The Marxist conception of ideology.

The Marxist conception of ideology:

Introduction:

Ideology was a term ‘coined by the French rationalist philosopher Destutt de Tracy, in the 1790s, to refer to the “science of ideas”, as opposed to metaphysics’ (Illinois State University 2001). Thus, when Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels wrote about the concept in the 1840s, in their work The German Ideology, they were discussing a relatively new concept. However, by the time the pair - who shared a life long collaboration - came to write about ideology, the term had already acquired ‘pejorative connotations’, and this can be seen in Marx and Engels conception of ideology (Illinois State University 2001). Marx and Engels regarded ideology as ‘false consciousness’. It was not actually Marx himself – the more famous of the duo – that used this phrase, but Engels. Engels, attempting to define ideology ‘in a generally applicable sense’ stated that

Ideology is a process accomplished by the thinker consciously, indeed, but with a false consciousness. The real motives impelling him remain unknown to him, otherwise it would not be an ideological process at all (Engels cited in Seliger 1977: 30).

For a time, ‘the negative sense of ideology as “false consciousness” was the most common usage in the Marxist tradition’ (Illinois State University 2001). Throughout the twentieth century, though, much more academic discussion of this conception of ideology has taken place, with the result being that the idea that ideology is false consciousness may now fall under the category of an essentially contested concept. This essay aims to critically evaluate Marx’s claim that ideology is “false consciousness”, determined by social conditions or social existence. In doing so, it will first be necessary to further clarify the two concepts – ideology and false consciousness – that are central to this discussion. The essay will then proceed with an evaluation of this claim by examining the thoughts of those who agree with the concept; those who disagree with the concept; and those who agree with some aspects of the concept, but not all aspects. It will then conclude by…

The concept of ideology:

Ideology may be broadly defined as ‘ a more or less coherent set of ideas that provide the basis for some kind of organised political action’ (Heywood 1997: 406). Seliger states that there are two main categories of definitions of ideology. The first is the restrictive conception, so called ‘because it confines the concept to specific political belief systems’ (Seliger 1977: 1). The second is the inclusive conception in which ideology is applied to all political doctrines. According to Seliger

In the context of social and political theory and science, this usage means that the concept covers sets of factual and moral propositions which serve to posit, explain and justify ends and means of organised social action, especially political action, irrespective of whether such action aims to preserve, amend, destroy or rebuild any given order. According to this conception, ideology is as inseparable from politics as politics from ideology’ (Seliger 1977 :1).

It is this inclusive conception of ideology that is more closely related to Marx’s conception, as, for Marx, ideology is part of the superstructure ‘which includes politics, law, religion, the family, and ideas and institutions that are grounded in the economic base’ (Tannenbaum and Schultz 1998: 252). It must be noted that in his works, Marx did not always use the term ‘ideology’ when referring to this concept. Instead ‘he used interchangeably ideologie, ideen, anschauungen and doktrinen’, which in German respectively mean ideology, conceptions/ideas/notions, outlook and doctrine (Seliger 1977: 26). Seliger believes that there are two intertwined theses which characterise Marx and Engels theory of ideology. The first is that ‘all socially relevant thought is conditioned by reality until the disappearance of labour’. The second is that ‘because ideology is so conditioned, it distorted reality’ (Seliger 1977: 2). There are three ways in which ideology can be conceived of in a marxist account. According to McLennan, these ways are economistically, culturally and structurally (McLennan 1976: 2-3). These ways will be discussed in greater detail in a latter part of this essay.

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The concept of false consciousness:

False consciousness is defined by Heywood as ‘a Marxist term denoting delusion and mystification that precents subordinate classes from recognising the fact of their own exploitation’ (Heywood 1997: 405). Marx and Engels have this to say in relation to false consciousness and the concept of ideology.

This is a preview of the whole essay

The concept of false consciousness:

The production of ideas, of conceptions, of consciousness, is at first directly interwoven with the material activity and the material intercourse of men…The same applies to mental production as expressed in the language of politics, law, morality, religion, metaphysics, etc…In direct contrast to German philosophy which descends from heaven to earth here we descend from earth to heaven. This is to say, we do not set out from what men say, imagine, conceive, nor from men as narrated, thought of, imagined…in order to arrive at men in the flesh. We set out from real, active men, and on the basis of their real-life process we demonstrate the development of the ideological reflexes and echoes of this life process. The phantoms formed in the human brain are also, necessarily, sublimates of their material life-process…Morality, religion, metaphysics, all the rest of ideology and their corresponding forms of consciousness, thus no loner retain the semblance of independence. They have no history, no development; but men, developing their material production and their material intercourse, alter, along with their real existence, their thinking and the products of their thinking. Life is not determined by consciousness, but consciousness by life (Marx and Engels in Arthur 1970: 47).

In other words, ideology is false consciousness, determined by social conditions or social existence.. Larrain believes that there are three essential dimensions of consciousness in Marx’s conception. The first is that consciousness is an external, material reality. The second is that consciousness has a social dimension, that ‘from the very beginning it [consciousness] is a social product’. Consciousness is also regarded as ‘internal to human beings’ (Larrain 1983: 101). There are also two Marxian assumptions behind the concept of false consciousness with regards to ideology. These are

that socio-economic facts condition the behaviour and destiny of social classes and account for the prevailing superstructure of specifically political ideas and institutions; and
that that which is ideological does not necessarily reflect the true nature of the facts (Seliger 1977: 7).

For Marx the notion of false consciousness applies to both the bourgeois and proletarian sections of society.

Those that agree with this claim:

The economistic critique:

The economistic account of the Marxist conception of ideology fundamentally agrees with the claim of Marx that ideology is false consciousness, determined by social conditions or social existence. This conception believes that ‘ideas are more or less direct (superstructural) emanations from the economically-defined ‘base’ or reality of a given society’ (McLennan 1976: 2). As social conditions and social existence are derived from the economic base, this corresponds to Marx’s conception of ideology. The economistic account also see ideas and ideologies as temporary, that they will disappear during a transition from capitalism to socialism (McLennan 1976: 2). This also corresponds to the Marxist conception, as, for Marx, the proletariat will inevitably realise their true position, thus resulting in their ideas no longer being false, and leading to the overthrow of capitalism. This account also sees ideology as false consciousness, not only because of it’s temporary nature, but also because these ideas ‘do not reflect the long term ‘interests’ of the proletariat’, and are therefore ‘false ideas, ‘ideological’ (in the pejorative sense) since they are the imposition of apparently-eternal truths by a historically limited minority class on the majority class, whose real interests lie elsewhere’ (McLennan 1976: 2). This is very similar to the view that Lukes presents regarding ‘real interests’ in his work Power: A Radical View.

A Psychoanalytical Critique:

From a psychoanalytical sense, the recognition by Marx that ideology is false consciousness is a good thing as ‘the moment of recognising false consciousness is the basis for empowerment. At this moment one lifts oneself out of one’s own immediate experience and begins to grasp the structure that dominates one’ (Garnham 1997). This seems to correlate to the experience that Marx says the proletariat will go through in recognising the reality of its situation, before overthrowing the bourgeoisie. This has lead to Garnham to remark that ‘it is strange that a tradition of thought such as cultural studies that has been and remains so deeply influenced by psychoanalytical modes of thought should refuse to recognise false consciousness while recognising repression in the psychoanalytical sense’ (Garnham 1997). This indicates that Garnham believes that the concept of false consciousness is a useful and valid tool in the area of cultural studies.

Those that disagree with this claim:

The Structuralist Critique:

The structuralist conception sees ideology ‘as springing from the everyday life as much as from class design’ (McLennan 1976: 3). This differs from the Marxist conception where ideology is based upon social conditions or existence, or in other words, the economic base and the class structure. For structuralists, ‘consciousness is situated in practices defined by and dominated by capitalist social relations’ (McLennan 1976: 3). This is similar to the Marxist interpretation, however structuralists have imposed conditions on how this dominance is to be established which are not Marxian. In the Marxist conception, this dominance does not need to be established as it is already assumed that the bourgeois, using the state as its tool, has dominance over the proletariat. However, for Gramsci – a famous structuralist – there is a ‘process by which this dominance is established [which he terms ‘hegemony’], and is something to be continually secured’. The process by which dominance is to be secured is through

a negotiated process involving a changing relation between coercive and consensual practices, and taking place throughout ‘civil society’, often through alliances, from the level of everyday, practical consciousness to that of political parties (McLennan 1976: 3).

Moreover, for Gramsci, the idea that ideology is false consciousness and ‘can be presented and expounded as an immediate expression of the structure, must be contested as primitive infantilism’. (Gramsci cited in Hoare and Smith 1971: 407). This is perhaps, the most scathing criticism of Marx’s conception of ideology. There are other structuralist objections against false consciousness. According to Larrain, these cover three aspects. The first is that ideology has nothing to do with consciousness. This objection is proposed by Althusser, who will be discussed in greater detail in a latter part of this essay due to the ambiguities in his conceptions of ideology and false consciousness. He argues that ideology is a system of representations,

But in he majority of cases these representations have nothing to do with “consciousness”: they are usually images and occasionally concepts, but it is above all as structures that they impose on the vast majority of men, not via their “consciousness” (Althusser cited in Larrain 1983: 95-96).

The second concerns the materiality of ideology. This argument is that ideology is based upon materiality, not consciousness, and therefore, the concept of false consciousness is incorrect. The third objection against ideology being false consciousness ‘rejects the very idea of falseness’ (Larrain 1983: 96). According to this objection, ideology cannot be false as ‘how can something which has effects be false?’ (Hirst cited in Larrain 1983: 96). Whilst structuralist objections against the notion of ideology being false consciousness are very important criticisms of Marx’s claim, they are by no means the only criticisms that exist.

The Culturalist Critique:

The culturalist conception of ideology takes the position that ‘there is no abstract ‘imposition’ or ‘distortion’ of ideas’ (McLennan 1976: 2). This conception is regarded as ‘a reaction against a kind of determinist or ‘vulgar’ marxism’, and ‘often takes the form of an assertion of the equality of social conditions and ideas’ (McLennan 1976: 2). For culturalists, social conditions and ideas are as real as each other, and thus ideology cannot be false consciousness as this would imply that ideas are somehow inferior and less real than social conditions, and this would go against the culturalist belief of the ‘equality of social conditions and ideas’. Edward Thompson, as a culturalist, believes that

Always life is more unexpected, arbitrary, contradictory, than the thoughts of the philosophers who abstract and make conceptual patterns…Imaginative and intellectual faculties are not confined to a ‘superstructure’ and erected upon a ‘base’ of things (including men things); they are implicit in the creative act of labour which makes man man’ (Thompson cited in MnLennan 1976: 5).

Thus Thompson has focused his work upon historical study in an attempt to show the views of those that ‘have been lost to our own modern history’ because of the fact that these people’s ‘everyday experiences relative to the conditions of their own society have been often cynically dubbed by the right as the spontaneity of the mob, or by the left as ‘ideology’, something pre-given by a social structure’ (McLennan 1976: 5). It can be seen from this that not only are culturalists against the notion of ideology being false consciousness, determined by social conditions or social existence, but are also against all ‘who ‘seek’ to replace individuality and agency’ (McLennan 1976: 5). It must be noted though, that their outrage is directed against Marxists in particular, perhaps because of the prominence that the notion of false consciousness enjoys in academic circles. Stedman Jones is another culturalist who has criticised the notion of ideology being false consciousness. He ‘recognises that ideology is not simply falsity, but can be seen as ‘lived experience’, having real conditions of existence’ (McLennan 1976: 25). Yet, at the same time he also regards ideology as being structured according to the values of and to the advantage of the dominant class, as Marx does. This ambiguity is similar to that found in Althusser’s conceptions of ideology and false consiousness.

An ambiguous critique: Althusser

Althusser is a structuralist who has criticised and rejected the notion of ideology as false consciousness, yet seems to accept this proposition when he discusses the notions of ‘false representation’ and ‘mis-recognition’. Lovell states that

In the case of “ideological practice” Althusser makes a persistent attempt to transform ideology from a body of ideas which stand in some relationship of (in)adequacy to their objects, into a material practice with real effects. Yet the connection which links ideology to epistemological inadequacy dies hard, and traces of the concept of “false consciousness” remain perhaps in Althusser’s “mis-recognition”. Ideology is, for Althusser, closely bound to the concept of the “subject” and of “consciousness”. But his theory of the constitution of the subject in and through ideology, entails that any “recognition” by a subject of his/her position within, or relationship to, the social relations of the social formation, is necessarily mis-recognition. It is difficult to avoid the implication here of some kind of epistemological inadequacy, something very like false consciousness (Lovell 1980: 236).

In other words, Althusser’s conception is that ideology is a material practice with real effects, which means that it cannot be false. Yet at the same time, he believes that the concept of ideology is linked to the notion of consciousness, as Marx does. He also believes that any understanding a person has which is based on social relations is necessarily ‘mis-recognition’. This is very close to Marx’s idea that any understanding that is based upon social conditions or social existence is false consciousness. Other theorists have remarked on this contradiction within Althusser’s thought, for example, McLennan 1976, and George 1981. It can thus be concluded that Althusser’s main criticism of Marx’s claim that ideology is false consciousness it based upon his idea that because ideology has effects it cannot be false, but agrees in essence with the other implications of this claim.

Conclusion:

Through the course of this essay it has been seen that many criticisms of Marx’s claim that ideology is false consciousness, determined by social conditions or social existence exist. These criticisms are predominantly structural and cultural. Other criticisms also exist, one being that if ideology is false consciousness, and the Marxist is regarded as an ideology, then what Marx has said about ideology being false consciousness is in fact false consciousness itself. This is another factor that must be considered when evaluating this proposition of Marx, however, such a claim is very difficult to substantiate. As with any concept in politics, philosophy or the social sciences – all of which it has been said Marx’s work belongs to – there are also those that agree with the concept. Such views encompass the economistic view and the psychoanalytical view. It is also the case that some theorists agree with some parts of Marx’s proposition, but not others, for example, Althusser. This makes it increasingly difficult to evaluate Marx’s proposition one way or the other. It is the author’s belief that the views of those who agree with some parts of Marx’s claim but not others are the most valid, because as with any proposition of this kind, there contains some element of truth as well as some falsity.

Bibliography:

Marx, Karl and Friedrich Engels, The German Ideology: Part One, in C. J. Arthur (ed), (1970), International Publishers, New York.
Larrain, Jorge (1983), Marxism and Ideology, The Macmillan Press Ltd, London and Basingstoke.
Seliger, Martin (1977), The Marxist Concept of Ideology: A Critical Essay, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Tannenbaum, Donald. G. and David Schultz (1998), Inventors of Ideas: An Introduction to Western Political Thought, St. Martin’s Press, New York.
McLennnan, Gregor (1976), ‘Ideology’ and ‘Consciousness’: Some Problems in Marxist Historiography, Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies, University of Birmingham, Birmingham.
Garnham (1997), ‘Political Economy and the Practice of Cultural Studies’, in M. Ferguson and P. Golding (eds), Cultural Studies in Question, Sage, London.
Illinois State University (2001), ‘Introductory Comments on Readings for Week 4: Ideology and Subjectivity (English 195: Marxist Theory), , retrieved on 30 Sept 2001.
Hoare, Quintin and Geoffrey Nowell Smith (eds and trans) (1971), Selections From the Prison Notebooks of Antonio Gramsci, International Publishers, New York.
Heywood, Andrew (1997), Politics, Macmillan Press Ltd, London.