feasibility of a hydrogen bomb. When asked for their opinion, the Joint Chiefs of Staff supported development of a hydrogen bomb, saying, "The United States would be in an intolerable position, if a possible enemy possessed the bomb and the United States did not." 22

The “Super” Is Built-Implications

Therefore, despite the significant number of people opposing the Super and the weight of their valid arguments, the fears generated by the Soviets won over powerful influences from the military and the scientific community. These latter forces convinced Truman to have the Super put into the developmental stage. And on January, 31, 1950, Truman publicly announced his decision: "I have directed the Atomic Energy Commission, to continue its work on all forms of atomic weapons, including the so-called hydrogen or super bomb." 23

So, the United States proceeded with the production of the Super, assuming that the Soviets were also working on a bomb. When viewed in the larger context of worsening bilateral relations, the decision to develop the hydrogen bomb was as inevitable as the mutual failure of moral diplomacy. In the words of Edward Teller, “It just had to be done.” 24 Once the approval was given, the building of the hydrogen bomb became an all out effort.

In November of 1952, less than three years after the initial development stage of the bomb, the first hydrogen bomb, codename “Mike”, was tested in the Pacific. With the inauguration of President Eisenhower, more emphasis on nuclear weapons in the foreign defense policy existed. 25

To the surprise of the United States, the Russians detonated their own hydrogen bomb just six months later in 1953. Russia did not stockpile the weapon in numerable quantities for a number of years to come. Also, Russia did not have a delivery device to enable an attack on the United States until after 1960. Still this validated the fears of the US government that the Russians were catching up technologically and militarily. The playing field was now virtually equal now that both possessed the hydrogen bomb, the ultimate in destructive weapons. 26

Conclusion

One of the first things that the former military leader did upon assuming office was to re-evaluate the nation's defense strategy. His "New Look" policy proposed heavy reliance on nuclear weapons. In Eisenhower's view these weapons promised national security at an affordable price.

However, by the mid-1950s, once both the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. began stockpiling hydrogen bombs, Eisenhower's thinking about the feasibility of fighting a nuclear war shifted dramatically. At a National Security Council meeting in 1960 Eisenhower said: "Our imagination could not encompass the situation which would result from an attack on this country involving the explosion of 2,000 megatons. War no longer has any logic whatsoever." 27

Economically, the hydrogen bomb changed the structure of the United States’ defense budget. Starting with the advent of “The Super”, the United States allocated a much larger percentage of their defense arsenal to nuclear weapons. Less emphasis was placed on manpower and conventional weapons of war. National defense would depend increasingly towards the stockpiling of a nuclear arsenal.

Dramatic increase of hydrogen bombs in 50s 28

The decision to build the hydrogen bomb was both pragmatic and political. There was a great amount of pressure to give the go ahead to build the bomb from Truman’s advisors. In addition, no one in the government wanted to appear soft on Communism to the American public. The government was terrified at the Soviet Union gaining a technological advantage in the arms race. The United States needed to develop the hydrogen bomb because they wanted to get it before the Soviets.

Endnotes

Faulk, Richard. 1982. Indefensible Weapons- The Political and Psychological Case Against Nuclearism. New York: Basic Books Inc., 8.
Ibid, 84.
Ibid, 84.
Ibid, 84.
Ibid, 85.
Morris, Christopher. 1966. The Day they Lost the H-Bomb. New York: Coward McCann Inc., 321.
Schilling, Warner. 1962. Strategy, Politics and Defense Budgets. New York: Columbia University Press., 67
The Nuclear Files [on-line]. The nuclear peace foundation; available from http://www.nuclearfiles.org/; Internet; accessed 25 November 2002.
Schilling, Warner. 1962. Strategy, Politics and Defense Budgets. New York: Columbia University Press., 84
Faulk, Richard. 1982. Indefensible Weapons- The Political and Psychological Case Against Nuclearism. New York: Basic Books Inc., 93.
The Nuclear Files [on-line]. The nuclear peace foundation; available from http://www.nuclearfiles.org/; Internet; accessed 25 November 2002.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Faulk, Richard. 1982. Indefensible Weapons- The Political and Psychological Case Against Nuclearism. New York: Basic Books Inc., 13.
Schilling, Warner. 1962. Strategy, Politics and Defense Budgets. New York: Columbia University Press.Irving, David. 1977. The Trail of The Fox. New York: Thomas Congdon Books, 5.
Ibid., 453.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Moss, Norman. 1968. Men Who Played God-The Story of the H-Bomb and How the World Came to Live with It. New York: Harper and Row Publishing.,45
Ibid.
Ibid.
Schilling, Warner. 1962. Strategy, Politics and Defense Budgets. New York: Columbia University Press.,33
Ibid.
Morris, Christopher. 1966. The Day they Lost the H-Bomb. New York: Coward McCann Inc., 78
Moss, Norman. 1968. Men Who Played God-The Story of the H-Bomb and How the World Came to Live with It. New York: Harper and Row Publishing.
Ibid.
Ibid.
The Nuclear Files [on-line]. The nuclear peace foundation; available from http://www.nuclearfiles.org/; Internet; accessed 25 November 2002.