In parallel, there were similar developments in the Middle East as well. At the midst of the collapsing Ottoman Empire in the early twentieth century, Arab Nationalism, which sought to unite Arabic speakers under a nation, started to emerge among intellectuals in different centres in the Arab world (Best et al 2008:92). But it was not until the fall of the Empire and the League of Nations’ authorization of the secret Sykes-Picot agreement of 1916 that Arab nationalism intensified. This agreement was made between Britain and France to split the territories of the former Empire in order to achieve their strategic and economic interests in the Middle East (Best et al 2008:93-94). The French colonization of the Levantine resulted in further complications among the Arabs, by separating the population of Greater Syria into what we today know as Syrians, Lebanese, and Palestinian citizens of Israel. At the same time, Britain established the mandate of Palestine and thus was able to ensure a geographical corridor to Iraq, Iran and Afghanistan (or in other words the oil reserves in the Gulf), a fresh stop on the Mediterranean, and of course a close eye on the Suez Canal (Best et al 2008:111). The international system, aka the League of Nations, gave legitimacy to such colonial acts by masking them with the supposed necessity of the region for empire rule rather than independence. Yet, on the other hand, it also did oblige the super powers to aid their colonies with state-building institutions and ensure their future right for self determination according to Wilson’s fourteen points.
However, the post World War I colonial rule in Palestine proved challenging for the British. For, the increasing Arab nationalism was not only due to colonial resistance but also to another problem - Jewish immigration to their land.
The Two World Wars
On the international system level, the Sykes-Picot agreement is related to two other agreements that took place in the period of World War I, the Balfour Declaration and the Hussein-McMahon Correspondence. It is important to note in this context that the British government was able to purchase its 44 percent of shares of the Suez Canal in 1875 from a loan provided by the Rothschild family. No less important to note is that the Correspondence came after British defeat by the Turks in the Battle of Gallipoli in 1915 (Kattan 2009:xxi,xxii).These two contradicting agreements not only deepened the already existing collision of the Zionist and the Arab nationalist projects but also had logistical flaws; they did not specify the exact geographical land in Palestine, nor did they elaborate on the nature of this promised national state (Best et al 2008:113).
These international developments had clear effect on the state level. Tensions in the region grew as a result of the double declarations. Aside for the state-building race, in which the Jewish Palestinians were very much ahead (with their establishments of Hagana, Irgun, Lehi, Jewish National Fund, Jewish Colonial Association, etc.), the inter-war period was characterized by great unrest in the region. Palestinian nationalism started to emerge separately from Arab nationalism and took the form of clashes between the two populations, and Arab revolts against the British in which they demanded the halt of the doubling Jewish immigration to the land. Even before the Second World War, anti-Semitism was increasing in Europe (Best et al 2008:116,117). On the more global level, Britain was facing the threat of Nazism and its quick military and expansionist developments (Best et al 2008:118). Subsequently, one might argue that Britain’s concerns for its prestige, power and resources were demonstrated in its “Iron Fist” policies when dealing with the challenging uprisings in the mandate. These policies were further belligerent as World War II broke out, and Britain sought to quiet the revolt by executing Arab nationalists. But both Arabs and Zionists were too much of a challenge at such busy times that British control loosened its control.
The events of World War II were very significant to the future of the region. More specifically, the Holocaust was a major turning point in world history. Yet, the real determining factor of the future of the region was the international response to these outcomes.
The War for Palestine
The results of World War II were various and numerous, but in context with the Middle East, one could pin point two fundamental ones. Firstly, the war marked the end of the British Empire. As a result, a gradual process of decolonization started among the colonies in Asia and Africa. Britain’s preoccupancy with more important matters at home and in other colonies made it incapable to solve the Problem of Palestine and so referred its unfinished business to the United Nations (Shlaim 1996:224). Secondly, the post Holocaust international community was soaked with guilt from the atrocities it has tolerated and caused during the war (Best et al 2008:119). That is how the United Nation’s Partition Plan was born, an utterly illogical plan that proposes that a Palestinian state could exist in three separate pieces, while many of its population is beyond the suggested borders, while the Israeli state is the sole benefactor of central cities and sea ports. The UN, influenced by the Zionist lobby and the events of the Holocaust voted for partition of a land that is not theirs to divide. The point of inevitability though, was the irrational and unintelligent response of the Arabs to boycott the vote, while the Zionists accepted it and declared independence on May 14th 1948. From this moment on the only act of rejection to this betrayal was for the Arab states to declare war on Israel (Best et al 2008:125). And so on may 15th 1948, the mess got messier. The war which lasted for approximately five months had twists and turns; in the beginning the Arabs outgrew the Zionists by number, but the Zionists were better acquainted with European military doctrines and were able to prolong the situation by taking on the defensive. Also, as a result of British executions of Arab nationalists during the revolts of the 1930’s, the Arab forces were divided and untrusting of one another and thus overlooked some strategic possibilities. The Zionists were able to equip themselves with Czechoslovakian artillery with the help of the wealthy, well organized, and influential international branch of the Zionist movement, while the Palestinians had severe shortages in weaponry, and most villages in the land were of farmers who could not fight nor defend themselves (Morris: 2004:186-189).
This relatively long war ended with the defeat of the Arab forces, the Zionist occupation of parts of the land, but mainly with the dispossession, expulsion and flight of approximately 750,000 Palestinian refugees (Best et al 2008:126). From this point onwards, history demonstrates how the international community’s interference in the conflict was of no success to make the conflict evaporate, because it does not acknowledge that it is that same interference that was the main cause of the conflict in the first place.
In conclusion
Of course, one cannot distinguish the international system level as the sole source of the conflict. This is where the levels of analysis become complex and indistinguishable. Whereas the main source of instability in the Middle East is the intervention of the Great Powers, the insufficiency of the Arabs’ inner divisions, conflicting interests and dis-cooperation, were a contributing factor to the conflict as well (Shlaim 1996:227). This is seen all throughout the conflict; By the Arab states’ mixed interests in the Land of Palestine after the British decolonized the land and left it unsolvable in 1948 (Shlaim 1996:225) - By the western interference that is bluntly demonstrated by the British-French-Israeli planned attack on Egypt in 1956, in which the British-French interests were clearly economic and as I have mentioned earlier, the British-Jewish economic bond was already strong much before. – By the Six Day war in 1967 which again reveals the rivalries and mistrust among the Arab states – primarily Egypt and Syria (Shlaim 1996:228). By the Yom Kippur War in 1973 which was characterized by the superpowers’ contradicting foreign policies in the Cold war, in which they failed to bring the region to a resolution because they were simultaneously and continuously providing arms to the conflicting sides (Shlaim 1996:331). And the more time progresses, the more complex it all becomes.
To sum up, the conflict is best explained through the international system, as the initial and main cause whose effects are simulated through the state level until 1948. The post-48 Middle East is a different complexity; it is more driven by domestic changes and ideologies, whereas the individual level comes into play only in rare occasions such as in the cases of Jamal Abdel Nasser, Ariel Sharon, and others. Which is why responsibility for the conflict lies in the hands of the former Great Powers who meddled in the affairs of the region, in the hands of the Arab community which played an unjust game on behalf of the Palestinians for territorial and political gains, and of course in the hands of the Israelis that are foot-dragging almost every peace process since the Oslo accords in favour of further expansion and annexation of the “Biblical homeland”. But whether laying the responsibility for the conflict helps in bringing justice or even a compromised resolution is a whole different matter.
Bibliography
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Best A. et al, (2008) International History of the Twentieth Century and Beyond, Second Edition Oxfordshire: Routledge.
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Kattan, V., (2009) From Conquest to Coexistence: International Law and the Origins of the Arab Israeli Conflict 1891-1949, London: Pluto Press.
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Morris, B. (2004) Righteous Victims: A History of the Zionist-Arab Conflict, 1881-2001, Tel Aviv: Am Oved.
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Shlaim, A. (1996) ‘The Middle East: The Origins of Arab Israeli Wars’ in Woods N. (ed) Explaining International Relations Since 1945 Oxford: Oxford University Press.
American president Wilson’s views on the right of self-determination and other issues in international relations.
A formal statement sent by the British government to Lord Rothschild in 1917, which promises the establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine, while taking into account the existing non-Jewish communities.
A non formal promise made by the British government to the Arabs between 1915 and 1916, in which they were promised an independent state in return for their aid by revolting against the Ottomans during World War I.
Makes one think that the British were not ever really considering giving a Palestinian state.
The genocide of 6,000,000 Jewish Europeans during WWII by the Nazi regime.
The map of the Partition Plan is a common fact that I do not see the need to reference it.
It is interesting to note that Britain was one of the countries that did not vote in the UN Partition Plan (Morris 2004:179).
The Arab states constituted of Syria, Egypt, Jordan, Iraq, and Lebanon.
Such as the Galilee and Jaffa.
The Ottoman Empire, and after its collapse in 1918: Britain and France until the 1956 Suez war, the Soviet Union and the United States during the Cold war until 1991, and lastly the United States ever since (Shlaim 1996:223).
The Lord Rothschild loan.